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The Great Depression
Monetary Economics (Macro VI)
Marcelo Mello and Christiano Arrigoni
References
Mankiw, N. G., (2006), Macroeconomics,
Worth Publishers.
Blanchard, O. (2005), Macroeconomics,
Prentice Hall.
The Economist, several issues.
Walton, G., and H. Rockoff, History of the
American Economy, 10th edition, 2005.
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What caused the Great Depression?
In 1929 the unemployment rate in the U.S. was
3.2%. In 1933, it was 25.2%...
What caused the depression? Shocks to the IS
curve? Shocks to the LM curve?
As shown below, the Great Depression provides
Data Source
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Year Unemployment rate
Real GNP Consumptio n
Investment Gov. Purchases
1929 3.2 203.6 139.6 40.4 22.0
1930 8.9 183.6 130.4 27.4 24.3
1931 16.3 169.5 126.1 16.8 25.4
1932 24.1 144.2 114.8 4.7 24.2
1933 25.2 141.5 112.8 5.3 23.3
1934 22.0 154.3 118.1 9.4 26.6
1935 20.3 169.5 125.5 18.0 27.0
1936 17.0 193.2 138.4 24.0 31.8
1937 14.3 203.2 143.1 29.9 30.8
1938 19.1 192.9 140.2 17.0 33.9
1939 17.2 209.4 148.2 24.7 35.2
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Year Nom. Int. Rate
Money Supply
Price Level Inflation Real Money Balances
1929 5.9 26.6 50.6 - 52.6
1930 3.6 25.8 49.3 -2.6 52.3
1931 2.6 24.1 44.8 -10.1 54.5
1932 2.7 21.1 40.2 -9.3 52.5
1933 1.7 19.9 39.3 -2.2 50.7
1934 1.0 21.9 42.2 7.4 51.8
1935 0.8 25.9 42.6 0.9 60.8
1936 0.8 29.6 42.7 0.2 62.9
1937 0.9 30.9 44.5 4.2 69.5
1938 0.8 30.5 43.9 -1.3 69.5
1939 0.6 34.2 43.2 -1.6 79.1
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The Spending Hypothesis
One hypothesis about the causes of the GD is the
so-called Spending hypothesis which suggests that the depression was caused by contractionary shifts in the IS curve.
Popular view associates the depression with the stock markets crash of 1929.
However, the evidence suggests that the recession
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The Spending Hypothesis, cont.
Several shocks to the IS curve may have exacerbated the initial reduction in spending.
Shock 1: the stock market crash of 1929 may have
caused a significant shift in the IS curve: by reducing wealth and increasing uncertainty in the economy
consumers were induced to save more rather than continue spending.
10 Shock 2: Boom-bust cycle in housing. Some
economists suggest that the decline in spending was associated with a large drop in residential investment.
The 1920s were marked by boom in residential
investment. Once the “overbuilding” became
apparent the demand for residential investment fell substantially.
The slow down in residential and non-residential
11 Shock 3: Another possible reason for the decline
in the demand for residential investment was the large drop in immigration in the 1930s.
The next slide shows data on immigration
Year New Arrivals Year New Arrivals
1910 1,041,570 1920 430,001
1911 878,587 1921 805,228
1912 838,172 1922 309,556
1913 1,197,897 1923 522,919
1914 1,218,480 1924 706,896
1915 326,700 1925 294,314
1916 298,826 1926 304,488
1917 295,403 1927 335,175
1918 110,618 1928 307,255
13 Shock 4: Contractionary fiscal policy of the
1930s.
The Revenue Act of 1932 increased various taxes on middle and high-income consumers.
The top income tax after the Act was signed into
law was 63% ($1 million/year)
14 Shock 5: Credit-crunch - a large number of bank
failures (more on that later) may have
exacerbated the fall in investment by not providing enough credit to healthy firms.
October 1930: Bank failures in the South and
Midwest
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff
June 1930: the Smoot-Hawley Act was approved
in Congress.
The Smoot-Hawley Act increased the import
tariff on a number of agricultural goods.
Was the Smoot-Hawley Act a cause of the depression?
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The Money Hypothesis
This hypothesis places primary blame for the
depression on the Fed.
