Encontro 5 Texto 1

http://oss.sagepub.com/

Organization Studies

http://oss.sagepub.com/content/9/4/453

The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/017084068800900401

1988 9: 453

Organization Studies

V. Lynn Meek

Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

European Group for Organizational Studies

can be found at:

Organization Studies

Additional services and information for

http://oss.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://oss.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: http://oss.sagepub.com/content/9/4/453.refs.html Citations:

What is This?

- Jan 1, 1988

Version of Record

>>

453 V.

_Lynn

Meek V. _Lynn Meek Centre for Administrative and Higher Education Studies, University of New England, Armidale, N.S.W., Australia Abstract

This paper is a _{brief but critical survey of} some theories of

_{organizational}

culture. It outlines the theories of culture borrowed from

_{anthropology by}

social scientists interested in

_{’complex organizations’,}

and locates these theories in an historical debate

regarding

their

_’proper’

use. The _{paper argues the need} for a

_conceptual

distinction between culture and social structure, and asserts that the culture

_{of organizational}

life

cannot be

_analyzed

in terms of a universal

_unitary

_concept. The _argument concludes

_by

suggesting ’conceptual

tools’ for

_interpreting

culture —

symbol,

ideational _systems,

myth

and ritual — and how

they might

be used in

_analysis.

Introduction

The

_study

of

_{organizational}

culture - the

proposition

that

_{organizations}

create

myths

and

_legends,

_{engage in rites and} rituals, and are

_{governed through}

shared

_symbols

and customs -

is much in vogue.

Although

the reasons for this

are not

_entirely

clear,

two issues deserve mention:

₍₁₎

the effect of

_political,

ideological

and socio-economic factors on social

_{theory; (2)}

the related issue of the

_scholarly

and

_{ideological implications}

of the selective

_borrowing

of

_key

concepts

from one

_discipline

_by

other fields of

_study.

The

_present

_{preoccupation}

with

_{organizational}

culture is

_probably

related to socio-economic factors in Western

_society.

Most Western countries have

experienced

a dramatic downturn in their economies.

This,

in turn, has

_helped

to

_emphasize

the structural

_inequalities

inherent in these societies and has

placed

the structure of western

_capitalism

under severe _{pressure. It}

_probably

is

no accident that many scholars are

_emphasizing

cultural

_problems

-particularly

where cultural

_problems

are

naively

_{operationalized}

in terms of

’people problems’

- at _a time when the structures

of many Western

institutions are under strain.

Some social theorists use the term ’culture’ to embrace all that is human within the

_{organization. They emphasize}

culture,

either

_consciously

or

_{unconsciously,}

in such a _way as to blur or hide

_problems

and contradictions inherent in the

social structure. Of course, both an

_{organization’s}

culture and its structure are

socially

created;

but that is not what is at issue here. The

_problem

with some

in a real and

_tangible

sense a collective

_{organizational}

culture that can be

created,

measured and

_manipulated

in order to enhance

_{organizational}

effectiveness. The link between ’culture’ and ’effectiveness’ has

become,

recently, quite

pronounced,

and studies

_{incorporating}

in their title such

_phrases

as the ’culture of school effectiveness’, or the ’culture of

_corporate

effective-ness’ abound. It is

_implied

that an ineffective

_organization

can be made

effective -

a school can

_produce

the ’model

citizen’,

that is, one who can find

employment,

and the

_corporation

can enhance its

_{profit margin}

- if

an

unhealthy organizational

culture can be

_supplanted

with a

_healthy

one. The

problem

is one of

_changing

_people’s

values,

norms and attitudes so that

_they

make the

_’right’

_{and necessary contribution} to the

_healthy

collective ’culture’

despite

(or

in

_ignorance

_of)

_{any inherent conflict of individual and group}

interest or _{the way in which power,}

_authority

and control are structured in the

organization.

Areas of

_study,

such as the

_study

of

_{complex organizations}

-

including

educational and

_{corporate administration, management}

studies, and human relations and

_{interpersonal}

_dynamics

-

are influenced

_by

_concepts

that filter down into the ranks of their

_{practitioners}

from older, well-founded

_disciplines.

The idea of culture in

_{organizations}

is a

_concept

borrowed

_mostly

from

anthropology,

although

some

_{sociologists,}

such as

Durkheim,

have also been

influential.

There is

_nothing

_{wrong with} one

discipline

borrowing

_concepts

from another

discipline;

this process has resulted in

important

theoretical innovations.

However,

there is a

_danger

that,

when one area of

_study

borrows

_key

_concepts

from other

_disciplines,

the

_concepts

become either

_stereotyped

or distorted in

the transfer. Also, when

_concepts

are borrowed from other

disciplines,

they

may not be borrowed ill toto: that

is,

rather than

_accepting

an entire

_{’package’}

-which may include the historical debates

surrounding the ‘proper’

uses of the

concepts

-

people

only

select

_aspects

of the

_concepts

that suit their interests and

_thinking

at a

_particular

time. This may result either in a slanted and biased

application

of the

_concepts

or a dilution of their

_{original analytical}

_power. The

_concept

of

_{organizational}

culture can be a

powerful

analytical

tool in the

analysis

and

_{interpretation}

of human action within

_{complex organizations.}

Alternatively,

it can be misused to

_reify

the social

_{reality of organizational}

life. It _may be

_timely

to have a close look at some _{of the ways in which the}

_concept

of ’culture’ has been used in

_{organizational}

research,

_{paying particular}

attention

to

_questions

_concerning

what

_aspects

of the

_concept

of culture have been

borrowed from

_anthropology

and,

to a lesser extent,

sociology.

