Exploring the effect of land use on ecosystem services: the distributive issues

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Land

Use

Policy

jou rn al h om ep a g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / l a n d u s e p o l

Exploring

the

effect

of

land

use

on

ecosystem

services:

The

distributive

issues

Luis

Filipe

Gomes

Lopes

a,b,∗

_,

_João

_Manuel

_R.

_dos

_Santos

_Bento

a

_,

Artur

F. Arede

Correia

Cristovão

b

_,

_Fernando

_Oliveira

_Baptista

c

a_Department_of_Forest_Sciences_and_Landscape_{Architecture,}_University_of_{Tras-os-Montes}_and_Alto_Douro_(UTAD),_PO_Box_1013,_5001-901_Vila_Real,

Portugal

b_Centre_for_{Transdisciplinary}_Development,_University_of_{Tras-os-Montes}_and_Alto_Douro_(UTAD),_PO_Box_1013,_5001-901_Vila_Real,_Portugal

c_Department_of_Rural_Economics_and_Sociology,_Instituto_Superior_de_Agronomia,_Tapada_da_Ajuda,_1349-017_Lisboa,_Portugal

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received18February2014

Receivedinrevisedform

20November2014 Accepted29December2014 Keywords: Ecosystemservices Justdistribution Lorenzcurve Landuse Ginicoefﬁcient

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Thecurrentdebateofecosystemserviceshasfocusedmoreonmonetaryvaluationmethodsand pay-mentsforenvironmentalservices(PES)thenontheclassiceconomicanalysis(i.e.assumptionsregarding: sustainability,justiceandefficiency).Thispaperexamines,takingintoconsiderationecosystemservices, incomedistributionfromdifferentlandusestostakeholders.WestudythePortuguesecommonland ecosystem,whichischaracterizedashavingawiderangeofecosystemservices.Allowingthatallthe benefitscanbetranslatedintoeconomicvalue,weestimatedthetotaleconomicvalue(TEV)associated withtheseterritorieson5differentlandusesituations:forest,shrubland,waterbodies,mountain agri-cultureandotheruses,andanalyzedthecurrentinstitutionalarrangementsaroundtheseterritories. Wefoundthatthedistributionofthebenefitsofdifferentlandusesisrelativelyinequality.Theresults showedthatthecontemporaryinstitutionalarrangementsofwealthdistributionensurearelativelyfair distributioninsiderofsystem;howeverthisinstitutionalarrangementisunabletoensureequitable dis-tributionofwealthbyexternalstakeholders.Wecanconcludethatdifferenttypesoflanduseprovidea veryasymmetricdistributionofincomebydifferentgroupsofhumans:landowners;citizensofacountry, andresidentsofEarth.

PublishedbyElsevierLtd.

Introduction

Distributionreferstothedivisionontheﬂowofresources,as

embodiedinﬁnalgoodsandservicesbetweenpeople’salternatives.

Agooddistributionisfairorthatis“reasonable”,oratleasttheone

whoallowedthedegreeofinequalityislimitedwithinan

accept-ablerange(Daly,1992).Thereisalonghistoryineconomicsofa

consequentialistapproachtodistributivejustice.Fromthe

classi-caleconomics’pointofview,distributivejusticeisdeterminedby

whatevergeneratesthebestoutcomeforsociety(Mill,1848).While

inwealthproduction,humanityisrestrictedbynaturallaws,its

dis-tribution,isamatterofhumaninstitutionsolely.Thedistribution

ofwealth,therefore,dependsonthelawsandcustomsofsociety.

Therules,bywhichitisdetermined,reﬂecttheopinionsand

feel-ingsoftherulingportionofthecommunity(Mill,1848).Onthis

∗ Correspondingauthor:Tel.:+351259350883;fax:+351259350859.

E-mailaddress:lﬂ[email protected](L.F.G.Lopes).

concernprivateproperty,institutionissupposedtoguaranteethe

fruitsoftheindividuals’ownlaborandabstinence.

ThemaintoolforanalyzingeconomicinequalityistheLorenz

curve(seeFig.3),thisconceptwasintroducedbyLorenz(1905)who

investigatedtheproblemofmeasuringwealthconcentration.This

curveisanintuitivemethodforrepresentingincomedistribution.

