(De)militarization: fragile democracy and the militarization of public safety in Brazil

8

Fragile Democracy

and the Militarization

of Public

_Safety

in Brazil

by

Jorge

Zaverucha

Jorge Zaverucha is a _professor of political science at the Federal _University of Pernambuco in

Recife, Brazil. He is the author of Rumor dos sabres: Tutela militar ou controle civil? (1994), &dquo;Military Justice in the State of Pernambuco after the Brazilian _{Military Regime&dquo; (Latin} Ameri-can Research Review 34[2]: 43-73), and _Fragil democracia: Collor, Itamar, FHC e os militares

(2000).

The

_major

crimes in modem societies are not the crimes _per se but rather the

fact that the

_{fight against}

them will conduct these societies to totalitarianism. -Nils Christie

As Pereira

_{(2000: 228-229)}

reminds us,

The literature on democratic consolidation has devoted considerable attention

to

_{civil-military}

relations at the elite level and such matters as the

_preservation

of

_military

coup attempts and the reduction of

_military

_autonomy. In

_general,

however, there is insufficient attention in the literature to the issue of the demo-cratic control of

_everyday

forms of state coercion.

_{By "everyday}

forms of state

coercion" I mean routine

policing, intelligence

work, and

military operations

that do not involve the seizure of the executive or the

_shutting

down of other branches of _government. Over time,

changes

in

_practice

in these realms have

the

_potential

for the

_"hollowing

out" of the democratic

_regimes

from within,

through

the

_{gradual expansion}

of the

budgets,

functions, and _autonomy of the

coercive institutions that _engage in them.

This article calls attention to a related

_phenomenon

that is also

being

disre-garded by

the literature on democratic consolidation: the militarization of the

civil

_public

_space

and,

especially,

of the

_security

_apparatus.

Militarization must be understood as a _process of

adoption

and use of

_military

models,

methods, concepts, doctrines,

procedures,

and

_personnel

in

_police

_activities,

thus

_giving

a

_military

character to

_{public safety}

_(and

_public

_space)

_questions

(Cerqueira,

1998).

Such a _process also occurs in areas of

_nonpolice

nature

With the end of the cold war and in the absence of _any border

_conflict,

the

Brazilian armed forces turned even more to their domestic affairs. Because

these actions are

_performed

within the

_existing

_legal

structure, one

_might

think that the

_military

was subordinate to constitutional civilian control.

However,

this

_phenomenon

is

_{simultaneously}

_corroding

some institutions

that are fundamental to the survival of the social

_pact,

such as the

_police

and the Constitution.

Furthermore,

it bestows on the

_military

a _power

increas-ingly incompatible

with its role as the defender of the external

security

of the

country.

’

The militarization of

_{public safety}

in Brazil did not

_{happen by}

chance. It

was

_{constitutionally protected,}

and it has been

_occurring

with

_increasing

fre-quency at the federal and state

levels,

in _governments of both the

_right

and the left.

Furthermore,

it is

_supported

_by

the

_political

elite and the

_society

as a

whole. This article will

_{explain why}

this situation

_{persists today}

and how it

jeopardizes

democratic consolidation in Brazil.

PATTERNS OF REGULARITY

The federal and/or state

_military

continues to be an

important

source of

power in Brazilian

politics,

a _{power that is}

_expanding

toward the area of

pub-lic

_safety.

Since a

regular

_pattern

_{emerges between 1985}

(the

end of the

mili-tary

regime)

and the

_present

_day,

one cannot _{argue that the}

_following

exam-ples

are casual.

1. The 1998 Constitution includes in its title 5

_(The

Defense of State and of Democratic

_{Institutions)}

three

_chapters:

₍₁₎

The State of Defense and the State of

_Siege,

₍₂₎

The Armed

_Forces,

and

₍₃₎

Public

_Safety.

This means that our

_{representatives}

were unable to

_produce

a real

_departure

from the

_military

regime

just

replaced;

the

_police

continued,

although

to a lesser extent, to defend the state instead of its citizens. The Constitution’s framers mixed

questions

of an external nature with

_questions

of

_{public safety,}

that

is,

they

made militarization

_{constitutionally}

_{valid. Furthermore,}

_{they preserved}

the

superiority

in number of men,

training,

and

firepower

of the

military police

over the civil

police.2

_Up

until

_1969,

it was the civil

_police

_(CP)

who

_patrolled

the streets and directed traffic with uniformed civil

guards. They

were

responsible

for the

_prevention

and

_repression

of crime and for the

_safety

of

governors and

dignitaries. Today,

the CP is

_nothing

more than a

_judiciary

police

force

_(Barbosa,

_1998).

Therefore it is no

_surprise

that article 142 of the Constitution confers on

the armed forces the

_{responsibility}

for

_guaranteeing

law and order. In other

forces have a constitutional orientation toward internal matters. This can be

expected

to have ramifications within the institutions

_responsible

for

_public

safety, especially

because the state

_{military polices (MP)}

and

_military

fire

bri-gades

are still controlled

_by

_{the army and in fact} amount to

_ancillary

forces and reserves.

After

_repeated

_episodes

of

_{police brutality,}

President Fernando

_Henrique

Cardoso,

through

Portaria 369 of

_May

_{13, 1997,}

created a

_working

_group for the

restructuring

of the

_police

forces. The

_{ruling acknowledged}

&dquo;that

_today’s

s

institutional model for

_public

_safety

was structured almost

_{entirely during}

the

authoritarian

_period,

i.e.,

before the

_promulgation

of the 1988 Constitution. This Constitution is the

_legal

landmark of our new rule of law.&dquo;

_Therefore,

the

model would have to be modified. This was _pure

fanfare,

_especially

when one

observes the identities of the members of the

_working

_group.