The money supply fell 25% from 1929 to 1933.
However, the price level also fell by 25% in the 1929-33 period.
17 Does that mean that monetary events were
irrelevant to explain the depression?
As shown below, monetary events were very
important in explaining the depression.
The Monetary Hypothesis is associated with
Milton Friedman and his brilliant book “A
18 M1=currency +checkable deposits
M1=B*multiplier, where B=monetary base=currency +banks’ reserves.
The multiplier depends on how much reserves
19 The monetary base, B, increased from 1929 to
1933. This implies that the decrease in M1 came from the decrease in the money multiplier.
Why did the multiplier decline so much?
Because of a large number of bank failures.
20 Checkable deposits at failed banks became
worthless.
Moreover, once banks start to go bust people take their money out of the banks and fearful
banks tend to maintain a higher level of reserves in relation to deposits.
These events caused to the money multiplier to
24 The Fed should have increased the money supply
enough to more than offset the decrease in the money multiplier.
This would have shifted the LM to the right and helped the economy get out of the depression (or even avoided the depression).
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Is deflation bad? Expansionary effects
As P falls, real money balances increases, M/P. This
effect causes the LM to shift down, which leads to higher income.
The Pigou Effect: Real money balances are part of
households’ wealth. As P falls and real money
balances rise, consumers feel richer and want to
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The destabilizing effects
of deflation: contractionary effects
Debt-deflation theory: unexpected changes in
inflation redistribute wealth between debtors and creditors.
Real debt is defined as Debt/P. If P falls, the debt increase in real terms. This distributes
wealth from debtors to creditors. IS shifts to the left.
Why this could have had contractionary effect
27 Real effects of a financial crisis [Bernanke
28 How does expected changes in prices affect
income?
Recall that r=i-πe. Investment depends on the
real interest rate, and the money demand depends on the nominal interest rate.
The IS-LM model:
29 Suppose that initially we have πe=0, and that
suddenly everyone expects deflation, that is,
πe<0.
For a given nominal interest rate, the real interest rate must be higher.
↑
r=i-
π
e↓
The increased real interest rate for a given
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The Money Hypothesis: conclusion
The money hypothesis is not about contractions on M/P causing decreases on GDP!
The money hypothesis is about contractions on M causing deflation and this deflation causing decreases on GDP through the debt deflation and expected deflation channels!
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The Money Hypothesis: recent
discoveries
From the 1980s, historian economists has
sought to confirm the money hypothesis looking at international data.
This is a natural course, since the great depression was a global phenomenon.
They discovered that there was an important link between the gold standard (the
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The Money Hypothesis: recent
discoveries
Conclusions from that research:
The monetary contraction in the US before the crash (1928) was automatically transmitted to the countries adopting the gold standard.
The severity and duration of recessions in each country were tightly linked to the extent in
which the country remained in the gold
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Conclusion: What caused the Depression?
There were several negative shocks to the IS
curve in the 1930s.
Furthermore, the Fed’s inaction may have
made a bad situation worse. The amount of
real money balances, M/P, didn’t change
during the GD (which means that the LM
curve didn’t shift) but the fact that we had
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Conclusion: What caused the Depression?
Besides, the international monetary system
at that time, the gold standard, make things
worse!
The Fed’s inability to manage this system
and the importance of US economy made the
great depression a global phenomenon.
Countries that insisted for a longer time to
stay within this system had the worse
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Conclusion: What are the policy lessons?
The Fed should have increased the money supply in an attempt to change inflation expectations.
A large increase in the growth rate of the
money supply could have reversed inflation expectations, from πe<0 to πe>0.
Given that the nominal interest rate was so low, positive inflation expectations would have
generated low or negative real interest rates,
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Conclusion: What are the policy lessons?
Policy makers at that time didn’t know about the IS-LM model. Imagine that: raising taxes to balance the budget in the midst of a recession with deflation!!!
Macroeconomics as a science was at best in its infancy at that time of the Great Depression.
In fact, some say that the Great Depression marks the birth of macroeconomics with the
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Conclusion: What are the policy lessons?
Another important lesson: Central bank and governments must worry about financial
stability!
The failure of a large amount of banks was an important factor deepening the recession!