dictated by experience and
personal inclinations:
for the benefit of young demographers
(100 years old, or less)
Massimo Livi-Bacci
1. Knowledge of methods & models, statistics & mathematics is essential. But before, acquire a good understanding in a substantive disciplinary area in the humanities or social sciences or biology.
2. Make of crossing disciplinary borders a habit, rather than an exception. Don’t be cowed by the heigth of disciplinary fences or by the precision of disciplinary perimeters. Borrow and use (not blindly) concepts, methods, results – but understand properly their limits, significance, area of application.
3. Any (good) punctual analysis (related to a specific time or geographic area) maybe relevant. But put the results in perspective, across time and space.
4. Macro and micro approaches to population issues are not in competition, but must be integrated. Macro trends influence micro (individual) behaviors and viceversa. Examples: malthusian models, density dependent phenomena, etc.
5. Relate and integrate the various demographic phenomena into a “demographic system”. Phenomena are not independent but interdependent via the functioning of the system. Systems change over time.
6. Demographic behaviors (entering a union, having children, mobility, healthy behaviors, survival…) are essential, basic components of human capital. They are abilities, capabilities, prerogatives (see A. Sen)
7. Do not be discouraged if there are no “appropriate data”, or the needed “database” is not available at a click of your PC. “Quod non est in numero non est in mundo”?
8. Do not change subject of study just because there is plenty of reasearch money in a different field (Contraception, family planning, AIDS, ageing...).
9. On any topic there might be relevant literature in languages different from English. 10. Demography is central to social sciences, it is not a subservient, ancillary, peripheral
Marcia C. Castro
In the past three decades, discussions around demographic challenges for the 21st century
were often centered on the trends and consequences of population growth (EHRLICH; EHRLICH, 1990; VAN DE KAA, 1990). Recently, the discussion has expanded to a diverse range of topics, including: international migration, below replacement fertility in Europe, assessing demographic components in conflict areas, patterns of urbanization, extreme climatic events and population mobility/ displacement, aging populations (and the pattern of mortality, diseases, and disability in the elderly population), future impact of HIV/AIDS on population structure, and factors that make populations vulnerable or resilient to demographic changes (CHRISTENSEN et al., 2009; Lutz; SKIRBEKK, 2008; SuRKYN et al., 2008). While these issues are of utmost importance for understanding current and future trends of the population, their proper measurement, analysis and modeling depends on two factors: availability of proper methodologies; and training of demographers on those methodologies. This paper prioritizes these two factors, and therefore discusses the methodological and training challenges that the field of demography may face (and therefore needs to address) on the 21st
century.
Methodological challenges
If the analysis of demographic trends in a particular population aims to be comprehensive and to generate much needed evidence for effective planning and policy making, it should account for, at least, four different aspects: measurement; causality; spatial effects; and multidisciplinary approaches.
Measurement
One could argue that any analysis of population issues necessarily requires good quality data. However, many countries have incomplete and/or defective data, and do not have a vital registration
system (or have one that lacks full coverage) (SETEL et al., 2007; MAHAPATRA et al., 2007). In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, demographers have devised ways to produce mortality and fertility estimates from incomplete and defective information through the use of indirect methods (BRASS et al., 1968; uNITED NATIONS, 1983). Although these methods have been largely used, and several refinements have been proposed recently (MuRRAY et al., 2003; RAJARATNAM et al., 2010), the estimation of mortality (e.g., maternal, neonatal, post-neonatal, infant and child) and of fertility indicators for developing countries still carries much uncertainty. This has direct implications for the proper formulation and evaluation of population and/or public health policies, for the assessment of progress toward the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and for the generation of good population estimates. Therefore, there is still room for improvement both in properly accounting for vital events and for producing indirect estimations.
Another challenge regarding measurement relates the assessment of the demographics of conflict areas. It is extremely difficult to count vital events in a conflict area, and there is no recommended protocol on how numbers could be collected. Estimates of death in Iraq during the war generated much polemic (BROWNSTEIN; BROWNSTEIN, 2008; BuRNHAM et al., 2006; HICKS, 2006; McPHERSON, 2005; ROBERTS et al., 2004), and the real numbers remain unknown. Also challenging is the measurement of population in the aftermath of natural disasters (STONE, 2008).
The proper measurement of migratory events faces difficulties in almost any setting. Recent increase in extreme climatic events (GEMENNE, 2010) and in conflicts has resulted in voluntary and involuntary migration, involving both international movements (some as refugees) and internal migration (some as internally displaced people). In addition, population displacement consequential to infrastructure projects has been significant (CERNEA, 2008). Indeed, future patterns of migration (and the costs and benefits they may produce in sending and receiving areas) are likely to gain much importance regarding future demographics (GOLDIN; CAMERON; BALARAJAN, 2011). However, there is no systematic mechanism to consistently record human migration, and therefore the comprehensive understanding of the driving forces of migration, as well as its modeling and prediction both locally and globally still require improvement.