It seems that much of the use of culture as a

_unitary

_concept

expressing,

on the one

hand,

social cohesion and

_integration,

and on the

other,

_{organizational}

effectiveness,

is the result of the transfer of the

_concept

of culture to

_{organizational}

_analysis

from a

_{particular anthropological}

and

sociological

theoretical

tradition, i.e.,

the ’structural-functional’ theoretical

_paradigm.

Organizational

culture is a difficult but seminal

_concept,

and a

_single

_paper

ways in which it has been

employed

in

empirical

research. There is a

_growing

body

of literature that

_critically

assesses the

_study

of

_{organizational}

culture,

and it is

_likely

that the debate

_surrounding

the

_’proper’

use of the

_concept

of culture in

_{organizational analysis}

will continue for some time

_(see,

in

particular,

Allaire and Firsirotu 19g.~;

_Gregory

1983;

Smircich

_1983).

This paper contributes to _{the debate in three limited ways.} First, it

_briefly

reviews a

few of the _consequences of the selective

_borrowing

of the

_concept

of culture. The purpose here is not to debunk

_past

studies of

_{organizational}

culture, but to

attempt

to illustrate some of the

_political

and

_ideological

as well as the

scholarly

effects of

_viewing

culture from a

_particular

theoretical

_perspective.

The paper then

attempts

to

_disentangle

the subtle difference between an

organization’s

culture and its social structure. _{The paper concludes with} a brief

discussion of some

_{’sub-concepts’}

that

_comprise

the idea of culture. Culture, as a total

_concept,

is too all

_embracing.

It needs to be dissected into

_manageable

proportions

so that it can be used in the

_{interpretation}

of observed

behaviour.

z

The

_Concept

Borrowed ....

Some recent studies of

_{organizational}

or

_corporate

culture have been undertaken

_by

what Turner

_{( 1986),}

_drawing

on Ott’s

(1984)

terminology,

calls

’pop

cultural

_{magicians’,}

’tricksters’ who make their

_living

_{by convincing}

North American and

_European

corporate

executives that

_they

can

_equal

the

productivity

of

_{Japanese industry through}

the mechanical

_manipulation

of

organizational symbols, myths

and customs. Such studies are not much concerned with

theory

of any sort, _{but seize upon fads in the} realm of ideas.

However, many ’honest

grapplers’

(Turner 1986)

in their

approach

to

corporate

culture have

_produced

studies that also seem

_unduiy

linked to the

interest of

_management

and which

_promulgate

the idea that ’culture’ is the collective consciousness of the

_{organization,}

’owned’

_by

_management

and available to

_management

for

_{manipulation.}

An

_attempt

will be made to illustrate the effects of these weaknesses on the

_study

of

_corporate

culture, not

by

questioning

the

_integrity

of individual researchers, but

_{through examining}

the theoretical basis on which the idea of

_corporate

culture rests. The

_argument

will

_explore

three interrelated themes: 1.

_{organizational}

theorists -

particularly,

though

not

_exclusively,

those

belonging

to the human relations and related schools - have not considered

the multiplicity

of theories of culture, but have borrowed the

_concept

of culture from

_only

one

_{anthropological}

tradition: structural-funct lonal ism,

2.

_although

theories of

_{organizational}

or

_corporate

culture have their ’roots’

in structural-functionalism,

_they

have also ’mutated’ in the process of

applicatiun;

3. the

_equating

of

_corporate

culture with a ’naturul’ force for sucial

integration

within the

_organization

- with

consciousness that can both be measured and

_manipulated

-

seems to flow from the structural-functional tradition from which the

_concept

is

bor-rowed.

Nearly

twenty-five

years ago, van der

_{Berghe (1963)}

criticized

structural-functional

_theory

for its reliance on a

_{biological metaphor,}

for its

_positivistic

stance, for its insistence that social order is created and maintained

_through

individuals

_{internalizing}

dominant social norms and

values,

for its treatment of

people

holding

alternative norms and values as

_being

_socially

deviant,

and for

its

_assumption

that the

_parts

of a

_society

exist in a natural state of

_equilibrium,

functioning efficiently

so as to maintain the effectiveness of the total social

structure

_(also

see Rex

1961;

Friedrichs

1970;

and Gouldner

1970,

1973).

Although,

sometimes,

it is not realized that rather old

_arguments

are

_being

repeated,

similar criticisms are

_{being applied}

to studies of

_corporate

culture.

However,

the _{purpose of this essay} is not to

_ground

_contemporary

criticisms of

corporate

culture studies in

_past

criticisms of structural-functionalism. Rather,

the intention is to illustrate how studies of

_{corporate culture,}

because of the

structural-functional theoretical

_legacy,

tend to

_ignore

or

_gloss

over inherent

conflicts and

_important

structural features of the

_{organization,}

_particularly

the

structure _{of power} and

conflict,

structured

_inequality

and the

_significance

of the

structure of ’class cultures’

(see

Turner

_1986).

Later in the _paper, an

_attempt

will be made to build the

_concept

of structure and conflict back into a

_theory

of

corporate

culture.

The structural-functional theoretical framework has had a

_profound

influence on all

_aspects

of the

_study

of

_{complex organizations}

_{(Silverman 1970).}

Its influence on the

_concept

_{of organizational}

culture is

_particularly

notable,

which is not

_surprising

since ’structural-functional’

_theory

has its roots in the

development

of British social

_anthropology

in the 1920s’ 30s and 40s

_(Kuper

1973).