Createdbyplottingcumulativeincomesharesagainstcumulative

populationshares,theLorenzcurveformsthebackboneof

sev-eralinequalitymeasures,includingthepopularGinicoefﬁcient.The

Lorenzcurvehasplayedabasicrole,forexample,intheanalysisof

incomeandearningsinequality(Sen,1973;Slottje,1989;Doiron

andBarrett,1996).TheGinicoefﬁcient(Gini,1912),ameasureof

distributioninequality,isdeﬁned,geometrically,astheratioofthe

areabetweenthelineofequaldistributionandtheobservedLorenz

Curvetotheareaundertheuniformdistribution:

Gini=₍_A₊A_B) (1)

whereAistheareabetweenthelineofperfectequalityandthe

Lorenzcurve,andtheareaundertheLorenzcurveisB.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.12.008

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Thereare ways of decomposingtheGini coefﬁcientbut the

componenttermsoftotalinequalityarenotalwaysintuitivelyor

mathematicallyappealing(Litchﬁeld,1999).Theclassical,

mathe-matical,deﬁnitionofGinicoefﬁcientappearsinthenotationofthe

theoryofrelativemeandifference:

Gini= 1 2n2_y_¯ n

i=1 n

j=1 [yi−yj] (2)

wherenisthenumberofindividualsinthesample,yiistheincome

ofindividuali,iD (1,2,...,n),and ¯y=(1/n)yi,thearithmetic

meanincome.

Thiscoefﬁcienthasvalueswithintherange0(perfectlyuniform

distribution)to1(completeinequality).

Economistsfrequentlytakeproperty rights approach to

dis-tributivejustice,arguingthatwhateverdistributionemergesfrom

voluntarytransactions(e.g. markettransactions) isjust (Farley,

2012). For ecosystem services there are two ways to put this

approach into practice: the monetary valuation of ecosystem

servicesbased onestimates ofwillingness topay (e.g.through

contingentvaluation,hedonicpricing,travelcost,etc.)and/orthe

useofmarketbasedinstrumentsforallocationdecisions

concern-ingecosystemservices.IncontemporarytimesMartinez-Alierand

O’Connor(1999)discussedhowvaluationsoftoday’sexternalities

andalso valuationsof future externalities(andof

environmen-talresourcesand services)will dependonthedistribution,not

onlyofpropertyrights,butalsoofincomeandofpowerin

social-institutional terms. In the case of ecosystems services, justice

concernsentitlements to both thestructural buildingblocks of

ecosystemsandtheservicestheygenerate.Thetwoofcourseare

frequentlyinconﬂict(Farley,2012).

Ecosystemservices:concept,valuationanddistributionissues

Ecosystemservices(ES)researchhasbecomeanimportantarea

ofenvironmentalscienceinvestigationoverthelastdecades.The

MillenniumEcosystemAssessment(MEA,2005)andTheEconomic

ofEcosystemandBiodiversityreport(TEEB,2010)representtwo

importantmilestones, aimingat mainstreamingES in

decision-making.Despite this, theuseof ESisstill limited both in plan

and program-making (Geneletti,2011)and environmental

per-formanceassessmentofpolicytools(RegaandSpaziante,2013).

Inaddition, theconceptof ecosystem servicesdoesnot,toour

days,gatherconsensusamongstecologistsandeconomists(Boyd

andBanzhaf,2007;Wallace,2007;FisherandTurner,2008)since

linkedecological-economicsystemsare complex.Inboth ﬁelds,

economicsandecology,whichareoftenseentohaveconﬂicting

goals,ecosystemservicesareanextensionofbotheconomic

exter-nalitiesandecologicalfunctioning,providinganexusbetweenthe

twoﬁelds(Fisheretal.,2009).TwocommonlycitedESdeﬁnitions

aretheonebyCostanzaetal.(1997)inthatecosystemservices

represent“thegoodsand servicesderivedfromthe functionsand

utilizedbyhumanity”andTheMillenniumEcosystemAssessment

(MEA,2005)definition,inwhich ESaredefinedas “thebenefits

peopleobtainfromecosystems”.BoydandBanzhaf(2007)offeran

alternativedeﬁnition,i.e.,ecosystemservicesarenotthebeneﬁts

humansobtainfromecosystems,butrathertheecological

compo-nentsdirectlyconsumedorenjoyedtoproducehumanwell-being.

Fisheret al.(2009)deﬁne ecosystemservices astheaspects of

ecosystemsutilized(activelyorpassively)toproducehuman

well-being.Regardlessoftheauthor,ecosystemservicesareafunctionof

complexinteractionsamongspeciesandtheirabioticenvironment;

complexuseandutilizationpatterns;andvariousperceptionsby

beneﬁciaries(Fisheretal.,2009).Fromthismeaning,anystepin

thesystemcanbeconsideredanecosystemserviceregardlessof

whereitoccursalongthechainofeventsaslongashumansuseit

toproducewelfare.