Causality
Proper understanding of the mechanisms through which demographic changes happen is crucial for the effective formulation and evaluation of policies. Processes resulting in below replacement fertility, and in migratory patterns, to name a few, are often multifaceted. In addition, they can be reciprocal, and therefore one particular factor can be both cause and effect of demographic changes. Disentangling these relationships demands a comprehensive conceptual framework, which would guide empirical modeling based on the availability of data. The conceptual framework could draw from available knowledge and research assumptions to be tested. The empirical modeling
needs to be flexible to accommodate many variables, and the data need to have the appropriate format that would allow for the assessment of causal relationships.
Causal inference in demography have focused mainly on the individual level or, what could be called, micro-demography (BHROLCHÁIN; DYSON, 2007). Yet, the core of the discipline is on analyzing aggregated events, and assessing population composition and change over time, which one could call macro-demography (LEE, 2001). While both are important, macro studies in demography have received less attention recently. As a result, much knowledge is being generated regarding individual behavior and decisions, not accompanied by aggregated studies that assess population processes and dynamics (BHROLCHÁIN; DYSON, 2007; LEE, 2001).
Spatial effects
The use of spatial analysis in demographic studies has been growing recently, with many applications on the study of fertility, mortality, and migration, the analysis of population size, change, and distribution, and on varied applied demography research (CASTRO, 2007). Spatial methodologies facilitate the appraisal of regional inequalities, the investigation of diffusion processes during the demographic transition, and the identification of clustering patterns of demographic indicators, to name a few. Results obtained from spatial analyses provide unique information for the formulation and implementation of targeted policies.
The challenges, however, are many. First, available data are not always appropriate for meaningful spatial analysis due to the sampling frame and/or spatial coverage. Second, the spatial scale of the data may be too coarse, and therefore not useful for improving current knowledge and aiding policy making. Third, combining data from different sources in one spatial database may be imperiled by the spatial scale in which they were collected (GOTWAY; YOuNG, 2002). Fourth, some applications of spatial methods in the social sciences have failed to establish a sound conceptual framework linking the importance of spatial effects to the outcome of interest, leaving room to much criticism. It is imperative to hypothesize (and test for) the possible mechanisms through which space would impact varied population indicators – a good example is presented by Voss (VOSS et al., 2006) – as well as how this impact could vary depending on the adopted concept of neighborhood (FOTHERINGHAM; WONG, 1991). When appropriate, the assessment of causal effects in a spatial framework would also be useful.
Potential areas of future applications of spatial analysis include the understanding of processes and patterns related to fertility and mortality, modeling of migration, improved small-area population estimates, and the regular release of spatial demographic data, which could facilitate research in many different fields (e.g., health, education, and social security). Examples of such data include the Gridded Population of the World (CIESIN; COLuMBIA uNIVERSITY; CIAT, 2004) and the Global Rural-urban Mapping Project (CIESIN; COLuMBIA uNIVERSITY; IFPRI; THE WORLD BANK; CIAT, 2004).
Multidisciplinary approaches
Improved understanding of the determinants of demographic phenomena would demand a multidisciplinary analytical approach, combining cultural, behavioral, social, economic, political, and environmental aspects. Results obtained with such an approach could provide evidence for the need to establish multi-sectoral policies (e.g., integrating the health, education, and urban planning sectors of the government), and facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of these policies. The importance of this demand is reflected in funding mechanisms that explicitly require that research proposals include a multidisciplinary team of researchers (e.g., National Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of Health, both in the uS). Yet, the challenges are not negligible: data from different disciplines are not collected in a uniform manner, often do not have the same spatial and/ or temporal scale, and may be of varied quality; and the same variable can have different jargons depending on the discipline, which demands special care when disseminating results.
Training challenges
Demography training offered by Demography Departments is rare. Often, training in Demography is provided by departments of Sociology, Economics, or Public Health. Professionals graduating from these programs, previously referred as hyphenated demographers (LEE, 2001), do not necessarily have solid training on formal demography, but are very skilled on the use of techniques for the analysis of micro-level data. These professionals have much to enrich the discipline and contribute to the application of multidisciplinary approaches, although their research tends to focus on micro analysis, leaving the macro analysis of demographic data neglected. This is aggravated by the fact that research funding for formal demography is practically nonexistent, offering no incentives for departments or professionals to invest their time and effort in such studies (LEE, 2001).