While Talcott Parsons

_transported

structural-functionalism across the

Atlantic,

the British social

_{anthropologists}

- themselves influenced

by

the French

_sociologist

Emile Durkheim - gave birth to the

_theory.

Out of the many

conceptualizations

of culture

available,

social theorists have been prone

to seize - sometimes somewhat

uncritically

-

upon Durkheim’s idea of the

collective consciousness and _{upon Radcliffe-Brown’s notion that ’cultural}

patterns

are

_crystallized

in social structure &dquo;as institutionalized and standar-dized modes of behaviour and

_thought

whose normal forms are

_socially

recognized

in the

_explicit

or

_implicit

rules to which members of a

_society

tend to conform&dquo;’

_(Keesing

1974:

_83).

Several studies

_{of organizational}

culture seem

to assume that ’culture’ is a

_unifying

force within the

_{organization,}

that there

exists a universal

_homogeneous

culture,

and that the task for the researcher is

to discover it. A few

_examples

will

_help

illustrate the

_point.

Kilmann

_(1982:

11)

refers to culture as ’the collective will of

_members’;

it is ’what the

_corporation

_really

wants or what

_really

counts in order to

_get

ahead’.

According

to Schwartz and Davis

_{(1981: 33)}

culture is ’a

_pattern

of beliefs and

expectations

shared

_by

the

_{organization’s}

members’ that create ’norms that

Kilmann et al.

_{(1985a: 2)}

claim that their edited book

_Gaining

control

_of

the

corporate

culture

_represents

the ‘ &dquo;state of the art&dquo; of

_corporate

culture’ and that the contributors are ’those who are at the

_leading

_edge

of this

_topic’.

Chapter

after

_chapter,

definitions of culture are

_provided

that stress the internalization of norms, social

_integration

and

_stability,

that link culture

_firmly

with the interests of

_management,

and that treat culture as the collective will or

consciousness of the

_{organization.}

In the

Preface,

the editors define culture as

the ’invisible force behind the

_tangibles

_{and observables in any}

organiza-tion.... Culture is to the

_organization

what

_personality

is to the individual’

(1985a:

ix).

In the Introduction

_they

state that ’culture can be defined as the

shared

_{philosophies,}

_ideologies,

_values,

_assumptions,

beliefs,

_{expectations,}

attitudes,

and norms that knit a

_{community together’ (1985a: 5).}

In

_Chapter

Two,

Schein

_(1985a:

₁₇₎

_{argues that}

_{&dquo;strong&dquo;}

cultures are somehow more

likely

to be associated with effectiveness than are &dquo;weak&dquo; cultures, and that

strong

cultures can be

_deliberately

created’. In another

_chapter,

_Sapienza

(1985:

66-67)

states that ’one of the most

_important

facets of

_{organizational}

culture is the

_system

of shared

_beliefs’.

Lorsch

_{( 1985:}

₈₄₎

takes culture to mean

’the beliefs

_top

_{managers in} a _{company share about how}

_they

_{should manage}

themselves and other

_{employees’.}

Gordon

_{( 1985: 104)}

chooses to

_study

culture

through

an

_{’upper-level}

_{group because} we believe that the

_corporate

values held

_by

_management

are reflected in behaviour

_throughout

an

_{organization’.}

Davis

_{(1985: 138)}

states that

_’corporate

culture is the

_pattern

of shared beliefs

and values that

_shapes

the

_meaning

of an institution for its members and

provides

them with the rules for behaviour’.

_According

to Martin

_(1985:

148)

’in many

organizations,

corporate

cultures are

_developed

from the

philo-sophies

of

_{top management}

and maintained

_through

the

_acceptance

of these

philosophies

by

the

_{organization’s}

members’. Sathe

_(1985:

₂₅₅₎

sees culture as

’those beliefs and values

_people

consider to be their own; that is, those

_they

have internalized’. Allen

_{(1985: 334) firmly}

links culture with the internaliza-tion of norms, with:

’norms

_{encompass(ing)}

all behaviour that is

_{expected, accepted,}

or

_supported

_by

the

group, whether that behaviour is stated or unstated. The norm is the sanctioned

behaviour, and

_people

are rewarded and

_encouraged

when

_they

follow the norms, and

chastised, confronted, and ostracized when

_they

violate them.’

Those who deviate from the dominant norms are either to be resocialized or

excluded from the

_{organization.}

_According

to Kilmann et al. culture is a

’controllable variable’, and

_’managing

_corporate

cultures is now

_possible’

(1985b:

423, 431),

and for Kilmann

_{(1985: 351),}

’to understand the essence or

soul of the

_{organization requires}

that we travel below the

charts, rulebooks,

machines, and

_buildings

into the

_underground

world of

_corporate

cul-tures’.

Gaining

control

_of

the

_corporate

culture contains

_interesting

and valuable

information on

_aspects

of the

_operation

of various

_{corporations,}

but

_except

for one or two

_chapters,

the theories of culture used

_by

the contributors rest on the

premise

that the norms, values and beliefs of

_{organizational}

members are

factors that create _consensus,

_predict

behaviour and create

_unity.

This leads to conclusions that are little more than statements about

_{managements’}

responsi-bility

to reward

_positive

behaviour and attitudes, to foster the self-esteem and self-confidence of

_{organizations’}

members, to _encourage

_allegiance

to

organi-zational

_goals

and

missions,

to inform members of the need for

_change

when it

arises,

and to create a

_feeling

of

_esprit

de _{corps within the}

_{organization.}

If the book

_represents

the ’state-of-the-art’ of

_corporate

culture

studies,

then it is a

state-of-the-art based on a _very narrow

_{conceptualization}

of the idea of culture. The

_degree

to which norms, for

_example,

are internalized and create

_integrated

and stable structures, is, first of

all,

an

_empirical

_question,

not

_something

to be assumed

_through

_theory.