Thereisanon-goingdebateonhowtoassignvalueto

ecosys-temsservices.Themonetization(monetaryvaluation)ofecosystem

serviceshasbeenadvocatedbymanyasanoptimalstrategyto

make nature visible to decision makers and ﬁnancial markets,

withthehopethatthiswouldeventuallyleadtothesustainable

useofnaturalresourcesandtheirpreservation.Forotherauthors

(see,amongothers,deGroot,1992;Hanley,1992;Diamondand

Hausman,1994;VatnandBromley,1994),itisadvisabletolookat

alternativestoESforintegrationofnatureintoeconomicdecisions

(Baveyeetal.,2013).Thetotaleconomicvalue(TEV)isaconcept

madepopularbyPearceandTurner(1990),andrepresentsthe

sev-eralwaysbywhichanaturalresource,suchasaforest,isvaluableto

people.ThereforeTEVofanaturalresourceisthesumofitsdirect,

indirect,option,andexistencevalues(Pearce,1991;Groombridge,

1992).TEVcanbedecomposedintoeconomicvalueforusein

con-nectionwithutilityvalue,economicvalueofnon-use,relatedtothe

intrinsicvalue,whereallissuesofintrinsicvalue(ethical,religious

andcultural)ofnaturalresourcesarediscussed.Inthe“totalvalue

ofnature”Costanzaetal.(1997)publishedtheresultsofa

com-prehensivestudyestimatingthevalueofannualglobalecosystem

services.

Ecosystemservicesaresuppliedtotheeconomicsystemata

rangeofspatialandtemporalscales.Heinetal.(2006)arguedthat

ecosystemservicescanbegeneratedatarangeofecologicalscales,

andcanbesuppliedtostakeholdersatadifferentrangeof

institu-tionalscales.Inlightofdistributionissues,onepossiblyimportant

classiﬁcationschemeconsidersthedecisioncontextofhow

ecosys-temservicesrelatetoequityintheprovisionofhumanwelfare

(Fisheretal.,2009).Thisisimportantasitisnowwellaccepted

thatfailingenvironmentalqualitydisproportionatelyaffects

peo-plethataremarginalizedbythemarketeconomy(Dasgupta,2002).

Thiscanbecomplexbythefactthatstakeholdersatdifferent

spa-tialscaleshavedifferentinterestsinecosystemservices(Heinetal.,

2006).Thescaleatwhichbeneﬁtsandcostsarecapturedisalsoa

veryimportantissueintermsofpracticalityandequity.

Inthispaperwewilldiscussthedistributiveissuesassociated

withecosystemsservicestodifferentlanduses. Today’s

under-standingoftheeffectsoflanduseonecosystemservicesbeneﬁts

distributionisfarfromcomplete.Thispaperisstructuredas

fol-lows:Inthenextsectionwewillpresentdetailsthemethodological

anddatacollectionuseinthiscasestudy:Portuguesecommonland

ecosystem.KeyﬁndingsemergingfromthecasestudySectionwill

analyzeanddiscusstheresult,followedbysomebriefconclusions.

Researchapproachandmethodology

Casestudymethodologyis welldevelopedwithinsocial

sci-ences. The process of designing a case study must be carried

outinamethodicalmanneriftheresultsaretobeaccurateand

meaningful(Stake,1995).Althoughﬁndingsoriginatingfromcase

studiescannotbegeneralizedtopopulations,byfollowinga

rig-orous methodologicalframework that includesmaintainingthe

‘chainofevidence’andprotectingagainstvalidityproblems,case

studyresearchcanstronglycontributetoknowledgeaboutsocial

phenomena(Yin,2009).

Datacollection

Informationonthemonetaryvalueofecosystemserviceswere

sourced,mainly,fromthe“EcosystemServiceValuationDatabase”

(ESVD) developed by Van der Ploeg and de Groot (2010).This

databaseincludesmorethan300valuationstudiesand1350

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services,andlocations.Anotherusedsources,equallyimportant,

weretherelevantstudieswithdataonecosystemservicevalues

(Costanzaetal.,1997;Mendes,2005;Croitoru,2007;deGrootetal.,

2012),datafromPortuguesegovernmentalagencies(AFN,2010;

DGRF,2007)andformerassociatedprojectsdevotedtothe

charac-terizationanddeepeningofPortuguesecommonsinsight,suchas

Baptista(2010).

Aparticipatoryapproachwasusedtounderstandthe

institu-tionalarrangementsof wealthdistribution.In thisway, several

interviews were collected during the year 2010 with

differ-entstakeholders, involved in the management of commonland

in northern Portugal. We performed the semistructured

inter-views using a ﬂexible interview guide focused onfour issues:

stakeholder’sexpectationsregardingtocommonland,ecosystem

services,sourceofitslegitimacyandspeciﬁcgoods/servicesused.

Interviews,asopposedtosurveys,allowgreaterﬂexibility,

pro-vidingopportunitiesfortherespondenttochangethecourseofthe

conversationandbringupnewissuesthatwerenotpreviously

con-ceivedbytheresearcher,therebycontributingtotheorybuilding

(GlaserandStrauss,1967;Goulding,1999).Thesemeetingsbuildan

arrayofdifferentanalysisofwhatexactlytherealitiesofperceived

managementofcommonlandare.Differentinstitutionalmembers

wereinvitedtoparticipateinthesemeetings:staterepresentatives,

andnon-governmentalorganizations(NGO)ofdifferentassociative

structures(Baladi,ForestisandMountainResearchCenter(CIMO).

