This article analyses the Baltic policy of united Germany from the 1990s until to-day. The authors set out to identify the sig-nificance of German-Baltic relations and the role of the Eastern policy in Russian-German relations. The method of dynamic comparison between the political and eco-nomic narrative in intergovernmental rela-tions makes it possible to identify distincti-ve features of Germany’s Baltic policy in the context of current international rela-tions. In particular, it is noted that Germa-ny was most active in the Baltic region in the 1990s, when the country was establishing political, economic, and cultural ties with the new independent states. In the second half of the 1990s, Germany’s foreign policy became less intense. After the accession of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the EU and NATO in 2004, certain disagreements started to arise between Germany and the Baltics. It explains the lukewarm relations between them. The Ukraine events brought about a change in Germany’s regional po-licy. Despite Russia remaining one of the key economic and political counteractors, Germany, being a partner of the Baltics in the EU and NATO, cannot adopt a neutral position in the conflict of interests between the Baltics and Russia.
Key words: Germany’s foreign policy, Baltics, EU, NATO, Nord Stream, Baltic Sea region, Russia
The history of relations between the unified Germany and the three Baltic States — the topic of this article — be-gins in August 28, 1991. On this day, several days after the recognition of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the Russian Soviet Federa-tive Socialist Republic, the three Baltic countries were recognised as independ-ent states by Germany and the four countries established official diploma-tic relations. In the first years after their gaining independence, the Baltics’
go-THE BALTIC POLICY
OF GERMANY
AND CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
A. Salikov
*I.
Tarasov
*E. Urazbaev
**
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University 14 A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236041, Russia
Submitted on July 10, 2015.
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2016-1-5
vernment circles expected two possible models to be used by Germany in the region. On the one hand, there were concerns about the resumption of the
Drang nach Osten policy. On the other hand, Germany was seen by many as a natural counterweight to Russia, an ‘advocate of the Balts’1 defending the in-terests of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia both in the West and the East. The Ger-man presence in the Baltics was viewed by the Baltics’ government circles as a tool to overcome dependence on Russia and forge strong military, economic, and political ties with the West. [1, S. 21—22] The reality was different.
Until the early 1990s, Germany’s policy towards the Baltics was rather moderate. The German government’s careful official attitude towards Lithu-ania, Latvia, and Estonia was explained by the disinclination to weaken the position of President Gorbachev in the USSR, which could have postponed or even terminated the process of Germany’s reunification. [4, S. 137] After the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were seemingly no reasons for the German Federative Republic to refrain from activities in the Baltics.
In 1991—1992, relations between the Baltic States and Germany were rapidly developing. Several weeks after the establishment of official diplo-matic contacts, ambassadors were sent to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who arrived in Estonia on September 11, 1991, was the first top European politician to pay an official visit to the Baltics after independence. During his visit, H-D. Genscher reassured the Baltic leadership that the German government was interested in developing relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and would facilitate the return of the Baltics into the international community. H-D. Genscher also declared Germany’s commitment to support a conver-gence between the Baltics and the EU. [6, S. 67] H-D. Geschner’s words were backed by actions: Germany played an active role in the Baltics’ acces-sion to the CSCE, Council of Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).
Alongside facilitating the integration of the Baltics into the Western in-stitutions, Germany provided different types of assistance to Lithuania, Lat-via, and Estonia. In 1992-1994, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs al-located DM 30 million to the Baltics for the construction of a border control system [7, S. 101] and DM 125 million within the transformation pro-gramme. [8, S. 174] As to military cooperation, the Baltics received assis-tance in personnel training. Material assisassis-tance was insignificant and very selective. In 1992, the Baltic armed forces received communications equip-ment, medical supplies, trucks, and mine detectors from the warehouses of the former People’s Army of the GDR. A very limited number of weapons were supplied in order not to provoke Russia. [12, S. 474] Cooperation in
1
science and culture was rapidly developing between the FRG and the Bal-tics. In the early 1990s, German research foundations and academic organi-sations opened offices in the Baltics. These were DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), DFG (German Research Society), the Goethe Institute, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, etc. [9, . 163] As to the economy, in 1991—1993, Germany focused on assisting the Baltics in privatisation and increasing economic competitiveness. Assistance was provided in the form of trainings for administrative staff and financial support programmes. In the framework of the so-called Technical Cooperation and Mutual Assis-tance Programme, Germany granted Estonia DM 13 m in 1993 (13 m in 1993), Latvia — DM 13.3 m (13 m in 1993), and Lithuania — DM 14 m (1993, 20.4 m). [9, . 163]
In their turn, the Baltics did not only strive to adopt German practices in different fields, but they also considered Germany as one of preferable state-hood models. Estonia was most successful in adopting German practices. Its administrative, legal, and banking systems were largely based on German practices and expertise. However, this gravitation towards Germany particu-larly pronounced in the 1990s was gradually fading out. In the early 2000s, the Baltics ceased to consider Germany as a mode for their socio-political development.
Germany’s interest in the region was also decreasing. The short post-independence period of active cooperation, when contacts were established in numerous areas, was followed by a pragmatic assessment of relations with the region. From the economic perspective, the Baltics were not very attrac-tive to Germany due to their small size and limited economic potential. From the perspective of sociocultural ties, the region did not have considerable significance, since the German minority — a strong link between Germany and the Baltics before World War II — was not sizeable.
In the mid-1990s, Germany faced a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, the country recognised its historical responsibility for the Baltic States and showed solidarity with them. On the other, relations with Russia took prior-ity over cooperation with the Baltics. As a result, the German-Baltic rela-tions largely depended on Germany’s policy towards Russia. More than on-ce, they were tested for compatibility with the ‘Russian issue’.
