The economist Machiavelli

THE ECONOMIST MA CHIA VELLI

Brena

P.

M.

F ernandez

Antonio

M.

Süveira

Novembro de 1994

THE ECONOMIST MACHIA VELLI*

Brma P. M FerD8IIdez Antonio M SiM:ira

* *

BuchaMD, the 1986 Nobel Prize winner, is the chiefprotagonist ofthe Public Choice Sedition. In sbort, Public Choice is an extension of the neoclassical school for the ana1ysis of political phenomeoa.

Initially concentrated in the US, the seditious movement is now three decades oId, anel has been internationalized since the 1980s. To the theories of the consumer and of the

firm.

which bad tbeir origins by the end of the nineteenth century, a theory of the government was now aggregated. Today

we

see a

sedition which became a seduction.

To emphasize sedition is not just to engage Úl a word play, but it is to recognize that tbcre

was

no revolution here. lt was an extension into the domain of political science whcre it may be charactcrizai as an

invasion.

or as wbat has been called "economic imperialism". One may perbaps ta1k of a counter-revolution against the neoclassical move of throwing politics outside economics.

Machiavelli, as BuchaMn says. is the "ultimate father" of this academic movement We disagree but amcede that Bucbanan and bis followers reinforced Machiavelli's position among the prominent economisls who conducted the pre-historic phase of the discipline. Such fact is evidence that the importance of a scientist to the history of thought is a dated variable, i.e. depends upon the time period he is being analyzed.

We confront lhe Renaissance revolutionary with bis self-dcclared disciple. We analyze three great issues: the model and pen:eption of human being's nature (section 1), the power and conception of govemment (section

m,

anel the Ricardian Vice and related Indetermination of Senior - hCIe

we

consider the division of work between science and its art, and the categories whcre the works ofboth authors fit (section

Im.

We havc elsewhere verified tbat Bucbanan places science into the service of a political objective - the fight for personal freedom -, meaning limited or minimum governmcnt only. In the study of De PriDce and the DiIcounes it becomes obvious that Machiavelli

was

aiming at the unification of Ita1y. Ris scicmrific contribution is a by-product of this political objective.

Our

question

seems

original enough to allow

a

direct approach to Machiavelli's work. Thus, we postpone the analyses of lhe secondary sourtes, leaving this literature for a future test to what we

were

able to pen:eive directly here.

*This papel was based in Femandez (1993), and will be given at the Sixth Annual International Conference on Socio-Economics (SASE), at lhe Hautes Etudes Commerciales School of Management. in Paris, July 15-17, 1994.

*-r-emandez has a CNPq Research SchoJarship at the Graduate School of Economics of lhe Fllndaçto Getulio Vargas, and Silveira is Professor ofthe University Federal do Rio de Janeiro and the Fundação Getulio Vargas. JEL BOO Methodology and History of Economic Thought

KEYWORDS: Applicability of Theorics, Pore Economics, Social Economics, Art of Economics, Ric:anlian Vice, lndetcrmination of SeDior, Public Choice.

•

l-MACHIA VELLI AND THE MODELS

or

THE BUMAN BEING

Buehanan's perception of the human being is revealed in bis ftequent allusion to "man as

we

kDow him", by

what he

means lhe selfish

behavior only (Buchanan 1985, pp. 6, 58, 119, and Bnchanan and

Tulkx:k

1965, pp.

306, 313). His theoretical construct is the Ec::onomic Man without omniscicnc:e but with an important etIW::al

gadget: lhe strict adherence to consensually established rules (Bucluman 1985, p. 32).

Buchanan's perception of reality is then more simplified than its neoclassical abstraction! "Man as

we

know

him", contraJy to bis theoretical counterpart, has no ethical d;mension. Following SamneJson (1963, pp. 232-3),

who coiDed lhe expression F-Twist for Friedman's vangloriousness of lhe unrealism of hypotheses, SiM:ira

(19901, p. 11) called this lhe B-Twist

The extension of lhe analysis to lhe poütical domain rests upon lhe sectorial invariance of human behavior. It is a crucial hypothesis of Pubüc Choice that lhe realism of lhe Ec::onomic Man is unaltered by lhe move from the private to lhe pubüc sector - taking into account lhe current extensions oí neoclassicism to lhe SIDdy of all social domains, lhe time-space invariance of lhe ana1ytical unit is theoretically consolidated.

