The Dolly case, the Polly drug,
and the morality of human cloning
O c aso Do lly, o fármac o Po lly
e a mo ralid ad e d a c lo nag e m humana
1 Departam en to de Ciên cias Sociais, Escola N acion al d e Saú d e Pú blica, Fu n d ação Osw ald o Cru z . Ru a Leop old o Bu lh ões 1480, Rio d e Jan eiro, RJ 21041-210, Brasil.
Ferm in Rolan d Sch ram m 1
Abstract Th e year 1996 w itn essed th e clon in g of th e lam b Dolly, based on th e revolu tion ary so-m atic cell n u clear tran sfer (SCN T ) tech n iqu e, d evelop ed by research ers froso-m th e Roslin In stitu te in Ed in bu rgh , Scotlan d . Th is fact m ark ed a relevan t biotech n oscien tific in n ovation , w ith p robable sign ifican t con sequ en ces in th e field of p u blic h ealth , sin ce in p rin cip le it allow s for exp an d -in g p ossibilities for th e rep rod u ctive au ton om y of -in fertile cou p les an d carriers of d iseases of m i-toch on d rial origin . Th is article exp ou n d s on 1) th e exp erim en t’s tech n ical d ata an d th e th eoreti-cal im p lication s for th e biologieoreti-cal scien ces; 2) th e p u blic’s p ercep tion th ereof an d th e m ain in ter-n atioter-n al d ocu m eter-n ts aim ed at th e legal ater-n d m oral regu latioter-n of th e tech ter-n iqu e; ater-n d 3) th e m oral argu m en ts for an d again st clon in g, from th e p oin t of view of con sequ en tialist m oral th eory. We con clu d e th at in th e cu rren t stage of th e d ebate on th e m orality of clon in g, in w h ich th ere are n o cogen t d eon tological argu m en ts eith er for or again st, w eigh in g th e p robability of risk s an d ben fits is th e on ly reason able w ay of d ealin g w ith th e issu e in societies th at con sid er th em selves d e-m ocratic, p lu ralistic, an d toleran t.
Key words Gen etic En gin eerin g; Clon in g; Rep rod u ctive Med icin e; Bioeth ics
Resumo Em 1996, a ovelh a Dolly foi clon ad a, valen d o-se d a técn ica revolu cion ária d o som a tic ce ll n u cle a r-t ra n sfe r(SCN T ), d esen volv id a p or p esqu isad ores escoceses d o Ro slin In st it u t ed e Ed im bu rgo. Esse fato rep resen ta u m a in ovação biotecn ocien tífica relevan te, com p rováveis con -seqü ên cias sign ificativas n o cam p o d a saú d e p ú blica, p ois p erm itirá, em p rin cíp io, am p liar as p ossibilid ad es d a au ton om ia rep rod u tiva d e casais in férteis e p ortad ores d e d oen ças d e origem m it ocon d ria l. N est e a rt igo, a b ord a m - se 1) os d a d os t écn icos d o ex p erim en t o e a s im p lica ções teóricas p ara as ciên cias biológicas; 2) a p ercep ção p ú blica n o qu e se refere à clon agem e os p rin cip ais d ocu m en tos in tern acion ais qu e visam a su a regu lam en tação ju ríd ica e m oral; 3) os argu -m en t os -m orais p ró e con t ra a clon age-m , d o p on t o d e v ist a d a t eoria -m oral con seqü en cialist a. Con clu i-se qu e, n o estágio atu al d o d ebate sobre a m oralid ad e d a clon agem , n o qu al n ão ex is-tem argu m en tos d eon tológicos cogen tes, n em a favor n em con tra, a p on d eração d a p robabili-d a robabili-d e robabili-d e riscos e b en efícios con st it u i a ú n ica m a n eira ra z oá v el robabili-d e en fren t a r a q u est ã o em so-cied ad es qu e se p reten d em d em ocráticas, p lu ralistas e toleran tes.
Dolly, Polly, and others
On Ju ly 5, 1996, th e la m b Do lly wa s b o rn , a clo n e o f th e Fin n Do rset b reed , crea ted fro m n u clear DNA from a differen tiated adu lt cell extracted from th e u d d er of a gravid ewe an d in -trodu ced in to th e p reviou sly en u cleated oocyte o f a n o th er ewe o f th e Bla ckfa ce b reed , th a n ks to a tech n iq u e kn own a s n u clea r su b stitu tio n or som atic cell n u clear tran sfer (SCNT), d evel-o p ed by th e tea m evel-o f em b ryevel-o level-o gist Ia n Wilm u t a t th e Ro slin In stitu te in Ed in b u rgh , Sco tla n d (Pen n isi & William s, 1997; Wilm u t et al., 1997). Co n sid erin g th a t Do lly resu lted fro m th e u n ion of two in d ivid u al cells, of wh ich at least on e is a sexu a l cell (th e oocyte of th e recep tor ewe), strictly sp eakin g Dolly can n ot b e con sid ered a tru e clon e (or an in d ivid u al b orn of an -o th er in d ivid u a l th r-o u gh a sexu a l rep r-o d u c-tion ), b u t rath er a su i gen erisclon e or a ‘later-b o rn id en tica l twin’ o f th e ewe th a t p rovid ed th e n u clear DNA.
However, both th e m ass m edia an d th e sp e-cia lized litera tu re p resen ted Do lly a s a clo n e, given th at: a) Dolly was b orn with ou t u n d ergo-in g th e p ro cess kn own a s rep ro d u ctio n by fe-cu n d ation , u sin g m ale an d fem ale gam etes; b ) th e research ers h ave ‘rep rogram m ed’ a d iffer-en tiated (or sp ecialized ) ad u lt cell, m akin g it a stem cell. In th is sen se, Dolly in volves th e tran s-form ation of th e very con cep t of clon in g; h en ce we will con sid er h er a ‘clon e’ for th e p u rp oses of th is d iscu ssion .
If Wilm u t’s exp erim en t is con firm ed , Dolly will op en u p n ew p ossibilities for h u m an rep ro-d u ction an ro-d p rocreative au ton om y, in evitab ly im p lyin g a review of m oral valu es con solid ated th rou gh a n ew con sideration of risks an d ben e-fits for h u m an well-b ein g.