Also rare are Demography programs that provide training on spatial analytical techniques (CASTRO, 2007). First, there is the challenge of developing “spatial thinking” in the social science community, particularly among demographers (ENTWISLE; GuTMANN, 2001). The lack of spatial thinking often occurs before one gets a college education, and therefore this problem is not an exclusive concern of social scientists. Without spatial thinking we miss the visual power, the spatial exploratory investigation, and the understanding of the impacts that space can have on life outcomes (health, behavior, inequalities, etc). Above all, we miss the chance to provide adequate guidance for policy making (CASTRO, 2007). In addition, most of the universities that host a population center (taking as reference the members of the Association of Population Centers - http://www.popcenters. org/) do not have a Geography department, and only a few offer regular classes on Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and spatial analysis.
These challenges in training suggest that a core curriculum should be considered by all programs that provide training in Demography, so that new generations of professionals would have the basic tools to apply methodologies that will be in high demand in the future, but also to develop much needed novels ones that could improve the measurement and analysis of population events. The area of Applied Demography was the first in the discipline of Demography to claim the need of specific training, and a Ph.D. program was developed to provide the necessary skills needed by applied demographers (MuRDOCK; ZEY, 2008).
Discussion
The world is at almost 7 billion, mostly urban, showing striking demographic contrasts: below replacement fertility in some European countries vs. high fertility in parts of Africa; countries where population momentum will play a role in population growth for decades to come vs. countries struggling to avoid shrinking numbers; and older populations facing the burden of chronic diseases vs. younger populations facing the double burden of infectious and chronic diseases, to name a few. These and many other contrasts certainly characterize the nature of the demographic challenges for the 21st century. However, in order to understand these contrasts, and to formulate policies that
mitigate their negative effects, demographers will need to be equipped with comprehensive data and methodological approaches, and will need to have proper training to use them; these are, indeed, additional challenges of the discipline for the 21st century, which were addressed in this article.
The agenda of demographers in the decades to come should include attempts to improve the recording of vital events in different settings; to better measure migratory movements; to develop new indirect methods of estimation; and to incorporate varied analytical approaches (e.g., Bayesian analysis and fuzzy modeling) that could facilitate the assessment of causality and spatial effects, and that could make it possible to conduct multidisciplinary analysis. Concurrently, it would be advisable that Populations Centers providing training in Demography start planning for future demands, and establish a core curriculum that would provide skills for the coming generations of demographers to conduct both micro and macro analysis, and therefore pave the way for future methodological developments in the field.
It is important to note another potential challenge that relates to decisions regarding the survey format and the amount of information collected in censuses. The 2010 Census in Canada was surrounded by much controversy when the government decided to change the long-form questionnaire from mandatory to voluntary (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/survey-enquete/household-menages/5178-eng.htm), introducing sample selection bias. In the same year, a committee from the Republican Party in the uS questioned the amount of information asked in the American Community Survey, calling it an invasion of privacy (ROBERTS, 2010). If these problems become more frequent and result in discontinuity of data collection and/or drastic reduction of information gathered in
surveys and/or censuses, then the discipline would face a step backwards toward the goal of better understanding processes that result in current population structure and composition, and would have limited capabilities to properly inform policy making.
In conclusion, the demographic challenges for the 21st century are many. Although the focus
has been on specific challenges related to population structure and dynamics, methodological and educational challenges are equally important. Indeed, all three challenges are related: well trained generations of demographers have the skills to apply current methods and to develop new ones, which ultimately would facilitate the analysis and mitigation of population-specific challenges. References
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puntos para una discusión
Rosario CárdenasEl objetivo de este documento es hacer una reflexión alrededor de algunos aspectos que se consideran de importancia para el desarrollo de la demografía, particularmente a la luz de las consecuencias derivadas de las transformaciones en la dinámica poblacional ocurridas en las últimas décadas del siglo pasado y los avances tecnológicos.
I. Percepción de la sociedad respecto al quehacer demográfico. una dificultad que enfrente
la demografía es hacerse visible como disciplina frente a la sociedad. Es innegable que los resultados del trabajo demográfico son críticos para el bienestar de la sociedad. Sin la producción de información demográfica y su consecuente análisis con un enfoque de dinámica poblacional no es posible llevar a cabo la planeación de acciones de gobierno, evaluar el impacto de éstas, así como tampoco identificar prioridades. Sin embargo el público no necesariamente reconoce la existencia de la demografía ni como campo de trabajo ni como un grupo de científicos cuya labor deriva en un mejoramiento de su calidad de vida. De aquí que sea imperativo visibilizar frente a la sociedad el quehacer que los demógrafos llevamos a cabo. La sofisticación del entrenamiento demográfico y amplitud de aplicación de estas herramientas son dos elementos que requieren ser subrayados. De igual forma es necesario propiciar usuarios adicionales de los resultados de la investigación demográfica.
