ances (amounting 30.8 percent of GDP) is explained by the impact of the Irish bank- ing crisis on its public finances. Nonetheless, when we focus on the evolution of the components of public budget balances, significant differences emerge among coun- tries. Inthe case of interest payments, in 11 countries the size of interest payments (as a percentage of the national GDP) in 2009 was lower than that of the year 2007. Inthe case of the cyclical component of the budget balance, this component only showed an improvement in two countries: Malta and Hungary. Inthe other EU coun- tries, the deterioration of the economic activity meant a worsening inthe cyclical budget balance ranging from 0.9 (Poland) to 7.3 (Latvia) percent of GDP. Inthe case of the CAPBB, the variable used to analyze the discretionary fiscal policy (in other words, the responses of the public authorities to the economic crisis), all the 28 EU countries, with the exception of Hungary and Sweden, adopted fiscal measures that led to a deterioration of their CAPBBs. In Hungary, CAPBB moved from a deficit amounting to 2.5 percent of GDP to a surplus equivalent to 2.3 percent of GDP. In Sweden, its CAPBB moved from a surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP to a surplus of 3.6 percent of GDP. Inthe remaining countries, the discretionary fiscal impulse (meas- ured by the fall inthe CAPBB) ranged from 0.43 (Italy) to 9.96 (Spain) percent of GDP. The case of Ireland is different from the other countries that implemented ex- pansionary fiscalpolicies due to the direct relationship between banking and the fis- cal crises (Stephen Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba G. Aliti 2013). In Ireland the discretio- nary fiscal impulse reached 24.4 percent of GDP, but to a great extent this fiscal im- pulse is related to the impact of the banking crisis on Irish public finances. Thus, ac- cording to the AMECO Database, the one-off and other temporary measures on the expenditure sides of the Irish general government (which includes the public finan- cial assistance to the banking sector) amounted 2.5% of GDP in 2009, 20% of GDP in 2010, and 4.2% of GDP in 2011.
get rid of the contractual relations that became disproportionate because of the negative economic and market circumstances. The court held that the economic impossibility was not absurd however, in case of bank loan contracts, the economic changes or changes affecting the market duringthe period of repayment can be considered as business risk that cannot be ignored by the borrower (debtor) at moment of concluding a long-term contract of loan therefore, he must take this risk 22 . In another suit the court held that the modification of the contract by the
It is not surprising therefore, that public powers have confronted such situations over history (see e.g. Hazlitt, 1974, 71 and later publications). Although they have done so in different ways. According to Kirschen et al. (1977, 78-79), the distribution of income in Europe inthe form of aid to the poor remained up to the 17th century inthe hands of the church. The principle of governmental intervention was not established up to 1601 with the well known English "Poor Law". However, these authors forget that duringthe Middles Ages civil political petitions had been dealing with the problem in Spain (see e.g. Casado, 1971, 29) or that in 1526 Luis Vives published his work De subventione pauperum whose second book contained some recommendations for the burgomaestres (mayors) of Bruges. This led to fierce controversy between thinkers of the period who were in favour of interventionist positions or those who were liberal with respect to the issue (see Martín, 1988, 7-20; Perrotta, 1999, 95-120).
In this paper I accessed the savings-investment relationship within the EU, with the intent of testing if the 2008 crisis had a significant impact on capital mobility within these economies, inthe years that followed. The statistical evidence found using a panel error correction model suggests that capital mobility has decreased between 2007 and 2020 relatively to 1993 - 2007. I also find evidence that economic and financial integration reforms led by the EU have successfully reduced the home bias of investment between 1993 and 2007, mirroring increased capital mobility. The results support the existence of a solvency restriction identified by Coackly et al., (1996) as the reason for the co-integrating nature of savings and investment. Although, this paper shows that such restriction is not always binding, and thus there can be long time spans when countries can run continuous CA deficits, behaving as capital importers. Nonetheless, limits to borrowing can undermine capital mobility. The home bias estimate increased during 2007 - 2020 which is indicative that such restriction can have an actual impact on capital mobility. This may be confused with the barriers, which are ruled out, as many of the EU economies share a currency and have agreed on lifting restrictions on capital movements. This paper can shed light over a classical puzzle in International Economics, the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.