_Among

those with

_{practical experience}

in

_police

matters were a member of the

_CP,

one of

the Federal Police

_(FP),

a

_lawyer

who had been

_secretary

of

_{public safety}

for

the state of Rio Grande do

Sul,

and an MP colonel on reserve from Rio de Janeiro. Other members included an

_active-duty

_army officer from the

Gen-eral

_{Inspectorship}

of

_Military

Police Forces

_(IGPM)

and four more officers

(colonels

and

_generals

on reserve who

_occupied

or had

_occupied

governmen-tal offices in the

_public

_safety

_area).

_Among

the state secretaries of

_public

safety

then on

_duty,

the

_only

one selected was from Rio de Janeiro-Gen.

Nil-ton

_Cerqueira,

known for his

_policies

of &dquo;shoot

first,

_investigate

later&dquo; and &dquo;rewards for acts of

_{bravery.&dquo;3}

When the federal

_government

set _{up this group}

it gave more _power to the _army than to the

_police

to decide on the future of the latter.

_Thus,

_everything

has remained the same, since the army does not want to lose control over the MPs.

2. In contrast to the militarized

_police

forces of other

countries,

the Brazil-ian MP is inferior in status to the armed forces. It is an

_ancillary

force of the

army and is therefore subordinate to

it,

either

_{operationally}

or in terms _of

per-sonnel,

_during

times of peace. Its effective

force, ammunition,

and

organiza-tion are

dependent

on norms

_promulgated

_by

the army. The MP imitates the

model of the

_infantry

battalion. It is

_{governed by}

the criminal and criminal

procedure

codes of the armed

forces;

its

_disciplinary

code is written in the

same fashion as the

_disciplinary

code of the _army; Decrees 667 of

_July

2,

1969,4

and 88.797 of

_September

30, 1983,

which

_regulate

the

MP,

date to the authoritarian

_period

of Brazilian

_history;

and its

_intelligence

services

con-tinue to be _part of _army

_{intelligence.}

Therefore,

whereas other countries have

_police

forces with a

_military

structure, Brazil has a

_military

_structure,

_beginning

with its name,

_acting

as a

police

force. In

Honduras,

the

_{military police}

was under the control of the

August

1997 control over this

_police

force was assumed

_by

a national inter-vention board that is

_charged

with

_{demilitarizing}

it,

_transforming

it into a

national civil

_police.

Federal and state militaries that

_operate

in the area of

_policing

have a spe-cial

_{jurisdiction.}

Indeed,

in some

_{circumstances,}

such as cases of felonies

against

civilians,

if a soldier in the

_{army’s police}

force and a soldier of the MP

commit a crime

_together,

the former will be

_{judged by}

a

_military

tribunal and the latter

_by

a civil court, and

they

will be

_subject

to distinct

_penalties

in what

can be characterized as a violation of the

rule

of law. This is a demonstration that two kinds of

_military

officers are

_likely

to

_perform

activities connected with

_public

safety (Zaverucha,

1999:

70).

The Lord Mansfield

doctrine,

rec-ognized

in

_England

since

_1831,

_{says that}

_military

_{forces may intervene in} matters of

_public

_safety

but

_always

as

_{representatives}

of

_public

_{power and} not

as if

_they

were at war. For this _very reason, violations

ought

to be

judged

by

civil courts

_(Engdahl,

1971:

_35).

3. The number of federal

_military

officers

_occupying

administrative

posi-tions in

_governmental

_{public safety}

bodies is

_increasing.

President

Cardoso,

through

a

_{provisional measure,’}

created and

_appointed

a

_general

on reserve to

manage the Secretariat of Public

Planning

and

Safety’

and the

Department

of Public

_Safety

Affairs. The chief of the

_Military

Office of the

_Presidency

of the

_Republic

(hereinafter Military Office),

the

active-duty general

Alberto

Cardoso,

has the status of minister. He _{manages the Undersecretariat of}

Fed-eral Civil

_{Intelligence,’}

controls the National

_Drug

Control

Secretariat,

and

manages the Executive Secretariat of the Chamber of

Foreign

Relations and

National Defense of the

_Presidency

of the

_Republic

and the Executive Secre-tariat of the National Defense Council.

After the dismissal of the

_{director-general}

of the

FP,

Vicente

_Chelotti,

who disliked the idea of the interference of the armed forces in

_{drug trafficking}

combat,

General Cardoso increased his influence. For

_example,

he

_supported

the nomination of Pedro

Berwanger

for the

_{superintendency}

of the FP in Rio de Janeiro

_(Folha

de S.

Paulo,

_April

29,

1999).

He was also able to veto a

nomination

_by

the minister of

_justice

for the

_position

of head of the FP and

suggested

the nomination of the chief of

_police

Joao

_{B aptista}

_Campelo,

who seemed to him _very flexible with

_regard

to the role of the

_military

in

_fighting

drug trafficking. Campelo eventually

took office but

_resigned

three

_days

later,

having

been accused of

_practicing

torture

_during

the

_military

_regime

8 The retaliation from the FP came later. The FP started to

_investigate

the Civil

_Intelligence

Secretariat as

_{possibly responsible}

for

_wiretapping

tele-phone

calls

_involving

President Cardoso and his advisers

during

the

_bidding

on

_TELEBRAS,

Brazil’s

_public

_{telecommunication company.} In an official

Center,

said that the _army &dquo;reaffirms its full confidence in the honest conduct of General Cardoso and

_{vehemently repudiates}

the insinuations made

_against

our

_{reputable military}

chief

_{(Folha de}

S.

Paulo,

June

_{5, 1999).}

The Office of the Prosecutor wanted to _arrange a confrontation of witnesses between

Gen-eral Cardoso and one of his subordinates from Rio de

Janeiro,

a

_colonel,

with

a view to

_verifying

_{contradictory}

stories about the

_episode

of the

wiretap-pings.

But President Cardoso decided to restore Cardoso’s title of minister of

state,9

thus

_avoiding

_any

_possibility

of such a confrontation.

