Rev. Adm. (São Paulo) vol.52 número1

Revista

de

Administração

http://rausp.usp.br/ RevistadeAdministração52(2017)47–58

Strategy

and

Business

Economics

The

level

of

influence

of

trust,

commitment,

cooperation,

and

power

in

the

interorganizational

relationships

of

Brazilian

credit

cooperatives

O

nível

de

influência

da

confian¸ca,

do

comprometimento,

da

coopera¸cão

e

do

poder

no

relacionamento

interorganizacional

de

cooperativas

de

crédito

Brasileiras

El

nivel

de

influencia

de

la

confianza,

el

compromiso,

la

cooperación

y

el

poder

en

las

relaciones

interorganizacionales

de

cooperativas

de

crédito

en

Brasil

Denise

Maria

Martins

,

Ana

Cristina

de

Faria

,

Leandro

Campi

Prearo

,

Alessandro

Gustavo

Souza

Arruda

a_{FaculdadedeTecnologiadoIpiranga,SãoPaulo,SP,Brazil} b_{UniversidadeNovedeJulho,SãoPaulo,SP,Brazil}

c_{UniversidadeMunicipaldeSãoCaetanodoSul,SãoCaetanodoSul,SP,Brazil} d_{UniversidadeFederaldoMatoGrossodoSul,CampoGrande,MS,Brazil}

Received25June2015;accepted27April2016 Availableonline10October2016

Abstract

Thisarticleaimsto analyzethelevelofinfluence oftrust,commitment,cooperation,andpowerinthe interrelationshipsofindividualcredit cooperativesandtheircentralorganizationinBrazil.Thequantitativeanddescriptiveresearchwasdevelopedinuniquecreditunionslinkedto theCentralBankofBrazilandtheOrganizationofBrazilianCooperatives.Thedatawereanalyzedusingstructuralequationmodeling,withthe estimationthroughpartialleastsquares.Theresultsobtainedforthecoefficientsofdetermination(R2_{)oftheendogenouslatentvariablesconfirmed}

theassumptionsfoundinthetheoreticalmodelsofMorganandHunt(1994)andCoote,Forrest,andTam(2003).Statisticalsignificancewasalso foundintherelationshipsbetweenpowerandtrust,commitmentandcooperation,trustandcommitment,trustandcooperation,andpowerand commitment.However,inthisstudytherelationshipbetweenpowerandcommitmentcharacterizedthesignificanceandwaspositivebetweenthe individualcreditcooperativesandtheircentralorganization.Thisisinlinewiththeunderstandingthatpoweristhesolutiontoresolvingconflicts. Theresearchidentifieshowtheconstructsoftrust,commitment,cooperation,andpowershowrelevancetothealignmentofrelationsbetween individualcreditcooperativesandtheircentralorganization.

©2016PublishedbyElsevierEditoraLtda.onbehalfofDepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoe

ContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBYlicense(http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).

Keywords:Commitment;Cooperation;Power;Relationship;Trust

Resumo

Esteartigotemcomoobjetivoanalisaroníveldeinfluênciadaconfianc¸a,docomprometimento,dacooperac¸ãoedopodernorelacionamento interorganizacionaldecooperativasdecréditosingularesecentraisbrasileiras.Apesquisaquantitativaedescritiva,foidesenvolvidaemcooperativas decréditosingularesvinculadasaoBancoCentraldoBrasil–BACENeaOrganizac¸ãodasCooperativasBrasileiras–OCB.Osdadosforam

∗_{Correspondingauthorat:AvenidaFranciscoMatarazzo,612,05001-000SãoPaulo,SP,Brazil.}

E-mail:anacfaria@uol.com.br(A.C.Faria).

PeerReviewundertheresponsibilityofDepartamentodeAdministrac¸ão,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸ãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo –FEA/USP.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2016.09.003

tratadospormeiodaModelagemdeEquac¸õesEstruturais(MEE),comaplicac¸ãodométododeestimac¸ãodosmínimosquadradosparciais( PLS-PM).Osresultadosobtidosnoscoeficientesdedeterminac¸ão(R2_{)dasvariáveislatentesendógenas,confirmaramospressupostosencontradosnos}

modelosteóricosdeMorganeHunt(1994)eCoote,ForresteTam(2003).Constatou-se,tambémsignificânciaestatísticanasrelac¸õesentrepodere confianc¸a;comprometimentoecooperac¸ão;confianc¸aecomprometimento;confianc¸aecooperac¸ãoepoderecomprometimento.Noentanto,neste estudoarelac¸ãoentrepoderecomprometimentocaracteriza-secomosignificanteepositivaentreascooperativasdecréditosingularescomsuas centrais.Issoestáemconsonânciacomoentendimentodequeopoderéasoluc¸ãoparabuscarresolverconflitos.Apesquisapermiteidentificaro quantoosconstructosconfianc¸a,comprometimento,cooperac¸ãoepoderevidenciamaspectosrelevantesparaoalinhamentodasrelac¸õesentreas cooperativasdecréditossingularesesuascentraisdecrédito.

©2016PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.emnomedeDepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoe ContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP.Este ´eumartigoOpenAccesssobumalicenc¸aCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).

Palavras-chave: Comprometimento;Confianc¸a;Cooperac¸ão;Poder;Relacionamento

Resumen

Elobjetivoenesteartículoesanalizarelniveldeinfluenciadelaconfianza,elcompromiso,lacooperaciónyelpoderenlasrelaciones interorga-nizacionalesdelascooperativasdecréditosingularesycentralesenBrasil.Sellevóacabounestudiocuantitativoydescriptivoencooperativasde créditosingularesvinculadasconelBancoCentraldeBrasil–BACENylaOrganizacióndeCooperativasBrasile˜nas–OCB.Seanalizaronlos datospormediodemodelosdeecuacionesestructurales,conlaaplicacióndelmétododeestimacióndemínimoscuadradosparciales(PLS-PM). Losresultadosobtenidosenloscoeficientesdedeterminación(R2)delasvariableslatentesendógenasconfirmaronlossupuestosqueseencuentran enlosmodelosteóricosdeMorganyHunt(1994)yCoote,ForrestyTam(2003).Además,seencontrósignificaciónestadísticaenlasrelaciones entrepoderyconfianza;compromisoycooperación;confianzaycompromiso;confianzaycooperaciónypoderycompromiso.Sinembargo,la relaciónentrepoderycompromisosecaracterizaporsersignificativaypositivaparalascooperativasdecréditosingularesysuscentrales.Elloestá enconsonanciaconelentendimientodequeelpodereselrecursoparalasolucióndeconflictos.Elestudiopermiteidentificarcómolaconfianza, elcompromiso,lacooperaciónyelpoderponenenevidenciaaspectosrelevantesparalaalineacióndelasrelacionesentrelascooperativasde créditosingularesysuscentralesdecrédito.