Sin ce th e first d ata on th e exp erim en t were p u b lish ed , Dolly h as b een th e focu s of variou s typ es of sp ecu lation , in clu d in g th e m oral con -troversy b etween th ose affirm in g th e in trin sic im m orality of h u m an clon in g (p resu m ed to b e co n tra ry to h u m a n d ign ity a n d h u m a n righ ts, an d th u s su b ject to p roh ib ition u n d er an y cir-cu m stan ces) an d th ose wh o favor its regu lation after weigh in g th e p oten tial risks to rep rod u ctive h ealth an d th e b en efits for p rocreactive au -ton om y.
In fact, Dolly is n ot th e first an im al clon e in n atu ra, n or th e first p rod u ced by m an , or even th e ‘clo sest’ clo n e to th e o rigin a l. Th ere a re clo n es th a t a re gen o typ ica lly m u ch clo ser, m u ch m ore com m on in th e p lan t kin gd om , b u t n ot u n com m on in th e an im al kin gd om , in clu d -in g m am m als, even -in th e h u m an sp ecies. Su ch is th e ca se o f m o n ozygo tic twin s (a lso kn own
as ‘id en tical twin s’), b orn of a sin gle oocyte fe-cu n d a ted b y a sin gle sp erm cell, b o rn in th e sa m e u terin e en viro n m en t a n d wh ich th u s sh are n ot on ly th e sam e n u clear DNA (like Doly) b u t a lso th e sa m e m ito ch o n d ria l DNA (a l-th o u gh l-th e ro le o f l-th e la tter in verteb ra te d e-velop m en t rem ain s obscu re) (Kitch er, 1997:59). Do lly is a lso n o t th e first m a n -m a d e a n im a l clon e, sin ce clon es h ave already been p rodu ced with a m p h ib ia n s, fish , a n d m a m m a ls sin ce 1952 (Di Bern a rd in o & McKin n ell, 1997; Gu r-d on , 1997). Bu t th ese cases in volver-d th e u se of th e cell m ass d ivision tech n iqu e, also kn own as em bryo sp littin g or blastom ere sep aration , con -sistin g o f m a n ip u la tin g em b r yo s in th e first stages of life. Em b ryo sp littin g was also u sed in a n exp erim en t for clon in g h u m a n em b ryos in 1993 at George Wash in gton Un iversity, by Jerry Hall an d colleagu es, with th e p u rp ose of h elp -in g -in fertile cou p les (th e exp erim en t was -in ter-ru p ted by US govern m en t officials). Th e Roslin resea rch ers h a d a lrea d y rep orted th e b irth (in Ma rch 1996) o f Mega n a n d Mo ra g, u sin g th e sa m e SCNT tech n iq u e, b u t a p p lied to a d u lt em b ryon ic cells (Cam p b ell et al., 1996).
Less th an a year after th e creation of Dolly, Wilm u t a n d h is tea m crea ted th e tra n sgen ic lam b Polly, com b in in g an im al an d h u m an ge-n etic m a teria l a ge-n d u tilizige-n g th e em b r yo sp lit-tin g tech n iq u e. Th ere a re su b sta n tia l d iffer-en ces b etweiffer-en th e two exp erim iffer-en ts: a ) Do lly h a s th e sa m e n u clea r DNA a s h er o ld er sister, wh ile Polly con ta in s p a rt of th e DNA from th e d on or ewe an d p art from h u m an DNA; b ) Dolly was ‘clon ed’ from sp ecialized ad u lt cells, wh ile Po lly wa s crea ted fro m em b r yo n ic stem cells. However, on e cou ld also con ceive of a con tin u -u m b etween th e two exp erim en ts, sin ce Po lly is aim ed at p rod u cin g a lin e cap ab le of su p p ly-in g m ilk co n ta ly-in ly-in g -1-a n titr yp sly-in , a h u m a n p lasm a p rotein u sed in th e treatm en t of cystic fib rosis, th ereby op en in g th e way for th e large-scale, low-cost p rod u ction of oth er h u m an p ro-tein s. In sh o rt, o n e ca n rea so n a b ly su p p o se th at th e exp erim en ts at th e Roslin In stitu te will serve to facilitate an d u n iversalize th e p reven -tion an d cu re of variou s h u m an d iseases; tran s-gen ic clo n in g co u ld a lso a llow fo r crea tin g a su fficien t su p p ly of organ s for tran sp lan tation in h u m an b ein gs, with lower rejection rates.
p rob ab ly b e exp lain ed by th e fact th at th e m ass m ed ia focu sed m ain ly on th e th reaten in g sid e of clon in g with Dolly, wh ile for Polly th e th erap eu tic erap oten tial erap revailed , an d I b elieve erap roerap -erly so (Sch ram m , 1997a).
Th e first d ou b ts an d criticism from th e sci-en tific com m u n ity on ly cam e in Jan u ary 1998, p u b lish e d in Scien ce (Sga ra m e lla & Zin d e r, 1998). Th e critics b ased th eir attack on th e ob -se r va t io n t h a t t h e re we re n o t ‘m o re Do llie s’ cap ab le of con firm in g th e ‘sin gle ob servation’ b y Wilm u t, a n d th a t clo n es o f o th er m a m m a l sp ecies, p ro m ised fo r ‘very so o n’, h a d still n o t a p p ea red (a t lea st p u b licly). Th erefo re, wen t th e a rgu m en t, th ere were serio u s rea so n s to d ou b t wh eth er Dolly h ad actu ally b een created in th e term s rep o rted b y Wilm u t o r th u s th a t sh e rep resen ted a relevan t an d in n ovative sci-en tific fact. Besid es, Wilm u t an d h is team were b elieved to h ave com m itted a series of m eth od-ological errors: 1) th e fact th at th ey h ad n ot p erform ed th e gen etic con firm ation with th e ‘fin -gerp rin t’ tech n iq u e, relatively easy an d wh ich wou ld h ave allowed to d eterm in e wh eth er Dol-ly wa s a la t e r-b o rn t win fro m t h e d o n o r e we ; 2) th e fa ct th a t th ey h a d n o t u tilized a n a d u lt m am m ary cell, b u t rath er a fetal cell su p p osed -ly p resen t in th eir cell cu ltu re, wh ich cou ld b e exp la in ed b y th e fa ct th a t th e d o n o r ewe wa s gravid at th e tim e th e cells were h arvested .
