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The weight of «tradition» in multilateral commercial negotiations. The argentinian case during the Doha Round

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TH E W EI GH T OF ‘TRAD I TI ON ’ I N M ULTI LATERAL COM M ERCI AL N EGOTI ATI ON S. TH E ARGEN TI N I AN CASE D URI N G TH E D OH A ROUN D

Ju lie t a Ze licovich

Magister in I nternat ional Trade Relat ions. Ph.D. candidate in I nternat ional Relat ions. Scholar of t he Consej o Nacional de I nvest igaciones Cient íficas y Técnicas (CONI CET, Argent ina).

Assist ant professor and researcher at Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario (Argent ina). Her research areas are mult ilat eral t rade negot iat ions and Argent inean t rade foreign policy

Ab str a ct

The art icle st udies t he im pact of ‘t radit ion’ as a variable inside the analyses of foreign policy. For t hat end, it considers a part icular case, t he part icipat ion of Argent ina in m ult ilateral comm ercial negot iat ions. The cent ral argument signals t hat, for Argent ina, t he negot iat ing t radit ion has had an import ant role as a guidance in foreign policy act ions regarding m ult ilateral com mercial negot iat ions, especially in t he m om ent s of crisis. I n addit ion, t hat , wit hin t his t radit ion, the main variable in t he configurat ion of Argent inian opt ions has been t he development st rategy.

Ke y w or ds:

Tradit ion; Foreign Policy; Commercial Negot iat ions; WTO; Argent ina

H ow t o cit e t h is ar t icle

Zelicovich, Juliet a (2014). "The weight of «t radit ion» in mult ilat eral comm ercial negot iat ions. The argent inian case during t he Doha Round". JANUS.NET e- journal of I nt ernat ional Relat ions, Vol. 5, N.º 1, May-Oct ober 2014. Consulted [ online] on dat e of last view, observare.ual.pt / j anus.net / en_vol5_n1_art 7

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TH E W EI GH T OF ‘TRAD I TI ON ’ I N M ULTI LATERAL COM M ERCI AL N EGOTI ATI ON S. TH E ARGEN TI N I AN CASE D URI N G TH E D OH A ROUN D

Ju lie t a Ze licovich

The liberal and neoliberal theories of int ernational relat ions put an em phasis on how dom estic condit ionings are im port ant when it com es t o define St at es’ foreign policies. I n t he study of the positions and st rategies in int ernat ional negotiations such as com m ercial ones, the econom ic conditionings have been the m ost widely developed within t he set of specific dom estic variables of such foreign policy ( Rodrik 1995; Milner 1999; Frieden y Martin, 2001; Moravcsik 1997) . Regardless of ot her elem ents, less t angible, they have also cont ribut ed t o decision- m aking, and allow explaining St at e conducts, especially in the init ial inst ances of negot iation processes.

From t he analysis of the Argent inian case, in t his article we aim t o see how one of t hese int angible elem ent s, the negotiat ing ‘t radit ion’, m ade up by im ageries, ideas and t he weight of Hist ory, have guided the policy m akers decisions in one of t he m ost im port ant negotiations from t he st art of t he 21st cent ury, t he Doha Round in t he World Trade Organization (WTO) .

This negotiation is relevant , not only due t o t he am bitions agenda that it presents com m ercially, but also as a dist inct ive process of t he changes m ade during t he first decade of the 21st century regarding int ernational com m ercial relations. I t allows us t o see the reconfigurat ion of power relat ions am ong developed and em erging count ries, as well as bet ween t he lat ter and t he rest of the developing count ries. Furt herm ore, it illust rat es how the variat ions in prices of com m odities and in the ways of production and com m ercialisat ion ended cont ributing for t he configuration of the agenda in sensible subject s, priority or excluded.

Argentina is a m edium -resources count ry that had a lat e incorporat ion in the m ultilat eral trade regim e, but , from t he 1980s onwards, increased it s negotiating act ivism in the different ‘rounds’. For this country, the Doha negot iat ion in the st ar was m ainly agricult ural and could im ply a growth of up t o 20% of export s, and 5% of Gross Dom estic Product ( MRECI C, 2003) . Regardless, due t o the dom est ic crisis that had its epicentre in Decem ber 2001, the resources and t echnical, polit ical and econom ic inst rum ent s for the negotiat ion were lim it ed. Consequently, Argentina st art ed the Doha Round with a high chance for having an active participation and wit h high levels of uncert ainty.