Beginning with June 2003, theUnion decided to use conditionality as part of its approach inthe Iranian nuclear crisis. As noticed even by the member states, stronger economic relations can be developed only if Iran makes progress in four main areas, namely human rights, counter-terrorism, nonproliferation and the Middle East Peace Process (Council of theEuropeanUnion 2003a, 24). The main aim of the negotiations between theEuropeanUnion and Iran was to determine Tehran to abandon parts of its nuclear program that raised concerns regarding proliferation, especially the plans to construct a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water reactor (Kile 2005, 125). These elements of the Iranian nuclear program have a dual use and their elimination would have guaranteed theUnion that the program has indeed only civilian purposes. The EU emerged in 2003 as the main negotiator with Iran regarding its nuclear program and, as Anoushiravan Ehteshami noted, this was a position no one seemed to want or could enjoy (Ehteshami 2006, 81). Duringthe irst months of the negotiations, the EU was represented by the three big member states: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Their irst move was to send a letter to Iran in September 2003, in which they offered to help Iran in its nuclear program if it would cooperate with the IAEA.
During a lecture delivered in April 2013 at the University of Leuven, Jürgenă Habermasă deploredă theă factă thată “[w]hat unite theEuropean citizens today are the Eurosceptical mindsets that have become more pronounced in all ofă theă memberă countriesă duringă theă crisis” (Habermas, 2013). This is not the kind of unity that would satisfy a philosopher whose contributions to political theory have greatly contributed to the understanding of post-war European integration. As a social scientist and an influential public intellectual, Habermas felt it was his duty to respond to the current plight of theEuropeanUnion. He has done it repeatedly, since the beginning of the financial crisis, and the most substantive effort was a book first published in his native Germany, and translated in English under the title TheCrisis of theEuropeanUnion. A Response.
This paper uses static and dynamic panel estimates in a sample including all 28 EuropeanUnion countries duringthe last decade and provides empirical evidence on the important role that well- functioning EU banking institutions can play in promoting economic growth. The banking sector performance is proxied by the evolution of some relevant financial ratios and economic growth is represented by the annual Gross Domestic Product growth rate. In order to analyse the possible differences arising after the outbreak of the recent international financial crisis, the estimations consider two panels: one for the time period 1998–2012 and another for the subinterval 2007–2012. The results obtained allow us to draw conclusions not only on the importance of the variation of the different operational, capital, liquidity and assets quality financial ratios to economic growth but also on some differences evidenced inthe two considered panels, reflecting the consequences of the recent financial crisis and the correspondent reactions of theEuropean banking institutions.
For these reasons, it is expected that EMU promotes homogeneity in member states’ business cycles (Buti and Sapir 1998: 154-63). If asymmetric shocks are ruled out, there are fewer arguments in favour of redistribution implemented at the supranational level. A final justification for rejecting centralised redistribution inthe EU borrows from the expected effects of macroeconomic stabilisation. The EU is made of a compound of centralisation (monetary policy) and decentralisation (national fiscalpolicies), making it a case of distinctiveness when other federations are compared. More importantly yet, the clear distribution of competences is instructive of how EMU is different from centralised redistribution, and thereby deprives European integration from any connotation with ‘conventional fiscal federalism’ (Kletzer 1999, and Maillet 2002). Two correlated reasons explain this causality: the dominance of supranational monetary policy inthe overall architecture of economic policy; and the largely decentralised fiscal policy (albeit facing quantitative constraints due to the Stability and Growth Pact). Firstly, EMU’s political economy is based on the monetarist belief that monetary policy is powerful enough to offset the disturbances of the Euro-zone economy. Despite the claims that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ single monetary policy might be problematic when a minority of member states requires a different policy stance, the winning model puts its faith on the prospects of macroeconomic stabilisation given by the ECB monetary policy.
EU policy on tax has two major components: direct taxation – which is the responsibility of Member States and indirect taxation, which affects the free movement of goods and services. In this respect, especially considering indirect taxes (VAT and excise). Direct taxes are only subordinate to the goal to not affect free market competition, but it is recommended to the members the conclusion of agreements under international double taxation. Moreover, the Treaty from Maastricht (1992) requires to monetary union members to limit budget deficits to 3% of GDP, non- participant members to monetary union are being recommended to avoid substantial deficits.