In th eir reb u tta l, Ca m p b ell, Co lm a n a n d Wilm u t (Cam p b ell et al., 1998: 636-637) recog-n ized th a t “a sin gle birth from 400 attem p ted fu sion s is n ot an efficien t system”, b u t th ey on ly adm it a rem ote possibility of error, because at the tim e of th e exp erim en t th ere was on ly on e Fin n Dorset cell cu ltu re in th e lab oratory; th u s, th ey con ten d, “Dolly can on ly have been derived from th e cell cu ltu re establish ed from th e m am m ary glan d”. Besid es, given th at th is cell cu ltu re was n ot p lan n ed for the n uclear tran sfer exp erim en t, b u t for oth er p u rp oses, th ere was a valid reason for n ot havin g an alyzed the gen otyp e of the cells used for in sem in ation an d for n ot havin g kept the fetal m aterial for subsequen t ‘fin gerp rin t’ an alysis. As for th e absen ce of fu rth er Dollies, th e au -th ors also recalled -th at on ly eleven m on -th s h ad tran sp ired sin ce p u blish in g th e first data, wh ich was too short a tim e con siderin g that five m on ths are req u ired for th is typ e of gestation , p lu s th e tim e for writin g u p an d p u b lish in g th e resu lts.
In ord er to clarify som e term s in th e d eb ate, we will ta ke a n in tro d u cto r y a p p ro a ch to th e fo llowin g a sp ects: I) th e b io tech n o scien tific relevan ce of th e Dolly ‘fact’; II) th e p u b lic p er-cep tio n o f th e Do lly ‘ca se’; III) th e m o ra lity o f clo n in g in th e co n text o f th e secu la rized a n d p lu ralist societies of m od ern d em ocracies.
The biotechnoscientific relevance of the Dolly ‘fact’
From th e b iotech n oscien tific p oin t of view, an d d esp ite th e fa ct th a t m a n y q u estio n s rem a in u n an swered , we su ggest wh at th e relevan t as-p ects a re, a ssu m in g th a t th e resu lts o f th e Roslin In stitu te exp erim en t will b e con firm ed . We will d istin gu ish b etween th e exp erim en t’s p ractical (or tech n ical) sign ifican ce an d its th e-oretical relevan ce an d th en an alyze its im p lica-tion s for b iosafety.
Practical Significance
If co n firm ed , SCNT a llows to exp a n d p ro creative tech n iqu es in m am m als an d im p rove h u -m an reproductive health, without goin g through th e stan d ard fertilization p roced u res. Fo r th e tim e b ein g, th e p ro p o rtio n o f via b le em b r yo s ob tain ed from SCNT is very low (less th an 1%), wh ile “th e factors d eterm in in g th e su ccess or failu re of th e tech n iqu e, an d th e lon g-term d e-velop m en t of an im als gen erated in th is w ay, still n eed to be establish ed” (Ka h n , 1997:119). However, it is assu m ed th at SCNT will im p rove h u m an rep rod u ctive h ealth by con trollin g th e tra n sm issio n o f gen etic tra its in wo m en with seriou s d iseases of m itoch on d rial origin (Wal-ters, 1997 ap u d Paren s, 1997).
In sh ort, Wilm u t’s exp erim en t in clu d ed th e followin g stages:
1) d ep rivin g a d ifferen tiated ad u lt cell cu l-tu re o f its n u trien ts, red u cin g it to a sta te o f q u iescen ce (or d orm an cy), an d d ep rivin g it of th e n u cleu s con tain in g DNA;
2) en u cleatin g th e oocyte from th e recep tor ewe to receive th e n u cleu s of th e d on or cell;
3) fu sin g, u sin g an electric ch arge (actin g as a sp ark), th e n u cleu s of th e d on or cell with th e en u cleated recep tor cell; an d
4) im p la n tin g th e resu ltin g em b r yo in th e u teru s of a th ird p regn an t ewe, wh ich wen t on to give b irth to Dolly.
Wilm ut an d his team faced a huge challen ge, given th a t b efo re th eir exp erim en t scien tists th o u gh t it wa s im p o ssib le to clo n e m a m m a ls from d ifferen tiated ad u lt cells; th ey b elieved it was n ecessary to in terven e in th e em b ryo stem cells, m an ip u latin g th eir n u clear DNA an d ru n -n i-n g a seriou s risk of d am agi-n g th eir stru ctu re. Techn ically, they thought it was n ecessary to dis-cover the correct phase in which don or-cell DNA co u ld b e ‘gra fted ’ in to a recep to r cell with o u t th e DNA killin g th e cell or gen eratin g ‘ch im eras’ (resu ltin g from th e fu sion of two em b ryos).
-sistin g o n a ttem p tin g to co m b in e th e n u m er-o u s DNA seq u en ces a t th e righ t m er-o m en t (a n extrem ely com p lex an d risky op eration ), Wilm u t h ad an origin al id ea: h e treated th e n u cleu s of th e d on or cell like a ‘b lack b ox’ an d in trod u ced it in to th e recep to r o o cyte. It wo rked , d esp ite th e fact th at we still d o n ot kn ow th e exact con -d itio n s u n -d er wh ich th e exp erim en t wa s p er-fo rm ed , wh ich will o n ly b eco m e kn own wh en th ere a re o th er exp erim en ts o f th e sa m e typ e (an d p rob ab ly after th e p aten tin g of SCNT).
Theoretical significance
From th e th eoretical p oin t of view, th e clon in g of Dolly can b e con sid ered an im p ortan t step, in d eed a verita b le revo lu tio n in th e field o f b iotech n oscien ces, creatin g n ew research p er-sp ectives in b o th m o lecu la r b io lo gy a n d th e th eo r y o f evo lu tio n (Ka h n , 1997), p rovid in g n ew co n cep tu a l ‘to o ls’ fo r th e fo llowin g two -p ron ged issu e:
a ) th e d egree o f ‘fu n ctio n a l p la sticity’ o f a cell’s gen o m e, p ro n e to rep ro gra m a n d in vert its evolu tion an d m akin g it revert from th e d if-feren tiated stage to th e stem cell stage;
b ) th e gen om e’s d egree of ‘stru ctu ral stab ility’, cap ab le of en su rin g th e cell’s an d th e organ -ism’s id en tity d u rin g th e evolu tion ary p rocess. Th e two issu es co n stitu te th e two sid es o f on e an d th e sam e p rob lem , th at is, “Do grow th , d ifferen tiation an d d evelop m en t of th e em bryo in volve irreversible m odification s to th e gen om e in som atic cells?” (Stewart, 1997:769).