It was General

Cardoso,

instead of the

_Ministry

of

_Justice,

who

_negotiated

on behalf of Brasi’lia the end of the strike of the MP and the CP in 1997. He

said that the MP had been &dquo;shot dead&dquo; when

_they

violated their

_military

duties. The activities of the

_Military

Office had increased so much that at the end of March 1999 a

_deputy

office for it was established under the command

of an

active-duty

officer. For the first time in the

_history

of the

_republic

two

generals

were

_occupying

the most

_important

_posts

of the

_Military

Office

(Vasconcelos, 1999).

In the state

_{sphere, generals}

on reserve _occupy or have

_occupied

the

lead-ership

of the Secretariats of Public

_Safety

of

_Ceard,

Rio Grande do

Norte,

Tocantins, Maranhao,

Alagoas,

Espirito

Santo,

Distrito

Federal, Pard,

Per-nambuco,

and Rio de Janeiro. In the

latter,

for the first

time,

the _{army, navy,} and air force will have a seat on the

_just-created

State

_Security

Council. Gen-eral Bueno

_brought

to Pernambuco’s Secretariat of Social Defense three colonels-two to command the Directorate of

_Intelligence

and the Director-ate of General Administration and one to be the

_deputy

_secretary

of defense.

In

_addition,

he

_brought

four

_military

assistants. As if this were not

_enough,

he used article 10 of

_Ordinary

Law 865/1999 to declare &dquo;of

_military

nature or

interest the

_positions

ad nutum of the Secretariat of Social

Defense,

occupied

by military employees.&dquo;

This declaration created the

_legal

basis for the

nomi-nation of

_{active-duty military}

officers for

_positions

in this Secretariat.

In the

_city

of Sao

Paulo,

the commander of the

_Metropolitan

Guard,

a

police

force with a clear civilian

_character,

is a reserve _army

colonel. 10

In

other states, these

guards

are commanded

_by

officers-on reserve or

active-duty-of

the MP. The

_Metropolitan

Guard of Rio de Janeiro is commanded

by

MP Col. Cesar

Am6ndola,

who was one of the few

_military

men to be

con-victed

_by

a

_{military inquiry during}

the

_{military regime}

_(the

reason

_being

assault and

_{battery against}

a

_prisoner

in his

_charge

[Jornal

do

Brasil,

_May

1,

q

1999]).

It is

_important

to remember that the

_Metropolitan

Guard has

_police

power and that its

objective,

in accordance with the federal Constitution

(arti-cle

114),

is to

_protect

_city

_{property, services,}

and facilities.

In Rio de

_Janeiro,

the riot

_police

of the

_Metropolitan

Guard,

called the

Special

Group

for Urban

_Control,

was trained

_by

the First Battalion of the

army’s police

at its

_headquarters

in Barao de

_Mesquita

Street. The first

_stage

of this

_training

_program took

_place

at the end of

1993,

and the Eastern Mili-tary Command _{surrounded this program with absolute secrecy. The press} was

prohibited

from

_covering

it. The

_Metropolitan

Guards received instruction

regarding

tactics in the area of civil disturbance

control,

_techniques

that were

improved

during

the

_repression

of

_public

demonstrations and

_protests

_against

the

_{military regime}

of 1964. The _army has been

_using

these

_techniques

against

street vendors

_(camelbs)

and invaders of

_municipal

lands and in the

repression

of social conflicts.

The MP of

_Sergipe

was commanded from 1995 to 1998

_by

an

active-duty

army officer

appointed

by

the then-minister of the army, Zenildo Lucena.

During

the second term _{of the socialist governor}

_Miguel

_Arraes,

the head of the Secretariat of Public

_Safety

was a reserve

_general,

and the MP

com-mander became an adviser for Arraes’s third term and served as liaison

between Arraes and the _army,

_{especially during}

the strike of the MP in 1997. What is worth

_noting

here is that these nominations of army officers have come from

_politicians

of both the

_right

and the

leftll

and have not been

chal-lenged by public opinion,

the

media,

or even academia. What is

_really

impor-tant to conclude here is that the excessive

_military

_{presence in}

_public

_safety

issues still remains.

4. The

_proposal

_{of the governor of Sao}

_Paulo,

Mario

Covas,

on

April

23,

1997,

to

_{modify paragraph}

5 of article 114 of the federal Constitution reads as

follows: &dquo;The

_{military police,}

created to maintain

_public

order and internal

security [emphasis

added]

within the states, the

territories,

and the Federal District.&dquo; This

proposal

is a literal _copy of article

13,

_paragraph

4,

of the 1967 Constitution. The

_expression

&dquo;internal

_{security&dquo; is}

also

_part

of article

3,

para-graph

l,

of Law 6.620 of December

17,

1978,

the National

_Security

Law

(NSL)

passed during

the administration of President Ernesto Geisel

_(H.

B.

Cruz,

1997:

_40).

The

_expression

&dquo;national

_{security&dquo;}

was removed from the

Constitution

_by

Constitutional Amendment 1 of October

17, 1969,

but retained

_by

Decree Law 667 of

_July

_2,

_{1969, which,}

_among other

_things,

defined the

_jurisdiction

of the MP.

The doctrine of internal

_security

was

_{developed by}

the War

_College

and

reads as follows: &dquo;Internal

_Security

includes all the _processes

_by

which the

state

_protects

itself

against antagonisms

and _pressures of _any

_origin,

form,

or nature that occur within it.&dquo; The defense that

_corresponds

to internal

_security

is internal

defense,

_involving

actions aimed at

_protecting

internal

_security

against

internal enemies. Internal defense is therefore an instrument of

national

_security.

Covas’s

_proposal

maintained the

_logic

of the national

secu-rity

doctrine in its

_{interpretation}

of matters of

_{public safety.}

_Although

it had

the merit of

_returning

the MP and the CP to their

_pre-1969

status, it did not mention the

_necessity

of

_returning

the MP to the

_Ministry

of Justice.

In December

1998,

the army announced a new control over the MP. A new

organization

chart was created for the Command of Land

_Operations.