Culture,

if it is to _{have any}

_meaning,

needs to be related to the total

_{organization,}

not

_regarded

as

_phenomena

_solely

vested in the hands of

_management.

The idea that culture is the collective will of the

organization

- its

personality,

an invisible force or the

_{organization’s}

soul- is

a

_{metaphysical explanation}

of behaviour and events that are

_impossible

to

observe.

_{Any theory}

that assumes that culture is the internalization of dominant norms and values, must also assume that all members must hold to the dominant value

_system

or else be ’outside culture’. Of course, such a stance

flies-in-the-face of

_reality,

_particularly

when we consider

_{organizations}

where

management

tends to

_belong

to one social class and workers to another. In such

organizations,

values,

norms and social

_meanings

are structured

_by

’class

cultures’ and are a constant

_potential

source for

_dispute,

with strikes

_only

one

example

where such

_disputes

become overt conflicts. For

_example,

it would be difficult to

_explain

the 1984 strike of the British coal miners either in terms of the collective will of the

_corporation

or in terms of the internalization of dominant norms and values. As will be discussed

later,

norms and values have

as much

potential

for

creating

conflict within

organizations

as

_they

do for

creating

social cohesion.

It should be noted that

_just

because

_{organizational}

_{theorists may have} bor-rowed the

_concept

of culture from a certain social

_{anthropological}

tradition, it does not

_necessarily

mean that

_{organizational}

theorists use the

_concept

of

culture in

_exactly

the same _way as would social

_{anthropologists.}

For

_example,

while Radcliffe-Brown and other social

_{anthropologists}

have treated culture as an

_integral

feature of the structure and function of all societies -

relating

specific

cultures to

_particular

social outcomes - some

_{organizational}

theorists

have been inclined to treat culture as either exotic or ’irrational’ behaviour

(Kanter

1977).

More

_importantly,

several studies of

_{organizational}

culture have moved the

_concept

of culture

_beyond

that of a

_unifying

and

_regulatory

mechanism towards it

_being

a form of social control created and

_manipulated

by

management.

Baker

_(1980),

for

_example,

writes about

_’managing

organiza-tional culture’ and Allen and Kraft

_{(1982) attempt}

to illustrate ’how to create

the

_corporate

_{culture you} want and need’. Schein

_{(1985b: 2)}

maintains that

’organizational

cultures are created

_by

_leaders,

and one of the most decisive functions of

_leadership

_{may well be the}

creation,

the

_management,

and - if

and _{when that may become necessary} - the destruction of culture’ .

According

to Schein

_(1985b:

2)

’we must

_recognize

the

_centrality

of this culture

management

function in the

_leadership

_concept’.

Most

_{anthropologists}

would find the idea that leaders create culture

preposter-ous : leaders do not create culture, it _{emerges from the collective social}

interaction of groups and communities. It is

unlikely

that social

_{anthropologists}

would

_postulate

that tribal leaders create culture; the chief is as much a

_part

of a

local culture as are his tribal or clan

_compatriots.

The link between

culture,

management

and control is not

_solely

due to structural-functional

_theory

_per

se. It is also due to _{the way in which selective}

_aspects

of the

_concept

of culture have been borrowed from the structural-functional tradition,

_coupled

with the

propensity

(either

latent or

_manifest)

of this theoretical

_paradigm

to

_support

the notion that culture can be used

_by

leaders to control others in the achievement of

_{organizational goals.}

It has often been noted that one of the crucial weaknesses of

structural-functional

_theory

is its reliance on a

_{biological metaphor}

(see,

in

_particular,

Nisbet

_1969).

In accordance with the

_metaphor,

the

_theory

assumes that an

organization

can be understood as either a

_{huge organism}

or a

’superindivi-dual’ ;

hence, ’culture’ is transferred from the individual actors who create and

reproduce

it to the

_organization

as a whole. Since it is the

_{organic organization}

that has ’culture’, culture,

_including

members’ norms, values and beliefs, is

necessarily

a mechanism that creates

_{organizational unity:}

the

_parts

of a

healthy organism

do not work

_against

themselves.

There are numerous

_examples,

as Allaire and Firsirotu

_(1984:

₁₉₄₎

note, where the

_organization

is endowed with

_biomorphic

and/or

_{anthropomorphic}

characteristics: it is

_healthy

or

_unhealthy,

_goes

_through

a life

_cycle,

and has

personality,

needs and character

(see

Rice

1963;

Harrison

1972;

Argyris

and

Schon

1978;

Aldrich 1979;

_Kimberly

and Miles

_1980).

_Through

the use of the

anthropomorphic

analogy

in

_particular,

the

_organization

is transformed into a

‘superindividual’,

and culture becomes the

_product

of the collective

conscious-ness of the

_{organization’s}

members. As mentioned above, the basic criticism of this

_approach

to

_{organizational}

culture is that it leads to

_metaphysical

explanations

for

_something

that is

_impossible

to observe.

The use of

_organic

simile and the idea that culture can be

regarded

as the collective consciousness of the group are

_mostly

derived from the theories of

Durkheim.

_Although

_{these theories remain in vogue, it is}

_important

to note

past

criticisms: ...’. ... &dquo; . _{.... :..} ,:.:

;,I. .