II. Espacios de trabajo de la demografía. Tradicionalmente, los demógrafos se desenvuelven en
ámbitos académicos o en espacios de gobierno dedicados a la producción de información estadística. No es habitual que estudiosos de la población laboren en áreas de toma de decisión. Dada la importancia del uso riguroso de información demográfica para la planeación de acciones gubernamentales, sería deseable ampliar la participación de nuestro gremio en estos espacios. Asimismo, colaborar laboralmente en las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y promover la inserción de demógrafos en espacios de la iniciativa privada.
III. Grandes temáticas de trabajo. Sin menoscabo de temas específicos que requieren atención,
es necesario reconocer que un conjunto de grandes temáticas ocupa hoy en día nuestro quehacer, con las implicaciones que ello conlleva tanto para el entrenamiento de recursos humanos como para la producción de información estadística particular. Algunas de estas temáticas son resultado de la propia inercia demográfica o las transformaciones aceleradas en su dinámica, pero otras mas devienen de diferencias entre grupos o regiones o rezagos en la cobertura de satisfactores básicos. El envejecimiento, las desigualdades social o de género, las desventajas registradas entre poblaciones indígenas o minorías, la persistencia de patrones de reproducción en condiciones de riesgo o con afectación a trayectorias de vida, los flujos migratorios y sus modificaciones en volumen, composición y puntos de origen y destino ejemplifican algunos de estos grandes problemas.
IV. Métodos y aproximaciones. El entrenamiento en análisis demográfico debe continuar
siendo una de las piezas medulares en la formación de los demógrafos. Las herramientas que lo conforman no sólo dan especificidad a nuestro quehacer, sino también proporcionan una aproximación que no acompaña otros campos de estudio: una perspectiva dinámica que considera el efecto resumen de modificaciones en cada una de las piezas que componen la situación que se analiza, sea ésta, por ejemplo, el impacto de las distintas tasas de mortalidad en la estimación de una esperanza de vida o los componentes demográficos en la elaboración de proyecciones de población. Sin embargo, es necesario reconocer que cada vez más la formación demográfica requiere ir acompañada bien del entrenamiento en el uso de técnicas estadísticas o en el de aproximaciones derivadas de la socioantropología o inclusive de ambas.
V. Información sociodemográfica. A las fuentes de información sociodemográfica
habitualmente disponibles en los países de latinoamericanos del Caribe tales como los censos de población, registros administrativos y encuestas con temas específicamente demográficos, se añade la necesidad de conformar registros administrativos particulares, por ejemplo para enfermedades determinadas, o la organización de sistemas de información que articulen el uso conjunto de varias fuentes, así como la urgencia de ampliar los esfuerzos para contar con un mayor número de encuestas longitudinales en la región. un elemento que sería deseable contemplar en torno a la producción de información estadística es fortalecer los esfuerzos de colaboración entre países del área a fin de contar con datos comparables entre éstos particularmente con relación a fuentes complementarias a los censos poblacionales y las estadísticas vitales. La iniciativa internacional de documentación acelerada de bases de datos constituye un paso en esta dirección.
VI. Investigación. Dos son los aspectos en torno al desarrollo de la investigación en población
sobre los cuales esta propuesta de reflexión intenta llamar la atención. El primero se refiere a las fuentes de financiamiento. Es un hecho que los indicadores sociales, económicos y demográficos de los países de nuestra región apuntan hacia, en promedio, mejores condiciones de vida para los habitantes de Latinoamérica y el Caribe en comparación con los de otras áreas del mundo. Lo anterior puede colocar a la región en una situación de desventaja
en la competencia por financiamientos internacionales específicos para investigación. Es necesario redoblar esfuerzos que propicien que tanto la comunidad internacional como los tomadores de decisión nacionales perciban la trascendencia de la realización de investigación en población en nuestros países. El segundo aspecto se refiere a la importancia de promover la presencia de demógrafos en grupos de investigación multidisciplinarios. Resulta esencial propiciar que otras áreas del conocimiento reconozcan las contribuciones analíticas y metodológicas potenciales de los demógrafos y de aquí los beneficios de su participación.
VII. Recolección de información. Es posible que la diversificación e intensificación del uso de
espacios virtuales para compartir información personal (redes sociales, blogs, etc.) y el empleo de éstos con fines de mercadotecnia por parte de los proveedores modifique la percepción de la población en torno a la declaración o registro de datos y su utilización. El sentido que la experiencia pueda tomar y su efecto en las respuestas a censos de población o encuestas estará mediado por las acciones que las sociedades implementen para la protección de la información personal y las leyes que en algunos países hacen obligatoria la participación de los ciudadanos en ejercicios como los censales.