This command acts in accordance with ministerial

_guidelines

and

_guidelines

from the army

high

command,

maintaining

a link with the

_Military

Area Com-mands

and,

_through

them,

with the

_Large

Units,

_{Rapid-Response Military}

Organization,

Special

Action and Members of the

_Rapid

Action

Force,

the

Army

Air Force

Command,

the Center

_for

Evaluation of

_Training

of the

Army

and Tank

Instruction,

and First Sub-battalion of Electronic Warfare

(Noticiario

do

Exjrcito,

no.

_9499,

December

_{18, 1998).}

The new structure of the Land

_Operations

Command has two subcom-mands. The one that interests us is the Second Subcommand of

_Operational

Planning

and Use of Terrestrial Forces. This subcommand has five sections: Defense of the

_Country,

_Guardianship

of Law and

_Order,

International

Operations,

Complementary

Actions,

and

_Auxiliary

Actions. The latter is

charged

with

_studying

_legislation,

_{organizational}

_charts,

and

_proposals

for the creation and/or elimination of units of the MP and

_military

fire

_brigades,

as well as

_controlling

the soldiers and

_equipment

of those

_auxiliary

forces.

Therefore,

certain tasks that used to be the

_{responsibility}

of the

Inspectorship-General

of the

_Military

Police,

a bureaucratic _agency of the

Ministry

of the

_Army

in

_charge

of

_overseeing

the

MP,

began

to be

_performed

by

an

_operational

_agency at a _very

_high

level.

Thus,

through

this institutional

change,

the _army has revealed its desire to increase its control over the MP

and

_military

fire

_brigades.

In

_fact,

after the MP strike in

1997,

the _army demanded a

_{strengthening}

of the structure of the MP. President Cardoso even

sent

_Congress

a bill

_calling

for the MP to be trained

by

the

_army.12

In other

words,

the

_project

would reestablish the

_{&dquo;military training}

+

_military

regula-tion +

_military

_{justice&dquo;}

_{trinity implemented by}

General-President Garrastazu Medici.

5. It is considered natural for the armed forces to intervene in the interest of the maintenance of law and order without

_accounting

for its actions to the

state. A remarkable

_example

of this was the 1994

_Operation

Rio

I,

in which the armed forces

_employed

their war

_{doctrine, methods, concepts,}

and

proce-dures almost without civilian control. Not even _{the governor} or the

_top

offi-cers of the Rio MP

_participated

in the fundamental decisions about the

opera-tion,

and even now its costs are unknown. No soldier accused of a violation of

human

_rights

was

_{punished, despite}

the fact that civilians had been arrested

without _any warrant or

_probable

cause. The

_judiciary,

in violation of the

prin-ciple

that _everyone has the

_right

to be heard

_by

a

_magistrate,

chose

moreover,

provided

no

_public

defender to civilians who were unable to _pay for a

_{lawyer-the majority}

_{(see Caldeira, 1996).}

Complementary Law

69 of

_July

23, 1991,

implemented during

the Collor administration with the

_acquiescence

of the

_{military ministers, 13}

_provided

that federal _troops

_might

intervene in internal matters when asked to

_by

the

president

once other means of

_maintaining

of

_public

order

_(i.e.,

the use of the

police)

had been exhausted. It was

_adopted

after the incidents of

_1988,

when army

troops

killed three workers

_during

a strike at the

_{government-owned}

Companhia

Siderdrgica

Nacional in Volta

_Redonda,

Rio de Janeiro. On that occasion the army did not wait for the

_police

to act before it invaded the

_plant.

During

the

_government

of Itamar Franco, federal

_troops

were used to

con-tain a disturbance on the Rio-Niteroi

_bridge

in

_May

1993 and in

_January

1994.14

Of the nine members of the

_{Special Investigation}

Commission

cre-ated

_by

President Franco in

_February

1994 to

_investigate

the misuse of

_public

funds,

three were

_military

officers: Gen. Romildo

Canhim,

chair of the

com-mission,

Gen. Euclides

Lima,

the executive

_secretary,

and Gen. Francisco

Baptista

Soares de

Mello,

a member of the

_{Grupo Guararapes,}

_consisting

of reserve officers who had

_recently

advocated the

_shutting

down of the

Congress.

In March

1994,

soldiers acted

_again

on an issue of

_{public safety,}

this time

against

civilians

_{demonstrating}

on the 30th

_anniversary

of the

_military

coup

of 1964.

On

_May

_{11, 1994,}

Brasilia woke up to

_{1,000 soldiers, tanks,}

and combat vehicles in the streets and

_{helicopters hovering}

over the

_Esplanade

of the Ministries.

_Right

in front of the Planalto Palace

_(the

official

_presidential

resi-dence)

and the Federal

_Supreme

Court,

a demonstration of force was

_taking

place-40

parachutists

were

_climbing

and

_descending

_{ropes from the}

heli-copters

flying

over Three Powers

_Square.

The

_{parachutists belonged}

to the

Army

Air

_Brigade

from

_Taubat6,

Sao

_Paulo,

and were about to

_join

the

peacekeeping

forces of the United Nations in

_Angola.

One hundred soldiers

from the

_army’s

_{Special Operations}

_Batallion,

based in Rio de Janeiro and considered an elite

unit,

also

_participated

in the

_operation

_(Jomal

do

Brasil,

May 12, 1994).

The

_operation

had the

_objective

of

_surrounding

the

_{police headquarters}

and

_preventing

the FP strikers from

_approaching

the

_building.

Because the strikers’ main demand was

_higher

_salaries,

it was feared that the wives of the

military

officers

_residing

in Brasilia

_{might join}

the strike. To avoid this

prob-lem the

_troops

also

_occupied

the residential area where most of the families of the

_military

lived. General Jos6 Luis

_Lopes,

who had headed the

_operation

against

the strike in Volta Redonda in

1988,

told me that he had

_suggested

that

to start the intervention

_against

the FP

_strikers,

then commanded

_by

the _army

reserve colonel Wilson

Romao,

with as much force as

_possible,

and his

sug-gestion

was

followed.