©2016PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.ennombredeDepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoe ContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP.Esteesunart´ıculoOpenAccessbajolalicenciaCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).

Palabrasclave: Compromiso;Confianza;Cooperación;Poder;Relación

Introduction

Thetrendofrelationshipsbasedontrust,commitment, coop-eration, andpoweramongactors hasbeen characterizedas a meansofproducingvalueintransactions(eitherofinformation orresources),generatinganefficientmarketeconomy,and gen-eratingandsustaininggainsincompetitiveadvantage(Ndubisi, 2011;Olave&AmatoNeto,2001;Palmatier,2008).

ThestudiesconductedbyRingandVandeVen(1994)and

KleinandPereira(2014)analyzedthedynamicsof interorgani-zationalrelationshipsfromthepointofviewofthedevelopment ofcollaborativeandcooperativeprocesses—thelatterofwhich isthesubjectofthiswork. WegnerandPadula(2010,p.223)

notedthat“itisstillasmallnumberofstudiesthatareconcerned withthecriticalaspectsofinterorganizationalcooperation,such as governance and management”. Organizations that partici-pateincooperativerelationshipsareconsideredtoachievebetter resultsthanthosethatdonotactinthatway(Ambrose,Marshall, &Lynch,2010;Castro,Bulgacov,&Hoffman,2011).

Many of these organizations, in the face of factors such as uncertainty, need for flexibility, and the requirement to develop capabilities and other resources, have sought to be part of cooperative arrangements (Child & Faulkner, 1998). The understanding of factors that influence coopera-tiverelationships,especiallywithrespecttointerorganizational

relationship conflict, becomes a way to search for solu-tions and innovations in processes of interaction, such as thosethat occurincooperativesandcreditunions(Gianezini, 2010).

Creditcooperativesorcreditunions–theobjectsofstudyin thisresearch–canbeconstruedasanassociationof organiza-tionsseeking,throughmutualcooperation,bettermanagement of their financial resources through the benefits of collective ownershipof profit,as isestablishedinBrazilbyLaw 5.764, datedDecember16,1971(Brazil,2015).

Acooperativefinancialorcreditorganizationprovides assis-tanceintheformofcreditandtheprovisionofbankingservices toitsassociatesunderfavorableconditions(Franz&Azambuja, 2011).InBrazil,creditunionsareequivalenttofinancial insti-tutionsandtheirfunctioningmustbeauthorizedandregulated bytheCentralBankofBrazil(CBB,2010).Creditunionsare interorganizationalnetworksthatcanbeclassifiedaccordingto theirsizeandgoals.

isalackoftrustinmanagementandalackofunderstandingof itsimportance.

New-generation cooperatives,the object of this study, are definedasaformof architecturethatmaintainstheprinciples ofthedoctrineofcooperativism,bringingchangesinproperty rightsto inducecooperative organization toahigher level of economicefficiency,sincethevisionandtheinitialgoalarethe market(BialoskorskiNeto,2004).

With theproposal of amultidimensionalvisiontoexpand therangeoffactorsthatinfluencethesuccessofanetworkof cooperatives,thedevelopmentoftrust,commitment,andpower throughinteractionbetweencompaniesfosterscooperationand supports maintenance of the cooperative network (Ambrose etal.,2010;DeKlerk,2012;Ryu,Soonhu,&Chulmo,2009).

The integration of trust and commitment in the interac-tions of cooperatives can impactfinancial results,showing a logic of exchange that saves time, facilitates agreements on integration, andleadstoimprovement actions, specifically in therelationships between cooperatives,therebystrengthening goodgovernancepractices(Arruda,2014;Stecca,2014;Theurl, 2005).

Business networks, according to Ritter, Wilkinson, and Johnston(2004),canbeseenasasetof autonomousand iso-latedorganizationsthatjointogetheraroundsharedvaluesand sharedinterests,tothedetrimentofrigidhierarchicalstructures. However,itisnecessarytofocusontherelationsofpowerand dependenceinthesenetworks,consideredasastrongindication ofthewillingnessofparticipantstocooperatewitheachother (Machado-da-Silva&Coser,2006).

Fromtheperspectiveofhighlightingthedifferentpatternsof relationshipswithafocusonthenetworkofcreditcooperatives inBrazil,basedonamultidimensionalapproach,thefollowing questionguidesthisresearch:Whatisthelevelofinfluenceof power,trust,commitment,andcooperationintherelationship ofindividualcreditunionswithcentral?

Toanswerthisquestion,theresearchaimstoachieveageneral objective:toanalyzethelevelofinfluenceoftrust,commitment, cooperation,andpowerintheinterorganizationalrelationships ofindividualcreditunionsandcentral.

Theaspectstobeaddressedarediscussionsandreflectionson thecharacteristicsofinterorganizationalnetworks,cooperatives, and the social dimensions of their relationships, specifically in relationto the aspects of trust, commitment, cooperation, andpowerbetweenorganizations(Fynes,Voss,&Búrca,2005; Lambert&Schwieterman,2012).

Theoreticalplatform

Bibliographicresearchshowsthatseveralstudieshavebeen presented,suchasthosebyMorganandHunt(1994)– consid-eredaclassicinthefieldofBusinessManagementonthethemes focusedoninthiswork–andCoote,Forrest,andTam(2003), whodeepenunderstandingofthatclassicstudywiththeaimof identifyingthecharacteristics of successfulrelationships, and investigatingtheroleofconstructssuchastrust,commitment, cooperation,andpowerininterorganizationalrelationships.In

thecurrentresearch,relevantaspectsofeachoftheseconstructs areconsidered.

