lembrança não é mais do que uma projecção da forma da consciência sobre o informe
afectivo da matéria inconsciente. Não se deve depreender desta asserção que o
inconsciente se esgote numa projecção consciente de si mesmo ou do intérprete, sem
qualquer significado efectivo. A intenção de Ricoeur é bem diferente, ela consiste em
mostrar que a condição transcendental de possibilidade do inconsciente deriva, não
apenas do recalcamento, mas acima de tudo do trabalho hermenêutico de exegese das
múltiplas expressões simbólicas – oníricas, sintomáticas, «actos falhados», etc. –, ou
expressões de duplo sentido (manifesto e latente)
174. Por sua vez, a sua realidade
transcendental é intersubjectiva, na medida em que a verdadeira interpretação é aquela
que é realizada por um outro, o analista que «constrói» o sentido do inconsciente: «O
inconsciente é essencialmente elaborado por um outro, como objecto de uma
hermenêutica que a consciência própria não pode fazer sozinha. Dito de outro modo, a
consciência-testemunho do inconsciente não está apenas com este último numa relação
terapêutica, mas de diagnóstico»
175.
173RICOEUR, Philosophie de la volonté 1. Le volontaire et l’involontaire, 1950, p. 364; tradução nossa: “Contre ce réalisme naïf, il faut dire et répéter: l’inconscient ne pense pas. Mais précisément Freud ne fait pas penser l’inconscient […]; par un étrange retournement, ce réalisme naïf reviendrait à donner une conscience à l’inconscient et aboutirait à ce monstre: un idéalisme de la conscience inconsciente; cet idéalisme fantastique ne serait jamais qu’un idéalisme du sens projeté dans une chose pensante” RICOEUR, Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique, 1969a, p. 109. Um inconsciente que pensasse e se recordasse, por si mesmo, não seria mais do que uma consciência inconsciente, o que é inegavelmente um contra-senso.
174“Nous dirons donc que l’inconscient est un objet, en ce sens qu’il est «constitué» par l’ensemble des démarches herméneutiques qui le déchiffrent; il n’est pas absolument, mais relativement à l’herméneutique comme méthode et comme dialogue. C’est pourquoi on ne saurait voir dans l’inconscient une réalité fantastique qui aurait le pouvoir extraordinaire de penser à ma place. Il faut relativiser l’inconscient” RICOEUR, Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique, 1969a, p. 108.
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A decifração do sentido pode-se mover em duas direcções complementares:
como exegese e como diagnóstico. A exegese consiste em explicitar os diferentes níveis
de significação de uma determinada realidade. A descrição fenomenológica é, em
grande parte, coincidente com esta estrutura exegética de análise. O movimento
complementar desta análise descritiva, é pensada, por Ricoeur, nos seus primeiros
textos, com o nome de diagnóstico. Neste caso, não há nenhuma exegese explicitativa,
visto que não há qualquer unidade de sentido constituída. Pelo contrário, confrontamo-
nos com uma realidade cujo sentido se deve constituir. Nesta situação, o diagnóstico
identifica-se com o trabalho de interpretação, ao procurar reconstituir significações, até
então, não apreendidas. Ora, a dimensão de sentido do inconsciente corresponde
nitidamente a uma realidade diagnosticada. O inconsciente não é uma unidade de
sentido dada previamente à consciência, em que possamos explicitar as suas diferentes
instâncias, mas é antes um plano de sentido que é exigido pelo trabalho de interpretação
das diferentes expressões simbólicas que emergem na consciência. Quando Freud se
interroga sobre as razões descritivas que exigem a consideração de um nível
inconsciente, na actividade psíquica, a primeira apontada refere-se às lacunas dos dados
da consciência que só se podem explicar pressupondo uma outra instância
176. Assim, o
inconsciente não é um elemento da consciência, é antes um «pressuposto»
interpretativo sem o qual algo – as lacunas da consciência – ficaria sem explicação. O
inconsciente assume, assim, para a psicanálise, uma realidade diagnosticada, em que
através da interpretação de sintomas e sinais se reconhece a existência de um princípio
explicativo dos mesmos. A descoberta do inconsciente seria, deste modo, impossível
sem a presença da hermenêutica, no nosso entendimento, obviamente
177.
