Revista
de
Administração
http://rausp.usp.br/ RevistadeAdministração52(2017)456–466
Strategy
and
Business
Economics
Organizational
tolerance
in
agro-industrial
systems:
an
empirical
application
for
the
meat
sector
Tolerância
organizacional
em
sistemas
agroindustriais:
uma
aplica¸cão
empírica
para
o
setor
de
carnes
Tolerancia
organizacional
en
sistemas
agroindustriales:
una
aplicación
empírica
para
el
sector
de
carnes
Silvia
Morales
de
Queiroz
Caleman
a,∗,
Decio
Zylbersztajn
b,
Matheus
Wemerson
Gomes
Pereira
a,
Gustavo
Magalhães
de
Oliveira
baUniversidadeFederaldeMatoGrossodoSul,CampoGrande,MS,Brazil
bUniversidadedeSãoPaulo,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administra¸cãoeContabilidade,SãoPaulo,SP,Brazil
Received2February2016;accepted22November2016 Availableonline8September2017
ScientificEditor:PaulaSaritaBigioSchnaider
Abstract
BasedontheMeasurementCostTheory,thisstudyfocusesonthecoexistenceofinstitutionalarrangementsincoordinatingcomplexagribusiness systems.Undertherationaleof“OrganizationalTolerance”,theexistenceofpluralformsisinvestigatedintheacquisitionofcattle,poultry,and swinebythemeatpackingindustryintheStateofMatoGrossodoSul.Ingeneralterms,thedegreeoforganizationaltoleranceanditsdeterminants areassessedinthisstudy.Tothisend,98farmerswereinterviewedandthedataanalyzedbyapplyinganOrderedLogitmodel.Themainhypothesis isthatOrganizationalToleranceisrelatedtothedifficultyofmeasuringattributesofthetransactedproducts.Thefindingsshowthatthedifficulty ofmeasuringtheanimalconditionisstatisticallysignificant(5%)fortheexistenceofahigherOrganizationalTolerance.Othervariablessuchas tradition(5%),cooperation(10%),andadoptionofcontracts(1%)alsoexplainthedegreeofOrganizationalToleranceinagro-productivesystems. Understandingthedeterminantsoforganizationalchoiceisessentialtotheidentificationofefficientsolutionsforthecoordinationofproductive systemsinagribusiness,andfortheestablishmentofpublicandprivatestrategiesforthesector.
©2017DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublishedbyElsevierEditoraLtda.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBYlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Keywords: Agribusiness;Institutionalarrangements;Coordination;Diversity
Resumo
ApartirdaóticadaTeoriadosCustosdeMensurac¸ãoestapesquisafocalizaacoexistênciadearranjosinstitucionaisnacoordenac¸ãodesistemas agroindustriaiscomplexos.CombasenoargumentodaTolerânciaOrganizacional,investiga-seacoexistênciadeformasdecontratac¸ãonaaquisic¸ão deanimalparaabatenossistemasagroindustriaisdefrango,suínosebovinosemMatoGrossodoSul.Demodogeral,avaliam-seograudetolerância organizacionaldestessistemasprodutivoseseusdeterminantes.Paratanto,98produtoresruraisdosreferidossistemasforamentrevistados,sendo osdadosanalisadospormeiodaaplicac¸ãodeummodeloLogitOrdenado.AhipótesecentraléqueaTolerânciaOrganizacionalérelacionadaao graudedificuldadedemensurac¸ãodeatributosdoprodutotransacionado.Osresultadosdapesquisaapontamqueadificuldadedemensurac¸ão doatributo“conformidadedoanimal”éestatisticamentesignificativaparaaexistênciademaiortolerânciaorganizacionalaonívelde5%.Outras variáveiscomotradic¸ão(5%),cooperac¸ão(10%)eadoc¸ãodecontratos(1%)tambémexplicamograudeTolerânciaOrganizacionalobservadosnos
∗Correspondingauthorat:AvenidaSenadorFilintoMuller,Unidade10,Caixa-postal:549,CEP79070-900,CampoGrande,MS,Brazil.
E-mail:silviacaleman@gmail.com(S.M.Caleman).
PeerReviewundertheresponsibilityofDepartamentodeAdministrac¸ão,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸ãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo –FEA/USP.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2016.11.001
sistemasinvestigados.Acompreensãodosdeterminantesdasescolhasorganizacionaiséfundamentalparaaidentificac¸ãodassoluc¸õeseficientes paraacoordenac¸ãodesistemasprodutivosnoagronegócioeparaoestabelecimentodeestratégiaspublicaseprivadasparaosetor.
©2017DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Este ´eumartigoOpenAccesssobumalicenc¸aCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave:Agronegócio;Arranjosinstitucionais;Coordenac¸ão;Diversidade
Resumen
ConbaseenlaTeoríadeEstimacióndeCostos,seanalizaenesteestudiolacoexistenciadearreglosinstitucionalesenlacoordinacióndesistemas agroindustrialescomplejos.ApartirdelrazonamientodelaToleranciaOrganizacional,seinvestigalaexistenciadediversasformasdecontrato enlaadquisicióndeganado,avesycerdosenlaindustriaempacadoradecarneenelEstadodeMatoGrossodoSul.Entérminosgenerales,se evalúanelgradodetoleranciaorganizacionaldeestossistemasproductivosysusdeterminantes.Paraello,seentrevistarona98productoresyse analizaronlosdatospormediodeunmodelologitordenado.LahipótesisprincipalesquelaToleranciaOrganizacionalserelacionaconelnivel dedificultadparamedirlosatributosdelosproductosnegociados.Losresultadosmuestranqueladificultaddemedirelatributoadecuacióndel animalesestadísticamentesignificativa(5%)paralaexistenciadeunamayortoleranciaorganizacional.Otrasvariablescomolatradición(5%),la cooperación(10%)ylaadopcióndecontratos(1%)tambiénexplicanelgradodetoleranciaorganizacionalenlossistemasproductivosestudiados. Lacomprensión delosfactoresquedeterminanlaeleccióndelaorganizaciónesesencialenlaidentificacióndesolucioneseficientesparala coordinacióndelossistemasproductivosdelaagroindustriayparaqueseestablezcanestrategiaspúblicasyprivadasparaelsector.
©2017DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Esteesunart´ıculoOpenAccessbajolalicenciaCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palabrasclave: Agroindustria;Arreglosinstitucionales;Coordinación;Diversidad
Introduction
TheefficiencyofanAgro-IndustrialSystem1(AgS)isbased onitsabilitytocreate,sustain,anddistributevalue.Forthis,the
coordinationmechanismsare indispensable.Valuecreationis
associatedwithinnovation; sustainingisrelatedtothewayin
whichagentscandesignmechanismstoprotect thevalue
cre-ated(Monteiro&Zylbersztajn,2012);andthevaluedistribution resultsfromthesolutionofdistributionalproblemsin transac-tions.From thesustaininganddistributingeffortscanemerge potentialconflicts,leadingtoapossibledestructionofthevalue createdintheAgS.
Value creation can be associated with investment in
spe-cific assets that, subject to an environment of uncertainties, informationalasymmetry,andlimitedrationalityoftheagents, leads to the occurrence of transactioncosts. Finding institu-tionalarrangements2thatminimizesuchcostsandpreventthe occurrenceofopportunisticbehaviorandcontractualbreaches isimperativeforanefficientcoordinationthatresultsincreation andvalueprotection(Monteiro&Zylbersztajn,2012; Zylber-sztajn&Caleman,2012).