VIII. Comunicación en población. La divulgación de los resultados del trabajo demográfico
a todos los sectores de la sociedad constituye un desafío. Establecer espacios de difusión orientados a público en general, así como a tomadores de decisión redundará no sólo en un uso más amplio del conocimiento derivado del trabajo de los demógrafos sino también en un reconocimiento social a su labor y a la especificidad de su entrenamiento. Con relación a la interacción entre pares, es necesario continuar fortaleciendo la comunicación entre éstos a través de revistas especializadas así como mediante foros que congreguen a los estudiosos de la población. Las asociaciones gremiales tanto nacionales como la latinoamericana cumplen este papel.
IX. Colaboración regional. Sería aconsejable la conformación de un programa de colaboración
regional a través del cual se expandieran o reforzarán los vínculos existentes para la formación de recursos humanos, la investigación, el diseño de programas o su evaluación. Los esquemas de movilidad estudiantil son un ejemplo de colaboración que sería deseable promover en el área. De igual forma, iniciativas como el Proyecto Mesoamericano, por ejemplo.
Tal como el título indica, el listado de aspectos antes presentado busca promover una discu-sión de la situación que enfrenta la práctica de la demografía en la región y las oportunidades para su fortalecimiento. El conjunto presentado ha intentado señalar que los desafíos que enfrenta van desde el reconocimiento de su especificidad hasta la aplicación ineludible de esfuerzos por lograr un mayor uso de sus herramientas y resultados en la toma de decisiones.
a global force, ungoverned
Massimo Livi-BacciMigration, prime mover of society
“Man has spread widely over the face of the earth, and must have been exposed, during his incessant migration, to the most diversified conditions. The inhabitants of the Tierra del Fuego, the Cape of Good Hope, and Tasmania in the one hemisphere, and of the Arctic regions in the other, must have passed through many climates, and changed their habits many times, before they reached their present homes. The early progenitors of man must also have tended, like all other animals, to have increased beyond the means of subsistence; they must, therefore, occasionally have been exposed to a struggle for existence, and consequently to the rigid law of natural selection”. (DARWIN, n.d., p. 421). This is a quote from Darwin’s “Descent of Man”, a rather appropriate quote, I believe, since we tend to forget, two centuries after his birth, how pervasive migration has been – and continues to be today - in mankind’s geographical distribution, living circumstances, numerical growth, biological and social evolution. Indeed, in our century, we tend to consider migration (in its international manifestation) not as a prime and essential mover of human society, but rather as an unruly component to be dealt with, a deformed piece of a global puzzle that does not fall into place, a background “noise” disturbing the placid humming of social life.
A global force, on the rise
Yet, migration continues to be a major player on the world’s scene. In 2005, the united Nations estimated the “migrant stock” at 190 million, about 3 percent of the world population. But the “migrant stock” as so defined includes only the first generation of migrants (persons born in a country different from the country of residence; or people carrying a “foreign” passport who are also mostly first generation migrants). Should the second or third generations be included, the “migrant stock” would be much more numerous. Suffice to say that in the united States Hispanics alone
(mostly first and second generation migrants) were estimated at 42 million in 2005, while the total “foreign stock” (all places of birth in Latin America) numbered 20 million.1
Several forces are at work sustaining the view that international migration will continue to expand in the next few decades. In the first place, because of increasing interconnection among countries, both at the regional and at the global level. The Eu, now enlarged to 27 countries, is an area where migration is practically unhindered within the European space – and maybe, in the future, other regional common spaces will do the same, thus lessening the “partitioning” of the world. Economic globalization is another powerful force that generates new opportunities and modes for the exchange of people: workers circulating between branches of multinational firms and institutions; the liberalization of services that entails movements of dependant workers from one country to another in order to provide the required services; circular migration of the professionals, the highly skilled, and technicians. The cultural integration of the world, the rising of English as a global language, easier and cheaper communications and transports are all factors that lower the psychological, cultural and monetary cost of moving across countries, reducing the cost of migration, and gradually including populations (once closed or isolated) in the various migratory systems. And there is also another prime mover, traditionally stronger than frontiers: people of different countries get in touch, fall in love, intermarry and have children.
