Nuclear Sharing or Proliferation

Not being a NWS, Turkey, together with Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium hosts on its territory the biggest U.S. nuclear base in Europe and, therefore, has some shared responsibilities in nuclear disarmament. As a part of NATO’s “burden-sharing”¹⁰² commitment, the abovementioned five NATO member-states have allowed the deployment of U.S. B61 gravity bombs on their territories. These weapons would be under the direct custody of the United States and could be launched only in case of war and only by the command of the president of the U.S.

and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander.

Thus for these countries, which years later have sign and ratify the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, a question arises: do they breach their NPT obligations, namely Articles I and II¹⁰³ of the Treaty by participating in such an arrangement?

In fact, this issue was one of the most controversial during the Treaty negotiations and has not receive a clear answer yet. A widespread arguments by NATO on its favor is that the NPT did not exist at the time of the development and adoption of the arrangement¹⁰⁴.

102 The term ‘burden sharing’ or ‘responsibility sharing’ is defined by NATO as “the relative weight of the distribution of costs and risks across Allies in pursuit of common goals”. Mesterhazy A. Burden Sharing:

New Commitments in A New Era. Defense and Security Committee. N.P. 2018. P. 1. URL:

https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2018-12/2018%20-

%20BURDEN%20SHARING%20NEW%20COMMITMENTS%20IN%20A%20NEW%20ERA%20-

%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT%20-%20170%20DSCTC%2018%20E%20rev1%20fin.pdf (accessed:

26.03.2020)

103 Article I provide that: “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear- weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”. And according to Article II “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. Treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons // United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. URL: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/

(accessed: 26.03.2020)

104 NATO: Nuclear Sharing or Proliferation? British-American Security Information Council. London.

2005. P. 2. URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90409/05-

04%20NATO%20Nuclear%20Sharing%20or%20Proliferation.pdf (accessed: 27.03.2020)

51 For decades, NATO have been trying to persuade that the nuclear sharing program does not violate the abovementioned articles of the NPT, because the Treaty is not applicable during the “general war”. And nuclear sharing does not imply the transfer and control over nuclear weapons unless the decision of war was taken. Now let’s understand what the U.S means by

“general war”. An event of a hostile action against the NATO member state, the U.S. President can authorize the transfer of its nuclear weapons to the given member state since the U.S.

Presidents are given the right to brake certain restriction in the wartime, if that restriction would seriously harm the country’s and its Allies’ interests. And for the U.S. this logic is applicable for the NPT as well. Also, for the U.S., the main purpose of the NPT is to prevent nuclear proliferation to avoid the future conflicts and wars involving nuclear weapons, but if the war has already been unleashed, means that the Treaty has failed to fulfill its mission, therefore it may not be taken into account¹⁰⁵.

Coming to Turkey, the official Turkey reasserts its commitment to the idea of world without nuclear weapons, nevertheless, it envisages NATO’s nuclear weapons as mostly political instrument to ensure Allies’ security and, as long as, nuclear weapons exist in the world, it is extremely important for NATO to maintain effective nuclear forces for the deterrence of any kind of enemy¹⁰⁶.

NATO has never declared the actual number of TNW deployed in Europe. It is known that, during the Cold War the number of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons reached to about 7000 in Europe. Later, when the Berlin Wall was already fallen and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact demised, the number of these weapons dropped dramatically.

In Eskişehir, Balıkşehir, Erhac and Murted Turkish airbases were stored about 500 warheads and F 4 and F100 nuclear-certified aircrafts, ready for use by Turkish Air Force¹⁰⁷.

Currently, NATO’s 5 members host about 200 U.S. TNW on their territories and almost 60-70 of them are stored in Turkey, at Incirlik airbase. These are B 61 gravity bombs with the range of about 170 kilotons․ These weapons could be delivered by NATO or U.S. aircrafts.

So, the number of TWN in Turkey not only decreased significantly, but also, it is believed, that the Turkish Armed Forces, especially, the Turkish Air Forces, lost their connections with the

105 Butcher M. Butler N. Meier O. Nassauer O. Plesch D. Schöfbänker G. Young S. NATO Nuclear Sharing and The NPT – Questions to Be Answered. Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security. Berlin.