&dquo;

On March

17, 1995,

when President Cardoso visited Rio de

Janeiro,

the

army

police joined

the Rio MP in

containing

protests and demonstrations

against

him even

though

the latter could have

_performed

this task on its own.

On March

28,

1995,

federal and state

_governments

_agreed

to revive

Operation

Rio

I,

which had

_expired

on March 3. In contrast with the old one, this new

_operation,

Rio

_II,

had no termination date. The state

_government

of Rio

had,

at least in

_theory,

more

_{participation,}

because the command of the

operation

was to be shared between General Abdias da Costa Ramos of the Eastern

_Military

Command and the

_secretary

of

_public

_safety

of Rio de

Janeiro,

reserve

_general

Euclimar Lima da Silva. In

_reality,

this shared

com-mand

_placed

the

_{decision-making}

_{power in the hands of}

_military

_officers,

but

even _so, the two

_{generals disputed}

control of the

_operation.

General Silva said that the coordination of the

operation

had to be the

_{responsibility}

of his office to avoid the direct involvement of the armed forces. Col. Ivan

_Cardozo,

the

spokesman

for the Eastern

_Military

Command,

replied

that the command of the

_operation

should remain in the hands of an

active-duty

officer

_because,

according

to the

_{Constitution,}

the

_{military police}

is an

_ancillary

and reserve

force of the armed forces. Neither the minister of

_justice,

Nelson

Jobin,

nor

the governor, Marcelo

Alencar,

was able to

_clarify

who would

_really

be in

command of the

_{joint operations}

in Rio

_(Jornal

do

Brasil,

_April

1,

1995).

In

_May

1995 President Cardoso violated

_{Complementary}

Law 69 when he sent _army

_troops

to recover the

_Mataripe

oil

_refinery

from the hands of strik-ers. General Ant6nio

Araujo

de

Medeiros,

Chief of the Fifth

Military

Com-mand,

which was

_responsible

for the

_operation,

said that &dquo;if necessary he

would shoot to

_protect

the facilities of the

company&dquo;

(Gaspari,

1995).

In this case, the

strikers,

bearing

in mind the deaths in Volta

Redonda,

did not

resist,

and the incident ended without casualties. This incident differed from the Volta Redonda situation in that in the latter the _army was

_{enforcing a judicial}

order.

President Cardoso was to violate

_{Complementary}

Law 69

again

in Octo-ber

1996,

when

_1,000

_troops and 63 members of the FP

_displaced

the miners who were

_{illegally occupying}

an area that was to be

_{explored by}

the

Compan-hia Vale do Rio

Doce,

a

_{public enterprise.}

This

_operation

consisted of several

days

of

_military

exercises

_nearby

in a show of

_{military might}

_{(Krieger, 1996).}

In

_April

_1997,

_{Complementary}

Law 69 was

_{again disregarded.}

A

rally

of

the landless movement was scheduled to arrive in Braslia on

_April

17. On

April

16 the

_buildings

of the

_Ministry

of Education and

_Sports

were

_occupied

the

_building

_containing

the

_Ministry

of

_{Agrarian Policy}

was surrounded

by

troops.

The

_problem

was that the Braslia MP and the

FP,

respectively,

were

responsible

for the external and internal

_security

of those

_buildings.

_Only

if both

_police

forces were unable to

_perform

this task was _{the army authorized}

to act. In this

_{incident, however,}

the MP was used once

_again

as a mere reserve of the _army in time of peace, when the

_contrary

should be the case.

The army

again

acted as a

_police

force on November

8, 1997,

when it

occupied

the railroad facilities of

Vila Militar,

Realengo,

and Magalhaes

Bas-tos. On November

_11,

soldiers of the

_army’s

First

_Engineers’

Battalion seized the Santa Cruz railroad station. The order for the

_occupation

was issued

_by

Gen. Vald6sio Guilherme de

_Figueiredo,

commander of the First

Division,

who was concerned about the presence of

_drug

dealers in one-third of the

rail-road stations owned

_by

Flumintrens in _greater Rio. On the same

_day,

in

Realengo,

soldiers armed with rifles and

_pistols

and

_wearing

ski masks

_began

to

_apprehend

suspects at the station. In accordance with article

5, 64,

of the federal

_{Constitution,}

&dquo;the arrested _person is entitled to identification of those

responsible

for his arrest or for his

_{police interrogation.&dquo;}

The

_military’s

_autonomy was even more

_striking

in Rio de Janeiro on

November

_22,

1997. When the sentinels in the

_vicinity

of Villa Militar de Deodoro were robbed of their

rifles,

the _army

counterattacked,

_organizing

a

military operation

in the

_shantytown

called

_{Muquigo. Having}

failed to find the stolen guns, the soldiers of the Eastern

Military

Command,

_wearing

ski

masks,

descended on 12

_shantytowns

in the area in trucks with covered

license

_plates,

an Urutu combat

vehicle,

and even an M-13 tank.

_During

these

operations,

drivers were forced to

_stop,

_identify

_themselves,

and submit to a

detailed search

_{(0 Globo,}

November

25,

1997).

Women and schoolchildren also had to be

searched,

and _many houses were violated.

This was a

military operation simply

to find two _guns. The use of

over-whelming

force is an act of war, different from the activities of the

_judiciary

military police.

From this

_episode

one can

imagine

what would

_happen

if the

army had to face urban

_guerrillas.

_{Incidentally,}

the head of the Eastern

Mili-tary

Command at that time was the same

_general

who had led the

_operation

against

the Volta Redonda strike in 1988.

The

_{secretary-general}

of the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Asso-ciation released the

_following

statement

_regarding

the

_Muquigo

incident

(Castro,

1997):

The residents of those

shantytowns

in the

specific

case of this

military

opera-tion-and in the same way this

systematically

occurs in conventional

police

operations-were

treated as if

_they

were convicted persons. As usual, the con-stitutional

_principle

of the

presumption

of innocence was

_disregarded

because

the

_people

involved in the incident were _{poor. [The} defenders of rule of _law] demand that the

_public

_powers,

_especially

the

_president

of the

_republic,

from whom the

_prerogatives

were

_usurped,

_{take immediate action to} reestablish

public

order.