Trustreferstotheextensionofarelationshipbetweentrading partners, inwhicheach of the partiesrealizescredibility and benevolence(Aurifeille&Medlin,2009;Das&Teng,2001).It existswhenapartybelieves,orwhenthereiscredibility,inthe integrityandreliabilityoftheirpartner(Gulati&Sytch,2008; Mayer,Davis,&Schoorman,1995;McEvily,2011;Seppänen, Blomqvist,&Sundqvist,2007).

Inpursuitofthefulfillmentofexpectationsbetween organiza-tions,trustestablishesanincreaseinorganizationaltrust(Cunha &Melo,2006;Gulati&Nickerson,2008),whichdescribesthe extension of acollectiveorientation withrespecttoapartner company(Dyer&Chu,2003;McEvily,2011).Acceptanceof thesocialaspectbecomesrelevanttothedevelopmentoftrust ininterorganizationalrelationships(Aurifeille&Medlin,2009; Palmatier,2008;Paterson,Maguire,&Al-Hakim,2008).

Cooteet al.(2003)proposedthat the followingconstructs influencetrust,classifyingthemas predecessors: communica-tion,conflict,similarity,andevenopportunisticbehavior,asin theviewofMorganandHunt(1994).Trustdevelopseach inter-actionthatisestablished(Fulmer&Gelfand,2012).Instudies conducted byMorganandHunt(1994)andDeKlerk(2012), trustandcommitmentwerefoundtodirectlyandpositively influ-encecooperation.Inthissense,thefollowingpropositioncanbe established:

(P1)Trustdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescooperation.

Commitmentisbuiltthroughthereasoningofmutualtrust.

Morgan and Hunt (1994) established a relationship between commitment and trust as the basis of cooperative behavior. Accordingtotheseauthors,commitmentisthebeliefofoneof theactorsthatthecooperativenetworkthatexistsissoimportant that itisworthwhilestrivingtokeepit (Krause,Handfield,& Tyler,2007).Inthissense,thepartnerwillbehaveliketheother andtrustinthatbehavior(Ndubisi,2011).

IntheviewofDahmane,Allah,andAbderrezak(2015),the presence of commitment in trade cultivates the trust shared between the parties entered into the relationship. The con-tinuity of relationships over time motivates organizations to worktogether inpursuitof goalsandmutualbenefits for the membersofthe relationship(Principe,Dagger,&O’Sullivan, 2010;Ruyter,Milford,&Lemmink,2001;VanVuuren, Roberts-Lombard,&VanTonder,2012;Wagner&Rydstrom,2001).

IntheviewofEllram(1991),apartnership,asina coopera-tive,mustbebuiltonastrongcommitmentbetweentheparties. Itisfeasibletoassumethattrustandcommitmentarepositively associated,whereastrustisoneassumptionoftheexistenceof commitment(Morgan&Hunt,1994;Walter,Müller,Helfert,& Ritter,2003).

by Morgan andHunt (1994).In thissense, we caninfer the followingproposition:

(P2)Trustdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescommitment.

Commitmentemergesintherelationshipwhenthereisahigh level of trust, aswell asa socialenvironmentthat allowsfor the encouragement of cooperationandmayfacilitate interac-tionsandconstructiveactions(Goodman&Dion,2001).Some authors,suchas CoughlanandCoghlan(2002)andPalmatier (2008),havearguedthatthereisapositiverelationshipbetween commitmentandcooperation.Thus,thefollowingisproposed:

(P3)Commitmentdirectlyandpositivelyinfluences coopera-tion.

Basedontheliteratureonrelationshipsininterorganizational networks,thereisevidenceofsomedimensionsofthevariable ofcooperation.Forthepresentstudy,cooperationistreatedasa variableresultingfromtrust,commitment,andpower(discussed inthenextsection);thus,cooperationisconsideredavariable (Mahama,2006;Morgan&Hunt,1994).

Cooperationisthebasicdimensionofhorizontalnetworks,in whichcompaniesareindependentbutarepartofanetworkfor specificactivities,suchascreatingnewmarkets,socialaction, andresearch.Cooperationistheaxisofsocialdevelopmentand economiccompetitiveness,whichisreflected intheformation ofinterorganizationalnetworks(Balestrin&Vargas,2004).

IntheviewofBrito,Brito,andHashiba(2014,p.953), “coop-erationreferstothejoint activitybetweenpartnerstoachieve goalsmutually compatible whichwould otherwise be unfea-sible or costly.”The authors argued that behaviorsandgoals are fundamentaltodefinition of the concept, consideredas a multidimensionalphenomenon.

AsCastroetal.(2011,p.38)stated,“thecooperationmay representastrategyfor achievingorganizationalgoals,dueto itsinstrumentalvalue,that is,considerthedegreetowhicha givenconnectioncouldcontributetotheachievementof organi-zationalgoals.”Incontext,thatinstrumentalvalueisthedegree towhichagivenconnectioncouldcontributetotheachievement of organizational goals. Understanding of cooperation estab-lishesthepresumptionofapproachesoftrustandcommitment asthebackgroundtoaninterorganizationalrelationship(Brass, Galaskiewicz,Greeve,&Tsai,2004;Oliver&Ebers,1998).

Powerisalwayspresentinrelationsofexchange.Intheview ofFoucault(2001),powerisadynamicrealitythathelpshuman beingstoexpresstheirfreedomwithresponsibility.The depend-ence or interdependence of parties on their trading partners creates differencesinpower, wheretheexchange isdesigned forthefuture(Nicholls&Huybrechts,2014;Sambasivan,Phaik, Mohamed,&Leong2011).

Zaheer,Gözübüyük,andTome(2010)statedthatpowerisa relevantvariableforthebirth,development,decline,and termi-nationofinterorganizationalnetworks.Itcanbeunderstoodas anaspectoftheactualinteractionamongsocialactorsthatcan predictthedynamicsofthesecooperativerelationships(Knoke, 1994).