’The

_metaphysical

concepts of a _{group mind, collective} sensorium or consciousness are

due to an _apparent

_antinomy

of

_{sociological reality:}

the

_{psychological}

nature of human culture on the one hand and on the other the fact that culture transcends the individual. The fallaciow solution of this

_antinomy

is the

theory

that human minds combine or

integrate

and form a

_{superindividual}

and _yet

_{essentially spiritual being....}

[Sluch

concepts as consciousness of kind or the

_{inevitability}

of collective imitation, account for the

_{psychological}

_yet

superindividual

nature of social

_{reality by introducing}

some

In

_{incorporating}

the idea of collective consciousness into that of

_{organizational}

culture many theorists have failed to also

_incorporate

the historical criticisms attached to the

_original

notion.

Individuals create and

_reproduce

culture,

but

_{obviously they}

do not do so in a vacuum. The resources the individual has to _{draw upon in}

_creating

culture are

not manufactured

_by

the individual.

_Language

is the classic

_example:

no one

person creates

_language,

but we all use

_{language creatively}

_{(Giddens 1982).}

This

_point

will be examined in more detail below.

The human relations school of ’scientific’

_management

deserves

_special

mention for it was the first

_body

of theorists to

_explore

informal social relations in

_{organizations}

and to take the

_concept

_{of organizational}

culture

_seriously

_(see

Perrow 1979 for a review of the

_history

of the human relations school and see

Mayo

1933;

Gardner

1945;

Warner and Low

1947;

Richardson and Walker

1948),

but the human relations theorists have

_{approached organizational}

culture

_mainly

from a behaviourist oriented

_{psychological}

framework. The

language

used

_by

human relations theorists is based on a

_{medical/biological}

metaphor:

they speak

of

_healthy

and

_{unhealthy organizational}

culture or

climate and talk about

_{organizational hygiene.}

Human relations theorists

regard

culture as

_something

which an

_organization

has and which can be

man-ipulated

to serve the ends of

_management.

In

_summarizing

_past

research efforts

of the human relations school,

_Gregory

(1983: 361)

argues that the school’s

’promanagement

position

resulted in biased research that studied the &dquo;irrational&dquo; behaviour of lower

_ranking

_personnel

and

_supported

unques-tioningly

the &dquo;rational

_{manager&dquo;}

model’. Moreover: ,

’The current _corporate culture studies are not

_{substantially}

different from earlier Human Relations research, in that the

_goal

is still to illustrate the

impact

of &dquo;irrational&dquo; human factors on &dquo;rational&dquo; _corporate

_objectives.

&dquo;Rational&dquo; _corporate

_objectives

correspond

to

_{management’s goals}

for the

_{organization.}

Researchers in both areas

sought

to

_provide

_managers with tools to assess and control the

_{organizational}

culture of their subordinates’

_(Gregory

1983: 361)

Despite

such criticisms,

_{practitioners,}

as well as academic

researchers,

have been intent _upon

_discovering

what creates

_{’healthy’}

and

_{’unhealthy’}

organiza-tional culture.

_Managers

of

_{large corporations}

have come to think that economic success is somehow linked with the

_type

of

_{organizational}

culture or climate that

_they

create. The idea of

_corporate

culture has been

_pursued

in such

popular

forms as Business Week 1980 and Fortune

_Magazine

1982. Ouchi’s

(1981)

work,

and the

_development

of

_’Theory

Z’

_linking

successful and unsuccessful

_{organizational performance}

to the

_type

of culture created

_by

American and

_{Japanese companies,}

has

_gained

_great

_popularity

_(also

see

Pascale and Athos

_1981).

_Corporate

_managers seem to believe that a

_unifying

organizational

culture can be created and

_manipulated,

and are

_prepared

to

pay

good

money to back their beliefs: ’the

_marketing

of

_{&dquo;corporate}

culture&dquo; is

largely

underway’

(Smircich

1983:

346).

often blind to ’what is’

_by

their

_pursuit

of ’what should be’

_(Gregory

_1983;

Smircich

_1983;

Allaire and Firsirotu

_1984).

_Corporate

success,

_particularly

economic success, is

_dependent

far more _{upon external environmental}

influences and the

_vagaries

of the market

_place

than on internal

_{interpersonal}

dynamics.

More

_importantly,

the

_assumption

that a

_corporate

culture can be created so as to unite members for the effective and efficient attainment of

corporate

goals

flies-in-the-face of almost

_everyone’s

_experience

of

organiza-tional life.

_{Organizations}

are often arenas for

_dispute

and conflict, and one of

the main items under

_dispute

is often values.

_{Organizations}

are not one

homogeneous

culture, but are

’multi-cultural’,

and culture can be a source of conflict

_(Gregory

_1983).

Cultural conflict is most obvious in

_professional

organizations

-

large teaching hospitals,

research

laboratories,

_tertiary

education institutions. C. P. Snow’s thesis of two cultures manifests itself month after month in every

meeting

of a

_{university’s}

academic board. Several

studies have shown _{that academics may tend} to

_give

_greater

_allegiance

to their

profession

than to their

_college

or

_university,

_{which may}

_produce

conflict between the interest of the individual academic and the interests of those who manage the institution

(see,

in

particular,

Gouldner

1958,

but see also Meltzer

1956;

Merton

_1957;

Box and

_Cotgrove

1966;

Hind

_1971).

_Unity

within

organizational

sub-cultures

(academic

departments,

for

_example)

can be a source of conflict as the various sub-cultures

_compete

for both scarce resources

and

_prestige.