1997. URL: https://www.bits.de/public/researchnote/rn97-3.htm (accessed: 27.03.2020)

106 Kibaroğlu M. Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO’s Lisbon Summit. Nuclear

Policy Paper N 5. N.P. 2011. PP. 2-3. URL:

http://mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/kibaroglu-aca-basic- nuclear_policy_paper_no5.pdf (accessed: 26.03.2020)

107 Kibaroğlu M. Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO’s Lisbon Summit. P. 2

52 sole operational airbase¹⁰⁸. At present, the Turkish Air Forces participates only in military trainings, but even in this case, they are excluded from the strike forces. That is, in any circumstances, even during the wartime, these weapons could not be transferred and be used by Turkey. Nevertheless, according to U.S. sources, Turkish F16 nuclear-capable aircrafts are currently in use for nuclear missions by Turkish Air Forces․ According to Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, the main reason for such confusion over the Turkish status could be related with the nuclear readiness of Turkish aircrafts, which changed greatly over the years, from nuclear-capable and certified to certified and nuclear-capable¹⁰⁹. Probably, this fact has created the impression that the Turkish Air Force simply lost its role in the Incirlik AB and it no longer participates in NATO’s nuclear missions.

3.1.2. Turkey and Nuclear Sharing

Whether it is a violation of the NPT or not, the Nuclear sharing is a reality and Turkey shares the opportunities and responsibilities it provides. To understand how the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons appeared in Turkey and why, first we need to look back to the history.

Turkey has been for the U.S. one of the key geostrategic pillars in its 'battle' against the Soviets․ Therefore, it was expected, that the United States’ ‘nuclear presence’ in Turkey would allow to control the region more reliably. For the U.S. Turkey was the wall blocking the Soviets access to the Suez Canal, Mediterranean basin and the oil fields of the Middle East. Turkey, in its turn, had serious concerns over the disputes with some of its Middle Eastern neighbors and its longtime enemy Russia, that has sought to control over the Turkish Straits for military and economic purposes and to ensure the security of its western borders, the Black Sea and the Caucasus by stationing its troops on Turkey’s eastern and western borders¹¹⁰. Thus, realizing the superiority of the Soviet military capabilities over its military forces, the Republic of Turkey found protection under the auspices of the U.S. by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.

108 Sauer T. U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A European Perspective. Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists.

N.P. 2010. P. 67. URL:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254080025_US_tactical_nuclear_weapons_A_European_perspe ctive (accessed:07.04.2020)

109 Norris R.S. Kristensen H.M. U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011. Bulletin of The Atomic

Scientists. N.P. 2015. P. 70. URL:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0096340210393931?needAccess=true (accessed:

07.04.2020)

110 Stein A. Gören N. The Nuclear Bargain: Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Center for Economics

and Foreign Policy Studies. N.P. 2014. PP. 2-7. URL:

file:///C:/Users/ashot/Desktop/thesis%20literature/Nuclear_Bargain_TR_TNW%20-%20Goren.pdf (accessed: 27.03.2020)

53 Nevertheless, the 20^th century’s major geopolitical transformations were encompassing not only the North Atlantic and Europe but the whole world, and Turkey, which situated on the crossroads of two continents, was trying to gain dividends in the East as well. According to professor Kibaroğlu, Turkey’s membership to NATO have been solving country’s security issues only partially, as the Article 5 of the Treaty¹¹¹, which serves as a cornerstone for the whole Alliance, provided a guarantee for collective defense only in case of an attack in Europe and the North Atlantic region. It turned out that virtually Turkey’s interests and security in the East were not guaranteed, because at that time the Middle East was regarded as out of NATO’s interests¹¹². So, taking into account Turkey’s geostrategic importance for the U.S. in the fight against the Soviet Union, it was decided to deploy nuclear weapons in Turkey. During NATO’s Paris summit in 1957 a decision was taken to deploy Jupiter missiles with the range of 3000 km and a warhead with the yield of about 1.5 megatons in Turkey as a part of NATO’s extended deterrence policy and as a symbol of the U.S. commitments to Turkey’s defense ¹¹³, which became the start of the U.S.-Turkey bilateral military cooperation. To prevent the deployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey, the Soviet Union initiated the creation of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Balkans, which was meant to include Turkey as well, but it did not succeed. Turkey remained steadfast also when Russia have been trying to persuade to cancel the deployment of U.S. TNW on Turkey’s territory. The first Jupiter deployed in Turkey in 1959 and soon became one of the main subject-matters during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, proving once again the vital importance of the Turkish Straits for the Soviet Union. The point is that, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from Cuba, only if the U.S. withdraws its missiles from Greece and Turkey.