Power is arelevant variable that enablesus tounderstand themovementsofrelationshipsinwhichtherearecooperative actions and actions arising from individual interests (Zaheer etal., 2010).AccordingtoSilva,Melo,andMarra(2014),in astudyofafinancialinstitutionakintothatfocusedoninthe presentresearch,powerdoesnotrefertoaspecificsourceand isnotamatterofforceorcoercion,butpermeatesallofsocial life,andisexercisedinaninfinitevarietyofpositions.

AccordingtoMorganandHunt(1994),poweristreatedas coercive, bymeans ofarelation betweencoercion,authority, andinfluence.However,inthecontextofcooperativenetworks, powerisunderstoodasgearsthatmovethecoordination mecha-nismsoftheinterorganizationalrelationship(Bachmann,2001). Inthiscontext,propositionsregardingpowerareestablished:

(P4)Powerdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencestrust. (P5)Powerdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescommitment.

Basedontheassumptionsabove,inferencesregarding rela-tionships between the constructs of trust, commitment, and cooperation and interorganizational relations of power were assessed. This enabled construction of the conceptual model used intheresearch.Thisisdetailedinthefollowingsection, whichaddressesthemethodologicalaspectsoftheresearch.

Researchmethodology

This section discusses the methodological aspects of the research.

Classificationofresearch

The quantitative and descriptive study performed in this research were conducted through an intersectional (cross-sectional) survey; that is, the results depict the situation at a certain moment. This research was carried out between November 2014 and January 2015. Following the logic of

Babbie(1999),thesurveywasdevelopedforcreditunionslinked totheCBB(2010)andtheOrganizationofBrazilian Coopera-tives(OBC,2015),andfieldresearchwaschosenduetothefact thattheresearchisrootedinsocialsciencesandfieldresearch isappropriatefordescriptivestudies(Oppenheim,2001).

Theappliedmodelseekstoconfirmtheimpactofthelatent variables trust, commitment, cooperation and power (Coote etal.,2003;Morgan&Hunt,1994)ofindividualcreditunions withcentral.Inthiscontext,itisestablishedthatthelatent vari-able“power”referstoanexogenousconstruct,sincethereare other variablesthat exert aneffect onit. Trust, commitment, and cooperationare consideredto be endogenous constructs, becausetheyreceivetheinfluenceofothervariablespresentin themodel.

Theobjectofstudy(populationandsample)

1.154individualcreditunionsinBrazilwithsupervisionofthe DepartmentforMonitoring theFinancialSystemof theCBB (2010),inwhicharound91%ofcreditunionsarelinkedtothe OBC.

AccordingtotheCBB(2010),cooperativesocietiescanbe classifiedas:

(a) individualcooperatives,or firstdegree,providingservices directlytomembers;

(b) centralcooperativesandfederationsofcooperativesor sec-onddegree,consistingofindividualcooperativeswhichaim toprovide,ingreater orlesserextent, economicand sup-portservicesfortheinterestofaffiliates,byintegratingand directingtheiractivitiesandfacilitatingthereciprocaluse ofservices;and

(c) Confederation ofcooperatives,or thirddegree, formedof centralandfederations of cooperatives andwhichaim to guide and coordinate the activities of affiliates, in cases where the figure of the enterprises transcends the ability or convenience of the operation of central or federations ofcooperatives.AccordingtoArruda(2014,p.72),“when itcomestocooperatives,itisthoughttobemembersand companiesthatoperateinanetworkofbusinesses”.

Theunderstandingisthattherelationshipbetween individ-ualcooperativesandcentraloccursdifferentlyinarelationship dyadbetweenthe customerandtheservice provider. Specifi-cally,creditunionsarefinancialinstitutionsestablished inthe formofacooperativesociety,whichprovidefinancialservicesto theirmembers,providingbillingservices,andmaintaining cus-todyofreceiptsandpaymentsonbehalfofthirdparties,under anagreementwiththepublicfinancialinstitutionsandprivate companiesinthecountry,inadditiontootherspecificoperations andtaskslaiddowninthelegislation(CBB,2010).

Followingouridentificationofcreditunionstoconsiderin thisstudy,wecalculatedthesamplesize,assuggestedbyFaul, Erdfelder,Lang, and Buchner(2007), by means of applying G*Power(version3.1.9.2)(Erdfelder,Faul,&Buchner,1996). Considering the aforementioned population used within this study,weobtainedareturnrateof12.7%forthequestionnaires sent,yieldingasamplesizeof146individualcreditunions par-ticipatingintheresearch.Theserepresentedalltheregionsof Brazil.

Followingareview,as suggested byHenseler, Ringle and Sinkovics (2009), Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, and Mena (2012),

Wong (2013), andRingle, Silva and Bido (2014),we evalu-atedthe statistical significanceof the loadsof theindicators’ reflectivesensor(modelformeasuringreflection),aswellasthe significanceoftherelationsbetweentheconstructs(structural model).

Thecriterionusedwasthet-test.AccordingtoRingleetal. (2014),t-valuesabove1.96indicateasignificancelevelofless than0.05(p≤0.05),whichshowsthattheconstructshave cor-relations and/or weightings that are acceptable. In this way, thestructural model is adjusted,enabling,through an assess-mentofsignificancebetweentherelationships,acceptancethe

Table1

Scaleofindicators.

Latentvariables Indicatorsofconstructs

Powerrelations V33RCONT:Wehavemutualunderstanding onhowtodealwithdisagreements.

V35 CONFLICT:Therearefewsignificant differenceswiththeCentral.

V40POWER:Wehopethatnoneofthe partiesmakesdemandsthatmightbeharmful totheother.

V51POWER:Intherelationshipwiththe leaderofCentral,therearenothreatsofany kind.

Interorganizational trust

V52CINTERP:TheleaderofCentralkeeps promisesthecombinedwithfidelity. V53CINTERP:Theconductoftheleader givesustrust.

V54CINTERP:TheleaderofCentralis honestandfair.

V55CINTERP:TheleaderofCentralhasa highdegreeofintegrity.

V56 CINTERP:Thepersonalconsultationis guidingrelationshipmanagementofCentral withthecooperative.

Interorganizational commitment

V8COMP:Wehopetocontinueworkingwith Centralforalongtime.

V10COMP:Webelievethattherelationship withCentralwillbeprofitableinthelongterm. V11COMP:Webelievethereisa

commitmentbybothparties.