Machiavclli denies such an invariance. Exhibits I and II show what we deem as a lepresel).a. ive sample for

Machiavclli's perception of the human being. Through a series of quotations, Exhibit I synthesin:s the economic side of bis perception.

Let us review such quotatios while relating them to lhe best known human being models. The first two remarks translates what would be lhe behavior of someone who reduc:es himself to the neoclassical CODStruct. On

Knight's (1936, p. 38) vision:

(. .. ) lhe rational, economic, criticism olvalues give~ results repugnanl lO al/ common

.nse.

In Ihis view

lhe ideal man would be lhe economic man, lhe man who knowa what he wants and "goes after it" wilh singleness 01 purpoae. The lacl ia, 01 COlU'Se, lhe reverae. The economic man ia lhe ./jish. 11Ithless objecl olmoral condemnation.

The third remark may be viewed as one of lhe current meanings of Machiavellism. It highlights lhe game theol}' form of uncenainty and there is no incompatibility wilh Pubüc Choice. The ingenuonsocss of the Machiavellian elcment, however, evokes lhe

REMM

modeJ by Brunner rather than lhe rigidity of Buc:hanan's Ec::onomic Man -

see

Brunner and Meckling (1977, pp. 71-2)1.

One may understand that lhe "rising aspiration" of lhe fourth passage is impücit in lhe REMM

modeI.

even though Bnmner did not pen:eive this. It is, however,

a

fundamental eJement of lhe Administrative Man modeJ, Simon's less absttact construct -

see March and SiInon (1959,

pp. 47-50,182-83)2.

The fifth passage facuses a behavioral myopia 50 incompatible with neocJassical agents as lhe keeping up appearances of the sixth. We

are

unaware of

any

version of lhe Ec::onomic Man who take into account these dimensions ofMachiavelli's perception.

We also ignore ncoclassical formulations which consider rationality in imitation, as exposcd in lhe seventh remark. Again, imitativc behavior may be seen in lhe exteDded coucept ofrationality by March (1978, pp. 591-93), another prominent behavioral economist3.

IREMM

stands for R.esoun:eful, Evaluating, Maximizing. The gadget,

resoun:efulness

recognizes human

ability and disposition to generate alternatives and to circumvent rules whether or not these had been

consensualJy established.

2 The Administrative Man model describes decision as comparison between an altemative and lhe agent's aspiration levei. This levei is historically and socially determined, but may vary wilh sociO«OllOmic

circllmsrances.

3 March develops a general reference framework for rationality which may be taken as a comprchensive socio-economic model of the human being. He extcnds the mcaning of rationality in a trichotomy which encompasses lhe ncoclassical model, the Administrative Man and lhe systcmic rationality - lhe role following

• =

According with Exhibit 1 alone, Machiavelli's perception of the human being encompasses the ncocIassical model to a significant extenl It is naturally more complex and fits better into sociCHamOJDic CODStI'UCIS. This is

as expected. After

an.

Machiavelli

was

not ao academic but a professional working toward a practical ideal. Exhibit 2 shows a representative sample of the political facet of his perception. And this is not as expected in the "ultimate father" of Public Choice.

The eighth remark presupposes that the human being is able to change undcr lhe effect oi religion. The DiDth

reassures the malleability and

asserts

that.

in government. lhe public interest may domiDate lhe self-iDtacst.. This vio1ates a basic postu1ate of Public Choice.

We move from the Economic

Man to the

Political

Man

(Brunner and Meckling 1977, pp. 74-5) or, in Weberian (1978, pp. 24-6) terms, from the instrumentally rational to the value rational actíon. Obviously, Maquiavelli combines the two dimensions as it happens in socio-economic anaIysis and in the real world -

see

a1so

Georgescu-Roegen (1967, pp. 23-4) and Silveira (1991, p. 15).