Itisassumedthatvaluecreationinagiveninstitutional envi-ronment,basedontheproposalofefficientalignmentproposed byWilliamson(1996),wouldresultinsomedegreeof
conver-1 TheconceptofAgro-IndustrialSystemsAgSincorporatestheinstitutional environmentaspectstotheproductivechainapproach,suchassupportand regu-lationinstitutions,notexclusivelyfocusedonsequentialproducttransformation (Zylbersztajn,2000).
2 Institutionalarrangementsaregovernancemechanismsdesignedtogenerate
incentivesforcooperationamongeconomicagents.Thus,contracts, partner-ships,andstrategicalliancesareexamplesofhybridformsofcoordinationthat representinstitutionalarrangementsunderthelogicofTransactionCost Eco-nomics(TCE).Theterminology“institutionalarrangements”isusedbasedon freetranslationofinstitutionalarrangements,atermadoptedbyWilliamson (1996)totreatthesamephenomenon.
gence of the observedarrangements. That is,agents observe
and replicate organizational solutions that demonstrate
posi-tive results.However, analyzingthe arrangementsadopted in
AgSrevealsagreatdiversityintheformsofcontracting.Itis worthnotingthatthisdiversityisobservedevenintransactions that are similarin terms of asset specificity andinstitutional
environment rules.Nevertheless, transactions are coordinated
differently, witharrangementsthat persistovertime, suggest-ingtheirstability(Zylbersztajn&Nogueira,2002).Thisfinding motivatedtheefforttounderstandthecoexistence of arrange-mentsinasingleinstitutionalenvironment.
Incontrasttothealignmentproposalofinstitutional
arrange-mentsofferedbyTransactionCostEconomics(TCE),onecan
ask:wouldnotthediversityofarrangementsbeakindof regular-ity?Inaddition,agro-industrialsystemspresentdifferentrates ofadoptionofspecificarrangements(Zylbersztajn&Nogueira, 2002).Facedwiththediverserealityofarrangements,asetof questionsmaybepresented:Howcanthedifferentadoptionrates
ofspecificarrangementsamongAgSbeexplained,considering
specificityandsimilarinstitutionalenvironments?Ifthereisan
efficientand thereforesuperior arrangement, whyisthere no
convergencetoasinglegovernancemechanism?
Different explanations for the diversity of institutional
arrangements coexist in the literature. In general, this
coex-istence is explained as resulting from variablessuch as path
dependence,distinctinstitutionalenvironments,changesinthe transactionpattern(leadingtosituationsofimbalance),and spe-cificnon-transferableroutines(Zylbersztajn&Nogueira,2002). Suchexplanationsexploreanaspectwhichislargelyabsentfrom
the theorydevelopedby Williamson(1996),whichgenerated
thehypothesisofefficientalignment,thatis,thenon-diversity ofinstitutionalarrangements.
powerstructure,timeneededforthediffusionofefficient mod-els (informational asymmetries), differences in institutional
environment and coordination failures (Caleman, 2010), the
diversityofcoordinationformsinagivenAgScouldsignalthe existenceofthesystem’sowncharacteristics,thisfeaturecalled “Organizational Tolerance” (Zylbersztajn &Caleman, 2012). “OrganizationalTolerance”isdefinedas thedegreeofvariety ofinstitutional arrangementsobservedinsimilartransactions,
andits analysis is developed from the theoretical framework
proposed byBarzel (1997) inthe Measurement Cost Theory
(MCT), which accounts for a little-explored line of study in
TransactionCostEconomics(TCE).
ThepresentstudyfocusesontheAgSofswine,poultry,and cattle,characterizedby differentorganizationaltolerance pat-terns, with the poultry sectorpresenting the highest rates of formalcontractsadoption(lessdiversityofinstitutional arrange-mentstypes);andthebeefcattlesectorpresentingthegreatest diversityof arrangements,including coordinationthroughthe market,formalcontracts,agreements,partnerships,marketing alliances,andverticalintegration.Thechoiceofproductive ani-malproteinsystemstoperformthisresearchallowstheanalysis andcomparisonof organizational solutionsinsimilar institu-tionalenvironments,3exemplifiedbythesanitaryrequirements foranimalproduction,whichdespitetheexistenceofdiseases
specifictoeach animal,followsimilarparametersdefined by
nationalandinternationalagencies.
Whenanalyzingthecoordinationpattern inagro-industrial
systems,Macdonald(2006)pointsoutthatcontracted
produc-tionofcattle, swine,andchickens/eggs in2003intheUnited
Statesaccountedforrespectively28.9%,57.3%,and88.2%of
thetotal.ForBrazil,Zylbersztajn(2005)estimatesthatin poul-try,atleast59.5%oftheproductionwasorganizedbycontracts,
while in swine production the rates reach 30–40%. Various
authorshaveobserved,inthecaseofbeefcattle,thelow
adop-tion rate of contractsbetween suppliersandthe meatpacking
industryinBrazil(Pitelli&Moraes,2006;Silveira,Carrer, Car-valho,Foscaches,&Saes,2014),intherangeof0–25%,with thehighestratebeingforanimalswhicharetracedinaspecific exportingfirm.Inadditiontotheexistenceornotofcontracts, therearevariationsinthecontractualterms.Thatis,institutional arrangements, inthe form of formal contracts,are character-izedbysignificantdifferences,whichincludetheuseofvarious
mechanismsofguarantees,deadlines,andwaysofmeasuring
thetransactedattributes.
Themotivation of thepresent study istheinvestigation of thecoexistenceofinstitutionalarrangementsincomplex
agro-3 Thediscussionaboutthelimitsoftheinstitutionalenvironmentandthe parametertobesetineachagro-industrialsystem,orinotherwordsthedegreeof similarityand/ordifferenceamonginstitutionalenvironmentsandtheir respec-tiveAgS,isarelevantquestionforananalysisthatiswillingtounderstand organizationalsolutionsinagricultural-basedproductionsystems.Inorderto delimittheinstitutionalenvironmentinthisstudy,itfocusesonhealthissuesfor animalproduction,consideringthatthereisacommonscopeinhealth legisla-tionforthemeatsectorinBrazil(formalinstitution)andintheregion(Mato GrossodoSul).Still,inthecaseofproductivesystemsoperatinginthesame region(MS),thereisagreatersimilarityregardingculturalandtraditionissues inlivestockproduction(informalinstitution).
industrialsystems.Havingasitsobjectthetransactionsbetween
farmers and the slaughtering and processing industry in the
chicken,swine,andcattleagribusinesssystemsinMatoGrosso doSul,itaimstoevaluatetheorganizationaltoleranceofthese productive systems. Specifically, it seeks to: (i) identify the diversityofinstitutionalarrangementsintheseproductive sys-tems;(ii)analyzethevariabilityofthetransactedattributesand its degreeof measurability;and(iii)evaluate therelationship
betweenmeasurementcostsandthediversityofarrangements.