Otherkeysourceofinformationusedinthisstudywastheprocess

ofpublicdiscussionontheNationalProgramfortheUpgradingof

CommonLand(AFN,2010).Thesepublicinformationsessionswere

heldinapartnershipmodelwithkeyPortugueseforest

organiza-tions.Landuseinformationwastakenfromthelastnationalforest

inventory(IFN5,2010).Forsocio-economiccharacterizationofthe

studyarea,themaximumwecouldobtainintermsofdata

collec-tionwasaterritorialunitparishusingthedatafromINE(2001).

Keyﬁndingsemergingfromthecasestudy

ThePortuguesecommonlandecosystem:ourcasestudy

Inapreviousstudy(Lopesetal.,2013)anattemptwasmade

tooutlinetheemergence,evolution and transitionof the

insti-tutionalizationofcommonlandownershipinPortugal,fromthe

mid-nineteenthcenturytopresenttime.Inthispapertheauthors

focusedonthecontemporarydemocraticgovernanceofPortuguese

commonlandecosystem.Exploringthepotentialformsandmodes

ofgovernanceisanimportanttask.Wesuggestthatamoredetailed

andanalyticallyhighlyusefultypologyofgovernancefunctionscan

bedistilled fromthecommonfeatureslistsofsuccessful

gover-nancesolutionsaspresented,forexample,byOstrom(1990)and

Agrawal(2002).Debatesonpropertyregimesofferthebeststarting

pointfortheargumentthatallgovernancesolutionscanbe

under-stoodasformsofownership.FortwodecadesafterHardin’s(1968)

analysisofthecommons,thenationalizationorprivatizationof

nat-uralresourcesseemedtobetheonlyalternativeforresourcetenure.

Inthe1980s,scholarsworkingoncommonpropertyarrangements

madecounter-argumentstoHardin’sanalysiswhich,togetherwith

accumulatingempiricalevidence,recognizedcommonpropertyas

aviableformofresourcetenure(Runge,1986;Wade,1987;Wade,

1988;BromleyandCernea,1989;Ostrom,1990;Lopesetal.,2013).

Withdetailedhistoricalandcontemporaryevidence,studieson

thecommonshaveshownthatresourceusersoftencreate

institu-tionalarrangementsandmanagementregimesthathelpthemto

allocatebeneﬁtsequitably,overlongtimeperiods,andwithonly

limitedefﬁciencylosses(McKean,1992;Ostrom,1992;Agrawal,

1999). Table 1 Summary of monetary values for each land use per ecosystem services (values in D ha − 1year − 1, 2010 price level). Common land ecosystem goods and services (2010 D ha − 1yr − 1) Land use Areas ha × 10 3 Direct use Indirect use Non-use values Total value per ha, D /ha − 1yr − 1 Total global ﬂow value, D yr − 1× 10 6 Wood forest products (WFPs) Non-wood forest products (NWFPs) Timber Firewood Hunting Fishing inland Grazing Resin

Mushrooms and aromatics

Honey Recreation New activities Watershed protection Carbon sequestration Biodiversity Forest 200.0 100.0 20.0 8.0 10.0 7.0 4.0 1.0 10.0 68.0 20.0 50.0 298.0 59.6 D Shrubs 236.0 5.0 35.0 30.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 15.0 5.0 10.0 113.0 26.7 D Inland Water 0.8 15,000.0 80.0 36 50.0 15,166.0 12.3 D Mountain Agricult. 9.7 40.0 100.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 10 2 20.0 185.0 1.8 D Other uses 9.0 1500.0 1500.0 13.5 D Total per services D yr − 1× 10 6 20.0 D 5.2 D 9.9 D 12.2 D 10.1 D 1.4 D 1.8 D 1.2 D 3.3 D 13.5 D 17.3 D 5.2 D 12.6 D 113.9 D

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Fig.1.Thephysicalecosystem:distributionandsizeofcommonland(greenareas)inPortugal.(Forinterpretationofthereferencestocolorinthisﬁgurelegend,thereader

isreferredtothewebversionofthisarticle.)

Portuguesecommonlandareasarelocatedmostlyinthe

moun-tainsofnorthernandcentralPortugal(Fig.1).