Let

us

observe that the concentration of power is only a

means

to the achievement oi the public iDtacst.. The tenth remark restates the point. adding Machiave11i's preference for the republic since it furtbers the public interest bettcr than the monarchy.

The same point is repeated in the following two remarks which are both quite representative oi lhe popular meaning

oi

the word Machiavellism: in the search oi the public intcrest. ends justify means and cruelties should be commiued ali at ooce.

2-MACHIA VELLI AND THE GOVERNMENT'S "VISIBLE HAND"

If in Veblen the businessman is the saboteur oi the economic system (Heilbroner 1986, p. 235), in Bnchanan the

same

role is played by the politician (Silveira 1990a, p. 9). In Buchanan's perception, economic re1ations

are

particular cases of political re1ations, and both are explainable by the exchange paradigm.

Public Choice extcnds Smith's invisible hand to the government sedor through consensually estab)jsbM and rigidly followed constitutional rules.

Because

of the uncertainty at the constitutional decision leveI, the neoclassical agent reaches the public interest in his selfish search (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, p. 96).

Nothing could be more distant from Machiavelli's perception. Power, the conccntration

oi

discretionary power is the "visible band" that

serves

as a warrant for the public intcrest Exhibit 3 complements wbat

was

sbown above on lhe issue.

The thirtcenth remark put it brutally, reducing power to armies. Machiave1lism is exemplified again in the fourteenth passage, while the fifteenth take

us

back to the theme

oi

concentration of power. The cboice

oi

government regimes is put in terms of inequality in the sixteenth

passage:

again, alternative solutions require the violent

use

oi

power.

It is worth while to remember that the mark in the

movement

against capital pllnisbment

was

Bcccaria who, along with Smith and

Turgot.

marked the origin of economics as

a

science, two and

a

balf centuries after Machiave11i (Scbumpetcr 1986, pp. 179-80, 248).

Finally, passage seventeenth exposes the benevolent despot conception. We conclude that Machiave11i can only be

seen

among those who advocate unlimitcd

government

and perceive

power

as a crucial variable which cannot be ignored in the analysis of political relationships. There is no shie1d for Public Policy here.

behavior belongs to the 1ast category; the rules are rationali1ly derived in the passage

oi

time and, consequently, they are not necessarily related to current reasons.

-Let us also add that Brunner and Meckling (1977) established a causal re1ation betwcen "Tbe Pen:eption of Man and the Conception of Govemment". This was a single minded analysis or, to avoid lhe undeserved oegative connotatioB, an analysis at the highest leveI of abstraction. As soon as ooe comes down to an analytiaIl

levei c10ser to reality, as Machiavelli's, such corre1ations are blurred. We now tom to this issuc.

3-MACHIA VELU AND THE INDETERMINATION

or

SENIOR

BuchaMn's scientific contribution fits to the highest levei of abstraction of pore economics. This do not deter

him.

however, from directly deriving normative propositions, as exemplified by the advocacy of consti1utioaal rcfonns likc the institution ofbudget balance or offixed rale ofmoney issue.

BlIclulDan is then addicted to lhe Ricardian Vice (Schumpeter 1986, pp. 540, 1171), and an extreme case at tbat (Silveira 199Ob, pp. 14-6). The vice is the habit of ignoring what we have called the lDdetermiDation of Senior

-- we

paid bomage to Senior (1938, p. 3), but see also Mill (1887, pp. 152-5) -, and fOl1"nlatM _{in lhe foIlowiDg}

terms (Silveira 1991, p. 79)4 :

The propositions of

pure

economics, whatever be Iheir generality and Iheir trulh, do not aulhorize normative conclusiona, but caMot be ignored The lalter, namely what ought not to be done, is de1'ivable

from social economics which is the locIIS of intertwining of ali lhe relevant sciences. The derivation is to

be qualijied by the specijicities oflhe case.

Machiavelli's staoce here is exemplified in Exhibit 4. The eightecnth remark indic:ates tbat he

was

plainly

consclous about the importance that time-space specificities may play in social phenomena It follows an

assedioo about the historic:al indeterminism - remark 19 -, in contrast with the recognition of wbat is recurrent in histoty, remark 20.