Germany and other western countries had to seek compromises. For in-stance, Latvia and Estonia granted Russia a permission to continue the ex-ploitation of military facilities on their territories until August 31, 1994.
Another critical point in German-Baltic relations was the republics’ ac-cession to the EU and NATO. From the very beginning, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia strived for accession to the EU and NATO. The Baltics consid-ered Germany as a key to these organisations. In effect, Germany’s position was rather moderate. The country opposed the idea of speedy access of the Baltics to NATO. The official objectives of German foreign policy in the region did not contradict those in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They sug-gested support for reforms, guarantees for independence and integrity of the Baltics, and their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. [1, S. 166] However, despite the fact that the major interests of Germany and the Baltics coincided, differences in understanding how and when these objectives can be achieved became evident in the early 1990s. [1, S. 216]
At first, the accessions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the EU and NATO were discussed separately. The Baltics’ priority was their accession to NATO, which they viewed as a guarantee for independence and integrity. The Baltics’ governments considered the EU only as an economic associa-tion. It soon turned out that Russia did not object to the Baltics’ EU member-ship. However, their NATO membership was regarded as a threat to Russia’s security and the country’s interests in the region.
However, after the advocates of NATO enlargement had defeated the proponents of the ‘Russia-First’ policy in President Clinton’s administration in the mid-1990s, the US actively supported the Baltics’ NATO ambitions in the first round of enlargement. [2, S. 60] This increased pressure on the German government. As a result, the US nudged Germany into changes in its position on the Baltics’ NATO membership. At the same time, the gov-ernment of the Federative Republic supported the idea of synchronising the EU and NATO enlargement processes. Germany’s leadership believed that parallel enlargement would appease Russia (which opposed the enlargement of the Alliance) and accelerate European cooperation in foreign policy and security. Factors that expedited the decision about the Baltics’ accession to NATO were both the softening of Russia’s position and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which forced Russia and the US to cooperate more closely in the fight against terrorism and compelled NATO to revise its strategy towards enlargement. Germany’s position was also affected by the dramatic events in the Balkans. As the civil war in Yugoslavia raged on, Gerhard Schroeder’s government felt obliged to take measures to ensure stability in the Baltics, where ethnic conflict potential was also rather high.
A dramatic change in Germany’s position on the Baltic’s accession to NATO occurred in April 2002, when the Bundestag opposition seized the initiative and demanded that the government support the accession of the Baltics to NATO at the Alliance’s conference in Prague. [1, S. 275] Several days later, the German government declared its support for the enlargement. At the Prague summit in November 2002, the Baltic Republics were offi-cially invited to the accession talks. An important security objective of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was almost attained and the major differences in the Baltic-German relations were technically resolved.
After the Baltics’ accession to NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004, the relations between Germany and the Baltic States reached a new level — they became equal partners in Euro-Atlantic organisations. How-ever, this fact seemed to discourage cooperation between the Baltics and Germany even further, since their interests within the mentioned organisa-tions were diverging. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are fairly satisfied with their current participation in the European institution and they are not inter-ested in further European integration, which is supported by Germany.
recom-mendations concerning the pipeline route running through the Estonian eco-nomic zone of the Gulf of Finland. In September of the same year, the Esto-nian Party did not allow the Nord Stream to explore the country’s section of the seafloor. [13] Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Baltics, the pipeline was built and put into operation on November 8, 2011.
Although Germany played a key role on the Baltics’ international rela-tions, the fixation of the latter on trans-Atlantic relations and differences over the taxation policy suggest that Germany and the Baltics have not forged a close political partnership. [1, S. 23] The relations between the Bal-tics and Russia, with which Germany developed mutually beneficial relation, were also complicated. The confrontation between the Baltics and Russia puts Germany in a difficult situation, since, on the one hand, it cannot ignore the interests of its NATO and EU partners, on the other, the country is inter-ested in maintaining and improving relations with Russia. However, the tragic events that took place in Ukraine in February 2014 and Russia’s in-corporation of Crimea had an adverse effect on the relations between Russia and the West. Germany’s political elite was increasingly supportive of the Baltics in the Russian-Baltic confrontation. In March 2015, during his visit to Tallinn, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier stressed that the Baltics could rely on NATO and the EU (http://www.ves.lv/ rus/politika/glava-mid-germanii-strany-baltii-mogut-polozhitsya-na-nato-i-es/). It seems that under pressure from its NATO allies, Germany was forced to provide considerable assistance to the NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics. [14] According to the article
pub-lished in the Spiegel in March 2105, Germany plans to make available six
aircraft for a strengthened air-patrolling mission. [15] In a short- and mid-term perspective, Germany’s policy in the Baltic Sea region will be coordi-nated with its NATO and EU partners more carefully than before the Ukraine events. It means that in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Baltic dimension receives stronger support than the pro-Russian one.
The preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the Russian Foundation for the Humanities (No. 15-37-01209).
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About the authors
Dr Aleksey Salikov, Deputy Director of the Immanuel Kant Institute, the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.
E-mail: salikov123@mail.ru
Prof Ilya Tarasov, Head of the Department of Politics, Social Technolo-gy and Mass Communication, the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.
E-mail: ITarasov@kantiana.ru
Evgeny Urazbaev, PhD Student, Institute of Nature Management, Spatial Planning, and Urban Development, the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal Uni-versity, Russia.
E-mail: yrazbaev@gmail.com
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