V59VLCOMP:TheleaderofCentralmakes itclearthatunethicalbehaviorisnottolerated. V60VLCOMP:Centralundertakesformal agreementsethically.

Interorganizational cooperation

V41COOP:Wehavedevelopedmeansto fosterlearningprocesseswithourexperiences. V42COOP:Weseektoshareresourcesand expertiseforriskreduction.

V43COOP:Wepromotethetransferof technologyand/orinnovationsbetweenthe parties.

V44COOP:Weexchangesuccessfuland failureexperiences.

Source:Compiledbytheauthors.

propositionssetoutinthedevelopmentofthestudy(Hair,Black, Babin,&Tathan,2009).

Researchinstrumentfordatacollection

Followingareviewoftheliterature,weselectedthe theoret-icalmodelsofMorganandHunt(1994)andCooteetal.(2003)

foruseinthisresearch,sincethesemodelsestablishconstructs, variables,andtheirindicatorstounderpinthedevelopmentof theresearchinstrument.Thedatawerecollectedthrougha struc-turedquestionnaire,senttocreditunions,whichallowedusto obtaininformationinashorttime,facilitatingmorerapid tabula-tionofdatacomparedtootherinstruments(Selltiz,Wrightsman, &Cook,2005).

Interorganizational

Trust Interorganizational_Cooperation

Interorganizational Commitment P1(+)

P4(+)

P5(+)

P3(+) P2(+)

Power Relations

Fig.1.Structuralmodel–researchdesign. Source:CompiledbytheauthorsviaSmartPls3.1.9(2015).

power,comprisingatotalof18indicatorsfollowingexclusion ofsensorindicatorswithlowercorrelations(Table1).

We chose to use a Likert scale with ten options for the answers, inwhich the researchtarget was directors of credit unions.AsMalhotra(2011)stated,theLikertscalehas advan-tages including ease of construction andapplication, ease of understandingbyrespondents,andsuitabilityfor bothremote andpersonalinterviews.

AccordingtoMalhotra(2011,p.256),“thepre-test respon-dentsshouldbesimilartotherealsurvey,intermsoffundamental characteristics, familiarity withthe subject and attitudes and behaviorsof interest.” From the first versionof the data col-lectioninstrument,weconductedapre-testthroughinterviews withexpertsincreditunions,foradaptationandvalidationof thesurveyinstrument.Thefinalversionwassenttothe respon-dents electronically, by e-mail list provided by Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives (OBC), with a letter of introduc-tionandalinktothequestions,madeavailablebythewebsite

SurveyMonkey® (2015).

Statisticaltreatmentofthedata

Achievingtheresearchaimsandansweringtheresearch ques-tionrequiredtheuseofmultivariateanalysiswiththeestimation ofmultiplerelationsofdependenceinterrelatedthrough struc-turalequationmodeling–SEM(Hairetal.,2009).AsBreiand LiberaliNeto(2006)pointedout,inordertotestwhetherthe itemsused tomeasuretheconstructshavereached acceptable levelsofreliabilityandvaliditylogic,confirmatoryfactor anal-ysisisconducted,supportedbythepartialleastsquares(PLS) methodofestimation.

The above outlines the conceptual (structural) model that directsthebasisoftheconstructsforthevariablestrust, commit-ment,cooperation,andpowerofcreditunionswithpower.The structuralmodelshowninFig.1seekstoestablishthelevelof influenceoftherelationaldimensionsoftrust,commitmentand cooperation,andinterorganizationalrelationsofpower,interms oftheadequacyofthetheoreticalmodelsofMorganandHunt (1994)andCoote etal.(2003),inthe contextof cooperative networksofcredit.

Items P1–P5 shown in Fig. 1 refer to the conceptual propositionsoutlinedinsection “Theoreticalplatform”onthe theoretical foundation. It should be noted that the directions of connectionbetweenthedimensionsoftherelationship out-linedinFig.1arelatentvariableswithreflectivecharacteristics. Evaluationoftheconceptualmodelwasconductedintwomain stages:initiallythroughvalidation of themeasurementmodel andsubsequentlyvalidationofthestructuralmodel.

Thestatisticaltestsusedinthisstudywere:(1)calculationof thesizeoftheminimumsample;(2)SEMbyPLS;(3)analysis of averagevarianceextracted(AVE);(4)testsofdiscriminant validity;(5)testsofinternalconsistencyandcomposite reliabil-ity;(6)t-test;(7)evaluationofthecoefficientsofdetermination (R2);(8)effectsize(f2);(9)predictivevalidity (Q2);and(10) adherencetothemodelorgoodnessoffit(GoF)(Ringleetal., 2014).

Descriptionandanalysisoftheresults

Structuralequationmodeling–SEM

Consideringthemodeltobetested,foraPLSmeasurement model one should consider the construct with more predic-tors,witharrowscoming.Inthiscase,therearetwoconstructs: commitmentandcooperation,whichhavetwoarrows(Fig.1). Thus,adoptingtherecommendationsofHair,Kohli,Ringleand Sarstedt(2014),withamediumeffectsize(f2)of0.15andatest powerof0.80,theminimumsamplesizewouldbe52 respon-dents(posthoc);thisislowerthanthesampleinthisstudy,which comprised146respondents.

Evaluationofthemeasurementmodel

Fordataanalysis,weusedSmartPLS3.1.9(Ringle,Wende, & Becker, 2015). The initialanalysis of the model,using all theitemsfromthequestionnaire,showednoconvergent valid-ity(AVE<0.5)ordiscriminantvaliditybasedonthecriterion of Fornell andLarcker (1981),withthe squarerootsof AVE lessthanthecorrelationsbetweenconstructs.Thisobservation ledtoadjustmentofthemodel,withtheexceptionofreflective sensorindicatorswithlowercorrelations,whichwere commit-ment(V58,V57,V7),trust(V45),cooperation(V29,V28),and power(V20,V31).