Up on clon in g Dolly from differen tiated cells fro m a n a d u lt fem a le in d ivid u a l, Wilm u t a n d colleagu es ap p ear to h ave p rodu ced argu m en ts in favor of th e th esis by wh ich th e gen om e of at lea st som e typ es of cells (like m a m m a ry cells) d o n ot u n d ergo irreversib le m od ification s d u r-in g th e evolu tion a ry p rocess, wh ile th e d iffer-en tiated cell u n d er giviffer-en con d ition s (to b e d e-term in ed) can revert to its in itial stage of u n dif-feren tia tio n , th u s fu n ctio n in g a s a stem cell. Th is is th eoretically relevan t sin ce we kn ew th at th e gen om e of oth er cells, like th at of lym p h ocytes, for exam p le, defin itely u n dergoes recom -bin ation in given region s.
Befo re Do lly wa s crea ted u sin g SCNT, clo n in g exp erim en ts u sin g sep a ra tio n o f cells from th e b lastom ere (th e em b ryon ic stage with o n ly 4 o r 8 cells) a p p ea r to in d ica te th a t th e DNA fro m su ch cells wa s n o t a ltered , wh ile it wa s su p p o sed th a t th e n u clea r gen etic co d e was. On th e con trary, th e Dolly exp erim en t ap -p ears to h ave raised argu m en ts in favor of th e th esis accord in g to wh ich ad u lt cells can m ain -tain th eir DNA u n ch an ged , th ereby rem ain in g
com p eten t to con serve th eir fu n ction al id en ti-ty. Begin n in g with Dolly, on e can con ten d th at at least som e typ es of ad u lt cells (d u ly m an ip u -la ted ) a re fu n ctio n a lly to tip o ten t (Pen n isi & William s, 1997). In short, Dolly ap p ears to p rove th at th ere was a rep rogram m in g (alth ou gh we d o n ot kn ow exactly wh y) of th e d on or som atic cell, m akin g it totip oten t (Kah n , 1997). Th u s, if co n firm ed , th e Ro slin In stitu te exp erim en t rep resen ts a sign ifica n t b io tech n o scien tific step towa rd s n ew form s of con servin g a n d re-p rod u cin g gen etic in form ation .
Biosafety aspects
Yet Dolly in volves a th ird im p ortan t asp ect, re-gard in g b iosafety an d legal im p lication s, sin ce sh e wa s th e p ro d u ct o f gen etic m a n ip u la tio n an d h en ce we can reason ab ly ask if sh e is n ot a gen etically m od ified organ ism (GMO). In d eed , if Dolly were a GMO, sh e wou ld b e th e ob ject of sp ecific regu la tio n , co n sid erin g th a t in m a n y cou n tries exp erim en ts with GMOs are su b ject to rigo ro u s restrictio n s. Su ch is th e ca se with th e Brazilian Biosafety Actn o. 8974 of Jan u ary 5, 1995, th e first a rticle o f wh ich esta b lish es “safety n orm s an d in sp ection m ech an ism s for th e u se of gen etic en gin eerin g tech n iqu es in con -stru ctin g, cu ltu rin g, m an ip u latin g, tran sp ort-in g, m ark etort-in g, con su m ort-in g, an d disposort-in g of ge-n etically m odified orgage-n ism s (GMOs), aim ed at protectin g th e life an d h ealth of h u m an kin d, an -im als, an d p lan ts, as w ell as th e en viron m en t” (Brasil, 1995:5), fu rth er p rovid in g san ction s for offen ders.
If we view gen etic en gin eerin g in its n a r-rower sen se of ‘recom b in an t DNA tech n ology’, th e Dolly ‘clon e’ can n ot b e con sid ered a clear-cu t p rod u ct of gen etic en gin eerin g, n or an or-th od ox GMO, sin ce strictly sp eakin g or-th ere was n o alteration in th e sen se of a ‘recom b in ation’ of d ifferen t DNAs (as in th e case of Polly). Wh at h ap p en ed was a m an ip u lation in th e sen se of a tra n sfer o f a ‘clo sed p a cka ge’ o f DNA fro m a d on or cell to a recep tor cell, b u t with ou t fu sion or recom b in ation of d ifferen t DNAs. However, if we a p p lied th e sa m e tech n iq u e to h u m a n s, we wou ld ru n u p again st article 8 of th e ab ovem en tio n ed la w, wh ich p ro h ib its gen etic ovem a -n ip u latio-n of h u m a-n germ cells in toto.
Ba sed o n th is in terp reta tio n , th e CTNBio stated th e followin g: “a som atic cell n u cleu s in -trod u ced w h ole in to an en u cleated oocyte, al-th ou gh givin g rise to an em bryo, can n ot, from an on togen etic p oin t of view, be con sid ered a germ cell;[h owever]sin ce th e oocyte w as en u -cleated , an d sin ce th e n u cleu s of an oth er cell w as in trod u ced in to it to m ak e th e exp erim en t p ossible, th is p rocess con stitu tes (...) germ cell gen etic m an ipu lation” (CTNBio, 1997).
In oth er word s, from th e on togen etic p oin t of view, th e wh ole form ed by th e n u cleu s of th e d ifferen tiated d on or cell an d th e en u cleated re-cep tor oocyte p erh ap s can n ot b e con sid ered a GMO, b u t fro m th e fu n ctio n a l p o in t o f view it ca n , sin ce th ere wa s gen etic m a n ip u la tio n o f th e germ cell, wh ich in p rin cip le allows on e to co n sid er Do lly a GMO. Th is ‘h a irsp littin g’ in th e d efin ition , alth ou gh logically an d sem an tica lly o d d , h a s its rea so n s. In fa ct, th e legisla -to r’s co n cern in th is a rticle a im ed -to a vo id b y a ll m ea n s p o ssib le th a t m a n ip u la tio n o f a n d in terferen ce in h u m a n gen etic m a teria l b e-co m e h ered ita r y, p a ssin g th e ‘m a n ip u la ted ’ ch aracteristics on to th e offsp rin g. Th at is, it is im p ortan t to kn ow wh eth er Dolly is a GMO b e-cau se on e of th e m ain con cern s of b iosafety is th e p ossib le h ealth im p act (i.e, th e ‘h azard ou s-n ess’) resu ltis-n g from th e is-n trod u ctios-n of GMOs in to th e en viro n m en t, given it wo u ld red u ce b io d iversity a n d th erefo re th e a b ility to resist p ath ogen ic m icroorgan ism s. However, con sid -erin g th a t SCNT is a n in cip ien t tech n o lo gy, it will b e n ecessary to ‘let th e d u st settle’ an d wait fo r o th er scien tists to rep ea t th e exp erim en t u n d er th e p ro p er co n d itio n s a n d a s o ften a s d eem ed n ecessa r y in o rd er to eva lu a te th e p rob ab ility of risks an d b en efits.