In order to achieve the objectives set, through the stability and convergence projects, the Member States have expressed their intention of accepting the change of their tax systems as a result of a regulatory coordination process, aiming at tax harmonisation in compliance with the two principles of European integration: the principle of accepting all the countries’ fiscalpolicies, under certain conditions, and the principle of subsidiarity, as vertical relations between theEuropean institutions and the national governments, with the aim of ensuring theEuropean Union’s freedoms and protection of the single market. The extent and the limits of thefiscal harmonisation process have been the subject of often divergent opinions and debates, so that the results of this process have mostly failed to occur especially inthe field of indirect taxation.
An additional test can be made to see whether the responsiveness of primary budget balances to changes inthe debt is hindered by the political cycle. In other words it might be relevant to see whether the electoral budget cycle diminishes the government adherence to a Ricardian fiscal regime. Indeed, faced with elections, governments might be less willing to deliver primary surpluses, which could be used to redeem debt, and more prompt to incur in more expansionary fiscalpolicies. Additionally, in an environment of quick government turnover, the authorities may be tempted to spend more before elections leaving a higher government indebtedness level for the new government since it probably does not share its spending priorities.
On the other side of the comparative analysis some instructive findings were brought out. The constructive lessons coming out from that method unveil those elements that already enable a residency for European integration inthe context of fiscal federalism. I remember those aspects revealing a similarity between some of the federal countries and the solutions that characterise the EU, with variable degrees of resemblance for redistribution and stabilisation. It isn’t by accident that when the analysis falls within the conceptual traps of the comparative method, Switzerland bestows the stepping-stone for envisaging the EU in line with fiscal federalism. Obviously the EU doesn’t replicate the characteristics of the Swiss fiscal federalism, as there are many instances where the differentiation is remarkable. The same happens with the comparison made between the EU and Germany’s fiscal federalism. Some of the features embedded in this model of fiscal federalism are already emulated inEuropean integration. Nevertheless, there are other elements where the dissimilarity is markedly palpable.
The innovation is straightforward when the historical observation of member states’ practice is illustrative of the absence of political independence, or at least of limited independence, enjoyed by central banks. The exception was Germany, where the Bundesbank indeed was afforded with considerable guarantees of independence. The innovation also rests on the supranational arena. Here again, imprinting the sense of uniqueness that goes hand in hand with European integration, the creation of the ECB was a mirror of unprecedented political independence (Dyson 2002b: 358-9). Considering the Federal Reserve of the United States and the Bundesbank as the reference points for independent central banking, the ECB is even most independent (Harden 1993: 153, and Dyson 1994: 150). In this context, the ECB went far beyond what was already stated as the reasonable confines of central bank independence, deepening the limits towards a new dimension that wasn’t acknowledged anywhere. The extended political independence the ECB was endowed with raises the main source of concern to those who voiced against how the supranational central bank is structured. Contrary to other examples of great central bank independence, the ECB is reported as having excessive independence and limited accountability and transparency. Critics argue the ECB is independent from elected politicians, thus being unaccountable. If national and supranational central bankers are unaccountable, they lack democratic legitimacy (Verdun 1998: 107-8, Begg and Green 1998: 7, Crowley and Rowley 1998: 24, and Moran 2002: 276). The reasoning standing on the conventional literature that urges against the existing EMU institutional set up leads me to raise the first two research questions:
of foreign companies revenues and their diversification. To avoid the possibility of manipulating corporate tax systems through transfer pricing, fiscal authorities impose requirements concerning the preparation of some documentation related to transfer pricing, increasingly more onerous. Thus, companies are faced with the situation where they need to develop complex documentation on transfer prices in all countries where it operates, so they are much more likely to incur penalties for noncompliance with the requirements of fiscal authorities. In addition, the application of different methods for determining the correct transfer price is becoming increasingly complex and costly, given that new technologies and business structures (implying a greater emphasis on the firm's intangible assets) created difficulties in identification of comparable uncontrolled commercial transactions necessary for the correct transfer pricing. There are also substantial differences inthe rules for applying the methods of transfer pricing between Member States so that EU companies face with uncertainty regarding the prices of intra-group transactions, because they could be considered unacceptable by fiscal authorities at a later audit (European Commission, 2005). The transfer pricing adjustment, made after thefiscal authorities audit, can lead to double taxation risk. For example, the double taxation through transfer pricing occurs when a fiscal authorities of a Member State unilaterally adjust the price for a sale achieved between companies of the same group, without this adjustment to be offset by a corresponding adjustment inthe Member State in which the purchase was made. Although, researchers conducted by theEuropean Commission suggests that the number of disputes between fiscal authorities and corporations regarding transfer pricing adjustments is quite limited inthe Member States, business representatives have complained that often litigation costs are so high that the acceptance of double taxation is a less expensive option (Ernst & Young, 1999).