The second powerful engine of migration is the increasing inequality between countries and, as a consequence, the expanding inducement to migrate from poor to rich countries. In 1973 per capita income (expressed in 1990 PPP dollars) was 16,700 in the uSA and 4,900 in Mexico; 30 years later, in 2003, 29,000 and 7,100. As a consequence, the difference in GNP per capita between the two countries has increased from 12,300 in 1973 to 21,900 in 2003; the ratio, that was 3.4:1 in favour of the uSA in 1973, only marginally decreased to 3.1:1 in 2003. If we compare Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa the divergence in opportunities is even more striking: per capita income was 11,400 and 1,400 respectively in 1973 and 19,900 and 1,550 in 2003. The difference expanded – between 1973 and 2003 - from 10,000 to 17,350, and the ratio from 8.1:1 to 12.8 (MADDISON, 2007). Introducing more sophisticated measures, expanding comparisons across countries, varying time periods would not fundamentally change the fact that differences between rich and poor countries have been increasing and will probably continue to do so for a time, since growth depends heavily on innovation and innovation gives most benefits to the countries sitting high on the hierarchical scale of knowledge and technical progress.
A third powerful factor of migration is demography. until the world completes its transition to less unequal patterns of fertility and mortality – which will take several decades on a business as
usual course – the demographic unbalance between rich and poor regions will remain conspicuous.
Poor countries where fertility decline has initiated only recently will generate an exuberant inflow of young people into the labour force for decades to come, while rich countries where fertility fell below replacement decades ago, will continue to produce young cohorts conspicuously less numerous than those of their parents and, in some instances, of their grandparents. One example: between 2010 and 2030, the population aged 20 to 40 (the age group to which the overwhelming majority of migrants belongs) will decline 26 percent in Europe and increase 56 percent in Africa (uNITED NATIONS, 2008a).
Policies, restrictions, selection
While the forces that generate migration persist unabated, barriers – metaphorical and physical – are raised in the attempt to regulate and reduce international flows. Yet, according to a 2007 united Nations survey, only 19 percent of world governments considered their immigration too high, down from 41 percent in 1996. In the more developed part of the world, in 2007, only 4 governments out 49 considered immigration too high, as against 29 (out of 48) in 1996. (uNITED NATIONS, 2008b, p. 64). But closer scrutiny of actual policies reverses this rosy picture. In many rich countries, policies tend to become more restrictive. Restrictions take different forms, such as reduction of quotas; less generous criteria for family reunification; revision of the qualifications for the legal admission of immigrants; attempts to reduce unskilled immigration while selecting the highly skilled ones; more stringent criteria for the admission of refugees. On the other hand, governments seem to be powerless in managing the phenomenon of irregular migration, and the growing stock of undocumented (or illegal) immigrants runs into the tens of millions: 11-12 in the uS, 5 to 8 in Eu-27, 5 to 10 in Russia. In Europe irregular (non European) immigrants determine an unresolved legal conundrum: Eu regulations do not permit mass expulsions nor do they allow mass amnesties. Expulsions or regularisations must be on an individual basis and decided within a complex juridical frame, but the legal systems are unable to cope with a great number of cases, so that the problem remains unsolved and irregularity remains high. In the uSA, the Bush administration has been unable to push legislation through Congress in order to address the problems of an illegal population the size of Pennsylvania’s. In Russia – the flow of immigration of returning Russian nationals is now almost over – but irregular workers from central Asia worry the authorities. Everywhere no efforts are spared in order to control illegal inflows so that irregular stocks are not inflated: stringent border checks, walls and physical barriers, terrestrial and maritime patrols, electronic surveillance, air monitoring – besides the obsolete passport visas or inefficient internal police checks.