Interorganizational Trust

Interorganizational Cooperation

Interorganizational Commitment

Power Relations

V52

V41 0.859

0.685

0.756

0.804 0.830

0.599

0.690

0.670

0.761

0.839

0.866 0.748

0.829

0.678 0.353

0.515

0.450

0.257

0.49 5

0.716 0.790 0.800

0.624

V42

V43

V43

V10

V11

V59

V60

V8 V53

V54

V55

V56

V33

V35

V40

V51

0.265 0.573

0.387

Fig.2.Measurementmodeladjustedwithexclusions. Source:CompiledbytheauthorsviaSmartPls3.1.9(2015).

areaof Social Sciences,the coefficientof determination (R2) canberatedforeffectaccordingtothefollowingR2:2%=small, 13%=medium,and26%=large.

Fig.2showsthatallcoefficientsofdeterminationareabove 26%,indicatingthattheobservedvariableshavealargeeffect on the latent variables. The path coefficients (Γ) for the linear regression of the latent variables are moderately ris-ing,suggestingthattherearecausal relationsbetweenpower, trust,commitment,andcooperation.Table2showstheresults obtained with the adjusted model, which correspond to the referentialparametersofconvergentvalidity(AVE>0.50)and reliability(compositereliabilityandinternalconsistency– Cron-bach’salpha>0.70).

The results show that the adjusted model has convergent validityandreliability(Hairetal.,2014).Theresultsobtained withqualityadjustmentlistedinTable2considertherootsof AVEforevaluationofdiscriminantvalidity.

AsshowninTable3,theadjustedmodelshowsthesquare rootsoftheaveragevarianceextracted(AVE)fortheconstructs ofcommitment,trust,cooperation,andrelationsofpowerthat are largerthan the correlations withother constructs. In this sense,theresultsattheleveloftheconstructsprovide discrim-inantvalidityaccordingtothecriterionofFornellandLarcker (1981),indicatingthatthe latentvariablesare independentof oneanother(Hairetal., 2014).Note alsothat theconvergent validity,reliability,anddiscriminantvalidityofthemodelsfor measuringreflectiveindicatorswereinitiatedintheanalysisand validationofthestructuralmodel.

Assessmentofthestructuralmodel

Followingthereview,assuggestedbyHenseleretal.(2009),

Wong(2013),Hairetal.(2014),andRingleetal.(2014),we evaluatedthe statistical significanceof the loadsof reflective sensorindicators(modelformeasuringreflection),aswellasthe significanceoftherelationsbetweentheconstructs(structural model).Thecriterionusedwasthet-test.

Fig.3showstheresultsobtainedfromtheprocessof boot-strapping, considering the parameters of individual changes andresampling 146 cases, indicating that all relations of the

structuralelements(endogenousandlatentvariable),orthe rela-tionsofthemeasurementmodel,areabovetheminimumlevel specified.

Fig.3showsthevaluesofthet-testforthethreeconstructs andtheirrespectivevariables.Inallcases,thesearelargerthan 1.96(p≤0.05);thus,alloftheserelationsaresignificant,leading toacceptanceofthepropositions,asshowninTable4.

The statistical significance found in the relations led to acceptanceof thepropositions,asshowninTable4,basedon evaluation of the coefficients of determination (R2). Accord-ingtoHenseler,RingleandSinkovics(2009),oneofthemain assessmentsof astructuralmodelcomprisesevaluationof the

R2ofthelatentvariables.AsRingleetal.(2014,p.65)stated, “TheR2measurestheportionofthevarianceoftheendogenous variables,whichisexplainedbythestructuralmodeland indi-catethequalityoftheadjustedmodel”.TheR2resultsobtained inthemodelshowthefollowing:

(1) TheR2presentedinFig.3forinterorganizationaltrust indi-catesthat26.5%ofthevarianceinthisconstructisexplained bytheconstructofpowerrelations.

(2) TheR2presentedinFig.3forinterorganizational commit-mentindicatesthat38.7%ofthevarianceinthisconstruct isexplainedbytheconstructsoftrustandpowerrelations. (3) The R2 presented inFig.3 for cooperationindicatesthat

57.3%of thevariance of thisconstructwas explainedby theconstructsoftrustandcommitment.

TheR2oftheendogenouslatentvariablesoftrust(26.5%), commitment(38.7%),andcooperation(57.3%)wereadequate, withalargecoefficientofdetermination(asCohen(1988)stated fortheareaofSocialSciences,R2valuesindicatedthe follow-ingeffectsizes:2%=small, 13%=average,and26%=large). Thepathcoefficientsorregressioncoefficients(β)betweenthe constructs(Fig.2)indicatedthatthevariationofaunitinpower relationsimpliesasignificantvariationof0.515in interorgani-zationaltrust,aswellasavariationoflessintensityoftheorder of0.257ininterorganizationalcommitment.

Table2

Convergentvalidityandreliabilityoftheadjustedmodel.

Construct AVE Compositereliability Cronbach’salpha

Interorganizationalcommitment 0.525 0.846 0.773

Interorganizationaltrust 0.547 0.856 0.789

Interorganizationalcooperation 0.683 0.896 0.844

Powerrelations 0.552 0.830 0.726

Referencevalues AVE>0.50 0.70 0.70

Source:CompiledbytheauthorsviaSmartPls3.1.9(2015).

Table3

Discriminantvalidity–adjustedmodel.

Construct Interorganizational

commitment

Interorganizational trust

Interorganizational cooperation

Relations power Interorganizational

commitment

0.725

Interorganizational trust 0.582 0.739

Interorganizational cooperation

0.700 0.641 0.827

Power relations 0.488 0.515 0.523 0.743

Source:CompiledbytheauthorsviaSmartPls3.1.9(2015).

Note:Diagonal(yellow)showsthevaluesofthesquarerootsoftheAVE.

2009;Ringleetal.,2014;Wong,2013).AsHenseleretal.(2009)

stated,bothindicatorscanbeobtainedthroughtheBlindfolding moduleofSmartPls.

ThereferencevaluesforStone–Geisser’sQ2are0.02(small effect),0.15(mediumeffect),and0.35(largeeffect),indicating howanexogenouslatentvariablecontributestotheR2valueof theendogenouslatentvariable(Wong,2013,p.27).However,for

Henseleretal.(2009)andRingleetal.(2014),obtainingvalues ofQ2largerthanzeromayindicatetheexistenceofrelevance orquality.