Wh a t m igh t b e th e sp in -o ffs o f clo n in g fo r h u m an s?
In p rin cip le, from th e p u rely tech n ical p oin t of view, clon in g ap p lied to h u m an s is m erely a m atter of tim e an d in vestm en ts in ord er to:
1) rep ea t Wilm u t’s exp erim en t a s o ften a s n ecessary to con firm its feasib ility for h u m an s, wh ich is exp ected in on e to ten yea rs (Na tu re, 1997) an d
2) lower costs an d op tim ize th e risk/ b en e-fit re la t io n sh ip t o m a ke it fe a sib le fo r h e a lt h p olicies.
However, it a p p ea rs u n likely th a t ‘clo n in g’ in h u m a n s will b eco m e co m m o n p la ce. It is m ore likely th at h u m an s will con tin u e to rep rod u ce u sin g th e tra rod itio n a l m eth o rod , wh ich a p -p ea rs to b e m u ch m o re -p lea su ra b le. In o th er word s, clon in g sh ou ld b e viewed a s a n excep -tio n a l m eth o d , to b e u sed wh en o th ers fa il. It ap p ears im p rob ab le th at in th e foreseeab le fu
-tu re clon in g will sign ifican tly affect th e gen etic stru ctu re o f th e h u m a n p o p u la tio n , red u cin g its b iod iversity.
At th is stage on e m igh t ask if Dolly is n ot a p red ictab le ‘artifact’, esp ecially in ligh t of a se-rio u s o f tra its in co n tem p o ra r y Western so ci-eties, su ch as: th e sim u ltan eou sly ration al an d op eration al stru ctu re of con tem p orary scien ce, m a kin g it a tech n oscien ce(Ho tto is, 1990); its evolu tion towa rd s th e ‘rep rogra m m in g’ of liv-in g system s, m akliv-in g techn oscien ce a biotech n o-scien ce(Sch ra m m , 1996); th e em ergen ce o f a con su m er society m a rked by a ‘h ea lth cu ltu re o f d esires’ (Pellegrin o, 1979), wh ich in so m e cases m ean s a veritab le ob session with ‘p erfect h ea lth’ (Sfez, 1995). On e co u ld th u s sta te th a t b iotech n oscien tific tech n iqu es like th e clon in g of Dolly are p art of th e very logic of th e collec-tive im agin ation an d of th e m ean s to satisfy th e n eed s an d d esires of con su m ers.
All th is h elp s exp la in wh y Do lly, b esid es con stitu tin g a n oteworth y b iotech n oscien tific fa ct, ra p id ly b eca m e a sym b o l fo r a p o ssib le a n d even p ro b a b le tra n sfo rm a tio n o f th e h u -m an con d ition , d esp ite Wil-m u t h i-m self statin g clea rly th a t it wo u ld b e o u t o f th e q u estio n to clon e h u m an b ein gs, sin ce “it w ou ld be u n eth i-cal to attem p t th e ex p erim en t w ith p eop le” (Wilm u t, 1997:4).
Yet it is th rou gh th e p ossib ility of affectin g th is im a ge th a t h u m a n s h a ve o f th em selves a n d th e p o ten tia l fo r tra n sfo rm in g so -ca lled ‘h u m a n n a tu re’ (o r th e h u m a n ‘essen ce’) th a t th e social con troversy arises over th e legality of th is n ew th resh o ld a ch ieved by b io tech n o sci-en tific kn ow-h ow.
Public perception: the ‘Dolly case’
After Th e Observeran d Th e New York Tim esan -n ou -n ced th e b irth of Dolly i-n th eir Feb ru ary 23 an d 24, 1997, issu es, th e n ews rap id ly b ecam e th e ‘Do lly ca se’. Sci-fi sto ries a b o u t clo n in g soon ap p eared , alon g with an alogies like th ose p u b lish ed by N ew sw eek, co m p a rin g th e likely con seq u en ces of clon in g with th ose of th e n u -clear bom b or chem ical weap on s (Begley, 1997). Oth er an alogies, like th ose in Tim e, com p ared Do lly to Fra n ken stein , with a rm ies o f d ro n es, clo n in g fa cto ries p ro d u cin g sp a re p a rts, a n d d icta to rs p ro d u cin g gen era tio n s o f clo n e s o f th em selves (Klu ger, 1997).
exa m p le, ra n a sto r y with th e title Th e Dolly revolu tion . It ’s n ow p ossible to clon e a h u m an bein g( Veja , 1997) a n d th e weekly Istoém a d e m atters worse by talkin g ab ou t a ‘p eop le facto-ry’ an d ‘dup licatin g hum an bein gs’ (Istoé, 1997). On the other han d, the scien tific awaren ess m ag-azin e Ciên cia Hojep u b lish ed a b alan ced rep ort of th e facts an d th eir b iom ed ical an d m oral im -p lication s (Pen a, 1997; Ru m jan ek, 1997; SBPC, 1997; Sch ram m , 1997b ).
Yet th e reaction to clon in g in th e m oral field wa s a lso essen tia lly em o tio n a l a n d in m a n y cases irration al, flu ctu atin g b etween p ragm atic a p p rova l (resu ltin g fro m th e h o p e o f h a vin g fo u n d a n ew p a n a cea fo r d isea se a n d o rga n ic d ysfu n ction ) an d con d em n ation a priori.