Nonetheless,

human relations and related fields of

_study,

_{and their} preoccupa-tion with the idea of a

_healthy

or successful

_corporate

culture, need to be taken

seriously

for two reasons.

First,

there are successful and not-so-successful

organizations,

and there is

_something

about the successful

_organization

that

goes

beyond explanations

based on

_{superior technology,}

efficient

_management

and an

_advantageous

_position

in the market

_place.

There is a certain ’feel’

about the successful school,

_university,

or

_{large corporation,}

and the

phenomenon,

whatever it is _{and whatever ’success’ may} mean, deserves

investigation.

Second, while

_{organizations}

_{may be}

_regarded

as forums for conflict and

dispute, they

also wield power in modern

society through

what Galbraith

(1983)

terms their

_ability

to condition their own members and the

_public

at

large. Organizations

have access to the three

_primary

_{instruments of power:}

condign

power

(physical),

compensatory

power

(economic)

and conditioned power

(belief). According

to

Galbraith,

conditioned power is the most

important

in modern industrial

_society,

and

_organization

is the locus of conditioned power. It is

through ’persuasion,

education,

or the social commitment to what seems

natural,

proper or

_right’

that the

_corporation,

educational

institution,

church and the state ’cause the individual to submit to the will of another or of others’

(Galbraith

1983:

_23).

_{Organizations}

may also enforce their will

_through

the use of

_physical

or economic power. In the

_past,

the church was

particularly

_prone to exercise _{its power}

_through

such means, but

polity,

and in

_capitalist

and socialist countries alike’

_(Galbraith

1983:

_23).

Thus,

it is

_imperative

that we understand the

beliefs,

symbols, myths, ideologies

and folklores - the ’culture’ - of the modern

organization

as a form of social control. It is not a form of social control created and

_{manipulated by}

management,

but a _process in which

_management,

workers and the

_community

at

_large

_participate

alike. < ... ’,

Furthermore, Galbraith

(1983)

argues that there is a

symmetric relationship

between how power is exercised and how it is

_{challenged: condign}

_{power is} met

with

_{violence, compensatory}

_{power is} met with the

_regulation

of the market

place,

and conditioned power is met with

_{countervailing}

beliefs and

_ideologies.

Consumer _{and environmental action groups}

_represent

a

_{good example}

of a

symmetric challenge

to the _{conditioned power of modern}

_{corporations.}

In this

respect,

organizational

culture is not a force for social

_integration,

but a

phenomenon

likely

to breed ’counter-cultures’.

An

_adequate

_theory

of culture needs to be divorced from the direct interests of

management

and the naive

_assumption

that a ’successful

_corporate

culture’ is

either

_’naturally

_good

and

_{stabilizing’ or}

can be

’consciously

manipulated’.

Just

because _{group interaction} within an

_organization

is based on norms and

symbols,

it does not

_necessarily

follow that consensus and

cohesion,

based on

shared and internalized value

systems,

are the result.

Hopefully,

the

structural-functional theoretical

_assumptions

on which the

_biomorphic,

cohesive,

_integrative

and

_stabilizing

characteristics of

_{organizational}

studies of

corporate

culture rest have been

_adequately

demonstrated and

_critiqued,

and the need for a

_theory

of culture that more

_adequately

takes account of the

contextual richness of social life within the

_organization

as a whole has been

illustrated. Before

_suggesting

_{alternative ways of}

_viewing

_{corporate culture,}

a

few additional words need to be said about the

_manipulation

of culture. While it is maintained that culture as a whole cannot be

_consciously

manipulated

by

management

or _{any other group, culture is} not

_necessarily

static: cultures do

_change

within

_{organizations,}

and

_management

does have

more direct control than other

organizational

members over certain

_aspects

of

the

_corporate

cultures, such as, control over

_logos

and

_officially

stated missions

and ethos. In this

_regard,

some scholars have

_expressed

concern that certain

organizations

can foster an

_allegiance

to a

_corporate

ethos that borders on

religious

fervour, while the ethos itself is of

_questionable

social value

_(Turner

1986).

The way in which

management

attempts

to intervene in the culture of an

organization

should be a research

_{priority, particularly}

in relation to the

potential

’conditioned

_{power’ of organization.}

However,

_empirically

_assessing

the _power and

_ability

of

_management

to intervene in the culture of an

organization

and

_{assuming through theory}

that

_management

creates,

_changes

and

_imposes

’culture’ on a

_passive

and uncritical

_{membership -}

that

management

creates a cultural milieu in which rank-and-file staff are immersed

and have no choice but to internalize its embedded norms and values - _are

quite

separate

considerations.

is

_argued

_here),

_{then the way in which}

_management

_may

_attempt

to

_manipulate

organizational symbols, myths,

customs, etc., must be

_interpreted

in relation to

the total

_{organizational}

culture of which

_management

itself is

_only

one

_part.

Hitler did not create Nazi

_{Germany by}

_{himself. It may be the} case that some

organizations

are more _prone to

_accept

executive control,

_including

control

over

_{organizational symbols}

and

_meanings,

than are other

_{organizations,}

but

again,

this is, first of all, an

_{empirical question,}

not

_something

that can be assumed

_{through theory.}

Also, _power, as Weber maintained, is exercised not

merely through

its

_acceptance

_by

others,

but rests on

_having

the resources

-which

flow,

at least in

_part,

from one’s

_position

in the social structure -

to

impose

one’s will on others

_despite

_opposition.

While,

in

_{practice, questions}

_{of power, conflict and culture in the modern}

organization

cannot be

divorced,

the

_symbiotic

_relationship

between the

phenomena

may be more

_adequately

understood if a

_conceptual

distinction is

drawn between culture and social structure. We will now look at what consequences such a distinction may have for a

_theory

of

_{organizational}

or

corporate

culture.