Toconcludethe assessmentofthe structuralmodel,itwas necessarytoevaluatetheadherenceofthemodel;thus,aGoF test was applied to the score of the overall quality of the adjustedmodel.Foramodelinwhichallconstructsare reflec-tive,Tenenhaus, Vinzi,ChatelinandLauro(2005)proposeda GoF index, that is basically the geometric mean (the square rootoftheproductoftwoindicators)betweentheaverageR2

(adequacy of the structural model) and the weightedaverage of the AVE (adequacy of the measurement model). Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder,andVanOppen(2009)suggestedavalue of0.36asappropriateforthefieldofSocialSciences.

The size of the effect measured by Cohen’s f2 is able to evaluatethe“magnitudeorthestrengthofrelationshipsamong thelatentvariables”(Wong,2013,p.26).Theresultsobtained through the Blindfolding module of SmartPls are shown in

Table5.

Table5showsthatvalidationofthestructuralmodelbasedon therelevancepredictor(Q2),whichindicatesthemodel’s accu-racy,aswellasassessinghow“useful”eachconstructisforthe adjustmentofthemodel(f2),indicatesthatinterorganizational cooperation(38.5%)hasasignificantimpactonthestructural model.Thisdemonstratestheadequacyofthestructuralmodel, astheproposedconceptualframeworkhasanindexofadhesion of48.3%(GoF).

Interorganizational Trust

V52

V54 V53

V55 V56

V35 V33

V10

V41 0.859

0.866 0.748

0.829

0.678 4.768

0.265

0.387

0.573 0.685

0.756 0.804 0.830

0.599

0.690 0.670 0.761

0.839

7.753

5.752

2.800

6.985

0.716 0.790 0.800 0.624

V42

V43 V43

V11

V59 V60

V8

V40 V51

Interorganizational Cooperation

Interorganizational Commitment

Power Relations

Table4

Validationofthepropositionsofthetheoreticalmodels.

Constructs Propositionsofthetheoreticalmodels Evaluation Conclusion

Interorganizational trust

P1:Trustdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescooperation. T=4.768 Positivesign

Proposition accepted P2:Trustdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescommitment. T=5.752

Positivesign

Proposition accepted Interorganizationalcommitment P3:Commitmentdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescooperation. T=6.985

Positivesign

Proposition accepted

Powerrelations P4:Powerdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencestrust. T=7.733

Positivesign

Proposition accepted P5:Powerdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencescommitment. T=2.80

Positivesign

Proposition accepted Source:Compiledbytheauthors.

Table5

Predictiverelevance(Q2),totaleffect(f2),andadherencetothemodel(GoF).

Construct Q2 _F2 _GoF

Interorganizational commitment

0.281 0.190 0.483

Interorganizational trust

0.314 0.138

Interorganizational cooperation

0.461 0.385

Powerrelations 0.254 0.000

Reference values

Q2_{>0 F}2_{=0.02,small 0.36} F2=0.15,medium F2_=0.35,large Source:CompiledbytheauthorsviaSmartPls3.1.9(2015).

Conclusions

To achieve the objectives of the current study, conceptual modelsdesignedbasedontheconstructsoftrust,commitment, cooperation,andpowerrelationswereusedasabasisforguiding researchinthelightofthetheoreticalconstructsofMorganand Hunt(1994)andCooteetal.(2003).

Theresultsweregeneratedviatheintegrationoftheoretical models(trust,commitment,cooperation,andpower),resulting in confirmation of the constructs in the network of individ-ualcreditunionsinvestigatedanddemonstratingthatthelatent variablesoftrust,commitment,andcooperationpositively influ-encetherelationshipbetweenindividualcreditunionswiththeir central.

This allows for a relationship that establishes more than informationsharing, positioning ina structure or network of relationships in which actions are defined and possibilities delimited,andthusleadingtotheemergenceof environments thatarestructuredinanorganizedandintegratedfashion(White, Owen-Smith,Moody,&Powell,2004).

AsCookandChaddad (2004)stated,the principlesof the cooperative system advocate cooperative societies based on democraticmanagementbyassociates, asaguaranteethatthe results of the activities carried out provide a return to their membersand enhancementof the associatesand their work-ingconditions, andadheretothevaluesof solidarity, concern forthecommunity,autonomy,andindependence.

Inparticular,creditcooperativesorcreditunionsaredeemed tobestrategicnetworks,asDesrochersandFischer(2005) sug-gested, andto represent a movement toward the creation of hybridsystemsofgovernance(Arruda,2014).Oneoftheaspects ofthestrengtheningofcooperativerelationships,whichseekto achievestrategicgoals,involvesmotivatingfactorssuchastrust, commitment, cooperation, and power (Huang & Wilkinson, 2013;Serigati&Azevedo,2013;Stecca,2014).

The performance of sparse way, can be characterized in as leaders andtechnicianswhichare divided betweengroups according to opposition or situation, promoting integration, failedatalllevels,bothhorizontalandvertical,aswellas dif-ferent patterns of relationships. These relationships have the ability to create distinct processes of information sharing of knowledge and resources, depend on the perception of the companywithinthenetwork.Inthissense,understandingthe relationshipbetweencreditunionscanestablish actionsof an integratedrelationshipinthehorizontalandverticallevel net-work,strengtheningtheprinciplesofcooperativism.

Inthissense,inresponsetothequestionWhatisthelevelof influenceofpower,trust,commitment,andcooperationinthe relationshipofcreditunionswithpower?,withinthe interorga-nizationalrelationshipofindividualcreditunionsandcentral, themaindimensionsofcooperation,trust,andcommitmentcan beobserved,inwhichpowerinfluencestrust,attheexpenseof commitment,inasignificantway.

Withrespecttothegeneralobjectiveofanalyzingthelevel of influenceof trust, commitment,cooperation, andpowerin relationshipsbetweencreditunionsinBrazil,arelationshipwas notedbetweencooperativesandcentral,sothatthedimensions are identifiedatdifferent levels,depending onthesize of the effect(f2).