As far as regular migration is concerned, two trends are emerging among rich countries. The first – as said above – is selectivity, in the effort to attract the highly skilled and boost the contribution
of immigrants to growth. Needless to say that selectivity implies a symmetrical negative effect for sending countries, deprived of valuable “human capital”. Selectivity is an official policy in countries with a long history of immigration: Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have a “points system” based on the characteristics of candidates, such as age, family status, knowledge, language and professional skills, etc. Only those that accumulate a certain number of points are considered for admission. This system is spreading to Europe as Denmark, the united Kingdom and Germany have recently adopted new regulations in this vein. The other tendency favours temporary and circular migration. The (official) rationale being that these forms of migration minimise the losses caused by the brain drain to sending countries while maximising the benefits of remittances for those left behind. But there is a hidden rationale, as well: the hope that the demand for unskilled labour also be satisfied on a temporary basis migration, minimizing the drain on welfare budgets and, more generally, avoiding that low skilled, less educated people and their families – supposedly more difficult to integrate – become permanent residents or candidates to citizenship. European institutions are supporting a “Policy Coherence for Development” and migration, where temporary and circular migration have a central place. But it is difficult not to agree with the conclusions of OECD’s authoritative report on international migration:
The expectation of temporary stay by labour immigrants does not appear to be a foundation on which one can construct a solid migration policy. Some labour needs, both high and lesser skilled, are of a permanent nature and need to be addressed by longer term migration […] Likewise some returns of high-skilled migrants to their countries of origin do occur and will undoubtedly continue to do so. But it is illusory to expect that migrants will return just because they are able to do so without jeopardising their status in the host country. Little from recent migration experience suggests that this is a major phenomenon, especially when the entire family is involved and when economic conditions in the country of origin remain difficult. (OECD, 2008, p. 20)
Conflict
So let us resume the situation. First, global forces sustain global migratory flows: globalization, increasing interconnection of cultures, decreasing costs of travel and – above all – growing divergences in wellbeing among countries and demographic differentials. The impending crisis, whose duration and gravity nobody is able to forecast, adds to the complexity of the situation. Second, restrictive legislations tend to be enforced in rich countries in order to control and decrease regular migration flows. In many countries, new legislation tends to favour the highly skilled, changing the composition of immigrants, and to privilege temporary and circular migration as alternative to a long term one. Third, irregular migratory stocks are on the rise and attempts to stabilize or deflate them by contrasting irregular inflows are often frustrated.
These trends, roughly and incompletely summarized, add to the conflicts of interest between the macro players (sending and receiving countries) and the individual protagonists (immigrants and
citizens of both receiving and sending countries). Sending countries lament the depletion of their valuable human capital but have an interest in expanding the emigration of part of their numerous and growing young cohorts entering the labour force. They also deprecate the obstacles to permanent integration of immigrants in the countries of destination and the restriction to family reunification, but, on the other hand, valuable remittances are maximised when migration is temporary and migrants leave families behind. Countries of immigration, on the other hand, are distressed by the lack of cooperation of sending countries in the control of illegal migration and by their unwillingness to readmit deported illegal aliens onto their soil. But the real victims are the migrants themselves, caught in the quagmire of regulations, unable to exploit in full the opportunities opened by their decision to move, often in an illegal situation and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation. It is common place to say that migration is a positive-sum-game, where everybody gains something. It may be so, but contrasting interests and policies, the lack of cooperation between countries (not to say the absence of governance) detracts from the gains that the various actors may reap through migration.
[…] international governance requires acknowledging that different states have different goals, compromising where possible, and building first on recognized common objectives - the need for more knowledge and understanding of migration phenomena, fewer deaths of migrants in transit, reduction of the influence of criminal networks, minimizing tensions between migrants and host communities, greater safety and dignity for migrants, increased national security, the maximum mutual benefit from migration, and a general capacity to implement policies that have been embraced. (NEWLAND, 2005, p. 17).
But is international governance possible? A plea for international governance
As is well known, there is a fundamental difference between the globalization process that took place between 1870 and 1920 and the globalization wave of the last half a century. The first wave involved capital, goods and people: America was rich in land, and endowed with natural resources, but poor in labour; Europe was rich in labour and poor in land. The mass migration from Europe to America entailed a rise in the standard of living of the sending and receiving countries, as well a closing of the gap in the standard of living in the two continents. The modern process of globalization has been one of goods and finance, and less so of people. In comparison to the tens of millions who left Europe for America – and other regions of the world in the final decades of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth centuries – immigration in the developed world in the last decades has been relatively modest. The united States receive today approximately the same number of immigrants that – with a population two thirds smaller – arrived a century ago. Between 1960 and 2005, the foreign stock in Europe (when corrected of the effects due to the changes in borders after the dissolution of uSSR and Yugoslavia) increased at a rate that is a fraction of the rate of increase of
international trade. Indeed, notwithstanding the strengthening of those global forces of migration mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the increase of immigration has been moderate – and the perception of an immigrant avalanche submerging Europe is wrong and deformed. The fact is that economic globalization has been sustained by a cultural and political action in favour of free trade and lower tariffs, and the setting up of a regulating institution like the WTO. But barriers to migration, in the meantime, have been raised, and the action of global forces checked, for a time. No shared vision of common good has emerged and calls for international cooperation – not to say governance – have been feeble. It is a telling fact that few states have ratified the two ILO conventions (n. 97 of 1949 and n. 143 of 1975) dealing explicitly with migrant workers, and that the united Nations Convention on the Rights of Migrants Workers and their Families needed 13 years to enter into force, and that – as of the beginning of 2009 – has been ratified by only 43 states (only one in Europe). Too strong are the conflicting interests, too feeble the voice of migrants, too weak the perception of common, long term interests.