175RICOEUR, Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique, 1969a, p. 108; tradução nossa: “[…] cette réalité n’existe que comme réalité «diagnostiquée» […]. J’ai eu recours à la notion de diagnostic et de réalité diagnostiquée dans la première interprétation que j’ai proposée de l’inconscient freudien” RICOEUR, De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud, 1965, pp. 422-423, p. 423, n. 18. 176Quando se interroga o inconsciente, a nível descritivo, não o distinguimos do pré-consciente. A relação entre inconsciente e lacunas da consciência é apresentado por Freud na sua obra O Inconsciente, cf. FREUD, «The unconscious», 1915c, in Standard Edition, XIV, 1957, pp. 159-215.
177Devido à delicadeza e conhecida controvérsia desta posição, de seguida expomos o nosso entendimento com fundamentos teóricos, meta-teóricos e clínicos no âmbito da psicanálise actual; esta exposição não pretende ser exaustiva devido à própria natureza de uma nota, mas reveste o argumento (ainda que longo…) que ilustra a verosimilhança da posição por nós defendida no corpo do texto: “Roy
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Schafer has offered what is probably the most straightforward use of the term hermeneutic. In his discussion of narration in psychoanalysis he writes: «What has been presented here amounts to a hermeneutic version of psychoanalysis. In this version, psychoanalysis is an interpretive discipline rather than a natural science. It deals in language and equivalents of language. Interpretations are re-descriptions or retellings of action along the lines peculiar to psychoanalytic interest…The facts are what the analyst makes them out to be: they are a function of the specifically psychoanalytic questions that guide this narration project, and these questions implement the narrative strategies that are favoured by the analyst’s own presuppositions, however un-systematized these might be» (Schafer, 1983, pp. 255-256). For Schafer, the description of psychoanalysis as hermeneutic means that psychoanalytic activity is essentially interpretive and that the psychoanalyst is always interpreting according to a particular narrative structure or strategy (cf., Schafer, 1985, 1990). The analysand’s story is retold psychoanalytically –as a story in which the emphasis now falls on: «infantile or archaic modes of sexual and aggressive action…but also as defensive measures adopted…to disguise…the actions in question» (Schafer, 1983, pp. 223-224). While Schafer points out that there are other psychoanalytic narratives structures than his own, which is a rather classical Freudian perspective as modified by his own action- language theory, he keeps the emphasis on the fact that psychoanalysis, as hermeneutic, involves the formulation of a second or alternate narrative to that of the analysand. In employing the term hermeneutic in the context of their discussion of competing psychoanalytic models, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) shift the emphasis from alternate –psycho-analytic– narrative to competing psychoanalytic narratives. Relying on the formulations of Thomas Kuhn (1962, 1977), they view the different psychoanalytic theories as inherently different models of mind that ultimately derive from different views of human nature. Thus of ‘their’ two major models they write: «The drive model and the relational model embody fundamentally different visions of human nature, and the theories of technique which have developed from them are similarly divergent in their basic premises» (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 388). In this context psychoanalysis is a discipline that interprets clinical data in accordance with a particular model or theory, and hermeneutic functions as an adjective to describe the ultimate, foundational quality of a particular model. Thus they write of Freud’s model: «The drive/structure model, like other models, by positing a clearly defined hermeneutic system, directs our attention to certain aspects of a situation and away from others» (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 43). Finally, Levenson states rather sharply: «I find it hard to imagine how psychoanalysis cannot be hermeneutical. Hermeneutics being, by definition, the study of interpretation, we are all, like it or not, involved in an hermeneutical undertaking» (Levenson, 1988, p. 6). He then expands on the actually diverse meanings of this term in psychoanalytic writings: a canonical use by which the ‘data’ are interpreted according to a given interpretive scheme, a creative use in which canonical truth is superseded by narrative truth, and finally a deconstructive use in which the quest for final truth or interpretation is abandoned. The three authors just cited exhibit differing versions of the sense of hermeneutics in contemporary psychoanalysis. Schafer’s is the most straightforward: psychoanalysis involves the substitution of the patient’s manifest narrative with a second narrative that will offer a more productive understanding than the first. Schafer may be seen as representing a bridge between the traditional (as a social science) hermeneutic and the newer (as dealing with incommensurable discourses in any field) hermeneutic. While he is clearly engaging the old (traditional) argument that psychoanalysis belongs to the humanities rather than the natural sciences, his emphasis on an alternate narrative leads naturally to the consideration that there may be more than one alternate psychoanalytic narrative. The other two examples are fully in the scope of the newer hermeneutic: Greenberg and Mitchell emphasize the critical point that there may be more than one alternative narrative, that different theoretical positions impose different narratives; Levenson with his deconstructive use of hermeneutics suggests a further extension of this progression: not one narrative, and not a choice between narratives, but rather a proliferation of narratives. Examples can be found of a persistent use of hermeneutics in the older sense, that is, to emphasize the humanistic status of psychoanalysis (cf., Stolorow and Atwood, 1984; Rubovits-Seitz, 1986; Freeman, 1989). The examples cited here, however, point to the never