Theoreticalfoundation
Theco-existenceofinstitutionalarrangementsforthe coordi-nationoftransactionsinthesameinstitutionalenvironmentand involvingsimilartransactionalcharacteristicsisacurrenttheme. Atheoreticalbranchthatinvestigatesthediversityof coordina-tion forms, called“plural forms” of coordination, is inspired by a vast literature on franchises (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Lafontaine &Slade,2007; Silva&Azevedo, 2007). Accord-ingtotheseauthors,thereisapluralityofcoordinationformsof therelationshipbetweenfranchiseeandfranchisor,co-existing productdistributionstructuresthrough itsownstores(vertical integration), andfranchisedstores(coordinatedbycontracts).
Moreover, in the argument of “plural forms”, but advancing
the proposition of othervariablesfor the transactionanalysis (ambiguity,complexity,andstrategicbehavior),Menard(2013)
developsamodelthatisempiricallytestedintheagricultural sec-torbyMenard,Saes,Silva,andRaynaud(2014).Furthermore,
Monteverde andTeece (1982) investigated the occurrence of hierarchicalsolutionssimultaneoustocontractsinthe automo-bileindustry,andZylbersztajnandNogueira(2002)analyzedthe coexistenceofcontractualarrangementsintheBrazilianpoultry industry,arguingthatthephenomenonoccursduetosituations of imbalance,barriersfor theadoptionofthenewcontractual arrangement,andeffectsoftheinstitutionalenvironment. How-ever,thesestudiesalldialogtosomeextentwiththetheoretical
assumptions of Transaction Cost Economics, whose analysis
variablesarestronglyrelatedtoassetspecificityandtransaction frequency.
Under a distinct theoretical approach, aligned with the
assumptionsoftheMeasurementCostsTheory(Barzel,1997),
the Organizational Tolerance argument for the study of the
diversityofinstitutionalarrangementsisproposedinthisstudy (Zylbersztajn&Caleman,2012).ThetermOrganizational
Tol-erancewasinspiredbytheconceptofTechnologicalTolerance
treated by Farina, Azevedo, and Saes (1997), based on the
referencepointsdevelopedbyHirschman(1958)inIndustrial
Organizationtheory.Fortheauthor,thereisadifferentiationof
the productive systems duetogreater or lesser technological
tolerance.Thus,inless tolerantsystems, thereisalow diver-sityoftechnologiesadoptedintheproductiveprocess:thesame
technological standard is adopted by most of the productive
agents.
In general, these standards represent higher technological sophistication,notobservedinhightolerancesystemsthatallow thecoexistenceofdifferenttechnologystandards.Waak(2000)
technologicaltolerance,whilethebeefAgSpresentsahigh tol-erancesystem,inwhich“therearevaccinesofdifferentquality
standards,varied productionandhandling systems and[]the
beefweconsumecanbefoundwithdifferentqualitystandards” (Waak, 2000, 344). Thus,just as productive systems present greaterorlessertoleranceoftechnologicaldiversity,wouldthese sameproductionsystemsbesubjecttogreaterorlessertolerance towardthediversityofinstitutionalarrangements?
The concept of Organizational Tolerance (Zylbersztajn & Caleman, 2012), developed on the basis of the theoretical
assumptions of Measurement Costs Theory (MCT) (Barzel,
1997),is defined as the variety of institutional arrangements observedinsimilartransactionsinthesameinstitutional
envi-ronment. This concept is applied to the study of complex
institutionalarrangementsinwhichthecoexistenceof coordina-tionformsadoptedbytheeconomicagentsisobserved,having asavariable ofanalysis themeasuring costof the transacted attributes.
Convergentwiththediversityhypothesis,theMCTisa the-oreticalpartthatcontributestotheexplanationofthediversity ofinstitutionalarrangements,countingontheargumentofthe variabilityofthetransactionalattributesandof their measure-mentcosts.ForBarzel(1997),thestrategicvariableisnotasset specificity(Williamson,1996),butthedegreeofattribute mea-surability.Itisonthebasisofthisargumentthatthehypothesis thatproductive systems maypresentparticular characteristics
which make them more or less tolerant to the institutional
arrangementsdiversity,thatis,withhigherorsmallertolerance tothecoexistenceofdifferentarrangements.
TheMeasurementCostTheory(Barzel,1997)isconsidered
abranch of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985;
Zylbersztajn,2005);howeverotherauthorsemphasizeitsroots inthePropertyRightsTheory(Allan&Luek,1998;Caleman, 2010;Monteiro&Zylbersztajn,2012;Zylbersztajn,2005).
According to Barzel (1997) property rights may be legal
and/oreconomic.LegalrightsareguaranteedbytheState,while
economicrightsareguaranteedbyprivatemechanismssuchas
acompany’sequityandreputation.Therightsthatindividuals actuallyhaveover agivenassetresult fromeffortstoprotect them,fromeffortstocaptureitsvalue,andfromtheprotection offeredbythe State.The centralissueisthe costof defining andofguaranteeingtheserights,4sotherightsarenotperfectly delineatedwhilebeingsubjecttocapture.Thedifficultyin defin-ingrightsisrelatedtotheirmultidimensionalcharacter,5andto thevariabilityofthetransactedattribute,whichthereforecreates spaceforthevaluecapture.
4 Fortheauthor,transactioncostsarethecostsassociatedwiththetransfer, capture,andpropertyrightsprotection(Barzel,1997,p.2).
5 ForBarzel(1997),transactedassetsshouldbeanalyzedasasetofattributes, hencethetransaction’smultidimensionalnature.Thus,eachdimensionisrelated tothedefinitionandguaranteeofapropertyright.Acquiringafruitrepresents acquiringaweight,ashape,acolor,avariety,aflavor,asanitarycondition,an origin,etc.
Toillustratethisargument,theacquisitionoflivestockbythe slaughterandprocessingindustryshouldbeanalyzed.The ani-malforslaughterisnotaone-dimensionalasset.Inadditionto thegender(maleorfemale),aswellasitsweightandage, dimen-sions traditionally recognized by the industry, a setof other attributes andby-products areinserted inthisproduct generi-callydenominated“finishedanimalforslaughter”.Attributesof quality,sanitarycondition,andtraceabilityarealsotransactedat thetimeofsale.Thus,theslaughteranimalisaclassicexample ofamultidimensionalproduct,whereeachdimensiondiffersin thedegreeofmeasurementdifficulty.
The animal for slaughter presents a set of margins—age,
weight, gender, sanitaryconditions, traceability, fatfinishing,
viscera,andleather,amongothers—andpartof thesemargins
maynotbecontractedatthemomentoftheanimal’s
commer-cialization.Asaresult,thereisasetofmarginsinthetransaction that,whennoteffectivelycontracted,fallintothepublicdomain, becomingsusceptibletocapturebytheeconomicagents,inthis casethemeatpackingindustry.Thereisthusroomforconflictin thetransactionofdifferentnatures:discussionofcarcassyields, non-remunerationofqualityattributes,discountsduetoanimal
non-compliance,non-remunerationforleather,amongothers.
