Behavioral Law and Economics

De uma maneira geral, a Behavioral law & economics tem trazido à Law & Economics os insights da Economia Comportamental para uma releitura de temas até então trabalhados à luz dos postulados do modelo neoclássico113.

Segundo Christine Jolls, três tipos de vieses cognitivos particularmente tomam a atenção dos estudiosos da matéria114:

a) egocentric bias ou viés egocêntrico (que se refere à tendência das pessoas a interpretar informação em prol de seus próprios interesses);

b) hindsight bias ou viés de retrospectiva (por força do qual os tomadores de decisão tendem a atribuir alta probabilidade a eventos simplesmente porque eles acabaram ocorrendo);

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Sobre o famoso experimento, p. ex.: BERTRAND, Marianne, MULLAINATHAN, Sendhil e SHAFIR, Eldar. “Behavioral economics and marketing in aid of decision making among the poor”, p. 8-23.

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Cf. JOLLS, Christine. Behavioral economics and the law, p. 2. V. ainda: JOLLS, Christine. “Behavioral law and economics”, p. 116; HAYDEN, Grant M e ELLIS, Stephen E. “Law and economics after behavioral economics”, p. 652: “Behavioral economics is a fundamentally conservative approach in that it retains the basic

approaches and structures of economic theory. Its basic Project is that standard economics, with extra concern for empirical adequacy”.

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c) optimism bias ou viés de otimismo (por força do qual os indivíduos acreditam que a probabilidade de enfrentarem um mau resultado é menor do que realmente é).

Com isso, o projeto da Behavioral Law & Economics é tomar os conhecimentos básicos e os sucessos da economia e construir sobre eles hipóteses mais realistas sobre o comportamento humano. Ou seja, é manter a capacidade de abordagem dos economistas para as ciências sociais, oferecendo, no entanto, uma melhor descrição do comportamento dos agentes na sociedade em geral e na economia em particular. A Behavioral Law & Economics traz consigo, em suma, o potencial para ser uma Law & Economics com R2 mais alto, isto é, com um maior poder de explicar os danos observados115.

Nesse sentido, a behavioral law & and economics põe em xeque os três princípios fundamentais do conventional law & economics – todos eles calcados na teoria dos preços e na ideia-força de racionalidade plena ou ilimitada –, tal como enunciados por Richard Posner: i) a demanda total por um bem cai quando os preços sobem; ii) os custos afundados ou perdidos [“sunk incurred costs”] não afetam as decisões sobre quantidade e preços; iii) os recursos tendem a gravitar ao redor de seus usos mais valiosos116. O behavioral law & economics imporia uma modificação ao traditional law & economics, pois117.

Segundo Jolls, Sunstein e Thaler:

Traditional law and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful but often false. People display bounded rationality: they suffer from certain biases, such as overoptimism and self-serving conceptions of fairness; they follow heuristics, such as availability, that lead to mistakes; and they behave in accordance with prospect theory rather than expected utility theory. People

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R2 é medida de ajustamento de um modelo estatístico linear generalizado em relação aos valores observados. O R² varia entre 0 e 1, indicando, em percentagem, o quanto o modelo consegue explicar os valores observados. Quanto maior o R², mais explicativo é modelo, melhor ele se ajusta à amostra. Por exemplo, se o R² de um modelo é 0,8234, isto significa que 82,34% da variável dependente consegue ser explicada pelos regressores presentes no modelo (Disponível em: <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C2%B2>. Acesso: 17 jan. 2016). 116

Apud JOLLS, Christine, SUNSTEIN, Cass e THALER, Richard. “Behavioral approach to law and economics”, p. 13-15.

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Cf. RACHLINSKI, Jeffrey J. “The ‘new’ law and psychology”, p. 130: “More recently, other scholars have

begun to use BDT [behavioral decision theory] as a modification of law and economics. In two review articles, Professor Sunstein claimed that because BDT provides more accurate models of human choice, it will principally be used to modify, rather than to undermine, existing theories in law and economics. Similary, Professors Korobin and Ulen have asserted that the application of BDT to law is similar to law and economics, except that BDT eschews the assumption that human choice is rational. The work that these reviews describe identifies a brighter path for BDT in law. As one of my colleagues described it, however, this application of BDT to law consists only of changing the numbers in the law-and-economics equations”. Em outro texto, Rachlinski

sustenta que, na verdade, a disciplina “Behavioral law and economics” deveria chamar-se “Cognitive psychology

and law”, sem qualquer menção ao “Economics”, uma vez que a base fundacional da matéria é menos

economicista que psicologista: a inserção do “Economics” seria uma estratégia de marketing, pois historicamente a economia penetrou o direito mais a fundo do que a psicologia (“The psychological foundations of behavioral law and economics”, p. 1675 e ss.). Korobkin e Ulen preferem dar à disciplina o nome de “Law and behavioral

also have bounded willpower; they can be tempted and are sometimes myopic. They take steps to overcome theses limitations. Finally, people are (fortunately!) bounded self-interested. They are concerned about the well- being of others, even strangers in some circumstances, and this concern and their self-conception can lead them in the direction of cooperation and the expense of their material self-interest (and sometimes spite, also at the expense of their material self-interest). Most of these bounds can be and have been made part of formal models.118

Rachlinski aponta quatro sentenças fundamentais que resumem as principais conquistas da BL&E nos últimos anos:

(1) Because consumers can make consistent errors in judgment, a free market cannot entirely be trusted to produce an efficient allocation of goods and services. This observation arguably supports as whole range of interventions into the marketplace, from labeling laws to the imposition of strict liability in products liablity.

(2) Because voters rely simplistic decision-making strategies, the political process can direct public officials toward unwise policy judgments. This line of work suggests that risk regulation is best done by expert agencies insulated from political influence.

(3) Decision making by judges and juries is frequently inaccurate in ways that can distort the civil and criminal justice systems. Procedural rules governing dispute resolution are, or should are, designed to prevent systematic errors in judgment from determining the outcome of adjudication. Jury decision making is traditionally an area in which psychology has had influence, but BLE has added several new dimensions to this line of research.

(4) People are both more altruistic and vindictive than rational models of behavior predict. This observation has several implications for how societies might function well or function poorly. This observation has implications for understanding how social norms govern behavior more so than legal rules and for understanding the attractiveness of legal rules that promote altruistic norms.119

Tabela comparativa:

Law & Economics Behavioral Law & Economics

Racionalidade ilimitada ou plena Racionalidade limitada Maximização de riqueza ou utilidade Maximização de bem-estar social

Conteúdo das normas jurídicas Efeito prático das normas jurídicas Economia neoclássica Economia comportamental

Agentes egoístas Agentes altruístas Modelo matemático Modelo psicológico

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“A behavioral approach to law and economics”, p. 77. 119