The Global Commission on Migration and Development, created by Kofi Annan in 2003, after two years of consultation and debates, came up in 2005, with a rather timid proposal: the creation of an Inter-agency Global Migration Facility (IGMF) with the objective of facilitating a “coordinating and integrating policy planning in areas that cross the mandates of several institutions, for example human trafficking, the migration-asylum nexus and the developmental implications of international migration, including remittances” (GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 2005, p. 77). In other words, the IGMF should coordinate functions that are carried out by various agencies (that would continue to carry out those functions) both belonging to the united Nations family – such as uNCHR or ILO – and outside the uN, like IOM, WTO etc. Areas of IGMF competence should be capacity building, policy planning and analysis, development, data collection, promoting consultation with regional bodies, NGOs etc. But even this modest proposal for coordination of dispersed capacities and functions – four years after the report – has remained unheeded. As for bringing together the “disparate migration-related functions of existing uN and other agencies within a single organization” this was left, in the Report, for a “long term approach”, meaning, by that, the deferral to a far away nebulous future.
If even minimalist proposals have been set aside, what about the idea of gradually building up a supranational institution – of the nature of WTO – to which governments might cede parts (even minimal at the beginning) of their sovereignty in migration-related issues? Proposals of this nature do not seem to be popular in the international debate and are left to the initiative of isolated voices. “The world badly needs enlightened immigration policies and best practices to be spread and codified. A World Migration Organization would begin to do that by juxtaposing each nation’s entry, exit and residence policies toward migrants, whether legal or illegal, economic or political, skilled or unskilled. Such a project is well worth putting at the center of policymakers’ concerns”
wrote economist Jagdish Bhagwati a few years ago (BHAGWATI, 2003). Few voices have joined the debate.
Yet, this Forum of Academies, in view of the G8 meeting this coming July in Italy, seems to be the right place to take up with force the issue of the need for a global governance of migration. Let us leave aside the complex problem of the nature of the institution to be invested with regulating powers: whether a new autonomous Agency – a World Migration Organization - or a merge of existing Agencies (such, for instance, uNCHR and IOM); whether within or outside the united Nations family, etc. But let us for a moment think of the functions that an Agency of this type could subsume. Kathleen Newland has suggested, for a first phase, the areas of data collection and monitoring of trends, policy research and development, technical assistance and training, provision of services, platform for discussion, support for negotiations, anti-trafficking initiatives, promotion of migration-related initiatives. These are functions relatively free from clashes of interests that could form the basis for the initial action of an international institution that needs to develop cooperation among states. But other functions must also be gradually (but not too gradually) included if an embryo of governance is to be developed: again, drawing from Newland’s list “protection of migrant’s rights, standard setting, immigration law enforcement and border control, compulsory returns, and facilitation of migration”, issues for which, at present, “divisions among states […] are too pronounced” (NEWLAND, 2005, p. 7). Just think of the issue of migrant’s identification; of certifying their place of birth and their nationality, age and family relations; their skills and education; their knowledge of languages; their possible criminal record… Or the importance of ensuring that remittances can be freely circulated, with a minimum of cost and a maximum of security; that pension rights are not lost; that work contracts conform to minimum standards. Or the importance of seconding, supporting and eventually enforcing bilateral and multilateral agreements for the reunion of family members or readmission of lawfully deported migrants… And, above all, the protection of migrants rights of those who have migrated lawfully and of those – tens of millions – who live illegally in foreign countries. Even legal migrants live – in several countries – in a state of semi-servitude, their passports being retained by the authorities or by their employers. Fortress Europe has counted 13,500 certified migrant losses of lives in the attempt to reach Europe in the last 20 years.2 This is only the tip of the
iceberg of total migrant losses, most of which go unrecorded, along desert routes or during sea crossings; the Mexico-uS border is an equally dangerous area for the illegal migrant. These are not victims of wars but of peaceful movements.
Global forces are behind the growth of migration. Conflicting interests are on the rise. So is the need for global cooperation and governance.
References
BHAGWATI, J. Foreign affairs. Borders Beyond Control, v. 82, n. 1, 2003. DARWIN, C. The descent of man. New York: The Modern Library, n.d.
GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. Migration in an interconnected world: new directions for action – Report of the Global Commission on International Migration. Geneva, 2005.
MADDISON, A. Contours of the world economy. 1-2030 AD. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2007. NEWLAND, K. The governance of international migration: mechanisms, processes and institutions. Global Commission on International Migration, September 2005.
OECD. International migration outlook: Sopemi – 2008 edition. Paris, 2008.
uNITED NATIONS. World population prospects. The 2008 revision, New York, 2008a. _________. World population policies, 2007. New York, 2008b.