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Com efeito, a natureza interpretativa do inconsciente torna-se mais nítida se
tivermos em consideração a análise tópica freudiana. Quando nos situamos a um nível
descritivo, e não tópico, o diagnóstico hermenêutico é ainda uma exigência da descrição
understanding of hermeneutics (i.e., hermeneutics as a way of dealing with incommensurable discourses in any field) as having less to do with the science-humanities conflict than with the conflict of competing psychoanalytic models of mind. What then of background to this interest in a psychoanalytic hermeneutic perspective? In a word, this interest reflects a breakdown in ‘recent’ years of any sense of a unified psychoanalytic theory. Whatever consensus existed in the past as to there being a single, general psychoanalytic theory, which could be subjected to the usual canons of scientific verification and be evaluated as to its veracity, has been exploded by the proliferation of general theories or models. Since none of these has been able to command the allegiance of the profession as a whole, the result has been an active discussion of competing theories –both expositions of the various points of view as well as discussion of how one should handle a multiplicity of points of view (cf., Gedo and Goldberg, 1973; Bornstein, 1984; Pine, 1985, 1990; Pulver, 1987; Rothstein, 1985; Michels, 1988). Such discussion of alternative interpretive schemata is inherently hermeneutic, whether that term is used or not. In the preceding paragraphs I have pointed to actual usage of the term. It may now be useful to indicate examples of the kind of discussion that I am calling psychoanalytic hermeneutic in its essence but in which the term is not employed. There was a journal issue of Psychoanalytic Inquiry (Pulver, 1987), entitled «How Theory Shapes Technique: Perspectives on a Clinical Study», that offers a brilliant example of the discussion of competing models. The journal issue consists of the presentation of clinical material by an analyst (Martin Silverman, 1987), discussion of the material by a variety of other analysts chosen specifically because of their different theoretical persuasions, and an admirable effort by the issue editor (Sydney Pulver) and other discussants to make sense of the conflicting discussions. What is most striking to the reader of these papers is the great diversity of opinion concerning both the dynamics and handling of Silverman’s case; as Shane summarizes: «In summary, I would say that the diversity of opinions regarding the diagnosis and dynamics of Silverman’s patient would suggest that one’s theoretical stance takes precedence over other considerations» (Shane, 1987, p. 205). The influence of the theoretical stance is so strong that it affects the very perception of what is going on in the consulting room, leading Pulver to conclude: «Facts, per se, do not exist. The very idea of what constitutes data and is thus worth recording is determined by the analyst’s theoretical bent» (Pulver, 1987, p. 292). The summarizing papers do attempt to discern what the widely diverging discussants in fact share in common, and they offer various ways to approach the obvious divergence. I will make allusion only to Schwaber’s sophisticated, and, in effect, psychoanalytic hermeneutic recognition that the consequence of a multiplicity of models is not chaos and capriciousness; that the clinician is involved in a dialectical process of having to choose a model while at the same time trying both to remain aware of the effect of this model on one’s perception and to remain open to having the model corrected by the patient: «I argue, rather, for our recognition that no matter what theory we espouse, we run the risk of using it to foreclose rather than to continue inquiry, to provide an answer rather than to raise a new question. I speak for a search for ways to sharpen our attunement to hear new cues from the patient that may tell us that we have, even if unwittingly, superimposed our views and used our theory to justify it» (Schwaber, 1987, p. 274)” DIAS, «The Heritage of Freudian Theoretical and Clinical Constructs in Contemporary Psychoanalytical Practice: Epistemological Conjectures and Clinical Refutations»[Thesis]; «The significance of the Menninger Clinic in the validation of psychoanalysis in international mental health practice inherent to the contributions of Lacan, Fairbairn, Matte-Blanco, Bion, Grotstein & Kernberg» [Subtitle], in Doctoral thesis, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2010, pp. 87-90, pesquisável em Items of Type Thesis - Goldsmiths Research Online.
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