In t h e Un it e d Kin gd o m , fo r e xa m p le, t h e con seq u en tialist ap p roach p revailed , wh ile in th e Un ited Sta tes th e focu s wa s m ore d eon to-lo gica l a n d re ligio u s. Th is t yp e o f re a ct io n in th e Am erica n im a gin a tio n a p p ea rs to co n tra -d ict th a t cou n try’s p ra gm a tist tra -d ition , b u t it m akes sen se wh en on e recalls th at “th e eth ical d iscu ssion of clon in g, h ow ever, seem s to h ave tak en u s back in tim e. An d th e cu stom ary p u blic an d m ed ia ex citem en t over th e latest ad -van ces in m ed ical tech n ology w as eclip sed by talk of m oral rep u gn an ce, ev il, w ron gn ess, p layin g God, an d im p erm issible in terven tion s” (Klotzko, 1997:430). In oth er word s, th e Am er-ican d eb ate in volved a sort of Cu ltu ral War, in wh ich “t h e a rgu m en t a b ou t Dolly sa w t w o cam p s in stan tly form ed – on e w as alarm ed by t h e d ev elop m en t a n d op p osed t o a n y fu rt h er m ovem en t tow ard clon in g h u m an s; th e oth er (seem in gly m u ch sm a ller) t ou t ed a p ot en t ia l gain in h ealth an d m ore rep rod u ctive ch oice if clon in g w en t forw a rd” (Ca lla h a n , 1997a :24). In o t h e r co u n t r ie s, like Fra n ce, t h e re wa s n o le ss e m o t io n a l a n a lysis o f t h e p ro s a n d co n s fo r clo n in g, weigh in g, fo r exa m p le, th e p ro b -a b ilit y o f r isks -a n d b e n e fit s, -a n d t h e d e b -a t e was left with p etition s of p rin cip le, fallin g b ack on th e sop h ism th a t con d em n s clon in g a p ri-ori b e ca u se it is su p p o se d ly u n a cce p t a b le, with n o m o re ela b o ra te a rgu m en ts ( Ta gu ieff, 1997). In sh ort, an d in gen eral, th e d eb ate was left in a sta ge o f p o la riza tio n b etween th e fo l-lowin g:
1) ‘fascin ation’, resu ltin g from b oth th e n ew p o ten tia l crea ted b y clo n in g fo r h ea lth a n d well-b ein g an d th e ‘con fron tation with im m or-tality’ th at h as accom p an ied h u m an im agin a-tion sin ce tim e im m em orial (Mattei, 1997);
2) ‘alarm’, p rob ab ly resu ltin g from h u m an s’ fear of losin g th eir id en tity an d sp ecificity, giv-en th at “th e aesth etic an d eth ical fou n dation of m od ern Western cu ltu re rests firm ly on ou r
be-lief in th e d istin ctiven ess of each in d ivid u al” (Gou ld , 1997:14).
Th is is wh y th e ‘Dolly fact’ b ecam e th e ‘Dol-ly ca se’, im m ed ia te‘Dol-ly m o b ilizin g n o t o n ‘Dol-ly sci-en tists, p h ilosop h ers, th eologian s, ju rists, an d p o liticia n s, b u t a lso th e im a gin a tio n o f th e p u b lic itself.
The positions of the N BAC, the Vatican, WHO , UN ESCO , and GAEIB
Particu larly relevan t official p osition s in clu d e th ose of th e Presid en t of th e Un ited States an d th e Na tio n a l Bio eth ics Ad viso r y Co m m issio n (NBAC), th e Va tica n , WH O, UNESCO, a n d th e Eu ro p ea n Co m m u n ity’s Gro u p o f Ad visers o n th e Eth ica l Im p lica tio n s o f Bio tech n o lo gy (GAEIB), rea ctin g tem p estu o u sly to th e Do lly an n ou n cem en t.
Th e Presid en t of th e Un ited States im m ed i-a tely co m m issio n ed i-a rep o rt fro m th e NBAC, h avin g 90 d ays to ad vise on th e risks, b en efits, an d eth ical an d legal im p lication s of p oten tial h u m a n clo n in g ( Th e Wh ite Ho u se, 1997). He also im p osed a m oratoriu m on h u m an clon in g in p u b lic in stitu tion s, cu ttin g off fu n d s for b oth research an d clin ical ap p lication s, an d requ est-in g th a t p riva te est-in stitu tio n s vo lu n ta rily a d o p t th e sam e attitu d e (Th e Wh ite Hou se, 1997).
Clin to n’s p o sitio n m a y h a ve b een h a sty, co n sid erin g th e p o ssib le b en efits o f clo n in g an d th e m an y d ou b ts still su rrou n d in g it, relat-in g fo r exa m p le to th e ro le o f m ito ch o n d ria l DNA in d efin in g in d ivid u al id en tity an d th e in -teraction with n u clear DNA; in -teraction s with gen etic m u ta tio n s a n d th e fu n ctio n o f telo m -ere len gth (wh ich allows on e to m easu re th e re-sp ective a ge o f th e d o n o r, recep to r, a n d Do lly h erself). As stated by NBAC ch airm an Harold T. Sh ap iro h im self, “several seriou s scien tific u n -certain ties rem ain th at cou ld h ave a sign ifican t im pact on th e poten tial ability of th is n ew tech -n iqu e to create h u m a-n bei-n gs” (Sh ap iro, 1997: 195).
by u n d erscorin g b oth th e scien tific u n certain -t ie s a n d -t h e d ifficu l-t ie s, o n -t h e o n e h a n d , in d ecid in g “if an d w h en ou r liberties, in clu d in g th e freed om of scien tific in qu iry, sh ou ld be re-stricted” an d on th e oth er, in weigh in g th e risks a n d b en efits o f h u m a n clo n in g, in clu d in g th e issu e o f in d ivid u a l id en tity, p erso n a l a u to n o -m y, fa-m ily ties, an d in tergen eration al relation s (Sh ap iro, 1997:195).
Th is stan ce by th e NBAC is u n d erstan d ab le con sid erin g th at it h ad to p on d er th e p lu rality of op in ion s for a n d a ga in st clon in g in th e d if-feren t in terest-b a sed a n d m ora l com m u n ities in th e Un ited Sta tes. It th u s p ro p o sed legisla -tion cap ab le of allowin g clon in g of em b ryos for resea rch p u rp o ses in so m e ca ses a n d m a in ta in in g th e p ro h ib itio n in p rin cip le over h u -m an clon in g with regard to th e u se of e-m b ryos for p rocreative p u rp oses. In oth er word s, NBAC exp erts su ggested th at scien tists relyin g on p riva te fu n d in g b e a llowed to clo n e h u m a n em -b ryos for research p u rp oses, -b u t th at th e u se of su ch em b ryos for p rocreation b e p roh ib ited .