~ z

Towards a

_Theory

of Culture ..

-While the idea of

_{organizational}

culture has been

_approached

in a

_variety

of ways, the various

theories,

basically,

fall into two camps or schools

_(Smircich

1983).

First,

as was

_argued

above,

there are those who treat

_{organizational}

culture as a variable: it is

_something

that an

_organization

has

_(see

_Cummings

and Schmidt

1972;

Schwartz and Davis

1981;

Deal and

_Kennedy

198?: Peters and Waterman

1982).

Second,

there is the view that ’culture is

_something

an

organization

is’

_(Smircich

1983:

347:

and see Harris and Cronen 1979: Weick

1979;

Morgan

1980;

Wacker

1981).

The second

_approach

is much more

_closely

aligned

to _{the way in which}

_{anthropologists}

treat culture. Rather than

regarding

culture as

_{something imported}

into an

_organization

from the broader

society,

or as

_something

created

_by

_management,

these theorists believe that

culture is the

_product

of

_negotiated

and shared

_symbols

and

_meanings;

it emerges from social interaction. In this

approach

to culture, the researcher is

not

_analyzing

some irrational’ or exotic

_aspect

of

_{organizational}

life. The

interpretation

of

_{organizational}

culture must be

_deeply

embedded in the contextual richness of the total social life of

_{organizational}

members. Culture

cannot be treated as

_being

incidental, or outside of, the ’true

_purpose’

of the

organization (Gregory

1983).

Treating

culture as

emerging

from social interaction -

treating

it as

_something

that the

_organization

’is’, rather than

_treating

it as a variable that can be

manipulated

by

management -

has obvious research

_{implications.}

It also has

political implications.

If culture is

_regarded

as embedded in social interaction.

that

is,

as

_something

that is

_{socially produced}

and

reproduced

over

time,

rules and

laws,

and

_knowledge

and ideas

_(including

ideas about

_legitimate

authority

and

_leadership),

then it cannot be discovered or

_mechanically

manipulated;

it can

_only

be described and

_interpreted.

The researcher

_adopting

the social

_emergent

view of culture cannot

_suggest

how it can be created or

destroyed;

the researcher can

_only

_attempt

to record and examine how culture may be altered in the process of social

reproduction.

People

do not

_just

passively

absorb

_meanings

and

_{symbols; they produce}

and

_reproduce

culture,

and in the _process of

_reproducing

it,

they

may transform it. The social

emergent

approach

to culture also moves the researcher away from the

_political

and

ideological

interests of

_management,

towards those of the

_{organizational}

community

as a whole.

While it seems _necessary to consider culture as

_something

that an

_organization

‘is’,

rather than

_something

that it ’has’ this still

_begs

the

_question

of how

_(or

if)

culture is to be demarcated from other social

_aspects

of the

_{organization.}

The basic

_question

is whether to

_adopt

an inclusive use of the term ’culture’ in the tradition of

_Tylor

_([1871]

_1958),

or to

_distinguish

culture from social structure?

The debate between those theorists who view culture as meshed into the social

system

and those who view it as a

_conceptually

distinct ideational

_system

is not

confined to

_{organizational}

studies. It is a debate which has

_raged

in social

anthropology

over several decades

_(Singer

1968:

528).

Social

_theory

which

_adopts

an inclusive view of culture

_’tacitly

assumes that the

social and structural

_components

are

_(must

_be)

_{fully integrated,}

_synchronized

and consonant with the

ideational,

symbolic

dimensions of the

_{organization’}

(Allaire

and Firsirotu 1984:

199).

One of the

_problems

with this

_approach

to culture is that it does not take account of shifts in the social structure _{which may}

occur in the absence of

_{corresponding}

shifts in members’ norms, values and

ideologies.

Another

_problem

with the inclusive view of culture is that it denies the

_possibility

of conflict between the

ideas,

ideologies

and values of

organizational

members and the

_{organization’s}

structure

_(formal

and

infor-mal).

There is evidence to

_suggest

not

_only

_{that such conflict may}

exist,

but also that it can be an essential feature of an

_{organization.}

For

_example,

in a case

study

of an Australian

_College

of Advanced

_Education,

it was concluded

that: .. ~ , - , ..

’When structures ... are

_thought

to be in conflict with basic academic norms ...

disputes

of an

_ideological

nature will follow. This form of conflict can

_rapidly

become intractable, with

_participants

_basing

their actions upon opposing sets of values and

finding

it

_extremely

difficult to communicate with each other. Structural

_change

within

[the

College] proceeded

in the absence of due consideration for the normative nature of the

_{enterprise....}

Severe and

_protracted

conflict was the result.’ (Meek 1984:

1330131 )

_ ,

z

On a broader

scale,

it also seems _necessary to draw a distinction between

culture and structure in order to address the

_question

of how the structure of ’class cultures’ in the wider

_society

may cut across individual

_{organizations}

_(see

Turner

_1986).

For _{the purposes of}

_analysis

and

_{interpretation,}

it seems _necessary to

_distingush

between culture and social structure, but in so

_doing,

two factors must be

_kept

firmly

in mind.

First,

culture and structure are two sides of the same coin:

_they

are

_parallel

and

_{complementary}

and

_{constantly interacting}

with one

another:

’One of the more _{useful ways - but far from the}

_only

one - of

distinguishing

between culture and social _system is to see the former as an ordered system of

_meaning

and of

symbols,

in terms of which social interaction takes

_place;

and to see the latter as the

pattern of social interaction itself...’