The placement of refugees through asylum is not an easy matter to elucidate. Not enough to differentiate between two options, supporters accept everyone, not violate human dignity or violate the human rights treaties and supporters of closing the borders and deny entry abroad, ap- plying the right of return. The first possibility, in practice, is not feasible since no financial means and organizational structures (education, health) that can respond to these massive demands. But one can not adopt a purely negative response because, besides that asylum seekers have a human rights recognized by various texts and treaties, theEuropeanUnion has as one of its foundations recognition and guarantee of human rights, which tantamount to denying its own principles. Get- ting to an intermediate step between the two possibilities of wider acceptance or rejection is generalized so difficult. There have been few moral philosophers who have dealt with the issue of refugees. Just think of the work of Rawls, A Theory of Justice, where justice is exclusively within a society, without thinking of “those outside”. Some philosophers have expressed regarding the influx of refugees and to the great question of how to resolve this humanitarian crisis.
The article discusses the possibilities of using optical measurements for defining the geometric accuracy of gear wheels casts manufactured inthe rapid prototyping process. The tested gear wheel prototype was cast using an aluminum alloy. The casting mould was made by means of the three-dimensional print method (3DP) with the use of a Z510 Spectrum device. The aim of the tests was to determine the geometric accuracy of the cast made by the ZCast technology inthe rapid prototyping process. The tests were conducted with the use of the coordinate optical measuring method and a GOM measuring device. The prototype measurements were made inthe scanning mode. The results of the measurements, saved inthe STL format with the use of the scanning device software, were compared with the gear wheel 3D-CAD nominal model. The measurements enabled the determination of the real accuracy of prototypes manufactured in casting moulds by means of the ZCast technology. The selection of the measuring method was also analyzed in terms of measurement accuracy and the RP technology precision.
The relevant difference is fed by the same centralisation index of Germany and the United States, putting both countries on a overlapping position. Inthe first hypothesis (a qualitative one) Germany was more centralised than the United States. According to quantitative data based on revenue and expenditures across all government layers, both countries stand inthe same position alongside the centralisation/decentralisation spectrum. Another instructive lesson is the awareness that none of these countries is totally centralised or decentralised. It would be surprising that full centralisation was the outcome after surveying statistical data, for centralisation does not match with federalism’s genetic code. In fact federalism is more open to decentralisation nature, at least when its theoretical underpinnings are remembered (Rodden 2006: 31-32). The figures reveal that Switzerland, the most decentralised country, has an index of 36.3% (full decentralisation means a zero index) while Australia, the most centralised one, ranks 70.3% (centralisation means 100%).
personal and corporate revenues; about the progressive taxation, some countries have given up with it in favor of the plate taxation (an example is Slovakia). Among the old 15 EU countries, other differences have to be also mentioned. The Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) insist more on the direct taxation, differently from the Southern countries (especially Greece and Portugal) which are featured by high rates of indirect taxes. Denmark is to be remarked, for most of the social expenses are mainly based upon taxes instead of social contributions; thus, in Denmark, the direct taxes rate within the total revenues from taxes is the highest within the whole Union, while the revenues from social contributions are low. In Germany, the opposite phenomenon is obvious: Germany records the highest weight of social contributions and the lowest rate of direct taxes within EU 15; France is a similar case.
African and European affairs are intimately and historically entwined. The twentieth first century, however, has been characterized by the ascension of a relatively new player: theEuropeanUnion (EU). It was not until the 1990s, with the advent of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which were added together with more traditional external policies, such as trade and development, that the EU acquired a “proper” foreign policy dimension.
From Fig. no. 6 it can be seen that industries in countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have made the largest investments for environmental protection, because they must comply with the standards imposed by the EU environmental acquis, in particular those with on the limitation of emissions and waste management. Data on investment by industry can be further broken down into two main parts, namely investment for pollution treatment (integrated investment) and investment in pollution prevention.Integrated investments are investments that lead to a modified or adapted production process and serve to reduce the amount of pollution generated. From fig. no. 7 it can be seen that investment in pollution treatment were higher than investment for its prevention in 10 of the 21 countries for which data are available. The largest investments in pollution prevention were recorded in Cyprus and Latvia, while Bulgaria, Portugal and Croatia are primarily invested in pollution treatment technologies.