Medicine as an applied science (Margenau 1966, pp. 29-31) can be read in the twenty-first remark which also

sounds likc K.uznets' (1961, p. 119) conception about his own social ecoDOlllia. The twenty-second shows tbat Macbiavelli was aware that "in practice, lhe theoty is dUferent", a thesis which is presented elsewhere (Silveira

1994, pp. 203-16).

On lhe wbole, these remarks evidence a quite rcasonable conscicnce of the Indetcrmination of Senior, as it could be grasped in the sixtecnth centtuy. In his time and space, Machiavelli does not look likc an addict of lhe Ricardian Vice. The 1ast remark, however, is quite representative of bis way of thinking and it points in lhe

direction of the Vice.

Let us observe, however, that this remark is understandable as a proposal of using a modd for the design of

govemment. Citizens should be taken

as

if they

were

bad. It is not BuchaMo, whose equivalent statemcmt

would be sometbiog like citizens should be taken "as we know them", i.e. bad. It is Friedman on the steps of Walras (Scbllmpeter 1959, p. 10).

It is also worth while to emphasize lhat Machiavelli's problem was the lIoification of ltaly. The consttuction of a

State is a cimnnstaoce of obvious and dominant contlict with vested intercsts. ODe may add the

wars

among lhe city-states, the army of a Pope's SOB, the invasions by

lhe

King of Francc, the incursions of the Empcror's army, and forro the picture. It has no similarity with BuchaMn's time and country.

4 Indetcrmination has beco a recurrent theme in sevcral of my papeIS since the 1980s. But it was only during

a sabbatical spent at the University of Cambridge that 1 found the appropriate connection in the history of ecooomic thought (Silveira, 1990b, 1991, 1993, 1994). In the order that 1 read them, the following autbors had influenced me before lhat: Toynbee (1962), Morgenstem (1963), Kuhn (1971), Georgsecu-Roegen (1967), Heisenberg (1963) and Knight (1936, 1960). Schumpeter (1986) consolidated my understanding and led me to Mill (1877) and Senior (1938).

In the ltaly of the 15005, we could not reasonabIy concIude for the Ricardian Vice in Maclúavelli even if bis analyses were one-dimensional. Under those conditions, the human being himself should have been closer to the one-dimensionally selfish behavior.

CONCLUSION

Machiavelli

was

called "ultimate father" of the Public Choice Sedition by its chief protagonist, Buchanan This fact Ied us to confront the works ofboth autbors.

Machiavelli

was

a political activist, who revealed himself as a scientist while coMlldÍng bis pmdical aft'aUs. In countcrpart, Buchanan is a scientist, who revealed birnself as a political activist while concfnding bis academic affairs. The 1atter does everything to rninirnin: governments, the former did everything to organize a government, a sufticient1y unlimited government to unify ltaly.

Buchaun advocates government by roles, based on the exchange paradigm and on Smith's -invisible hand-. Machiavelli worried himself with armies and the need to concentrate discretionary power, an -ostensivdy-visibIe- hand", which is precisely the opposite.

Machiavelli's analysis was not one-dirnensionally selfish. Despite its dorniunce in the behavior 01 the private citizen, this dirnension

was

combined with the public interest when the behavior 01 the authorities

was

in questiono lt is social economics in its beginning.

Machiavelli

was

quite conscious of time-space specificities. His historically based and direct1y pcrcciwd empirical genera1izations and abstractions are qualified. He

was

not addicted to the Ricardian Vice. MisJeading appearances which indicate an addiction are due to bis own time and space, i.e.

wars and

revolutions.

Bucbaun's analysis is conducted in the highest leveI of abstraction within nrncIassicism Thus, it is then

necessarily one-dirnensional, and reduced to selfish behavior. This is no probIem if such knowledgc is mcant for academic use only. lt cannot do more than illurniute soci<H:COnomic models. BuchaUD , however, keeps

talking about reality, exposing bis addiction to the Vice at the most extreme degree.

Maclúavelli has bis name registered in the history of economic thought, preceding Mandeville. Ferguson

and

Smith in the Iong gestation of the Economic Man. The Public Choice Sedition reinforces this fact, and evidences that the importance of a scientist to the history 01 thought is a dated variabIe.