Barzel(1997)advancesinrelationtothePropertyLaw The-orymainstreamwhenidentifyingandcharacterizingitsdifferent
dimensions: legal right, economic right, and right in public
domain,thelastbeingadimensioninwhichoneoftheparties
is capable of appropriating the value even if it is protected
(imperfectly)bylaw orbyprivatemechanisms.Accordingto
thispresentstudy’sauthor,theexistenceofrightsinthepublic domain leadstodissipationof the transactionvalue,andthis
valuecanbecaptured byeconomicagents.ForMonteiroand
Zylbersztajn (2012), the risk of value capturemay occur not
onlyinthepublicdomainbutalsointhosedomainsprotected
bylegalandeconomicrights,sincethesealsohaveprotection costsinthefaceofvalueappropriation.
Thus,forBarzel(1997),thekeyvariablefortheefficient coor-dinationanalysiswouldnotbeassetspecificityasproposedby
Williamson(1985,1996),butthemeasurabilityofthetransacted attributes.Itisunderstoodthatthistheoreticalbranchalsoallows foreseeing the possibility of co-existent institutional
arrange-ments, since the assets are consideredmultidimensionaland,
dependingonthemeasurabilityofeachdimensionofthe trans-action,therewillbeamoreefficientcoordinationmechanism. Thefocusisthetransactionvalueandnotitscostsminimization (Zylbersztajn,2005).
Ingeneral,coordinationthroughthemarketarisesfrom trans-actionswitheasilymeasurableattributes,whoserightsguarantee isexercisedbythelegalsystem(judiciary).Hierarchical coor-dination results from the transactionof attributes of difficult (orextremelycostly)measurement,withthefirm’sassetsbeing
the guarantee for the transaction. Hybrid forms of
coordina-tionwouldinvolverelationalcontracts,withreputationbeingthe sourceoftransactionguarantee.Thus,thetransactionofgreater
valueresults fromthe adequateform ofguarantee offeredby
Inordertoanalyzethediversityofinstitutionalarrangements
linkedtomeasurementcosts,twobasicassumptionsaremade:
Assumption1:“Thediversityof institutionalarrangements arisesfromtheproportionofeasily-measuredattributesthat provideincentivesforconvergence,anddifficult-to-measure attributesthatimplydiversearrangements.”
Assumption2:“Thehighertheproportionofeasily-measured attributes with rights protected by formal institutions, the smallerthevariabilityofinstitutionalarrangementsinagiven hybridformofcoordination.”
In summary, in the presence of mechanisms that define
and properly protect property rights, transactions are carried out atlow cost.If propertyrights are notadequately defined
and protected, some value will be subject to capture, either
because of imperfections in the protection of legal and
eco-nomic rights, or because they fall into the public domain.
Thus, the institutional arrangement results from a
combina-tionof formalinstitutionalprotections, relatedtolegalrights,
and informal institutional protections related to economic
rights.
Methodology
The object of this study is the transaction that involves
the acquisitionof animals for slaughter bythe slaughter and
processingindustry.Theanalysisunitisthetransactionbetween producers(poultryfarmers,swinefarmers,andcattleranchers) andtheprocessingindustry.Itseekstoidentifythegovernance pattern inthese transactions through analysis of the
acquisi-tion of animals under the commoditystandard. A commodity
standardisaproductthatdoesnothaveabrand,seal,or certifi-cationauditedbythirdparties,andisthereforenotintendedfor specificanddifferentiatedmarketniches.Asanexample, differ-entiatedproductsfromorganicproduction,productionsystems focusing on precocity andquality (earlycalf, golden piglet), amongothers,willnotbepartofthisstudy.Productsdestinedto theinternationalmarketswhichdonotpresentspecificstamps, brands,andcertificationsareconsideredascommoditiesinthis research.
Thestudywasdevelopedthroughthecollectionofprimary
and secondarydata. Secondary data collection (documentary
andbibliographicresearch)wascarried outtoachievea
gen-eral understanding of the respective AgSinMato Grosso do
Sul.Semi-structuredinterviewswerepreviouslyconductedwith AgS’sectorleadersinpoultry,swine,andcattle(rural produc-ers,slaughterandprocessingindustry)inMatoGrossodoSul.
The aim of theseinterviews was tocharacterize andidentify
the standard(s) of animal contracting for slaughter, the
vari-ablesconsideredinthe transaction,measurementaspects and
guaranteesoftransactedattributes,aswellasthemainconflicts involved.Fromtheseexploratoryinterviewsitwaspossibleto elaborateasemi-structuredquestionnairethatwaslaterapplied toruralproducers(poultryproducers,swinefarmers,andcattle ranchers).
Table1
Standardoftransactionofanimalsforslaughter.
Contracts Agreementsa Market Others
Poultry 100% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Swine 66.7% 15.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Cattle 3.0% 42.4% 63.6% 9.1%
Source:Researchdata.
aFor thedatatabulation, “contracts”were understood as formalwritten contracts,dulysigned.The“agreements”categoryinvolvesasetofinformal solutionssuchasunsignedcontractsbetweentheparties,verbalagreements basedonthereputationoftheagents—cattleranchersandindustries.Inthecase of“agreements”,reputationisaguaranteeofthetransaction,notthecourts.
The sample consists of 98 observations,6 divided into 33
poultry farmers, 25 swine farmers, and 40 cattle ranchers.
Dependingontheinterviewees’availability,the questionnaire wasappliedeitherpersonally(60%ofthequestionnairesabout
swine,100%aboutpoultry,and30%about cattle)or by
tele-phone(40%swine,0%poultry,and70% cattle).Aproducers
registerprovidedbytheStateAgencyforAnimalandPlant Pro-tection(IAGRO/MS)wasusedtoidentifycattleranchers.Asfar
aspoultryfarmersandswinefarmerswereconcerned,producer
associationsandcooperativesprovidedproducercontacts.Inthis wayaconvenientandnon-probabilisticsamplewasobtained.7
In order to guarantee a comparison standard between the
different productive systems surveyed, the questionnaire
pre-sentedsimilarquestions forthetransactionpatternevaluation, respectingparticularitiesregardingthetransactedattributes.
Analyticalmodel
Theanalyticalmodelchosenforthisstudydevelopmentisthe
OrderedLogit.AccordingtoWooldridge(2002),suchamodel
allowsthevariableresponsetohavemorethantwoorderedor
hierarchicalcategories.Theempiricalapplicationconsideredthe degreeof organizationaltolerance (TD)of theagro-industrial
systems of poultry, swine,andcattle as adependent variable
suchas:
TD=
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩
1 LowOrganizationalTolerance
2 AverageOrganizationalTolerance
3 HighOrganizationalTolerance
(1)
The organizational tolerance degree (TD), categorized as high/average/low,arisesfromthediversityofthetransaction pat-ternbetweensuppliersandslaughterandprocessingindustries. AccordingtoTable1,presentedintheresultsdiscussion,beef cattle showed greater diversityinthe transactionpattern,and thushighorganizationaltolerance,followedbyswineand
poul-6Asoneoftherespondentsdidnotanswersomequestions,thefinalmodel has97observations.
tryrespectively,withthepoultrysectorbeingtheleastdiverse inthetransactionpattern,andthusloworganizationaltolerance. Inorderingorganizationaltolerance,themaximumlikelihood ratio test is used, based onthe comparisonof the likelihood functionoftherestrictedmodel(i.e.theorderedmodel)8with the unrestricted model function (i.e., the unordered model),9 definedbyJohnstonandDinardo(2001):
λ= L∗
L, (2)
whereL*isthevalueofthelikelihoodfunctionoftherestricted (ordered)model;L,thevalueofthelikelihoodfunctionofthe unrestricted(unordered)model,and0≤λ≤1.10Thetest statis-tic,whichisthelogarithmofthelikelihoodratio,isequivalent to:
LR=2(ln L−lnL∗)∼χ2m, (3) wherethevariableLRischaracterizedbythedistributionof chi-square(χ2),withmdegreesoffreedom.11 Thenullhypothesis tobetestedisthattheorderedmodelisequaltotheestimated non-orderedmodel,or,inotherwords,
H0:Orderedmodel=Unorderedmodel.
