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P O S S I B L E WAY S O F I N C R E A S I N G T H E AT T R AC T I V E N E S S
O F LOT T E R I E S A S S O C I AT E D W I T H I M P L E M E N TAT I O N O F
C O O P E R AT I V E S P E C I F I C I N V E ST M E N T
NATALIYA B. DZAGUROVA,
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, e-mail: ndzagourova@gmail.com, ndzagourova@hse.ru
The present paper continues the discussion of the theme raised in our preceding paper published in the second issue of JIS this year. The paper contained the analysis of vertical restraints (VR) set out in (Rey and Tirole, 1986) and (Hansen and Motta, 2015). We proposed an alternative approach, namely, the interpretation of VR as a tool for increasing the attractiveness of the lotteries associated with implementation of cooperative specific investments (in the above-mentioned articles the risks associated with market shocks were discussed).
The cooperative specific investments are more risky than the selfish specific investments. First of all, it concerns the possible termination of the contract after a specific investment will be carried out (at ex post stage). The VR voluntarily adopted by the firm play a significant role in strengthening the incentives for cooperative investments of the firm’s partners as they decrease the risk coupled with these investments.
Firstly, VR can reduce the riskiness of lotteries associated with investment in specific assets by the redistribution of control in favor of the investing parties
Secondlyб VR can be considered as an element of the firm’s signaling activity aimed to convince the investing partners in the firm’s readiness to continue cooperation at the ex post stage.
Thirdly, the VR, such as exclusive contracts, ensure receiving by the investing partners at least partial compensation (for termination of such contracts).
And only fourthly, VR limit the possible redistribution of quasi-rent between the firm and its partners.
Keywords: vertical restraints; compensation for risk; specific investments; cooperative specific investments.
JEL: D81, D86.
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б
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