We concIude for the illegitimacy of taking Machiavelli as the "ultimate father" of Public Choice. In 50 doing, however, Buchanan called attention to the fact that the neoclassical analytical unit

was

originally developcd in politics. This is a positive achievement lt is an excellent teasing against those who are proud ofthe most -haId" 01 the "soft sciences" .

•

EXHIBIT 1 - MACHIA VELLI (1968, 1983) AND TBE PERCEPTION OI' TBE HUMAN BElNG: ECONOMIC MAN

(l-"Tbe Pig PbüOlOpby")

Prudent men always and in all their actions make a favor of doing things even though tbey would of uecessity be constrained to do them anyhow. (1983, p. 234)

(l-DomiDaDce

or

tbe Economie Motivation)

[A priJu:e shouldJ, above all things, abstain from taking people's property, for

men

will

sooner

forget the death oftheir fathers than the loss oftheir patrimony. (1968, p. 73)

(3-Diuim

_u

1a

_{tion or}

_{MacbiaveUism)}

For one should not declare one's intention, but should seek to get what one desires anyhow. Tbere is, for instance, no need in asking someone for

a

weapon to say '1 propose to kill you with it', since you

c::an

satisfy your

appetite ooce you bave lhe weapon in your bands. (1983, p. 220)

(4-Riling Aspirations)

The reason is that nature has so constituted men that, though all things are object of desire, not all things are attainable ( ... )

Hence arises

the vicissitudes oftheir fortune. For. since some desire to bave more and others are aftaid to lose what they bave alIeady acquiIed, cnmities and

wars

are begotten, and this briDgs about lhe ruin of ooe province and lhe exaltation ofits rival. (1983, p. 2(0)

(5-Myopia)

Yet so great is man's ambition that, in striving to slake bis present desire, he gives no thought to the evils that in

a

short time will (ollow in its wake. Nor is he stim::d by lhe lessons ofthe past .. (1983, p. 341)

(6-Keep Up Appearances)

And more than all else is it necessary for

a

prince to seem to possess the 1ast quality [pietyJ; for mankind in

general judge more by what tbey see than by what they feel, every one being capable of the former, anà but few

ofthe!ater. Everybody sees what you seem to be, but few really feeI what you are; and these few dare not oppose lhe opinion ofthe many, who are protected by the majesty ofthe state; (1968, p. 78)

(7-Rationality in lmitation)

For as men almost always follow the beaten track of others. and proceed in their actions by imitation, and yet

c::annot altogether follow the ways of others, nor attain the high qualities of those whom tbey imitate, so

a

wise man should ever follow the ways of great men and endeavor to imitate only such as bave been most eminent; so that even if

bis

merits do not quite equal

theirs,

yet that they may in some measure refled their greatoeSS. (1968, p. 20)

EXBIBIT 2- MACHIA VELLI (1968, 1983) AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE HUMAN BElNG: POLlTlCAL MAN

(8-MaIleability 01

Mala.

Religious Motivation)

For our religion. baving taught us the truth anel the true way of live, leads us to ascribe less esteem to worIdly honor. Heoce the gentiles, who held it in high esteem anel looked upon it as their highest good, displayed in their

actions more ferocity

tban

we

do ( ... ) Tbis pattem of live, tberefore, appears to bave made lhe workI weak, and to bave haDded it over as a prey to the wicked, who run it sua:essfully and securely siDa: they are well awake that lhe generality of

mcn.

with paradise for their goal, consider how best to bear, rather tban how best to

avenge, their injuries. (1983, pp. 277-78)

(9-MaIleability of Mau, PoIitical Mau)

Wherefore lhe prudent organizer of a state whose intention it is to govern not in bis OWD iDterest but for lhe

COmDlOD good, and not in lhe interest of bis successors but for the sake of their fathcrlaud which is COIDDIOD to alI, should CODtrive to be alone in bis authority. (1983, p. 132)

(lO-The Public: Interat, The RepubUc)