Theresultsobtainedforthecoefficientofdetermination(R2) of theendogenouslatentvariablesconfirmedtheassumptions foundinthetheoreticalmodels.Thesewereasfollows: cooper-ationR2=0.573,commitmentR2=0.387,andtrustR2=0.265. Statistical significance was also observed in the relations between power and trust (t=7.753), commitment and coop-eration(t=6.985),trustandcommitment(t=5.752),trustand cooperation(t=4.768),andpowerandcommitment(t=2.80).

ofeachconstructvalidatedbythetheoreticalmodel.The inter-relationshipbetweenpowerandtrustinthemodelof Morgan andHunt(1994)recommendsthatthepowerrelationhasa neg-ativeinfluenceontrust;thatis,thatonepartynolongerrelies onanotherifthelatterpushesthemtodosomethingthatthey donotwanttodo(Nicholls&Huybrechts,2014).

However,ourresultoft=7.753,withapositivesign,indicates thattherelationshipbetweentheconstructsofpowerandtrust issignificantandpositive(P4).Aprobableexplanationforthis liesintheconceptionofpowerasrelationsofdominationinan unknownenvironment.However,powerandtrustinthecontext ofcreditunions,characterizedasahorizontalnetwork,enable coordinationofexpectationsandtheactionsofthenegotiating parties(Bachmann,2001;Schilke&Cook,2013).Intheviewof

Hingley(2005),thereisagapintheliteratureregardingtherole ofpoweranddominationininterorganizationalrelationships.

In terms of the relation betweenpower andcommitment, thetheoreticalmodelofMorganandHunt(1994)establisheda significantandnegativerelationship.However,inthisstudythis relationischaracterizedas significantandpositive(P2), with

t=2.80,inwhichpower influencesinvolvementin apositive wayamongcreditunionsandtheircentral.

Therefore,exercisingtheuniquepowerofcreditunions pro-videsgreater involvementinthe relationshipwiththe central cooperative, inline withGiglio, Pugliesi, andSilva’s (2012)

understandingoftherelationofpowerwithinvolvement,where inthesolutionistoinvolverulesandnormsinordertoresolve conflicts.

IntheviewofFoucault(1997),institutionsexercisepower anddiscipline through the standardization of proceduresand constantvigilance,characterizedasinstrumentsforintegration and cohesion. This favors involvement with the operational structure of credit unions interms of carrying out activities, together with leadership to promote dialog with the credit bureaus(Martins&Paz,2000;Mintzberg,1983).

InthemodelpositedbyCooteetal.(2003),whichfocuseson trustandcommitment,theauthorsarguedthattheeffectoftrust oncompromiseisattenuated,tothepointofnotbeing signifi-cant;however,MorganandHunt(1994)confirmedasignificant andpositiverelationship.Inthecurrentstudy,itwasfoundthat trustdirectlyandpositivelyinfluencedcommitment(P2),with

t=5.752.Thus,there isaconvergence between themodel of

MorganandHunt(1994)andthecurrentstudy.

Inrelationtothecontextofcreditunions,analyzingthe state-mentinthescenarioofcreditunions,accordingtoStecca(2014, p.116),“thecooperativeposturetoclearlyexplainitsrulesand socializeyour goals,makingthepurposesof theorganization knownandassumed bythegroup,relatestothe feelingof to commit.”Thus,thevariableoftrustimpliesareadinessto com-promise and for individual credit unions to cooperate, based ontheunderstandingthattheactorsthatmakeupthenetwork choosetosubstantiatetheirrelationshipsontrust,assumingthat otherpartieswillbehaveasexpected(Hagen&Choe,1998).

Cooperativescantranslateintoamorecoherentmeansof col-laboratingandcooperating(Olave&AmatoNeto,2001).This researchenabledustoidentifyhowtheconstructsoftrust, com-mitment,andpowerininterorganizationalrelationshipsrelateto

thealignmentofrelationsbetweencreditcooperativesandcredit bureaus.Therefore,inamannersimilartothatofAmbroseetal. (2010),thisstudyprovidesananalysisthatallowsusto under-standthecharacteristicsofinterorganizationalrelationshipsand thekeyfactorsthatcontributetotheirimprovement,amongthe networkofcooperativesstudied.

Fromtheestablishmentofcooperativerelationships,trustand cooperationoccursimultaneouslywithcompetition,being influ-encedbythetypeofstructureformedinthenetwork(Balestrin & Vargas, 2004). Analysis of the formation of cooperative networksbetweencompaniesispremisedontheunderstanding ofcommitment,havingasfocusthedifferentiationoffirms,the interdependence of interorganizationalnetworks (Sambasivan etal.,2011),andflexibility,interpretedastheabilitytoadaptto theenvironment(AmatoNeto&Amato,2009;Palmatier,2008; Serigati&Azevedo,2013;Verschoore&Balestrin,2008).

Future studies can consider the latent variables of trust, commitment,cooperation,andpowerasmediatorsofother vari-ables,suchassimilarity,communication,informationsharing, contractualrelations,socialrelationships,adaptability,conflict, interpersonalandorganizationaltrust,problemsolving,shared values, and opportunistic behavior, which are not addressed inthisstudy. Anothersuggestionfor futureworkcouldbeto rebuildthemodelviatheincorporationofconstructsof endoge-nousmeasures,suchasincomegeneration,socialinclusion,and qualityoflife.

Anotherrelevantaspectforfutureworkpertainstotheneed for abroad approachto the levels that make upthe network of credit unions,involving the main stakeholdersof the net-workas well asthe involvementof otherpeople inthesame network,inadditiontoconsideringreplicationofthedata collec-tioninstrumentusedinthisresearchviatheinvolvementofother respondentsincooperativesorapplicationtoothersegmentsof cooperatives,suchasoutput,consumption,andeducation.

Therefore,fromtheseconsiderationsrelevantinterms con-ceptual and methodological, it is considered that this study contributestoaunderstandingtheinter-relationshipsina busi-nessnetwork.Thisstudyhasnothighlightedthecontributionof publicagents,whichcouldalsobeanalyzedinfuturework.

Studies with a focus on interorganizational relationships regarding trust,commitment,cooperation, andpower,aswell astheimpactoftheseontheinterorganizationalrelationshipsof companiesthatoperateinbusinessnetworks,mayalsoprovide contributionsthatwouldassistinstrengtheningandmaintaining long-term relationships,improvingbusinessnetwork relation-shipsinsegmentsoftheeconomyotherthancreditunions.

Conflictsofinterest

Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest.

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