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The following points expose som e theoret ical and m ethodological considerat ions regarding t he ‘t radition’ as a variable for the analysis; aft er it , it s confirm at ion t hroughout Argent inian negot iat ing hist ory and, finally, we analyse the role it had in the prim ary definitions of t he Argentinian position and negotiating st rat egy in the initial m om ent s of t he Doha Round, of t he WTO.

1 . Th e ‘ne got ia t ion t r a dit ion ’ in t h e a na lyse s of for eign policy

The quest ion about how t o configure t he foreign policy of a country is t he cent ral int errogat ion from the perspect ive of foreign policy analyses. These st art ed t o develop with greatest int ensity since the 1970s and 1980s, even beginning t o becom e a ‘sub-field’ within t he subject (Hudson, 2005) . They are charact erized by it s act or-specific focus, as an opposit ion t o the syst em ( Hudson, 2005) and are the bases for all int ernational and t ransnational relations that are based in hum an decisions, individually or as a group. Thus, t his m akes us consider that , for t he underst anding of the St ate’s conduct , those who m ake such decisions, which are the decision-m akers, nat ional and int ernational t hat have weight over t hem , and how t heir im plem ent at ion t akes place.

One of the variables t hat incorporates in these analyses gives us a t hrowback t o

hist orical, cult ural and social fact ors, and t o the role these have in t he configuration of

a t radit ion that will influence policy m akers. According t o aut hors such as Van Klaveren

( 1992) ‘t he values can generat e dem ands of act ion by rest ricting the opt ions available for the decision-m aking players’. I n fact , t hese int angible elem ent s are m ade up in m ent al m aps for the actions, affecting the select ion of result s before m ult iple opt ions, const it ut e institut ions and, conform ident it ies (Goldst ein and Keohane, 1999) . I n a last st age, these elem ents com e t ogether in the notion of ident it y, regarding the self-percept ion that the players have regarding their place in t he world and t he expect ations of act ion deriving from it . Merke agrees that ‘all foreign policy needs t o give a sense t o t he situat ion and build its m ost relevant object s. For t his, foreign policy resorts t o a range of identity att ribut es that serve t o m ake som e actions possible and restrain ot hers. [ I n as m uch,] identit y appears, sim ult aneously, as a precondition of t he act ion and as reproduced by that sam e action’ ( Merke 2009: 75) . Therefore, t his t ends t o endure in tim e and be a m ore or less const ant guidance of t he policy.

When these elem ent s are reit erat ed in t he change of diplom atic actions t hat t hen conform t o a ‘t radition’, in our case, a negotiation tradit ion, that will have a guidance funct ion. We agree with him in the idea that political identit y is m ade up as reference with a t em poral system , articulat ed wit h the accum ulat ion of experiences and int erpret at ions of past act ions, project ing t o the fut ure, giving it the m eaning of the act ion (Aboy Carlés, 2001 in Pereyra Doval, 2013: 88) .

On their part , values and hist ory also configure in elem ent s of the Unit ed St at es soft power, cont ributing t o t he percept ion that ot her St at es have of t heir own act ion regarding foreign policy, particularly in negotiat ions. As Bruening st at es ( 2007) , the Unit ed St ates soft power is based in t he continuity of t he values t hat guide t he governm ent ’s actions, in the dom estic plan, in t he int ernat ional organizations and in foreign policy.

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variat ion of ideas regarding t rade and t he econom ic developm ent as an explaining entit y of t he changes in the com m ercial policies in the lat est years ( Milner, 1999) . Tussie (2009) and Bott o ( 2007) also developed t he link of t he ideas and knowledge in t he form ulat ion of foreign com m ercial policies, facing the negotiations. Furt herm ore, Odell ( 1988) has underlined t he im port ance of the ideas and budget s prevailing am ong t he decision- m akers at the t im e of explaining t he select ion of a cert ain position and negotiation strat egy. I n a broadest sense, Pereyra Doval (2013) analysed the weight of t his variable, t radit ion, in case analysis, such as in the one of Brazilian foreign policy.