The proposal to create a NWFZ in the Balkans was put forward once again in 1980, however, for the U.S. as well as for Turkey, that was an unacceptable idea, since the TNWs were the only reliable instrument to ensure the security of NATO’s European members, which were

111 The Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” (The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2019. URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed:

01.04.2020)) That is why Turkey was afraid that its NATO allies would protect Turkey only in the case if it would be attacked by Warsaw Pact nations and that it would stay alone in fight against its Middle Eastern competitors, such as Iraq, Syria and Israel.

112 Kibaroğlu M. Turkey and Shared Responsibilities. Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Cambridge. 1996. P. 25. URL:

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/saganInside.pdf (accessed: 01.04.2020)

113 Ibid

54 extremely sensitive against the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact nations¹¹⁴. So, the nuclear sharing was a mutually beneficial bargain for both sides. Although, these missiles were primarily intended to deter the Soviet Union, they also had an indirect restraining effect on Turkey’s Middle Eastern opponents and increased county’s prestige to some extent.

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a panic within the Turkish political elite. The latter was concerned that Turkey’s role in the changed geopolitical landscape would gravely decrease for NATO and the country would lose its connection with the West. In order to prove that NATO still needs Turkey, the government decided to be actively involved in NATO’s military operations in the East Europe and the Middle East¹¹⁵.

The concerns of the Turkish political circles over losing Turkey’s privileged position in NATO and being switched off from the West were passed from government to government as a political ‘legacy’ and, in fact, turned into the main logic about keeping U.S. TNW in Turkey.

After the end of the Cold War Turkey reassessed its security threat perceptions․ However, some security issues remained unresolved for Turkey and the Turkish government was still counting on the nuclear weapons’ deterrent power․ The targets of its security policy became the immediate internal enemies, that is the rebel Kurdish minority, and ‘potential threats' in the Middle East. These Middle Eastern ‘potential threats’ will be discussed in the upcoming subchapter.

3.1.3. Current Situation: The Possible Fate of TNW on Turkish Soil

The last decade of the 20^th century became a start for dynamic geostrategic changes in the whole world, including Turkey. This was a period of the reassessment of foreign policy and security issues for Turkey. As mentioned above, the threat from the Soviets was no longer virtual neither for NATO nor for Turkey. As a result, the U.S. TWNs deployed in Turkey began to lose their logic. Nevertheless, the Turkish government was not ready yet to say farewell to that nukes, that have become the symbol of Turkey’s privileged status in the Alliance and also had their place in Turkey’s regional policy calculations.

Although until recently, when U.S.-Turkish relations got tense and unstable dynamism due to the military cooperation between Russia and Turkey¹¹⁶, a discussion about the withdrawal

114 Kibaroğlu M. The Future of Extended Deterrence: The Case of Turkey. Foundation Pour La Recherche

Strategique. Paris. 2010. PP. 88-89. URL:

http://www.mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/kibaroglu-extended-deterrence-full- document.pdf(accessed: 03.04.2020)

115 Stein A. Gören N. P. 14

116 Back in April 2017, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement about the purchase of Russian S-400 anti- aircraft long-range missile system. This caused dissatisfaction in Washington, as before that Turkey negotiated a similar agreement with the U.S. about the purchase of F-35 fighting jets. Besides that, the U.S.

55 of TNW from Turkey did not arise in Turkish political circles. In contrast, the Turkish experts’

community is generally against the keeping of the Incirlik airbase. Most of them argue, that tactical nuclear weapons are no longer credible instrument for deterrence when it comes to curbing Russian powerful military apparatus. The idea, that TNW in Turkey can play a key role against the Iranian missile defense program is unreal, since there could be no scenario when Turkey will confront Iran just to protect NATO and U.S. political interests by putting its own political and economic close ties with Iran aside, as Iran is the second major energy supplier and economic partner for Turkey.

Iran, in its turn, finds in the face of Turkey, an important supporter despite the unfavorable geopolitical situation created during the recent decades around Iran¹¹⁷.

Another argument in favor of the withdrawal of TNW from Turkey is the fact that Turkish Army is excluded from the decision-making procedures at Incirlik airbase and plays a tiny role in U.S. nuclear missions, hence there is no any benefit for Turkey to keep those weapons on its territory¹¹⁸. Still, this argument is debatable since, as we discussed above Turkish Air Force is actually involved in NATO’s nuclear mission and, moreover, there is a possibility, that in the future the U.S. will certify Turkish F16 nuclear-capable aircrafts, as most recently, the U.S.

provided $ 1.1 B to upgrade Turkish F16s¹¹⁹.