Thecommonlandecosystemprovidesmultiplegoodsand

ser-vices(Pereira etal.,2005), includinganexceptional richness in

terms ofbiodiversity, which are crucial for thesocio-economic

developmentof rural areas. However,the social capital that is

jointedincommonlandisold.Approximately18,706km2 _of_its

areaisoccupiedbyparisheswherethereisaverylowpopulation

densityof52.9inhabitantsperkm2 ₍_INE,₂₀₀₁_)._Population

den-sityisoftenusedasanindicatorforclassifyingruraltypologies.In

Europe,localadministrativeunitshavebeenclassiﬁedasruralif

theirpopulationdensityisbelow150inhabitantspersquare

kilo-meter(VanEupenetal.,2012),whereasinAustraliaruraldensities

arereportedintheorder0.9personsperKm2₍_Smailes_et_al.,₂₀₀₂_).

Asanexample,fortheparishofSistelo,onePortuguesemountain

parish,Pereiraetal.(2005)indicatesapopulationdensityof13

persons/km2_._In_this_way,_using_our_study_as_a_starting_point_and

theguidelinesproposedbyWCPA(1998)andMEA(2005)wecan

characterizePortuguesecommonlandecosystemashavingahigh

stockofnaturalresources(water,wildlife,temperateforestsand

otherdiverselandscapes)andawiderangeofecosystemservices,

andmainlylocatedinruralregionswithlowpopulationdensity.

Valueofecosystemservicesper“landuse”inmonetaryunits

Forthepurposesofthisanalysis,weusedFisheretal.(2009)

generaldeﬁnitionsofterminology.Weusetheterm“ecosystem

service”torefertoalltheservicesprovidedbyPortuguesecommon

landsthatdirectlyorindirectlyprovidewell-being (irrespective

ofwhethertheyareintermediateorﬁnalproducts,processesor

anthropogenicbeneﬁts).Totaleconomicvalue(TEV)associatedto

allnaturalresourcesandecosystemservices,andannualﬂowsof

beneﬁtsprovidedbycommonlandsundercurrentmanagement

practiceswereestimated(Table1).Asimilarapproachhasbeen

usedbyCominoetal.(2014).In AppendixIdetailed resultsare

provided.WeestimatedtheTEVassociatedtoallecosystem

ser-vicesofPortuguesecommonlands,andpredictedtheannualﬂows

ofbeneﬁtsprovidedbycommonlandsundercurrentmanagement

practices,i.e.,bydifferentlanduse.Wemeasuredtheaverage

per-hectarevalueofthecurrentstockofdifferentlanduses,broken

downbylandusetypeandbycomponentoftotaleconomicvalue.

Table1 presetsa summary of themonetaryvalues for each

landuseperecosystemservices,(valuesinDha−1yr−1,2010price

level).ThePortuguesecommonland,asalreadymentioned,

pro-videsawiderangeofbeneﬁts;however,mostofthemarebarely

recognizedby society and have nocommercial recognition.By

relatingtheeconomicvalueofeachoutputtotheTEVfora

repre-sentativehectareofcommonlandinPortugal,wecanperceivethe

scaleexploitationofnaturalresourcesexpressedinmonetaryunits:

Euros.Thecompetitionbetweenlanduse:forest,shrubs,inland

water,mountagricultureandotheruseshasbeencontentious.The

resultsshowtheabsoluteandrelativeimportanceofthebeneﬁts

associatedwithcommonland.InabsolutetermswehaveaTEV

ofD113.9million.Timberproductionistheservicethatpresents

thehighesteconomicvalue,followedbywatershedprotectionand

what we designated as new activities: wind energy parks and

quarrying.Severalgoodsandecosystemservicesproducedinthe

commonlandsareintrinsicallyinterdependent.Ecosystemservice

trade-offsarisefrommanagementchoicesmadebyhumans,which

canchangethetype,magnitude,andrelativemixofservices

pro-videdbyecosystems(Rodríguezetal.,2006;Chisholm,2010).

Distributionanalysis

Arelevantissueforunderstandingtheeconomicdynamics

asso-ciatedwiththecommonlandsystemisthedistributionofbeneﬁts.

We recall the distribution is only a matter of human

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Fig.2.(A)Landuseextension(areas)andincome;(B)adjustedLorenzcurvestodifferentlanduse.

managementof Portuguesecommonland,tracing theproﬁlein

termsofabilitytogeneratebeneﬁtsinasustainablemodeof

appro-priationofbeneﬁtsbycommonersandcollectiverelevanceofthese

beneﬁts.Thisauthorfoundnosigniﬁcantdifferencesamongthesix

formsofmanagement,inthiswayfromthispointonwewillrefer

toonlyoneformofPortuguesecommonlandmanagement.

Effectsoflanduseonbeneﬁtsdistribution

Itiswidelyknownthatchangesinlanduseplayapivotalrolein

environmentalandecologicalchanges,contributetoglobalchange

(MeyerandTurner,1991;Lambinetal.,2001), andhave

impor-tantconsequences fornaturalresources(Houghtonetal.,1991;

Houghton,1994;Turneretal.,1990).Landusesigniﬁcantlyaffects

keyaspectsoflandsystemfunctioning.Theyaretheprimarysource

ofalteringecosystemservices,andaffecttheabilityofbiological

systemstosupporthumanneeds(Vitouseketal.,1997).However,

understandingtheeffectsoflanduseondistributionofbeneﬁts

isfarfromcomplete.Ecosystemservicesandthenaturalcapital

stocksarecriticaltothefunctioningoftheearth’slife-supporting

system.Dramaticland-usechangesoftenhaveasigniﬁcant

nega-tiveimpactonecosystemsandongoodsandservices(Kreuteretal.,

2001).