This, in this lit erature one identifies a cert ain line of cont inuit y by considering the role of t his int angible variable in t he foreign com m ercial policy analyses, and/ or part icipat ion in int ernat ional negotiations. One also sees a connection bet ween t he way in which t his tradit ion, identit y and m at erial bases, from t he role played by the ideas or ideologies around the m odel or developm ent strat egy. I n fact , t he m odel or developm ent strat egy is a key for t he underst anding of the negotiat ion participation of a St at e. The sam e est ablishes a definit ion regarding which posit ion t o adopt in t he int ernational environm ent , how t o gain advant ages in it and, at the sam e t im e, how t o reduce the vulnerability with which t he St at e is exposed faced wit h the im pact s of globalization (Stiglit z, 1998) . This way, t he set of hist orical experiences linked in t he art iculation bet ween the developm ent m odel and negot iat ion participation, configures an im aginary of ‘t radit ion’ t hat result s as the ordering of t he m ent al m aps of negotiation agent s in t he individual plan.

I n the following section, we expose how it has been like that in the Argentinian case, in m ultilat eral com m ercial negot iat ions.

2 . M e t h odology de sign for t he a n alysis of t h e n e got ia t ion t ra dit ion in t h e Ar ge n t in ian ca se

As one can see from the t heoretical argum ents present ed above, the negotiation t radition as an investigation object const itut es a com plex elem ent , difficult t o operat e. This consist s in t he identificat ion and reconst ruct ion, in a reference hist orical period ( first , the negot iations during the GATT and, afterwards, the Doha Round) , of t he set of values, identity perceptions and predom inating ideas that the negotiat ors and policy m akers have sust ained around the developm ent m odel, the insertion st rategy and t he role assigned t o the com m ercial negot iat ions in the said articulation. For t hat , it was necessary t o adopt a unique case study approach (Gunderm ann Koll, 2001) , that allowed t o deeply research t he knowledge of t he Argent inian case.

The m et hodology applied for this work was, t herefore, qualit ative in nature. We resort ed t o several bibliographical, docum ental and st atist ical charact er, which are referenced t hroughout the following sections. Furtherm ore, sem i-st ruct ured interviews were perform ed with Argentinian st aff involved in the Uruguay Round and in t he Doha Round1

1 We int erviewed Taiana ( Foreign Affairs, I nt ernat ional and Cult Trade of Argent ina, 2005- 2010) , Dum ont ( Argent inian Represent at ive before t he I nt ernat ional Bodies in Geneva, 1999- 2010) , Chiaradia ( Represent at ive before t he I nt ernat ional Bodies in Geneva and t he WTO, 2002- 2010) , Taboada ( Perm anent m ission of t he Argent inian Republic before t he I nt ernat ional Bodies in Geneva, 2002- 2008) and Pet ri ( responsible for t he Unit of Agricult ural and Anim al Raising Policies in t he Minist ry of Econom y, 2004- 2008) . The int erview s were perform ed bet ween Sept em ber and Novem ber of 2012.

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orient ed t o t he developm ent of t he wide description of t he phenom enon in quest ion ( Dey, 1993: 30) .

3 . Th e sou r ce s of t he Ar gen t inia n in t he m u lt ila t e ra l n e got ia t ion of GATT t r a de a n d t he ide n t ifica t ion of t h e ‘n e got iat ion t ra dit ion ’

Before the launch of t he Doha Round, Argent ina had already developed a cert ain real part icipat ion2

As was previously st ated, in the configuration of this t radition, elem ent s of the debat e around the developm ent st rat egies have been conditioning the decisions t hroughout t he years. I n Argent ina, t he developm ent m odel has been a volat ile variable, subject t o t he count ry’s m acroeconom ic variat ions signed by decades by the cycle of ‘st op and go’ ( Gerchunoff, 2006) . Hist orically, the developm ent of the indust rial and agricultural sect or had been fight ing, expressing the fluctuat ions of the type of exchange an in the ext ernal restriction, the dist ribut ion dilem m a central t o the count ry’s econom y. As a result , t here has been a pendulum m ovem ent bet ween liberal and developm ent , which had found an echo as m uch as in the predom inant political part ies, peronism and radicalism , as in the m ilit ary sect or, that in several occasions t hroughout t he 20t h cent ury assum ed the com m and of the nation’s executive power

in m ultilat eral com m ercial negotiations. I n lit erature, we part icularly underline the conduct perform ed by this count ry in t he Uruguay Round ( Tussie, 1993; Miller, 2000) . Regardless, it is possible t o ident ify a relevant presence of the count ry since alm ost 40 years earlier. Such experiences would configure t he negot iat ion t radition, in which m any of t he diplom at s responsible for the process of t he Doha Round subscribed t hem selves.