In a d d itio n , th e NBAC p ro p o sed a su n set clau se accord in g to wh ich th e Con gress sh ou ld review its p osition after a trial p eriod of th ree to five yea rs, b a sed o n p ro gress in resea rch a n d risk p reven tion . In th e op in ion of Callah an , “th e idea of a su n set clau se w as th e perfect via m edia, of a k in d th at com m ission s trad ition ally seek w h en op in ion is rad ically d ivid ed . In th at re-sp ect, it w as a good p olitical solu tion , attem p t-in g to balan ce a variety of valu es an d t-in terests” (Callah an , 1997b:18). Accordin g to NBAC m em -b er Alexan d er M. Cap ron , p ru d en ce was ju sti-fied b ecau se th e issu e of h u m an clon in g h as to d o with on e of m ost m ora lly con flictin g field s in b io e t h ics: t h a t o f h u m a n re p ro d u ct io n , su ch th a t clo n in g is “gen u in ely con troversial” give n t h a t “t h e w in d s t h a t roil t h ese w a t ers blow from th e p oles, w ith scien tific an d rep ro-d u ctive freero-d om at on e p ole, an ro-d san ctity of life a n d t ra d ition al fam ily valu es at th e oth er” (Ca p ro n , 1997:173). Besid es, b y su ggestin g a
tem p orarym oratoriu m on h u m an clon in g, th e NBAC a lso a im ed to m a ke a d istin ctio n b e-tween clo n in g fo r h u m a n rep ro d u ctio n , o r ‘m akin g b ab ies’, from clon in g as research , th at is, h u m an clon in g p er se (th e real ob ject of th e Co m m issio n’s m o ra to riu m ), a n d clo n in g o f oth er an im als an d p lan ts. Both th is d istin ction a n d th e lega l stra ta gem o f th e su n set cla u se th u s ap p ear to su ggest th at th e NBAC d oes n ot in ten d to p roh ib it clon in g in totu m, sin ce “ju st as it is a m istak e to im p ly, as som etim es h ap -p en s in eth ics d iscu ssion s, th at everyth in g w e h ave a righ t to d o is righ t to d o, so too it w ou ld be a m istak e to say th at everyth in g w e believe
w ou ld be w ron g to d o sh ou ld be w ron g to d o” (Cap ron , 1997:176).
However, a cco rd in g to o th er resea rch ers, th is ‘com p rom ise’ is a de factop roh ib ition , with seriou s con sequ en ces in th e legal an d p olitical field , given th at it tu rn s clon in g in to a veritab le ‘p o litica l fo o tb a ll in Co n gress’ a n d en d s u p ch illin g an im p ortan t field of research in p u b lic in stitu tion s, d elayin g th e d evelop m en t of safe p roced u res (Wolf, 1997).
Neith er was th ere con sen su s over religiou s asp ects, wh ich are also d iscu ssed by th e NBAC, sin ce so m e th eo lo gia n s co n sid ered h u m a n clo n in g in trin sica lly im m o ra l, wh ile o th ers fo u n d it m o ra lly ju stified in so m e circu m -stan ces, so lon g as clearly regu lated to p reven t ab u ses (Sh ap iro, 1997).
Mean wh ile, th e Vatican , th rou gh its official b u lletin L’Osservatore Rom an oof Feb ru ary 26, 1997, con d em n ed clon in g, statin g th at “in both scien tific research an d ex p erim en ts th ere are lim its th at sh ou ld n ot be tran sgressed from ei-th er ei-th e eei-th ical p oin t of view or ei-th at of n atu re” (Co rreio Bra zilien se, 1997:10) a n d req u estin g its in terd iction by th e variou s h ead s of govern -m en t. In ad d ition to th is d eon tological p rin ci-p le, accord in g to wh ich it is always m orally il-licit to in terfere with th e wish es of th e Creator an d th e in trin sic fin alism of n atu ral p rocesses, th e Vatican d rew on th e con sequ en tialist argu -m en t kn own a s th e ‘slip p ery slo p e a rgu -m en t’, accord in g to wh ich we sh ou ld refrain from d o-in g so m e t h o-in g d u e t o t h e p o ssib le a b u se s it en tails.
Th e WHO took an oth er ap p roach . Director Gen eral Hirosh i Nakajim a con d em n ed th e u se of h u m an clon in g as “eth ically u n acceptable as it w ou ld violate som e of th ose basic p rin cip les w h ich govern m ed ically assisted p rocreation . Th ese in clu d e resp ect for th e d ign ity of th e h u m an bein g an d p rotection of th e secu rity of h u -m an gen etic -m aterial” (WHO, 1997a, ap u d Harris, 1997:354). Later, in its 50th Gen eral Assem -b ly, th e WH O p u -b lish ed a reso lu tio n sta tin g th at “th e u se of clon in g for th e replication of h u -m an in d ivid u als is eth ically u n accep table an d con trary to h u m an in tegrity an d m orality”
(WHO, 1997b, ap u d Harris, 1997:354).
Un esco, in tu rn , con cern ed over p reservin g d ifferen t typ es o f h u m a n en d owm en ts, d e-cla red th a t h u m a n clo n in g sh o u ld b e b a n n ed u n d er a n y circu m sta n ces, given th a t “th e h u -m an gen o-m e -m u st be p reserved as th e co-m -m on h eritage of h u m an ity” (Un esco, 1997, a p u d Harris, 1997:354).
h u m a n b ein gs, th e risks o f eu gen ist p o licies, an d th e red u ction of gen etic d iversity, wh en ce “an y attem p t to p rodu ce a gen etically iden tical h u m an in dividu al by n u clear su bstitu tion from a h u m an ad u lt or ch ild cell (‘rep rod u ctive clon in g’) sh ou ld be p roh ibited” (GAEIB, 1997: 352).
However, all th ese stan ces, alth ou gh p rob a-b ly ‘p olitically correct’ (like th at of th e Un ited States), d o n ot h old water wh en su b m itted to a closer an alysis. As stated by Dan iel Callah an in referrin g to the NBAC rep ort, “the presen t debate on clon in g sh ou ld by n ow h ave m ad e p erfectly clear an en orm ou s sh ortcom in g in bioeth ics”, given th at “as a field(...) it sim ply h as few h elp-fu l tactics, in sigh t, or even good p rovision al strategies, to resp on d to n ovel biological d evel-opm en ts (...) Bu t its political stren gth s betray its eth ical w eak n ess”, h en ce “th e rep ort is stron ger p roced u rally th an su bstan tively”(Ca lla h a n , 1997b :18).