Fig.2A illustratestheextent ofdifferentland useand ofits

income.Landuseismainlyoccupiedbyshrubs thatcover over

50%oftheterritory;nevertheless,itsincomerepresentsonly23%

of the total. Forests represent about44% of total territory and

haveanincomeof52%.Theotheruses(Windfarms,inert

opera-tionofquarriesandgravelpits)evenwithadiminishedterritorial

expressionprovideanincomethatcontributes 12%tothetotal.

Mountain agriculture has a residual area and correspondent

income.

Weobserve(Fig.2B)thatthedistributionofthebeneﬁtsof

dif-ferent landusesisrelativelyinequitable.Thisisdue tothefact

thatsomelanduses(inlandwater,otheruses)withlesserextent,

producehigherwealth.

Beneﬁtdistributionsbypeople

Understandingthemagnitudeandmixofnetbeneﬁtsreceived

byparticulargroupsisimportanttoassessthedegreeofinequality.

Atthenationallevel,thereare,inPortugal,10,356,117registered

residents,3,650,757familieswithanaverageof2.8individualsand

5,046,744dwellings(INE,2001).Only6%ofthispopulation,around

580,000individuals,arecommoners(Baptista,2010).InTable2

weillustratethedistributionofbeneﬁtsin3groups:localusers

(commoners),restofthecountryand citizensoftheworld.The

groupoflocalusers(commoners)wassubdividedintotwogroups:

commonerswithoutmountainfarming(59%oftotalcommoners)

andcommonerswithmountainfarming(41%oftotalcommoners).

Thesepercentagesamongstthetwogroupswereextrapolatedfrom

datapresentedbyBaptista(2010).

Weobservethatcommonerswithmountainfarmingappearto

retainmoreincome.Thisisprobablyduetotheexistenceofcattle

herdsthatgrazethecommonland.Howeverthedistributionof

wealthisveryfairwithinthesecommonersgroups(seeTable2).

Amongthethreegroups,thereisanon-uniformdistributionof

beneﬁts.Commonerscanhold45.3%oftotalbeneﬁts,leadingtoa

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Table 2 Distribution of the beneﬁces ﬂow between different groups of humans in the Portuguese common land ecosystem. Members per group Type of use and activities value D × 10 6yr − 1 Income per group a Gini index No. % D × 10 6yr − 1 % Insider Commoners (ownerships’) Without mountain farming

340,000 0.59 Collective Direct use = forest + resin + new activities = 20.0 + 1.4 + 13.4 = 34.7 34.7 × 0.59 = 20.5 40.1 0.199 With mountain farming 232,000 0.41 [collective Direct use: forest, resin + new activities] + [individual direct use: ﬁrewood + grazing + honey] = [34.7] + [5.5 + 10.1 + 1.2] = [34.7] + [16.5] [34.7 × 0.41] + 16.5 = 30.7 59.9 Total 580,000 100 51.3 44.3 Outsider Citizens of Portugal b 10,356,117 Direct use: hunting, ﬁshing + Collecting mushroom + recreation. National Indirect use: watershed protection = 9.9 + 12.2 + 1.8 + 3.3 + 17.3 44.6 39.1 0.843 Citizens of World c 6,989,643,883 International Indirect use: Carbon sequestration Non-use values Biodiversity = 5.2 + 12.6 17.9 15.6 Total 7 billon 113.9 100 a The income per commoners groups was weighted by no. of total commoners, to avoid double counts. b Value obtained in the 2001 census ( INE, 2001 ). c To the world population were withdrawn Portuguese citizens.

signiﬁcantincomeforlocalcommunities.ThePortugueseterritory

holds39%oftotalbeneﬁtsfromcommonlandsandtheremaining

15.6%aredistributedtotherestoftheworld.

ByestimatingandadjustingtheLorenzcurvetodatapresented

inTable2weobserved(Fig.3)thatthedistributionofthebeneﬁtsto

differentpeopleisrelativelyequitableinsideofthesystem(Fig.3A)

butveryinequitabletooutsidepeople(Fig.3B).

ContemporarydemocraticgovernanceofPortuguesecommon

landhasdevelopedandusedtheorganizationalandinstitutional

mechanisms,ensuringsocialequitydistributioninsiderofit,with

aGiniindexof0.199.Onthecontrarywhenweanalyzethe

distri-butionwithexternalstakeholdersweﬁndthatthedistributionis

veryasymmetricwithaGiniindexof0.843.Suchmeasuresappear

tobesensitiveorreﬂectinequalitiesacrossgeographicalareasor

groups.