H1:Orderedmodel=/ Unorderedmodel.
(4)
Ifthenullhypothesisisrejected,theorderedmodelwillbe chosen,andtheproducerwillfacethreelevelsoforganizational tolerance.Incasethenullhypothesisisnotrejected,onlyhigh organizationaltolerancewillbeused,ornot.
AccordingtoCapéau,Decoster,andVermeulen(2003),the
OrderedLogit modelisconstructedfromalinearrelationship
between an unobserved continuous latent variable Y∗
i and a vectorofregressorsXi(kx1),suchthat:
Y∗
t =Xiβ+εi, withi=1,...,n. (5) whereβisaparametervector(kx1)andεtistherandomerror term.Considerthatthevariableεthasalogisticdistribution,the errordistributionfunctionisgivenby:
F(εi)= 1
1+e−εi. (6)
TherelationshipbetweentheunobservedlatentvariableY∗ t andtheobservedresultsof theindividualsatisfactionlevelsi, canberepresentedbythefollowingobservations:
Yi =1 if Yi∗≤µ1,
Yi =2 if µ1≤Yi∗≤µ2,
Yi =3 if µ2≤Yi∗.
(7)
8 EstimatedbytheOrdered Logit,where theproducer faces threelevels (degrees)oforganizationaltolerance.
9 EstimatedbytheLogitmodel,whereitconsiders1iftheproduceradopts ahighdegreeoforganizationaltolerance,and0otherwise.Formoredetailson theLogitmodel,seeJohnstonandDinardo(2001).
10 Thetermλisknownasthelikelihoodratio.
11 Whereinmisthenumberofrestrictionsimposedbythenullhypothesis.
wheretheµk(1≤k≤2)aretheunknownlimitsoftheintervals (cut points)that willbeestimated togetherwiththevectorβ, asmentionedbyParente(2000).Inaddition,theµ’smustmeet thefollowingconditionsµ1<µ2.Assumingthattheerrorterm
islogisticallydistributed,thenthemodel’sprobabilitiescanbe writtenas:
Pr(Yi =1)=Pr(Xiβ+εi≤µ1)=
1
1+exp(Xiβ−µ1)
, Pr(Yi =2)=Pr(Xiβ+εi≤µ2)−Pr(Xiβ+εi≤µ1)
= 1
1+exp(Xiβ−µ2)
− 1
1+exp(Xiβ−µ1)
, Pr(Yi =3)=Pr(µ2≤Xiβ+εi)
=1− 1
1+exp(Xiβ−µ2)
.
(8)
The estimation of the unknown coefficients β and µ is
obtained by the maximum likelihood method. Wooldridge
(2002)statesthatforeveryi,thelog-likelihoodfunctionisgiven by:
li(µ,β)=1[Yi=1]log[Λ(µ1−Xiβ)]+1[Yi =2] log[Λ(µ2−Xiβ)−L(µ1−Xiβ)]+1[Yi =3]
log[1−Λ(µ2−Xiβ)] (9)
whererepresentsthelogisticfunction.
AccordingtoCapéauetal.(2003),themarginaleffectofthe OrderedLogitmodeliscalculatedthroughthederivativeofthe cumulativeprobability,ifPr(Yi≤k),thatis:
∂Pr(Yi≤k)
∂Xji
=−βj
exp(Xiβ−µk) (1+exp(Xiβ−µk))2
, (10)
wherePr(Yi≤k)= 1+(Xi1β−µk).Thisconfirmsthatthe proba-bilitydecreaseswithanincreaseintheexplanatoryvariableif
βjispositive,andtheoppositeoccursifβj≤0.
Themarginaleffectassociatedwiththeprobabilityofthekth satisfactionstageisgivenby:
∂Pr(Yi=k)
∂Xji
=−βj
exp(Xiβ−µk) (1+exp(Xiβ−µk))2
− exp(Xiβ−µk−1)
(1+exp(Xiβ−µk−1))2
(11)
whereXirepresentsthevectoroftheexplanatoryvariablesand
βtheirrespectiveparameters.
The model was estimated using the specialized statistical
packageofDataAnalysisandStatisticalSoftware10(STATA, 2007).
Resultanddiscussion
Thisresearchisconductedbasedonthecentralhypothesis thatOrganizationalToleranceisrelatedtothedegreeofdifficulty inmeasuringthetransactedproductattributes(Zylbersztajn& Caleman, 2012).For the purpose of the study, the following
General Classification
hypotheses
Type of Detailed hypotheses
Variable description
variable
Expected
signal
Tradition in activity Having tradition in the activity implies less
organizational tolerance / less diversity of
institutional arrangements (path dependence)
Dummy –
Longer time in the activity implies lower Time in activity (years)
organizational tolerance / lower diversity of
institutional arrangements (path dependence).
Continuous –
Variables of Producer profile
control
Being part of an association and / or Cooperation
cooperative implies adopting several
negotiating models (more options for
members), thus, a greater diversity of
institutional arrangements.
+
Difficulty in measuring the attribute “weight” of the
animal (high, average, and
low)
H1a/ H1b –The higher / lower the difficulty of measuring the animal's weight, the lower /
higher the Organizational Tolerance.
Dummy +
Difficulty of measuring the
attribute “age” of the
animal (high, average, and
low)
H1a/ H1b –The higher / lower the difficulty of
measuring the animal's age, the lower / higher
the Organizational Tolerance.
Dummy +
Difficulty of measuring the
attribute “quality” of the
animal (high, average, and
low)
H1a/ H1b – The higher / lower the difficulty
of measuring the animal's quality, the lower /
higher the Organizational Tolerance.
Dummy +
Transaction Attributes
H1a; H1b
Difficulty of measuring the
attribute “compliance” of
the animal (high, average,
and low)
H1a/ H1b –The higher / lower the difficulty of
measuring the animal's compliance, the lower /
higher the Organizational Tolerance.
Dummy +
Transaction
Standard
Adoption of formal
contracts for the transaction
H1a –The smaller the measurement difficulty,
the higher the possibility of adopting formal
contracts and the smaller the Organizational
Tolerance.
Dummy –
Organizational
Tolerance
Dependent
Variable
Governance mode of the
transaction
Based on the observed diversity of forms of
contracting animals for slaughter, there are:
High Organizational Tolerance (Cattle); Average Organizational Tolerance (Swine),
and Low Organizational Tolerance (Poultry).
Dummy
Chart1.Variablesoftheeconometricmodel.
H1a:Thehighertheproportionofeasily-measuredattributes, thelowertheOrganizationalTolerance(OT);
H1b: The higher the proportion of less easily-measured
attributes,thehighertheOrganizationalTolerance(OT).