President Cardoso was silent about the

_episode,

and Governor Alencar considered the

_{operation legal despite}

the fact that he had learned about it

only

a

posteriori.

The Office of the Federal Prosecutor decided to

_investigate

this

military

operation.

A

_spokesman

for the Eastern

_Military

Command,

Col. Helio

Borges,

said that the

_operation

had been based on

_{several judicial}

orders. The federal

_prosecutor,

Daniel

_Sarmento,

wanted to know more about the nature

of these orders-in

_particular,

whether there had been authorization for sol-diers in

_disguise

to conduct searches and invade houses to find the _guns. While Col.

_Borges

informed the media that

_Military

Justice had issued search warrants to the MP and that the

_army’s

_{participation}

in the

_operation

had been

merely

to

_{provide logistic}

_support,

_according

to the

_{parliamentary}

adviser of the Secretariat of Public

_Safety

of Rio there had been no warrants

_(Versano

and

Conti,

1997).

No warrants were found with the

_MP,

and on November 27 the

_prosecutors

asked for the immediate

_suspension

of the

_military

action.

_They

considered the action

_&dquo;very

serious,&dquo;

especially

because it was &dquo;inflicted

_against

_poor

people

who do not have the means to defend themselves

_against

the atrocities

performed by heavily

armed

_military

authorities:’

_They

ended

_{by saying}

that the

_operation

was

_{&dquo;clearly illegal}

and abusive&dquo; and

_{&dquo;absolutely}

unconstitu-tional&dquo;

_(Torres,

1997).

Only

on the

_evening

of November

26,

five

_days

after the

_operation

had

started,

did the _army asked

_Military

Justice for a search warrant, which was

granted

on the

_following

_{day by}

a

_judge

of the Third

_{Military Investigation}

Bureau. Even so, the warrant authorized the soldiers to enter

_only

one house in

_Muquigo,

one that

belonged

to a man known as Leandro

_who,was

a

_patient

at the Instituto Padre Severino. The Eastern

_Military

Command,

through

an

official

_notice,

_explained

on December 1 that the theft of the _guns was a

per-manent crime and therefore &dquo;it was not _necessary to have a

previous judicial

order to

_perform

the

_urgent

measure of

_searching

houses.

_{Additionally,}

it is

important

to _say

that,

_although

unnecessary, in those situations we asked and

received express authorization from the owner to search the house&dquo;

_(Jornal

do

Brasil,

December

_2,

_1997).

From the

_{military viewpoint,}

_{the army &dquo;did} not

act outside the law or violate civil

_rights,

_especially

because a

_military

action had never

_happened;

what had

_happened

was a

_{military police}

action.&dquo;

Military

prosecutors

from the Third and Fifth

_Military

Prosecutor’s

Offices of Rio de Janeiro issued a statement

_concluding

that &dquo;the action of the army was

_performed

within the limits of the law&dquo;

_(Noticiario

do

_Exército,

no.

9.337,

December

_{5, 1997).}

Even if theft were an instantaneous crime and the

receiving

and

_concealing

of stolen

_goods

a

_{permanent crime,}

_certainly

the

whereabouts and

_identity

of the receiver were unknown. Therefore the _army

could not

_simply

start

_searching

households without warrants,

using

tanks and combat vehicles as if

_they

were instruments of

_{military judicial police}

and as if it had taken these actions in accordance with the law.

Since

_May

1998 there has been a de facto intervention of the army in the

south of the state of Pard. General Edson Sa

Rocha,

commander of the 23d

Infantry Brigade

of the

_{Jungle, managed}

a committee

_consisting

of

represen-tatives from the

_Ministry

of Land

Reform,

the

_Ministry

of

_Justice,

the National

Department

of

_Highways,

the Receita Federal

_{(Brazil’s tax-collecting agency),}

the National Foundation for the

_Support

of

_{Indigenous People,}

the National Institute of the

_Environment,

the Land Institute of

Para,

the

CP,

and the Secre-tariat of Public

_Safety.

The

_{general gained}

_powers to

_{require explanations}

from all these

_agencies

and to

_impose

_changes

in

_operations

that were

_judged

ineffective. At the end of

_April

1999,

with the arrival of

1,500

landless

peas-ants in the

_city

of

_{Marabd, troops}

of the

_{Infantry Brigade}

of the

_Jungle

were

present

at the

_airport

and set _up roadblocks to search cars,

buses,

and trucks at

strategic points

(Jomal

do

_Commercio,

_April

_30,

_1999).

Eight

thousand rural workers held a

rally

in the streets of Recife on

_May

12, 1998,

marching

from the

_Parque

13 de Maio toward the

_{Superintendency}

for the

_Development

of the Northeast. The

_rally

was

_{protected entirely by}

the army, which even used a

_helicopter,

with the

_help

of the federal

_police

but no

involvement of the state

_police.

On

_May

26, 1998,

President Cardoso ordered the army to

_protect

trucks that were

_hauling

food to _{be distributed among the victims of the}

_drought

in the Northeast

_(Jornal

do

Commercio,

May

27,

1998).

The

_troops

that fol-lowed the convoy were

_supposed

to

_supervise

the distribution of food as well.

Involving

the army even

_though

no _convoy

_{protected by}

either the FP or the

Federal

_Highway

Police had ever been

_pillaged

was a show of force and a

clear interference in the functions of the

_police

forces.

Last but not

least,

it is worth

_mentioning

an

_{antismuggling}

blitz conducted on December

6, 1998,

in the

vicinity

of the international

airport

of Galeao in

Rio de Janeiro

_against

passengers on international

_flights

who had

_already

passed

through

customs and been cleared. This

_joint

_operation,

which was

searching

trunks and _occupants, without _any

_judicial

order.