Concerning the democratic control vector, the commoners’

assemblieshaveformallymoredemocraticcontrolthanthe

Por-tuguesegovernment.Themanagementmodelisbasedondirect

democracy,it is a political systemwhere each commoner

par-ticipate in decision-making in person, contrary to relying on

intermediariesorrepresentatives.Howevernotallother

stakehol-derssitintheCommonersassemblies.Thisleadstoopinionsthat

looksuspiciouslyatthedistributiveinstances(suchasthe

Com-moners’Assemblies),seeingthemasuncoordinatedand/oropaque

institutionsoftenforgettingthatthestate,therightful

representa-tiveofthepublicinterest,isaco-manager.

Institutionalarrangementstodistributionofwealth

In Table3we presenttheoutcome of interviews,thisTable

containsallstakeholdersthataredirectlyorindirectlyinvolvedin

themanagementofPortuguesecommonlandandthesourceofits

legitimacy.Theexistenceofalargeamountofpublicgoodsimplies

the involvement of a lot of stakeholders in the contemporary

managementofPortuguesecommonland.Inasmall,customary

commonpropertyregime,resourceusers areoftenmembersof

a communitysuchas avillage,which enforces and adjudicates

therules ofresource use. The communityperforms all

govern-mental functions, without separation of powers and, as such,

theresource userscanparticipatedirectlyintheenvironmental

decision-makingaffectingthem.Resourceusersmaythemselves

performsomegovernancefunctionssuchasmonitoringof

compli-ancewiththerulesofexclusionandauthorizedresourceuse.

Thedifferentstakeholdergroupshaveheterogeneousinterest,

andoftenperceiveverydifferentcostsandbeneﬁtsfromcommon

land.We concludedthat,inademocracy,newinstitutional

eco-nomicscontributestoemerginginstitutionalecologicaleconomics

bysheddingnewlightonurgentareasofenvironmentalpolicyand

governance.Theinstitutionalapproachhelpsustoexaminehow

theattributesofenvironmentalresourcesandtheiruserscancreate

interdependenceandconﬂicts.

Areasonableguidelinefordevolutionprograms(Lopesetal.,

2013) is to ensure that user groups’ rights are commensurate

withtheirresponsibilitiesinmanagingtheresource.Thisimplies

thatcases of“community-basedresource management”(where

userstakeovermoreof themanagement function)wouldhave

strongeruserrightsthancasesofjointmanagement(wherethe

stateretainsan activerole in managingthe system).However,

eveninthecaseofjointorco-management,someofﬁcial

afﬁrma-tionoftheusersrightsmayberequiredtocoalesceorstrengthen

localcollectiveaction,andtoplaceusersonarelativelymoreeven

footingwiththegovernmentalagencystaff.Theintra-household

andintra-communitybargainingliteraturehasshownthatthose

withmoreassets(especiallypropertyrights)aretreatedbetterand

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Table3

StakeholdersindemocraticgovernanceofPortuguesecommonland.

Stakeholders Stakeholderexpectations

regardingtocommonland

Sourceofitslegitimacy Speciﬁcgoodand

servicestheyuse

Characteristics

ofgoods

Interns Commoners Goodandservices Law,rules-in-use Firewood,grazing

water,honey

Rival

Localmanagement

organizations

Incomeandresources Law,rules-in-use Incometosell:

-timber

-resin

windfarm

Non-rival

Parish Resourcesandrevenuesforthe

beneﬁtoftheparish

Law,rules-in-use Incometosell:

-timber

-resin

windfarm

Non-rival

Externs NationalForestAuthority Areasproducingnational

wealthMinimizeconﬂicts

LawsPublicinterest Incometotimber Non-rival

NationalAuthorityof

conservationof

biodiversity

conservationofbiodiversity

andecosystem

LawsPublicinterest Biodiversity

Watershedprotection

Non-rival

EnvironmentONG’s Apartnerintheconservation

ofbiodiversityandecosystem

Speciﬁcinterests

(environment)

Biodiversity

Watershedprotection

Non-rival

Huntingandﬁshingclubs Resourceshuntingandﬁshat

lowcost

Speciﬁcinterests Gameandﬁsh Rival

Businessandindustrial

companies

Strategiclocationsfor

installationofinfrastructureat

lowcost

Speciﬁcinterests Rawmaterials

Windfarms,inert

quarries

Rival

1997; Haddad et al., 1997; Quisumbing, 1994).Over than 80%

of Portuguesecommonland are co-managementwiththe

cen-tralgovernment.Berkes(2002)notedthatco-managementisnot

merelyataskofassigningcomponentsofanenvironmental

prob-lemtovariousgroupsofparticipantsandtheirassociatedproperty

regimes.Becauseofcross-scalesocialandbiophysicallinkages,the

interplaybetweenlocalandcentralgovernancestructuresmust

alsobetakenintoaccount(Young,2002;Hilletal.,2010).