Theresearchwasdevelopedfromthreegroupsofvariables: (i)theproducerprofile;(ii)transactedattributes;and(iii) trans-actionpattern.Tosettheproducer’sprofile,thefollowingpoints
wereanalyzed:thedevelopedactivity(cattle,swine,and poul-try), time in activity (years), tradition (1st generation, 2nd, 3rd, > 3rd) and participation in associations or cooperatives (yes/no).Regardingthetransactedattributes,thedegreeof dif-ficulty (high, average, or low) in measuring the attributes of
weight,age,quality,andanimalcompliancewereanalyzed.In
Table2
Descriptivestatisticsofindependentvariables,OT.
Variable Description Measuredin General
Average Standarddeviation
Time(temp) Timeintheactivity Years 16.41 11.17
Tradition(trad) Traditionintheactivity 1stgeneration=1 2ndgeneration=2 3rdgeneration=3 >3rdgeneration=4
1.82 0.912
Cooperativism(coop) Participationofproducersin someassociationor cooperatives
(Yes=1,No=0) 0.806 0.3973
Transactionstandard(transcont) Ifthetransactionstandard occursviaformalcontract
(Yes=1,No=0) 0.5714 0.4974
Difficultyinmeasuringcompliance(difconf) Producerdifficultyin measuringproduct compliance
(Average/high=1,low=0) 0.2857 0.454
Source:Researchdata.
forthecattletransaction.Thetransactionpatternwasevaluated
based on the governance mode of the transaction: contracts,
agreements,market,orothermodality.
Consideringthetransactionpatternofanimalsforslaughter,it isobservedthatforpoultry100%ofthetransactionsarecarried
outby contract, whilefor swinethisindicator is 66.7%, and
forcattleitis3%.Forcattle,63.6%ofrespondentsreportthat thesaleofanimalsiscarriedoutinthespotmarketand42.4% throughaninformalagreementwiththemeatpacker(Table1).
Basedonthe observedcontracting methodsdiversity, it is
assumed that “Cattle” presents “High Organizational
Toler-ance”;“Swine”presents“AverageOrganizational Tolerance”;
and“Poultry”presents“LowOrganizationalTolerance”.
Theseresultsindicatethatoutofthe97interviewees,32(or 32.98%)arecharacterizedbyhighorganizationaltoleranceand areassociatedwithcattleproduction;25(or 25.77%)havean averageorganizationaltolerance;and40(or41.23%)havelow organizationaltolerance.
Chart1shows thevariablesconsideredintheeconometric model.
Empiricalresults
Regardlessof activity type(cattle, swine,orpoultry), itis observedthat theaverage timeofproducers intheactivity is of16.41years.Thus,onaverage,the producerisclosetothe secondgeneration(1.82).Theaverageparticipationofproducers inassociationsorcooperativesisquitehigh,80.6%.
Onaverage,57.14%ofproducerstransacttheirgoodshaving apre-arrangedformalcontractbeforesale.Regardingthe diffi-cultyofmeasuringtheproductcompliance,only28.57%ofthe producersthinkthatthisdifficultyisaverageorhigh.
Table 2 describes the independent variables, besides the meansandtheirstandarddeviations.Inordertomakethemodel
moreparsimonious, attributesof weight,age, andqualityand
theirrespectiveaspectsofmeasurementwerenotconsideredin thefinalmodelbecausetheydonotpresentstatistical signifi-cance.
Table3
Likelihoodratiotestfororderedmodel.
LogL•=−31.50 χ2 tab
•••=3.84 LogL*••=−42.76 LR>χ2tab
LR=22.52 RejectsHoatthelevelof1%ofsignificance.
Source:Researchdata.
Note:•
LogListhelogarithmvalueoftheunrestricted model’slikelihood function.
••
LogL*isthelogarithmoftherestrictedmodel’slikelihoodfunction. •••
Valueoftheχ2tabatthelevelof0.01ofsignificance,with1degreeoffreedom.
Table3presentsthelikelihoodratiotest,describedin(3),in
whichthehypothesis oforderingthe organizationaltolerance
degreeistested.Statistically,thisisdonebytestingthe hypoth-esisthattheestimatedorderedmodelisequaltotheestimated
modelinanunorderedway.
The test result strongly rejects the hypothesis of equality betweenthemodels,whichindicatesthattheorganizational
tol-erancedegreeisdoneinanorderedway,orinotherwordsis
moreaccuratelyestimatediftheOrderedLogitmodelisused. Itisalsoverifiedthattheestimatedmodelisglobally signif-icant,sincebytheLikelihoodRatio(LR)test,itispossibleto rejectthenullhypothesisthatallcoefficientsassociatedwiththe explanatoryvariablesarenull.
Testswereperformedtodetectheteroscedasticityandserial autocorrelation,sincethepresenceoftheseproblemsinvalidates theuseofthetandFtestsforinferencepurposesandthe estima-torsarenolongerefficient(Greene,2012).ThetestsofWhiteto detectheteroscedasticity,andtheDurbin-Watsontestfor auto-correlationwereperformed,whichdidnotindicatethepresence ofeither,givinggreaterconfidenceinthepresentedresults.
Multicollinearitywastestedforallvariablesandasignificant
relationship was foundbetween timeand tradition, since the
longertheactivityduration,thehigheritsfamilytraditionwill
be.Theproblemwassolvedbyexcludingthevariabletimein
theregressionoftheOrderedLogitmodel.
Table4presentstheestimatesresultsoftheOrderedLogit
Table4
OrderedLogitmodelresultoftheorganizationaltolerancedegree.
Explanatoryvariables Coefficient Standarddeviation
Trad −0.93006** 0.3824
Coop 1.6215*** 0.87627
trans cont 6.1547* 1.2399
difconf 1.6765** 0.6783
(cutpoint1)µ1 2.0476 1.179
(cutpoint2)µ2 65,908 1.6327
PseudoR2 0.5962
Source:Preparedbytheauthors. * Significantat1%.
**Significantat5%.
***Significantat10%;nsnot-significant.
swine,andcattleoftheagro-industrialsystems,calculatedby
STATA10.12
By the results analysis it is verified that the regression as
a wholepresented good predictive power, with aPseudo R2
of 0.6. The “TransactionStandard” variable(transcont)was significant at 1%,while the “Tradition” (trad)and Difficulty inmeasuring compliance(difconf)variablesweresignificant atthe 5% level,while the variable“cooperation” (coop)was significantatthe10%level.
The variable (transcont) showed a sign opposite to the
expected,thatis,theadoptionofcontractscorrelatedpositively tothedegreeoforganizationaltolerance.Theargumentthatthe adoptionofcontractspresupposestheexistenceofattributesof lowcostofmeasurement,whichwouldresultinalower organi-zationaltolerancedegreeinthetransaction,wasnotconfirmed. However,itisafactthatacontractinvolvesasetofnegotiated attributes,possiblywithvaryingmeasurementdifficulties.The detailingofthecontractsbetweenthepartieswasnotanalyzed inthisresearch.Thelackofthisanalysisis,perhaps,an oppor-tunityforimprovement,aswellasapossibleexplanationforthe oppositesignofthisvariableinthestatisticalmodel.