( ... ) it is not lhe well-being of individuaIs that make cities great, but the well-being of lhe community; anel it is beyond questiODS that it is only in republics that the colD!DOn good is looked to properly in that ali that

promoU:s it is carried OU!;

and.

however much this or that private pcI'SOn may be lhe loser OD this account, there are 50 many who beDdit thereby that the COmmOD good can be realized in spite of those few wbo suffer in consequence.(1983,p.27S)

(U-EndJJUItify Means)

It is a SOUDd maxim that reprehensible adiODS may be justified by their effects ( ... ) For it is lhe man who uses violence to spoil things, not lhe man who uses it to mend them, that is blamewortby. (1983, p. 132)

(ll-CraeIties Should Be COllllDitted AlI At Onu)

1 believe that this happcned according as lhe crueltics were well or ill applied;

we

may call cruc1ty well applied (if indced

we

may praise evil) when it is committed once from nec:cssity for self-protec:tion. and aftcrward DOt

persisted

in.

but converted as far as possible to lhe public good. m-applied cruelties are those which, though at fust but few, yet increase with time rather tban cease altogether. (1968, pp. 38-9)

•

EXBIBIT 3 - MACBIA VELU (1968, 1983) AND THE "VlSmu HAND"

(13-Power)

We bave said how necessary it is for a prince to lay 50lid foundatioDS for bis power, as witbout such he would inevitable be ruined. The main foundations which all states mUSl bave, whether

new,

or old, or

mixcd.

are good laws and good armies. And as there can be no good laws where there are not good armies, 50 tbc Jaws will be apt to be good where lhe armies are 50. I will therefore leave lhe question of lhe laws, and CODfiDe myself to that oflhe armies. (1968, p. SI)

(14-Power Game)

I will only observe that those men who at lhe beginning of a prim:e's reign are hostile to him, and who are ya 50 situated

that

they need bis support for their maintenance, will always be most easily won over by him; and they will be obliged to continue to serve him with greater fidelity, because oflhe i.mportaDce oftbcir effacing by their good conduct lhe bad opinion which lhe priru:e had formed ofthem at the beginning, (1968, p. 95)

(15-ConCeDtratioD of Power)

( ... ) partisans would have meant the formation OffactiODS in lhe city, and factiODS would have brought about its

downfall. (1983, pp. 125-26)

( ... ) lhe many are incompetent to draw up a constitution since diversity of opinion will prevent them from disc:ovcring how best to do it (1983, p. 132)

(16-Tbe Regime iJ FunctioD of Inequality)

From this situation lhe following conclusion may be drawn: (i) that, where lhe gentry are numerous, no ODe

who pmposes to set up a republic can sua:eed unless he first get rid of lhe Iot; and (ü) that, whcre considerable equality prevails, no one who proposes to set up a kingdom or principality, will ever be able to do it unless from that equality he selects many of lhe more ambitious and rest1ess minds and makes of them gentry in fact and not in name, by giving them castles and possessioDS and making of them a privilegeci class with respect both to property and subjects; 50 that around him will be those with whose support he may maintain himself in power,

and whose ambitions, thanks to him, may be realized As to lhe rest they will be compelled to bear a yoke which nothing but force will ever be able to make them endure. Between force and those to whom force is app1ied a balance will thos be set up, and lhe stand of every man, each in bis

own arder,

will be consolidated. (1983, pp. 246-47)

(17-LeviatIwl)

For government consist in nothing else but 50 controlling subjects that they shall neither be able to, nor have

cause to, do barm; which may be done either by making quite sure of them by depriving them of all meaDS of doing you harm, or by treating them 50 well that it would be unreasonable for them to desire a chaDge of fortune. (1983, p. 347)

EXHIBIT 4 - MACHlAVELLI (1968,1983) AND TBE INDETERMINATION OI' SENIOR

(l8-Specifidties)

We also see that. of two men equally prudent, the one will accomplish bis designs, while the otber fails; 8Dd in the same way we see two men sua:eed equally well by two entirely di1feren1

methods.

the ODe being prudcnt 8Dd

the other rash; wbich is due to nothing else than the character of the times, to wbich they conform in their pJ'OCl'!f'dinp ar not ( ... ) for if one

mau.