_{Interestingly}

enough,

in 1996 President Cardoso had sent

_Congress

a bill

_that

would have

changed

article 21 of the Constitution to increase the power of the air force in

the battle

_against

narcotics and

_smuggling

in the _{port areas,}

_{correspondingly}

reducing

the power of the FP.

6. As far as I

_know,

no stable

_democracy

makes the armed

_{forces,,through}

the

_Military

Office,

responsible

for the

_security

of the

_president

of the

repub-lic and his

_family

and for that of the

_top

officers of essential

_agencies

of the

presidency

and the

_respective

_{presidential palaces}

and residences. Since 1985 the FP has

_gradually

been

_{losing ground}

to the

_{military regarding}

the

security

of the

_president,

and

_today

its _presence in this matter is

_merely

resid-ual. For

_example,

it conducts the

_tracking

of

_wiretaps

and was

_designated

to

investigate

who was

_responsible

for

_throwing

rocks at a bus in the

presiden-tial

_cort6ge

in the

_city

of

_Campinas

Grande in

_May

1995. There are

_agents

of the FP

_working

on

_phone

_tracking

in the

_Deputy

Office of

_Security.

The Bat-talion of the Presidential Guard

_(about

_1,500

_men)

and the

_{Cavalry Regiment}

of the Guard

_(about

1,300

men)

are

_responsible

for the

security

of the

presi-dent and the vice

_president

in Brasilia.

The

_security

of the

_private

farm of the

_president

is also the

_{responsibility}

of _{the army}

_(Jr.,

_1996).

About

_2,000

men, with

tanks,

combat

_vehicles,

and

transport

helicopters,

are in a state of

_permanent

alert in case of an invasion of

the farm

_by

the Movimento dos Sem-Terra

_(Landless

_{Movement-MST).}

If

military

intelligence

should detect any

activity suggesting

an

_invasion,

_many

military

units would be

_{simultaneously}

activated,

among them the Battalion

of the Presidential Guard.

Because of the constitutional

_change

that

_provided

for the

_possibility

of

presidential

reelection,

the

_Military

Office had to

_develop

a new kind of

secu-rity

system

for President Cardoso

_during

his

_presidential

_campaign

for

re-election. To this end some

_military

officers were sent abroad to learn about

security

procedures

for

_presidential

candidates,

especially

in the United States

_(Moraes

and

Monteiro,

1998).

In the United

States,

however,

the

secu-rity

of the

_president

is the

_{responsibility}

of the

_Department

of the

_Treasury.

The Brazilian

model,

in its turn, has been imitated

by

the

_president

of Peru, Alberto

_Fujimori.

7. Civil

_Defense,

in

_charge

of disasters such as

_floods,

_droughts,

and

ava-lanches,

does not deserve its name, since it is militarized at the federal and

state levels. In the states, it is

_managed

by

the MP or the

Military

Fire

Bri-gades.

This is not the case in any liberal

democracy.

Some coordinators of the

federal Civil Defense are also army officers.

8. The National

_Security

Law

_(NSL)

is a

legal

ramification of the National

Security

Doctrine,

the

_{&dquo;ideological}

bible&dquo; of the

_{military regime}

of 1964. It

provides

for the

_{political protection}

of the _{state or,} better

said,

of an

authori-tarian state. The 1988 Constitution did not abolish the last version of the

NSL,

Law 7.170 of December

14, 1983.

What

_changed

was

_merely

the

_jurisdiction

over

crimes,

which was transferred from

_military

to civil courts.

However,

because the

_country

has no

_{jurisprudence}

for

_political

crimes,

cases

_always

end _up

_being

decided

_by

_military

courts.

Gun

_smuggling

has increased with the increase of the violence in Rio de Janeiro. Concerned about the creation of &dquo;zones of exclusion&dquo;-where state

authority

is

_practically

absent in the

_shantytowns

of the

_city,

the federal

attorney

Rogerio

Nascimento decided to invoke the NSL in matters of

_public

safety.

The reason is that while article 34 of the criminal code establishes a

penalty

of four years in

_prison

_{for gun}

_smugglers,

article 12 of the NSL estab-lishes a

_penalty

that ranges from three to ten _years.

In

_August

1995,

on the basis of the

NSL,

Nascimento had

_already

initiated

a criminal action

_against

the reserve colonel-aviator Latino da Silva

Fontes,

who had been arrested with a

_shipment

of

30,000

AR-15 and AK-47 rifle

car-tridges.

He ended up

being

convicted of

_gunrunning

and sent to

_prison

for

eight

years. The

judge

who convicted him included in her decision the

fol-lowing

statement from Gen.

_Golbery

do Couto e Silva: &dquo;No one

_really

knows

when the peace ends and the war starts. This is another

evidence,

and a

_truly

fatal _one, of the

_general

confusion of values that threatens to disturb Western civilization&dquo;

_(Otavio,

_1997).

Therefore,

crimes

_{against public safety}

were

transformed into crimes

_against

national

_security.

9. On

_September

23, 1997,

President Cardoso sanctioned Law

9.503,

which established the new National Traffic Code. Before the

military regime

of

1964,

traffic

_policing

was

_{performed by}

the CP Afterward it was trans-ferred to the MP. The new code does not reestablish the status _{quo ante; it}

makes the

_{military police}

forces of the states and the

_capital

_part

of the National Traffic

_{System (article}

7,

6).

Besides

this,

as in the 1966

code,

it

places

a

representative

of the

Ministry

of the

Army

on the National Traffic

Council,

the

_highest

normative and consultative _{organ of} the

_system.

The dif-ference between the old and the new codes is that the

_position

of this

repre-sentative has been

_{strengthened,}

since instead of 21 members the new council

has 7

_(article

_10).

The

_question

remains,

why

does the _army have to

_participate

in the deci-sion whether the maximum

speed

should be 80 or 100 km/h?

10. On

February

20, 1997,

President Cardoso

_{approved Law}

9.437,

which

established the National

_{Weapons System.}

Article 14 of this law says: &dquo;Arms

found without

registration

and/or authorization

_will,

after the elaboration of the

expert report,

be sent to the

_Ministry

of the

_Army,

which will be in

_charge

of their final

disposition.&dquo;

The

_exceptions

are the _guns used in a

_crime,

which

are to remain in the records

_department

of the criminal court.