3

Besides having part icipat ed in the Havana Conference, Argent ina was not a founding m em ber of t he Gener al Agr eem ent on Tar iffs and Trade (GATT) alt hough it was

convert ed in contract ing part y of t he recent said agreem ent in the 11th of Oct ober 1967, under the governm ent of Onganía

. The m ost active part icipat ion in t he m ultilat eral negot iations has been m ore close t o t he liberal option, form ing he negot iat ion t radition t o study.

4

As Russell st at es, ‘I n the nam e of t he econom ic independence the Perón governm ent ‘t ot ally abst ained’ from vot ing t he final docum ent of the extensive Unit ed Nations Conference about Trade and Em ploym ent , held in Havana from the 21st of Novem ber, 1947, up t o t he 24th of March, 1948, that proposed t he creation of an I nt ernational Trade Organization’ ( Russell, 2001: 128) . Behind t he said abst ention t here were political reasons - t he author defends that , for peronism , the GATT was ‘a project m ade t o m easure of North- Am erican int erest s’ ( Russell, 2001: 128) - , as well as econom ic –

.

2 This concept of Peña ( 1968) refers t o t he cont ent s, t he act ivism and t he efficiency achieved in t he int ernat ional plan in t he developm ent of t he negot iat ing conduct : it refers t o t ools and act ions ( such as t he presence in key inst ances, t he present at ion of docum ent s, t he for m at ion of pressure groups, et c. ) t hat t end t o t ry t o influence t he adopt ion of decisions r eferring t o t he principles, norm s, rules and procedures of a cert ain regim e, according t o t he aim s of t he negot iat or ( or negot iat ion posit ion) .

3 Cf. Rom ero ( 2001)

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fundam ent ally due t o t he early exclusion of the negotiations of the approach of food produce5

From 1945 t o 1990, t he Argent inian econom ic policy ( and foreign econom ic policy) balanced bet ween an econom ic m odel based in t he replacem ent of im port s and another point ing t owards open liberal experim ent s. I t was in the scope of one of t hose ‘liberal’ rounds that Argent ina joined m ultilat eral financial inst it utions (I nt ernat ional Monet ary Fund and World Bank

.

6) , during the so- called “ Liberating Revolution” . Later, during

another ‘revolution’, t he ‘Argent ina’ under the Onganía governm ent , produced t he above- m entioned subscript ion at GATT7

According t o Russell ( 2001) ‘The st eps t aken by t he Onganía governm ent t o a great er com m ercial opening, wit hin t he scope of t he econom ic plan conduct ed by the m inist er of Econom y, Adalbert Krieger Vasena, that included a general and program m ed reduction of right s, m ade Argentina naturally join form ally t o the agreem ent in 1967’. To t his ‘dom est ic’ fact or, authors such as Baldinelli ( 1997) aggregate foreign and int erdom estic elem ent s: (i) t he dist ancing of bilat eral t rade and paym ent covenants

.

8,

( ii) the insist ence of t he Brazilian governm ent so that Argentina joined t he agreem ent and ( iii) the int erest in being able t o t ake advant age of an access quote for the sale of bovine m eat t o t he European Econom ic Com m unity, which m aint ained a preferential t reat m ent regarding its ex-colonies9

Thus, Argentina joined t he GATT during the Kennedy Round. By t hen, Argentinian export s achieved 1,464.5 m illion dollars ( Rapoport 2010, 2084) , represent ing around 0.8% of world t rade ( Unit ed Nations Com m odity Trade St atist ics Dat abase, 1962) . I nitially, the Argentinian negotiating profile inside t he forum was a lot m ore react ive, due t o the secondary role that int ernational com m ercial relations had for the count ry ( Makuc and Ablin, 1994) , t o the lit tle will t o concede sovereignty over the rules applied in foreign com m ercial policy and t o t he volunt ary charact er t hat t he charact erized t he m ultilat eral t rade regim e.