Given the fact that, the “cradle” of terrorism is in immediate neighborhood with Turkey and that the Incirlik airbase is close to Turkish-Syrian state border, where the Islamic State terrorist organization actively operates in recent years, there are some international concerns over the security of TWN stored in Turkey with regard to the possibility of nuclear theft. Besides that, the Kurdistan Workers Party or the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, is considered to be another terrorist threat for TNW and for Turkey in general¹²⁰.

However, it seems that the threat of terrorism put on TNW in Turkey, is more subject for political speculations than a fact of reality, a tool used when it comes to political accusations between the two countries. The point is not, whether there is a real terrorist threat or risk of nuclear theft in Turkey for TNW. Certainly there is, and the authorities of the two countries must take

argues, that the Russian systems are incompatible with NATO system and that it could create major security risks as Russian can obtain secret information about U.S. F35 fighter aircrafts.

117 Interview with Dr. Abdolrasool Divsallar. Program Associate to Middle East Directions Program at The Robert Shuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. Saint Petersburg. 12.11.2019.

118 Kibaroğlu M. Turkey, NATO and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO’s Lisbon Summit. P. 8

119 $1.1B to Upgrade Turkish F-16 fleet // Defense Industry Daily. 2019. URL:

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/11b-to-upgrade-turkish-f16-fleet-0469/ (accessed: 05.04.2020)

120 According to some sources, Kurdistan Workers Party is one of the terrorist organizations interested in acquiring CBRN weapons․ It is known fact, that tactical nuclear weapons are more vulnerable against nuclear theft because of their size and weight. That is why concerns often arise about the TNW’s security stored in Incirlik, which is quite close to Turkish-Syrian state border, where often occur rebilions.

56 responsible actions to minimize that risk. The problem is that the issue is appeared to be discussed when it comes to the gaining of political dividends from each other.

Last time the issue was raised again in the U.S. during another escalation in Turkey-U.S.

relations after the Turkish government’s decision to purchase Russian S400 missile systems. Some political and scientist groups in the U.S. recalled that U.S. TNWs are unsafe on Turkish soil and they should be removed from there¹²¹.

As it comes to Turkey, together with other advantages provided by TNW for Turkey discussed above, this research maintains, that the Incirlik airbase serves in the hands of Turkish government as a unique tool for political leverage as well.

Thus, for the first time, in 1975 Turkey threatened to close the Incirlik airbase for the U.S. if it would not cancel arms embargo imposed on the use of U.S.- manufactured weaponry by Turkey for the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Turkey annulled the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. and took all the facilities under its custody, keeping only one ‘door’ open for NATO-related activities at Incirlik. As a result, several months later the U.S. canceled the arms embargo and only after that Turkey lifted the restrictions on the U.S.¹²².

A similar situation arose in 2019, when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey after its shocking military intervention in Syria and purchase of Russian S400 missile system, which as the U.S. argues, is inconsistent with NATO program and carries huge security risks.

In response, the President of Turkey Recep Tayip Erdogan once again used Turkey’s

‘heavy artillery’ threatening to expel the Americans from Incirlik. Erdogan’s threats had the necessary impact on the U.S. government for this time as well¹²³. So, ignoring the U.S. Congress’

calls against Turkey, President Trump actually turned on a ‘green light’ for Turkey to Syria, by

121 For more details, check:

SOURCE 1. Kristensen H. M. Urgent: Move US Nuclear Weapons Out of Turkey // Federation of American Scientists. 2019. URL: https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/

SOURCE 2. Bryen S. Turkey Could Seize US Nukes Stored at Air Base // Asia Times. 2019. URL:

https://asiatimes.com/2019/10/how-risky-are-us-nuclear-bombs-in-turkey/

SOURCE 3. Pifer S. It’s Time to Get US Nukes Out of Turkey // Brookings Institution. 2019. URL:

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/11/05/its-time-to-get-us-nukes-out-of-turkey/

122 Bölme S.M. The Politics of Incirlik Airbase. Insight Turkey. Vol. 9. No 3. N.P. 2007. P. 88. URL:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26328896?read-

now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A2c17341d7abb6c4b1536e185fe7a0981&seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed: 05.04.2020)

123 Turkey may close Incirlik airbase in face of US threats: Erdogan // Al Jazeera. 2019. URL:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/turkey-close-incirlik-air-base-face-threats-erdogan- 191216063638537.html (accessed: 06.04.2020)