Addi-tionally,co-managementisnotnecessarilybetweenamonolithic

centralgovernmentandonecoherentcommunity.Rather,itisa

morecomplexarrangementbetweenmultiplesourcesof

gover-nance,orwhathasbeenreferredtoaspolycentricity(McGinnis,

1999;Ostrom,1990).Thisprinciplealsoappliestonegotiationsand

interactionsbetweentheusersandagenciesinco-management

sit-uations:userswithrecognizedrightsaremorelikelytohaveasay

indecision-making.WiththePortugueseApril25th1974

revolu-tiontherewasaspreadofcommonlandownership,primarilyas

aresultofthepresenceofseveralinstitutionsaskingforexclusion

powers;thepersistenceofthepreviousadministrativeauthorities

(ForestService)isthentiedwiththeincipientinstitutionalization

ofthenewcommoners’committeesandthesustainedwishesof

smallfarmers.

Conclusion

Thereisanon-goingdebateonhowtoassignvalueto

ecosys-temsservices.Thereareseverallimitationsinthisstudyespecially

withregardtotheprecisionofthemonetaryestimationofsome

ecosystemservices.However,webelievethatdistributionand

sus-tainabilityissues are the debatethat follows. In this paper we

havearguedthatthereareinterdependenciesbetweenlanduse

anddistributiveissuesonecosystemservices.Wefoundthatthe

differentlandusearrangementsimplydistinctproblemsin

dis-tribution of its beneﬁts. We observed that, as we move away

fromnaturalized(forestandshrubs)tomanmade(mountain

agri-culture and other uses) land cover thedistribution of beneﬁts

becomesmoreasymmetric.Wecanconcludethatdifferenttypes

of land cover allow different types of activities and provide a

veryasymmetricdistributionofincome.Theforestlanduseisthe

onewithmore products/services,thereforethe economicvalue

perhacompared withotherlanduses (inlandwater andother

uses)islow.Itisexpected,andsupportedbyempiricalevidence,

thatcommonersprefertheseusestotraditionalones(forestsand

pastures).DeforestationisarealityinPortuguesecommonland,

however,forestlanduseisthemorebalancedlanduseforwealth

distribution.

The Lorenz curves are given for distribution discrepancies

betweendifferentgroups;itisnowclearforustheneedto

mea-sureinequality,takingintoaccountecosystemservices.Thegroups

of peoplearenot homogeneous,and computation of inequality

inthedistributionofPortuguesewealthbetweenPortugueseand

non-Portuguesecitizensisimportantsincesomeofecosystem

ser-vicescanhaveplanetaryscales(i.e.conservationofbiodiversity

and climatechange).Howeverwe havea full awarenessof the

disparityin thetotal populationbetweenPortugal and therest

of theWorld. Theneoclassic approachmay tendtoview these

exercises as almost meaningless. The results showed that the

contemporary institutional arrangementsof wealthdistribution

ensurearelativelyequitabledistributioninsiderofsystem,

how-everthisinstitutionalarrangementisunabletoensureequitable

distributionofwealthbyexternalstakeholders.NoPortuguese

gov-ernmentornon-governmentalregulatorybodyisaccountableto

non-Portuguesepeopleformanagement ofPortuguesecommon

lands.The relationship betweenPortuguese citizens and

trans-nationalgroupingsliketheWTOortheEUismorecomplex,but

certainlyisnotthesameastherelationshipofthePortuguese

peo-pletotheirowngovernment.

Researchersthatexaminemeasuresofhorizontalinequalities

havegenerallyfoundstrongerevidenceforapositiverelationship

betweeninequalityandconﬂict(Stewart,2002;Østby,2008;Østby

etal.,2009;Cedermanetal.,2011).Weobservedthatthereisa

needforsigniﬁcantdevelopmentsininstitutionalarrangements,

inordertomakethemmorejustonwealthdistributionto

exter-nalstakeholders.Thepercapitavaluetonon-Portuguesecitizens

ofallthegoodsthatareproducedbyPortuguesecommonlands

isboundtobeverysmall,becauseofthedisparityintotal

popu-lationbetweenPortugalandtherestoftheworld.Thisargument

isvalidonthedemandandsupplypointofview,thusthevalue

ofecosystemservicesseemstohavebeengreatlyunderestimated.

Thestraightjacketofneoclassicaltheorywillhavetobebrokenin

othertoopenthepathtoalternativewaysofintegratingnatureand

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AppendixA. Supplementarydata

Supplementarydataassociatedwiththisarticlecanbefound,

in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.

2014.12.008.

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