.

This lit tle relat ive relevance assigned t o t hese negot iat ions inside the agenda of Argentinian foreign policy was com pensat ed, in fact , by the place they t ook in other int ernational forum s, such as that of t he Unit ed Nat ions Conference about Trade and

5 During t he GATT, agricult ural t hem es were syst em at ically excluded from t he negot iat ions, under t he pret ense t hat t hey were considered a special sect or. Even if, during t he negot iat ion of list s by list s, by specific product s, som e agricult ural t hem es were included in t he agenda, in t he Dillon Round ( 1960- 62) t hey appeared for t he first t im e, syst em at ically, reducing right s in soy, cot t on, veget ables and preserve fruit s. Regardless of t hese advancem ent s, in t he fourt h r ound, t he Unit ed St at es gained a waiver t o apply quant it at ive rest rict ions over t his sect or, effect ively leaving a great part of t he agricult ural quest ion out side of t he GATT. Early in t he Uruguay Round, agricult ural t hem es were approached int egrally, deriving in t he Agreem ent about Agricult ure.

6 On August 31, 1956, t hrough decree- law 15.970.

7 The Mem bership prot ocol was signed on Sept em ber 11, 1967, and m ade int ernal on June 28, 1968, t hrough Law No. 17799.

8 Such as Baldinelli ( 1997) signals, t hese agreem ent s originat ed in t he 1930s, where it favored t he ‘int erchange wit h border count ries t hrough t he downsizing of right s non- ext ensible t o t hird part ies’. Agreem ent s were also subscribed wit h European count r ies and non- border Am erican count ries. Aft er t he Second World War, t hese agreem ent s were increm ent ed w it h specific paym ent covenant s, t hr ough which t he cent ral banks developed an exchange cont rol bet ween reciprocal export s and im port s.

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Developm ent ( UNCTAD) and the debat es regarding the ‘new international econom ic order’ ( NOEI ) , where Argentina played a m ore active role. Especially in the UNCTAD, Argentina found a space for t he developm ent of an act ivist foreign policy. Therefore, ‘Argentina led and participat ed in the int ernat ional debat es regarding t he t ransform ation of int ernat ional econom ic relations from m oderat e positions t hat were in agreem ent with it s st atus of a count ry placed in t he m iddle of the world’s hierarchy and high in t he region’ ( Russell 2010, 252) . As an exam ple and like the quot ed author regarding the im port ance of Argentina as a regionally relevant count ry, one can underline the signat ure of the High Grace Chart , in the sum m it done in the count ry before the UNCTAD’s own conference, within the scope of t he Special Com m ission of Coordination for Latin Am erica ( CECLA) . That m eeting in the country had a high- profile role regarding the organization and the debates that were discussed. I n it s analysis, Sim onoff underlines that ‘Signing the act of High Grace in March 1964 was an im port ant elem ent of t his governm ent ’s m ult ilat eral policy. I t was a dem and of t he continent ’s Southern countries that int ended ‘a rectification at the level of count ries t hat dom inated int ernat ional t rade’ and not ‘an out side help’ ( Zavala Ortiz, 1976: 22) ’ ( Sim onoff, 2007: 80) .

This preference by other forum s it was not , in fact , an obst acle. Such as Makuc and Ablin signalled ‘Paradoxically, the participation of the Argentinian represent atives in the GATT was always prom inent , probably exceeding t he priority given t o the body by the authorit ies of Buenos Aires’10 ( Makuc and Ablin 1994: 2) . Coinciding wit h this observation, one can find in Tussie ( 1993) , references t o t he Argentinian presence within t he coalit ion of less developed count ries wit hin the GATT for 1963, when the count ry had not yet achieved its full subscription t o t he agreem ent11

During the Tokyo Round (1973- 1979) , Argentinian participation cent red in the approach of the exceptions that , inside the GATT, were applied t o t he agricultural sect or. I t also participat ed in the search for an except ion for developing countries, seen in the end of t he round in the Enabling Clause.

.