acting with cantion and patience. is also fawRd by time 8Dd circllmstances. he will be su.ccessful; but if these change. than will he be ruined, unless. indccd, he changes his

conduct accordingly. (1968, p. 112)

(19-lIiJtoriealladetenninilDl>

I

am

well

aware

that many have held and still hold the opinion, that the a1fairs of this world

are

10 conttoIIed by Fortune and by the Divine

Power

that human wisdom and foraight cannot modify them;

that.

in fact, there

is no remedy against the decrees of fale, and that therefore it is not worth while to

mate

any effort, but to yidd

um:onditionally to the power ofFortune ( ... )

nevertheless.

as our free

will is not entirely c:IestJoyed, I judge that ít may be agptD'ItA:f

as true

that Fortune to the extent of one half is lhe arbiter of

our

actions, but that she permits

us 10

direct lhe other

halt:

ar perhaps a little less, ourselves. (1968, p. 110)

(lO-A QuaIified IIiItorical DetenninilDl)

If the present be compareci with lhe remate past, ít is easi1y

seen

that in alI cilies and in alI pcoples tbere are lhe

same dcsires

and lhe

same passions as there

always

were.

50 that. ir

ooe examines

with diligc:nce lhe past, it is easy to foresce the future of any commonwealth, and to apply those remcdies wbich

were

used of old; ar, if ODe

does not find that

remedies were

used, to devise new ooes owing to lhe similarity betwecn events. (1983, pp.

207-08)

(ll-Empirical Geaen1iutjoa)

Nor, again, is medicine anything but a record of experiments, performed by doctors of old, upon whích lhe

doctors of

our day

base their prescriptions. (1983, p. 98)

(ll-

neory

ud Pnctice)

Though men

mate

mistakes about thinp in general, they do not makc mistakes about partículars. (1983, p. 225)

(l3-Wickedneu of Mea)

All writers on politics have pointed out, and throughout biStory there are plenty of examples whích jwljcate. that in constjnrting and legislating for a common wealth it mUSl needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to lhe malignity that is in their minds when opportuDity

offers.

(1983, p. 111-2)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CAIXAS DE CONVERSÃO - Fernando Antônio Hadba - Agosto de 1993.

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A ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA NO PERÍODO MILITAR - Rubens Penha Cysne - Agosto de

1993 (esgotado).

219.

IMPÔSTO INFLACIONÁRIO E TRANSFERÊNCIAS INFLACIONÁRIAS

-

Rubens

Penha

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220.

PREVISÕES DE Ml COM DADOS MENSAIS - Rubens Penha Cysne e João Victor Issler _

Setembro de 1993.

221.

TOPOLOGIA E CÁLCULO NO

Rn -

Rubens Penha Cysne e Humbeno Moreira _

Setembro de 1993.

222.

EMPRÉSTIMOS DE MÉDIO E LONGO PRAZOS E INFLAÇÃO: A QUESTÃO DA

INDEXAÇÃO - Clovis de Faro - Outubro de 1993.

223.

ESTUDOS SOBRE A INDETERMINAÇÃO DE SENIOR, vol. 1 - Nelson H. Barbosa,

Fábio N.P. Freitas, Carlos F.L.R. Lopes, Marcos B. Monteiro, Antonio Maria da Silveira

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224.

A SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MOEDA NO BRASIL: A MOEDA INDEXADA - Fernando de

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225.

FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS - Walter

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226.

LA WS OF LARGE NUMBERS FOR NON-ADDITIVE PROBABILITIES - James Dow e

Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang - Dezembro de 1993.

227.

A ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA NO PERÍODO MILITAR - VERSÃO REVISADA - Rubens

Penha Cysne - Janeiro de 1994. ( esgotado)

228.

THE IMP ACT OF PUBLIC CAPITAL AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT ON ECONOMIC

GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION - Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira - Fevereiro de

1994 (esgotado)

229.

FROM

THE

BRAZILIAN

PAY

AS

VOU

GO

PENSION

SYSTEM

TO

CAPITALIZATION: BAILING OUT THE GOVERNMENT - José Luiz de Carvalho e

Clóvis de Faro - Fevereiro de 1994.