_(Geertz

1973:

₁₄₄₎

Second,

both culture and structure are

_{abstractions,}

not

_tangible

entities:

’The difference between the two _concepts is not that one is an abstraction and the other a

concrete, observable unit of behaviour, for both are abstractions of

_regularities

from observations of actual behaviour, whether these

_regularities

are

_implicit

and

uncon-scious or

_explicit

and verbalized.’

_(Singer

1968:

₅₃₃₎

The task for the researcher in the field is not to observe culture or structure, but

to observe the concrete behaviour of individual actors. Culture and social

structure are not concrete

_entities,

rather

_they

are abstract

_concepts

that are to

be used to

_interpret

behaviour. Geertz’s

_(1973:

5)

definition of culture

_clearly

focusses the attention of the researcher on concrete behaviour:

_{‘Believing,}

with Max Weber, that man is an animal

_suspended

in webs of

_significance

he himself has _spun, I take culture to be those

webs,

and the

_analysis

of it to be therefore

not an

_experimental

science in search of law but an

_interpretive

one in search of

meaning . ,

The task of the social scientist is to observe and describe the actions of human

beings

and their characterizations of social

_reality:

social science is the researcher’s constructions of the

_layman’s

constructions of what he and his

compatriots

are _up to

_(Geertz

1973:

_9).

While culture is the webs of

_significance

spun

by

man, structure is also the medium and the

_product

of social interaction:

’[Structures]

are both the medium and the outcome of interaction.

_They

are the

medium, because structures

_provide

the rules and resources individuals must draw on to

interact

_{meaningfully. They}

are its outcome, because rules and resources exist

_only

through

being applied

and

_acknowledged

in interaction -

they

have no

_reality

independent

of the social

_practices

_they

constitute ...’

_(Riley

1983: 415)

So far it has been

_argued

that while there is a

_{symbiotic relationship}

between

culture and social structure, in

_analysis,

the researcher needs to draw a

distinction between the two

concepts.

However, this still leaves the

_problem

of how to

_approach

’culture’ in

_empirical

research.

‘Culture’,

as a holistic

_concept,

is far too broad to be the main thrust on _{any research}

_agenda;

the

_concept

needs

The Dissection of Culture

Most

_{anthropological}

studies contain one or more of the

_following

’cultural

derivatives’:

_symbol

_(including

_language,

architecture and

_artifacts),

_myth,

ideational

_systems

_{(including ideology),}

and ritual. While

_{anthropologists}

and

sociologists

continue to debate the

_’proper’

uses and

_meanings

of these

concepts,

most studies

_approach

them in terms of what motivates individuals and _groups to action

_(Silverman

_1970).

There is no _{space here} to discuss each

concept

in detail . Rather, a brief definition of each will be

_provided

-

keeping

in mind the

_preceding

_argument

that culture is neither

_necessarily

an

_adaptive

regulatory

mechanism,

nor does it

_necessarily

unite individuals and _groups into

social structures - and

some hints on how

_they

may be used in

analysis

will be offered.

Symbol

is the most inclusive of the various cultural

derivatives,

’not

_only

because

_language,

ritual,

and

_myth

are forms of

_symbolism

but because

symbolic analysis

is a form of reference, a

_style

of

_analysis

in its own

_right’

(Pettigrew

1979:

575).

Symbols

are shared codes of

_meaning

and include a

variety

of

_things

- words, stories, icons,

organizational logos

or national

_flags

- that

_provide

_’meanings,

evoke

emotions,

and

_impel

men

[and women]

to

action’

_(Cohen

1974:

_23).

_Language

is a

_{representation,}

a

_symbol,

of the real

thing.

Organizations

may be

distinguished by

the

language

their members use:

academics use

_jargon

to

_{mystify knowledge}

and

_computer

_programmers use a

language

that

_mystifies

_{everyone but themselves. The}

_guard

tower is a

_symbol

of both the concentration _{camp and the modern}

_{prison, impelling}

individuals to

a form of

negative

action.

Religious

icons may, on the one hand, unite the

faithful,

and on the other, lead them to _scourge the infidel.

Organization

has itself been defined as

_{being nothing}

more or less than

_patterns

of

_symbolic

discourse. Within the

_{phenomenology, symbolic}

interactionism and

_{ethnomethodology}

schools:

’organizations

become

_{figments of participants’ interpretation of}

their

_{organizational}

experience; they

have no external

_reality

but are

_merely

social creations and ~:/~n~c~

they

have no externa)

_reaHty

but are

_merety

socia) creations and construction

_emerging

from actors

_making

sense out of

_ongoing

streams of actions and interactions. In what Burrell and

_{Morgan (1979:}

260) call their

_interpretive

_paradigm,

&dquo;organizations

simply

do not exist&dquo;.’ (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984: 208)

This

_approach

to

_{organizational analysis}

is in

_danger

of

_collapsing

the social

organizational

and cultural

_components

of social life into one

_unitary

_concept.

As

_argued

_above,

there is a need to maintain a

_conceptual

distinction between

culture and social structure,

_particularly

_{for the purposes of}

_{investigating}

change

and conflict. When the sociostructural

_pattern

of human

_organization

is

collapsed

into

_{being solely}

a

_pattern

of

symbolic

discourse,

’the

dynamic

elements in social

_change

which arise from the failure of cultural

_patterns

to be

perfectly

congruent

with forms of social

organization

are

_{largely incapable}

of

formation’

(Geertz

1957:

992)