During this period, t here were im port ant changes in Argentinian dom est ic policy - and foreign - with t he passage, first of the governm ents of Cám pora and Perón of the I sabel one, aft er his death. E soon with t he erupt ion of t he m ilit ary junt a, during the years from 1976 t o 1983. These changes brought a closeness t o econom ic ort hodoxy. The im aginary that ruled from t hen was t he one of the ‘Argent ine ‘open t o t he world’ of t he agricultural export age, t hat the 1880 generat ion had built ’ ( Rapoport , 2009: 39) . Ot her deep t rait of t ransform ation was the liberalization of the financial sect or, t hat increm ent ed t he debt process. Gradually, it began t o adopt a perspective m ore close t o t he (neo) liberal ideology, consolidat ed with Carlos Menem ’s neoliberal governm ent . This political and ideological turn would signify a break in foreign policy and would lead t o, such as Makuc and Ablin signalled (1994: 4) ‘t he evolut ion of Argent inian econom ic

10 They aggregat e ‘Effect ively, furt her beyond t he

delegat ions in t he life of t he body, t he definit ions and cont ent s of t he Argent inian foreign t rade policy cont inued condit ioned, during t he first decade of perform ance in t he GATT, by t he dom inant econom ic m odel in t he count ry; t hat is, t he indust rializat ion as subst it ut e od im port s in it s st age of decadence of crisis’ ( Makuc and Ablin, 1994 - own underline) .

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policy, and especially it s openness t o the ext erior, coincides for the first tim e, concept ually and factually with the guiding philosophy of the m ultilat eral syst em ’. Such accordance in econom ic thought allowed generat ing perm issiveness for the action in t he final inst ances of the Uruguay Round.

I n the external front , the 1980s signalled by the crisis increm ent ed the count ry’s int erest in t he forum and thus, facing the Uruguay Round, the GATT st art ed t o occupy

ever-increasing relevant places in t he agenda of foreign econom ic policy.12

Therefore, during t he Uruguay Round, Argentina st art ed from having an opposing and peripheral posture t o develop a highlight ed participation wit hin the negotiat ion process, especially cent ring in the approach of t he agricult ural area. Such as Carina Miller’s research regarding t he Round, the country’s goals were broad: ‘include agriculture in t he negotiations and subm it it t o st rict com m ercial rules, t o gain opportunit ies so t hat it s agricult ural and anim al product s have a bet ter access t o foreign m arket s, prohibit or restrict dom estic policies that increased disloyal com petition wit h its export s, et c.

( Miller 2000: 140) .

. I n part icular, the im plem ent at ion of growing policies of grants t o agricultural policies from developed count ries, such as the Unit ed Stat ed and the European Com m unit y, m ot ivat ed a m ore act ive participation in such negot iations. I t is good t o rem em ber t hat , for t hat m om ent , due t o internal constraints of t he developm ent m odel, t he growt h of Argentinian econom y depended of t he liquidity that agricult ural export s could give, which m eant t he rem oval of t he m easures m ent ioned was an elem ent of vit al im port ance.

To reach these goals, Argentina arm ed itself with st rategies such as negotiating in coalit ions and participat e in key groups ( such as the Morges group, the Eight Group, t he inform al group of the 36 and, t he m ost known of all, the Cairns Group, all linked t o t he drive of agricultural negotiations) . Furt herm ore, Argentina resort ed t o declarations t o posit ion it self inside the negotiations13

Therefore, during the Punt a de Est e Conference, Argentina was t he aut hor of one of the t hree docum ent s in discussion as proposals of Minist ry Declaration. Furtherm ore, t hroughout the eight years that t he negotiations last ed, it developed a prot agonist part icipat ion inside t he coalit ions m entioned above and, in cases such as the Mont real m eeting, it was able t o have an influence in the negotiating conduct of ot her developing count ries, generating pressures over the leaders of the negot iat ion process so t here were advancem ent s in the agricultural and t ext ile subject of the negot iat ions and for t hat , t hat a balanced look of global t rade was preserved

; and t he m aking of t echnical report s; and t he present at ion of proposals and docum ent s for the negot iat ions. I t also resort ed t o t he t hreat of blockages (for inst ance, not t o vot e anyt hing unt il there was an agreem ent in t he agricultural area) , as a way t o generat e power ( Croom e 1998; Miller 2000; Tussie 1993; Tet t am ant i, 1990) .