230.

ESTUDOS SOBRE A INDETERMINAÇÃO DE SENIOR - vol. 11 - Brena Paula Magno

Fernandez, Maria Tereza Garcia Duarte, Sergio Grumbach, Antonio Maria da Silveira

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231.

ESTABILIZAÇÃO DE PREÇOS AGRÍCOLAS NO BRASIL:

AVALIAÇÃO E

PERSPECTIVAS - Clovis de Faro e José Luiz Carvalho - Março de 1994.

232.

ESTIMATING SECTORAL CYCLES USING COINTEGRATION AND COMMON

-233.

COMMON CYCLES IN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES - João Victor Issler e

F arshid Vahid - Abril de 1994

234.

BANDAS DE CÂMBIO: TEORIA EVIDÊNCIA EMPÍRICA E SUA POSSÍVEL

APLICAÇÃO NO BRASIL - Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo e Cypriano Lopes Feijó Filho - Abril

de 1994 (esgotado)

235.

O HEDGE DA DÍVIDA EXTERNA BRASILEIRA - Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo. Túlio Luz

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236.

TESTING THE EXTERNALITIES HYPOTHESIS OF ENDOGENOUS GROWTH

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- 37 pág. (esgotado)

237.

THE BRAZILIAN SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM: DIAGNOSIS AND PROPOSAL

FOR REFORM - Renato Fragelli; Uriel de Magalhães; Helio Portocarrero e Luiz Guilherme

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238.

REGIMES COMPLEMENTARES DE PREVIDÊNCIA - Hélio de Oliveira Portocarrero de

Castro. Luiz Guilherme Schymura de Oliveira., Renato Fragelli Cardoso, Sérgio Ribeiro da

Costa Werlang e Uriel de Magalhães - Maio de 1994 - 106 pág.

239.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, TAXATION AND WELFARE MEASUREMENT - Pedro

Cavalcanti Ferreira - Maio de 1994 - 36 pág.

240.

A NOTE ON POLICY, THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH - Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira - Maio de 1994 - 40 pág.

241.

INFLAÇÃO E O PLANO FHC - Rubens Penha Cysne - Maio de 1994 - 26 pág. (esgotado)

242.

INFLATIONARY BIAS AND STATE OWNED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS - Walter

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243.

INTRODUÇÃO

À

INTEGRAÇÃO ESTOCÁSTICA - Paulo Klinger Monteiro - Junho de

1994 - 38

pág.

244.

PURE ECONOMIC THEORIES: THE TEMPORARY HALF-TRUTH - Antonio M.

Silveira - Junho de 1994 - 23 pág.

245.

WELFARE COSTS OF INFLATION - THE CASE FOR INTEREST-BEARING MONEY

ANO EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES FOR BRAZIL - Mario Henrique Simonsen e Rubens

Penha Cysne - Julho de 1994 - (esgotado)

246.

INFRAESTRUTURA PÚBLICA, PRODUTIVIDADE E CRESCIMENTO -

Pedro

Cavalcanti Ferreira - Setembro de 1994 - 25 pág.

247.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND CREDffiILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF

THE F ACTORS AFFECTING BRAZILIAN AND IT ALIAN INFLA TION AFTER 1970

-Giuseppe Tullio e Mareio Ronci - Outubro de 1994 - 61 pág.

248.

INFLATION

AND

DEBT

INDEXATION:

THE

EQUIV ALENCE

OF

TWO

ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES FOR THE CASE OF PERIODIC PAYMENTS - Clovis de

Faro - Outubro de 1994 -18 pág.

249.

CUSTOS DE BEM ESTAR DA INFLAÇÃO - O CASO COM MOEDA INDEXADA E

ESTIMA TIV AS EMPÍRICAS PARA0 BRASIL - Mario Henrique Simonsen e Rubens

Penha Cysne - Novembro de 1994 - 28 pág.

T

••

,

.

#'

250. • THE ECONOMIST MACIllA VELLI - Brena P. M. Femandez e Antonio M. Silveira _

Novembro de 1994 - 15

pág .