_Up

until

then,

confiscated guns had been sent to the

_police

station of the

_jurisdiction

in

which the confiscation occurred and in the case of an administrative action

forwarded to the

_appropriate

office of the Secretariat of Public

_Safety,

which,

in its turn, forwarded them to the

_Ministry

of the

_Army.

In

Pernambuco,

arti-cle 11 of State Decree

12.373,

of

_April

_{30, 1987,}

_stipulated

that if the confis-cation was due to

_{judicial police}

action,

the Criminal Procedure Code would

apply.

In the

_majority

of the states of the Northeast of

Brazil,

the MP declined to turn over the guns confiscated because of administrative offense to the

CP,

citing

Portaria 342 of the

_Army

of

_April

_2,1981,

to the effect that _guns

_legally

confiscated

_by

the

_military,

customs,

_police,

or

_legal

authorities are to be sent to the

_Army

Armament

_{Deposit. According}

to the law _{any gun} confiscation

performed by

the

police

is to be

reported

to _{this agency.}

_Only

the army and its

ancillary

forces

_(i.e.,

the MP and the

_Military

Fire

_Brigades)

are

_exempt

from

this

duty.

It is difficult to understand

_why

the guns confiscated

by

the CP have

to be

_registered

but those confiscated

_by

the MP do not,

especially

because

police

forces,

both civil and

_military,

need authorization from the army to

_buy

even 38-caliber revolvers. The National

_{Weapons System}

_strengthened

the

process of militarization of

public safety,

giving

importance

to

_military

organizations

and

_reinforcing

the internal orientation of the _army with the

acquiescence

of the

_Congress

and the

_president.

11. On June

19, 1998,

President Cardoso

_signed

a decree

_creating

the

National

_Antidrug

Secretariat and a

_provisional

measure

_creating

a Federal Council of Narcotics with members from the

_high

command of the armed forces. Both the Secretariat and the Council are under the command of the

Military

Office,

which is headed

_by

the

_active-duty

_general

Alberto Cardoso. This means _{less power for the}

FP,

which

_according

to the Constitution is

responsible

for the

_repression

of

_{drug trafficking.}

The structure of the Secre-tariat is based on that of the U.S. Office of National

_Drug

Control

Policy,

with

the difference that in the United States the commander is a reserve

_general

directly

responsible

to President Clinton.

For the first time the

_{participation}

_{of army}

_intelligence

and

_troops

in the

fight against

drug

dealers was

_publicly

_{acknowledged.}

The announcement followed a

_{military operation}

that resulted in the seizure and destruction of

clandestine cocaine laboratories in the

_&dquo;legal

Amazon:’15

_{The navy is} now in

charge

of the

_interception

of boats and

_ships

on the Amazonian rivers and

along

the coast. The air force is

_looking

forward to the

_inauguration

of the Amazon Surveillance

_System,

which will

_give

it a

larger

role in these

opera-tions.

_Up

until now, the army has been authorized

only

to

_{give logistic}

support to the FP.

According

to General

_Cardoso,

this

_change

took

_place

because of &dquo;secret&dquo; instructions to the armed forces

_by

President Cardoso in

_February

1996.

According

to the

_{president’s}

_{reinterpretation}

of article 144 of the

Constitu-tion,

the FP has no

_monopoly

of the

_{fight against drug}

dealers. On March

_24,

1999,

he announced the creation of the Federal Task Force for the Combat of

Drug Trafficking,

to be coordinated

_by

the National

_Antidrug

Secretariat. The _army, the _navy, and the air force will

_participate

in this

_special

500-member _group.

_{Representative}

_Tuga

_Angerami,

of the

_{president’s}

_party,

has

proposed

a constitutional amendment

_aiming

to include

_{fighting drug}

traf-ficking

as one of the tasks of the armed forces.

12.

_Military

officers are

_helping

to

_investigate

even cases of

_{irregularities}

in

_public

administration. In

_May

1997,

President Cardoso made a de facto

intervention into the

public

finances of the state of

_{Alagoas, appointing}

the

reserve colonel Roberto

_Longo

_secretary

of the _treasury when he

_might

have

chosen a technician from that _agency.

In Pernambuco in

February

1999,

Governor Jarbas Vasconcellos for the first time in the

_history

of the state nominated an

_active-duty

MP lieutenant colonel as intervenor of the

city

council of

Jaboatao,

in

metropolitan

Recife,

because of

_charges

of

_corruption.

When asked

_why

he had chosen a

_military

man for the

_job,

the governor

said,

&dquo;Since there were more

_{irregularities}

in

the

_city

council than in the

_city

hall I decided that a

_military

man was needed

there&dquo;

_(Jornal

do

_Commercio,

_{February 20, 1999).}

In other

_words,

a

_military

man was needed to intimidate. The lieutenant colonel in

_question

commented

on his

_appointment

that one of the duties of a

_police

officer was to

_fight

theft.

He

_appointed

four

_military

officers to advise

him,

despite

the notorious defi-cit of

police

officers

_working

in the streets.

Because of accusations of

_corruption,

the

_Ministry

of

_Transport

an-nounced in

_April

1999 that the

_paving

of two

_highways

in the state of Acre

would be done

_by

the _army.

_Later,

for the same reason, he directed the army to build the West Water

Main,

designed

to

_{help fight}

the

_drought

in the North-east

_(Jornal

do

Commercio,

June

27,

1999).

The businessmen

_protested,

say-ing

that while on one hand

_governmental

_{policy nowadays}

favors a

&dquo;minimal-ist

state,&dquo;

on the other it was

_{awarding responsibility}

for these

_projects

to the

army.

CONCLUSION

The

_military

_presence in domestic matters has been

_increasing.

In 1997 federal

_troops

left their

_headquarters

to maintain law and order

_during

a strike