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12 One has t o st ress, fir st ly, t hat Argent ina had opposed t he launch of a new r ound, but in fact , when t he agricult ural and t ext ile subject s were included in t he agenda, t he count ry’s posit ion t urned t o an act ive int erest in t he negot iat ions.

.

13 Even during t he crisis of negot iat ions of 1992, President Carlos Menem sent a m essage t o President Clint on, from t he Unit ed St at es of Am erica, t o t he president s of t he European Council and Japan’s Prim e-Minist er, Kiichi Miyazaw a, on behalf of t he De la Paix Group, wit h t he aim of solicit ing t o t hese t hree t he exercise of a m ore decisive leadership in favor of t he end of negot iat ions ( Croom e, 1998: 301) .

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During this period, Argent ina also t ook part of t wo cases within the problem - solving m echanism of t he GATT, connect ed with the Falklands. I n 1982 and in 1983, with t he European Econom ic Union, due t o t he em bargo t o t he I slands, and the applicat ion of art icle XXI . I t gave rise that , during the negot iat ions of t he Uruguay Round, there was a st rife t o revise the article relat ing t o except ions relating t o security15

These experiences produced result s t hat were considered as positive in light of the count ry’s init ial goals ( Miller, 2000) and, as a whole, served as a process of learning for t he next negotiations that the country would face on t he next decade.

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4 . Th e ‘ne got ia t in g t r a dit ion ’: Ar gen t in a at t he st a rt of t h e D oh a Roun d

As we saw in the previous sect ion, during t he Uruguay Round, Argent inian negotiat ing t radition in int ernational trade relations suffered an im port ant turn. Changing the negotiating conduct that was im perative until then, the count ry adopted an act ive part icipat ion, based on a solid t echnical base, and with negot iat ion st rat egies that assum ed t he risks of exercising vet o opt ions, giving priority t o convergence act ions in negotiation coalitions.

Thus, when the Doha Round st arted, Argentina held a cert ain leadership inherit ed from t he Uruguay Round, which collided with the econom ic, polit ical and social crisis t hat was condit ioning the count ry. I n fact , since several m onths, Argent ina was im m erse in a crisis that went through all of the St at e’s dim ensions and even lim ited the count ry’s foreign agenda. Negot iat ing foreign debt was the governm ent ’s central aim . As such, t he announced fourth Minist ry Conference of t he WTO was not priorit y for t he m anagem ent of t he then president De la Rúa, ot her than beyond t he weight t hat t his negotiation could have for the count ry and the leadership that Argent ina could develop in it .

I n fact , in Novem ber 2001, the Argentinian Presidency engaged on a m ission t o Germ any and sent the Chancellor t o t hat m eet ing inst ead of t he Doha Conference. Therefore, the Argent inian delegation before the WTO was in charge of second- grade st aff and lost the possibilit y t o exercise t he vice-presidency that had been gained m onths earlier in t he negot iations before Doha. While t he then Vice- Chancellor Horacio Chighizola presided the delegat ion, along with t he Agriculture, Livest ock Breeding and Fishing Secret ary, Regúnaga, it was am bassador Nést or St ancanelli t he one in charge of defending the Argentinian posit ion. That decision reduced Argent inian participation and depreciat ed t he im port ance of the delegat ion as a whole when it cam e t o seats in com m issions exclusive t o m inist ers16

t he cent ralit y of t he agricult ural t hem e given for t he count ry t o t hese negot iat ions, and describe t he ‘pragm at ic’ perspect ive wit h which it has decided t o m ove t he negot iat ions forward, which enabled t o m ove a negot iat ing conduct regarding ot her developing count r ies, giving rise t o punct ual init iat ives in t he agenda’s several subject s and not being afraid t o ‘deny support ’ t o t he negot iat ed set if t he result s did not offer an accept able m inim um t o nat ional am bit ions.

.

15 See Croom e, 1998 p. 82 and p. 187

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The next m ont hs, when five President s succeeded, were im pregnat ed wit h t he uncert ainty derived for t he institut ional inst abilit y in which the country was im m erse. On the other hand, those were the cent ral m onths for the const ruct ion and first placem ent of t he negotiating positions in the m ult ilateral plan. I n addition, it was t here t hat ‘t radition’ played a relevant role, in the definit ions of the priorit ies t hat Argentina would adopt and in the selection of t he st rat egies undert aken.