Asexpected,thevariable(coop)showedapositivesign;to
bepart of anassociation orcooperative wouldprovide
mem-berswithvariousbusinessoptions,increasingtheorganizational tolerance.The(trad)variablepresented anegativesign, indi-catingthat the higher the tradition the smaller the degreeof
organizational tolerance,possibly duetopath dependenceor
perhaps also suggesting that variablesassociated with
learn-ing,establishmentofrelationshipswithintheAgS,andprevious experience, are associated with less flexible choice patterns. Also,thevariable(difconf)presentedapositivesign, indicat-ing that the higher the difficulty of measurement, the higher theorganizationaltolerance,corroboratingthetheory.Thus,the study’scentralhypothesisisconfirmed,relatingthedifficultyof measuringtheattribute“animalcompliance”withtheexistence oforganizationaltolerance.
The calculated cut points (cut points) were:
µ1=2.0476<µ2=6.5908, and indicate the intervals where
changeoccursattheorganizationaltolerancelevel.
12FormoredetailsontheestimationoftheOrderedLogitmodelinSTATA, seeSTATA(2007).
Table5
Probabilitiesofoccurrenceofdegreesoforganizationaltolerance.
OT Probability
Pr(Yi=1)LowOrganizationaltolerance 0.45373 Pr(Yi=2)AverageOrganizationaltolerance 0.32125 Pr(Yi=3)HighOrganizationaltolerance 0.2250
Source:Preparedbytheauthors.
Table6
Marginaleffectsforthedifferentlevelsoforganizationaltolerance.
Variable Coef. Standarddeviation
∂Pr(yi=1) ∂xji
Trad 0.13499*** 0.07410
Coop −0.30327NS 0.2024 transcont −0.86081* 0.07240
difconf −0.19283** 0.09838
∂Pr(yi=2) ∂xji
Trad −0.0876NS 0.05933
Coop 0.25165NS 0.18676
transcont 0.44632* 0.1100
difconf 0.07904NS 0.08055
∂Pr(yi=3) ∂xji
Trad −0.04733NS 0.02899
Coop 0.05161NS 0.03224
transcont 0.41449* 0.0861
difconf 0.1137NS 0.08543
Source:Researchresults. *Significantat1%. **Significantat5%.
***Significantat10%;nsnot-significant.
Fromthismodeltheprobabilitiesofoccurrenceofthethree levels oforganizational toleranceareestimated:low,average,
and high, calculated by the mean values of the independent
variables(Table5).
The probability that the degree of organizational
toler-ance islowisPr(Yi=1)=0.45373,or45.37%;theprobability
that the degree of organizational tolerance is average is
Pr(Yi=2)=0.32125,or32.13%;theprobabilitythatthedegree of organizational tolerance is high is Pr(Yi=3)=0.2250, or 22.5%.Therefore,theresultsallowonetostatethatthe proba-bilityofagro-industrialsystemsbeingclassifiedashavinglow oraverageorganizationaltoleranceis77.5%.
Table6showsthemarginaleffectsofthethreeprobabilities, calculatedbythemeanvaluesoftheindependentvariables.
In general,it is observedthat the marginaleffects for the probabilityPr(Yi=1)arenegative,indicatingthattheincrease inoneunitintheexplanatoryvariablesdecreasestheprobability oftheagro-industrialsystemshavingloworganizational toler-ance.However,itisobservedthattheTraditionvariable(trad) presentedapositivesignal,indicatingthatthehigherthe produc-ers’tradition,themoreresistanttheywillbetoadoptasystem withhigherorganizationaltolerance.
WhilemarginaleffectsPr(Yi=2)andPr(Yi=3)arepositive fortheTransactionPatternvariable(transcont),indicatingthat theincreasebyoneunitintheexplanatoryvariablesincreases thelikelihoodoftheagro-industrialsystemshavinghigher
lev-els of organizational tolerance.The othervariables were not
theagro-industrialsystemsbeingconsideredaverageandhigh. Theresultsobtainedwiththestatistical modelcorroboratethe
twohypotheses presented. Thesimpler andlowerthecost of
measuringattributes,thelowertheobservedtolerancedegree. Thisresultsfromtheinductiveroleofformalinstitutionsinthe presenceoflegalpropertyrights.
Conclusions
Theobservationofthegovernancemodesoftheinstitutional
arrangementsincomplexagro-industrialsystemsdemonstrates
adiversityofpossibilities.Formalandinformalcontracts, verti-calintegration,andmarketsareexamplesofthesolutionsfound
in the same agro-industrial system. In spite of the expected
convergence to a model considered more efficient, from the
perspective of Transaction Cost Economics, what is seen is
the coexistence of arrangementsunder the same institutional
context.
Moreover,it isobservedthatsomeagro-industrialsystems demonstratehigher or lowertolerancetostrictorganizational
models.Thus,the poultryAgSunambiguouslyshowsa
dom-inant pattern in the relationship with processing industries
through integration contracts. In turn, beef cattle breeding
presentagreaterdiversityof arrangementswiththe slaughter andprocessingindustry.Despitetheimportanceofother theoret-icalexplanations,thisresearchinvestigatesthe“Organizational Tolerance”argumentforunderstandingthecoexistenceof insti-tutionalarrangements.Thatis,basedontheassumptionsofthe Measurement Costs Theory (Barzel, 1997),it is investigated whether the difficulty of measuring the transacted attributes impactstheexistenceofadiversityofinstitutionalarrangements intheagro-industrialsystems.
Consideringthetransactionpatternandtheproductattributes negotiatedintheacquisitionoftheanimalsforslaughterinthe beef,swine,andpoultryagro-industrialsystemsofMatoGrosso
doSul, an Ordered Logit model is proposedto testthe
cen-tral hypothesisthat the “Organizational Tolerance” is related tothedegreeofdifficultyinmeasuringthetransactedproduct attributes(Zylbersztajn&Caleman,2012).
Theresearchresultsindicatethatthedifficultyofmeasuring theattribute“animalcompliance”isstatisticallysignificantfor theexistenceofhigherorganizationaltoleranceatthelevelof 5%.Othervariablessuchastradition(5%),cooperation(10%), andcontractadoption(1%)alsoexplaintheorganizational
tol-erancedegreeobservedinthesystemsinvestigated.However,
“contract adoption” is in the opposite direction to what was
expected.Therefore,it is understood that the central hypoth-esis of the researchwas validated,namely that the degreeof organizationaltoleranceofaAgSdependsonthedegreeof dif-ficultyinmeasuringanattributeoftherelatedproduct,inthis case,theattribute“animalcompliance”.
Inadditiontotheconfirmationthatthecostofmeasuringthe transactedattributesmay explainthe higheror smaller diver-sityofinstitutionalarrangements(respectively,smallerorhigher organizationaltolerance),thisstudy contributesthe identifica-tionofguidelinesforpublicandprivatepolicies.
Thus, AgSs with ahigh diversityof institutional arrange-mentscanmeanhigherdifficultiesinthetransactionalattributes
measurementfrom whichhightransaction costsarise. Public
policiesaimedatreducingmeasurementcosts,suchasaccessto
newtechnologiesand/orprogramsthat facilitatethe
measure-ment ofattributes could reducetransactioncostsandprovide greaterefficiencytotheidentifiedarrangements.Forexample,
forthebeefAgS,theadoptionofprogramsforinspectionand
verificationofscalesintheslaughterhouses,standardizationof theanimals’hygieneandevaluationofcarcasses,aswellas ani-malandleatherqualityincentiveprograms,areinitiativesthat
havelongbeendemandedbytheindustry.