Thus, in the negotiations Argent ina first guarded itself in the negotiating pract ices and positioning that it had previously developed. Moreover, the negot iat ors, based in such t radition and prestigious past , were able t o exercise a cert ain influence, reducing t he im pact of the dom est ic crisis in t he int ernational plan.

Part icularly, the negot iat ion t radition identified was shaped in conduct s such as t he belonging t o the Cairns group, a coalit ion of com petitive agricult ural export count ries t hat do not give subvent ions t o their exports, as well as t he precedence of t he reclam ation for the access t o m arket s and the liberalization of agricultural trade, over ot her goods. This is fully illust rat ed by the full adhesion t o t he Vision St at em ent docum ent pronounced by t his coalition in 1998, as well as in t he ident ification of Aust ralia and New Zealand as key partners in this init ial st age of t he negotiat ion process.

Ot her inst rum ent s, such as the activism through t he present at ion of t echnical docum ent s, was influenced by that negot iat ing t radition observed above. Within it , it is wort hy t o m ention t hat Argentina was the aut hor, individually or collect ively, of 20% of t he t ot al of docum ent s discussed in t he agricult ural com m ission in t he period from March, 2000, t o Novem ber, 2001: about benefit s for export s, non-t rade legitim at e concerns and a general declaration regarding the negot iation process; four proposals with t he Cairns group and t wo joint proposals within the scope of MERCOSUR: one about St at e trading com panies and ot her referring t o disciplines t o the credit s of export s of agricult ural and anim al product s (one proposed by Brazil, the other by Argentina) .

Through these actions, the int ention was t o undert ake a technical diplom acy, based on t he bases of t he negotiation tradit ion. By m aking it possible, through such docum ent s, an interpret ation of t he effect s of each of the m easures that were being included in the negotiations, this diplom acy helped t o exert a cert ain influence over other count ries, especially the ones in developm ent . That was only possible due t o the technical hum an resources with which it count er, support ed in the previously form ed tradit ion; as well as t he soft power that this negotiation generat ed as prest ige for t he negot iat ors that pressed forward such docum ents in the m ultilateral plans or in t he coalitions.

I f, at a lat er st age, the country analysed enriched it s part icipat ion in the negot iat ions, with the incorporation of new elem ent s, such as t he int erest in indust rial issues and the part icipat ion in ot her kinds of coalit ions ( for instance, NAMA- 11) , we believe that in the m om ent s of great est crisis, such as the one felt in 2001, when tradit ion served as a guide for the action, placing the bases for later act ions.

I n fact , since 2003, as far as the count ry was recovering itself in it s econom ic and political bases, it increased it s m anagem ent capacity over t he foreign agenda, specified

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it s positioning and the participations in t he different st ages of negotiations becam e m ore frequent and int ensive. Consequently, with the advancem ent of the Doha Round, it was possible t o observe an increase in the part icipat ion in m inim inist ry m eet ings and green room s, as well as in the present ation of docum ents and proposals and in the part icipat ion in coalitions. I n that , the agricultural issues and the strat egic elem ents identified above were always t he central pillar of Argent ina at WTO.

5 . Fin al t hou gh t s

Thus, it is evident that the ‘negot iat ion t radition’ has played a relevant role in t he guidance of the act ions within foreign t rade negot iat ions. This variable, that has not been profoundly studied, such as ot hers, shows it can com e up wit h plausible explanations about st ates’ conduct regarding foreign policy, as well of it s resources of power by considering it self a source of soft power.

I n the case of Argentina, the im age of t he country as ‘t he world’s granary’, belonging t o t he m odel of liberal developm ent , has been present in each one of t he count ry’s part icipat ions in t he m ult ilateral plan, still guiding diplom atic actions in t he Doha Round. The negot iation tradit ion has, in cr escendo, st rengt hened a patt ern of act ions

t hat identify the count ry as an act ive player in t he negot iat ions, with a great t echnical background, as well as t he guidance through agricultural negotiation coalitions. I dent it y t hat , in the end, persist s in spit e of t he inst abilities the count ry faces, yet again.

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