Within the scope of private policies, programs such as
“Pesebem”13 of the Federation of Agriculture andLivestock
of Mato Grosso (FAMATO) and of Goiás (FAEG), and
ini-tiativesmodeled onthe Councilof Producersof SugarCane,
Sugar,andEthanoloftheStateofSãoPaulo
(CONSECANA-SP)(Belik,Paulillo,&Vian,2012)couldestablishclearcriteria
for animal remuneration, based on income and compliance
indexespreviouslyagreedbetweentheparties.However, accord-ing to Zylbersztajn and Nogueira (2002), the diversity of
organizational solutions does not mean per se acondition of
inefficiency.
Thereremainsaclearneedforcomplementarystudiestogain abetterunderstandingofthephenomenon.Thesample’slimited size,itsnon-probabilisticandintentionalnature,andthe investi-gationofarestrictedsetofattributesmayfacilitateandsimplify datacollectionandanalysis,buttheyalsorepresentlimitations. Suchlimitationsshouldbeunderstoodasanincentiveforfurther investigations,withdeeperstudiesonthesubject.
Understandingtheorganizationalefficiencyof
agricultural-based systems is critical to the establishment of public and
private strategies for the national agribusiness sector. This
researchinnovatesbybringingforwardthe“organizational tol-erance”argumentandbyseekingtovalidateitthroughempirical research.Itiscertainlyafirststepinabroadresearchagendato investigatethepluralformsofcoordination.
Conflictsofinterest
Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest.
References
Allan,D.W.,&Luek,D.(1998).Thenatureoffarm. JournalofLawand Economics,XLI,343–386.
Barzel,Y.(1997).Economicanalysisofpropertyright(2nded.).Cambridge: UniversityPress.
Belik,W.,Paulillo,L.F.,&Vian,C.E.F.(2012).AEmergênciados Consel-hosSetoriaisnaAgroindústriaBrasileira:Gênesedeumagovernanc¸amais ampla?RevistadeEconomiaeSociologiaRural,50(1),9–32.
Bradach,J.L.,&Eccles,R.G.(1989).Price,authorityandtrust:Fromideal typestopluralforms.AnnualReviewofSociology,15,97–118.
13ThePesebemPrograminMatoGrossowasfinancedbytheSupportFund
Caleman,S.M.Q.(2010).Falhasdecoordena¸cãoemsistemas agroindustri-aiscomplexos:Umaaplica¸cãonaagroindústriadacarnebovina(Doctoral thesis).Brazil:Faculdadede Economia,Administrac¸ãoeContabilidade, UniversidadedeSãoPaulo.Retrievedfromhttp://www.teses.usp.br/
Capéau,B.,Decoster,A.,&Vermeulen,F.(2003).Homeownershipandthelife cycle:Anorderedlogitapproach.CentreforEconomicStudies,University ofLeuven.
Farina,E.M.M.Q.,Azevedo,P.F.,&Saes,M.S.M.(1997).Competitividade: Mercado,Estadoeorganiza¸cões.SãoPaulo:Singular.
Greene,W.H.(2012).Econometricanalysis(7thed.).UpperSaddleRiver,NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hirschman,A.O.(1958).Thestrategyofeconomicdevelopment.NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress.
Johnston,J.,&Dinardo,J.(2001).Métodoseconométricos(4aed.).Lisboa, Portugal:McGraw-Hill.
Lafontaine,F.,&Slade,M.(2007).Verticalintegrationandfirmboundaries: Theevidence.JournalofEconomicLiterature,45,629–685.
Macdonald,J.M.(2006).Agriculturalcontracting,competitionandantitrust.
AmericanJournalofAgricultureEconomics,88(5),1244–1250.
Menard,C.(2013).Pluralformsoforganization:Wheredowestand? Manage-rialandDecisionEconomics,4(3–5),124–139.
Menard,C.,Saes,M.S.M.,Silva,V.L.S.,&Raynaud,E.(2014).Economia dasorganiza¸cões:Formaspluraisedesafios.SãoPaulo:Atlas.
Monteiro,G.F.A.,&Zylbersztajn,D.(2012).Apropertyrightsapproachto strategy.StrategicOrganization,10(4),366–383.
Monteverde,K.C.,&Teece,D.J.(1982).Suppliersswitchingcostsandvertical integrationintheautomobileindustry.TheBellJournalofEconomics,13(1), 206–213.
Parente,P.C.(2000).Umestudosobreasatisfa¸cãonotrabalho–Umaaplica¸cão domodeloLogitOrdenado.Lisboa:FaculdadedeEconomiaNovadeLisboa.
Pitelli, M. M., & Moraes, M. A. F. D. (2006). Análise do impacto das variac¸õesinstitucionaiseuropeiassobreagovernanc¸adoSistema agroin-dustrialbrasileirodacarnebovina.RevistadeEconomiaeSociologiaRural,
44(1),27–46.
Silva,V.L.S.,&Azevedo,P.F.(2007).Formaspluraisnofranchisingde ali-mentos:EvidênciasdeestudosdecasonaFranc¸aenoBrasil.InRevistade Administra¸cãoContemporânea(pp.129–152).
Silveira,R.L.F.,Carrer,M.J.,Carvalho,T.B.,Foscaches,C.A.L.,&Saes,M. S.M.(2014).Formaspluraisdegovernanc¸a:Umaanálisedastransac¸õesde suprimentoentrefrigoríficosepecuaristas.RevistadeEconomiaeSociologia Rural,52(4),761–782.
STATA.(2007).StatabasereferencemanualI-P.InVol.2,Release10.pp. 485–796.Texas:StataPressPublication,CollegeStation.
Waak, R. S. (2000). Gerenciamento de tecnologia e inovac¸ão em sis-temas agroindustriais. In D. Zylbersztajn, & F. N. Neves (Eds.),
Gestão dos Negócios Agroalimentares (pp. 323–347). São Paulo: Pioneira.
Williamson,O.E.(1985).Theeconomicinstitutionsofcapitalism:Firms, mar-kets,relationalcontracts.NewYork:TheFreePress.
Williamson,O.E.(1996).Themechanismsofgovernance.NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress.
Wooldridge,J.(2002).Econometricanalysisofcrosssectionandpaneldata. Cambridge,MA:MITPress.
Zylbersztajn,D.(2005,September).Measuringcostsandtransactioncosts per-spectivesofthefirm:Twoviewsaboutthesamesubject.Barcelona,Spain: PaperpresentedattheInternationalSocietyforNewInstitutionalEconomics.
Zylbersztajn, D. (2000). Conceitos gerais, evoluc¸ão e apresentac¸ão do sistema agroindustrial. In D. Zylbersztajn, & F. N. Neves (Eds.), Gestão dos Negócios Agroalimentares (pp. 1–21). São Paulo: Pioneira.
Zylbersztajn,D.,&Nogueira,A.C.L.(2002).Estabilidadeedifusãodearranjos verticaisdeproduc¸ão:Umacontribuic¸ãoteórica.EconomiaeSociedade,
11(2),329–346.