Harris, in tu rn , in an alyzin g th e argu m en ts from th e oth er d ocu m en ts, sh ows h ow th ey rem ain ed with in th e sp h ere of p etition s of p rin -cip le a ga in st clo n in g, th e resu lt o f ‘in sta n t reaction s’ an d with in con sisten tly d rafted argu -m en ts, co n clu d in g th a t “th e objection s to h u -m an clon in g [are] less th an p lau sible” (Harris, 1997:358). Accep tin g th e argu m en t of th e exis-ten ce (in cu rren t lib eral d em ocratic societies) o f th e righ t to ‘p ro crea tive a u to n o m y’, th a t is, th e “righ t to con trol th eir ow n role in p rocre-ation u n less th e state h as a com p ellin g reason for d en yin g th em th at con trol” (Dworkin , 1993 ap u d Harris, 1997:358), Harris con ten d s th at if we wish to live in su ch a society, “w e sh ou ld be p rep ared to accep t both som e d egree of offen se an d som e social d isad van tages as a p rice w e sh ou ld be w illin g to pay in order to protect free-dom of ch oice in m atter of procreation an d per-h aps tper-h is applies to clon in g as m u cper-h as to m ore straigh tforw ard or u su al p rocreative p refer-en ces” (Harris, 1997:359).
Th erefore, we sh ou ld avoid b oth th e feelin g of alarm wh ich d em on izes th e ‘Dolly fact’ an d p red icts a som b er, n ot-too-d istan t fu tu re, p eo-p led with legio n s o f en sla ved h u m a n clo n es, p rogram m ed an d organ ized in a kin d of society of ‘d ron es’, void of in d ivid u al will an d th e feel-in g of fascin ation, wh ich en sh rin es th e fact an d con ten d s th at th e p recariou sn ess an d fin itu d e of th e h u m an con d ition are on th e verge of b ein g overco m e fo rever th a n ks to a n ew b io a n -th ro p o -so cia l o rd er, co n sistin g o f in d ivid u a ls b elo n gin g to a sp ecies b etter a d a p ted to a wo rld in ra p id tra n sfo rm a tio n with h ea lth ier p h ysical an d p sych ological ch aracteristics an d m ore d esirab le skills, to th e p oin t of b ein g ‘p
er-fectly h ea lth y’ (Sfez, 1995). Th e two p o sitio n s (wh ich we h a ve ca rica tu red h ere fo r d id a ctic p u rp o ses) ca n b e eq u a lly h a rm fu l, sin ce th ey stir u p u n co n tro lla b le em o tio n s a n d get wh a t n ow is a n d wh a t ca n a ctu a lly co m e to b e (th e clon in g of b iological ch aracteristics) m ixed u p with wh a t is n o t n o r ca n co m e to b e (th e clon in g of in d ivid u ality or p erson ality).
The morality of human cloning
Before d irectly ap p roach in g th e m orality of h u -m a n clo n in g, we n eed to -m a ke a few p relm i-n ary rem arks ii-n ord er to d em arcate th e ob ject of ou r an alysis.
First, con trolled clon in g of p lan ts an d an i-m a ls d o es n o t en ta il i-m a jo r i-m o ra l co n flict, a s lo n g a s it is co n sid ered n ecessa r y fo r h u m a n well-b ein g a n d a s lo n g a s u seless su fferin g o f a n im a ls is a vo id ed (GAEIB, 1997). Obvio u sly th ere are p ertin en t ob jection s to th is p osition (like th e ‘b io cen tric’ o b jectio n s o f given en viron m en talist sectors an d th e ‘sen ticen tric’ ob jectio n s o f d efen d ers o f a n im a l ‘righ ts’ o r ‘in -terests’), b u t strictly sp eakin g th ese d o n ot p er-ta in to th e field o f b io eth ics, ra th er in fa ct to th e field s of en viron m en ta l eth ics a n d a n im a l eth ics, wh ich ca n b e co n sid ered d iscip lin es d istin ct from b ioeth ics (Mori, 1994).
Secon d , th e d eb ate over clon in g is n ot n ew, sin ce it b ega n in th e 1960s, wh en h u m a n clo n in g wa s p ro p o sed fo r th e first tim e a s “a scien tific solu tion to p reservin g th e en dan gered species of h u m an ity” (Cam p b ell, 1997:15).
Th ird , th ere is a sem an tic com p licatin g fac-to r, given th a t we a re n o t a lwa ys su fficien tly clear ab ou t wh at is m ean t by th e term ‘clon in g’. In fa ct, we ca n m ea n d ifferen t th in gs b y ‘clon in g’:
1) clon in g p er se, or th e p rod u ction of in d i-vid u als id en tical with an origin al th rou gh asex-u a l rep ro d asex-u ctio n , wh ich is co m m o n in th e p la n t kin gd o m a n d wh ich in p rin cip le p ro d u ces in d ivid u a ls with th e sa m e gen etic en -d owm en t, b u t n o t n ecessa rily, sin ce so m e ge-n etic m u tatioge-n cage-n occu r d u rige-n g th e p rocess;
2) ‘clon in g’ by SCNT, p rod u cin g a later-b orn id en tica l twin with th e sa m e n u clea r DNA a s th e d on or in d ivid u al b u t with ou t th e sam e m i-toch on d rial DNA; an d
3) ‘clon in g’ by em b ryo sp littin g, p rod u cin g gen etica lly id en tica l m o n ozygo tic twin s, b u t resu ltin g from th e recom b in ation of th e gen et-ic en d owm en t of m ale an d fem ale gam etes.
is-tin ction b etween 2) a n d 3), on th e con tra ry, is im p o rta n t fo r th e in feren ce o f a n in d ivid u a l’s id en tity b ased on existin g d ata an d is p ertin en t to m oral an alysis. In fact, in ‘clon in g’ by SCNT we h a ve a ‘clo n e’ wh o se id en tity ca n b e in -ferred a priori(th at is, ‘vertically’) b ased on th e gen otyp ical id en tity of th e clon ab le in d ivid u al, kn own p reviou sly, wh ile in ‘clon in g’ by em b ryo sp littin g we h a ve a n in d ivid u a l wh ose gen etic id en tity can n ot b e in ferred (‘vertically’) b ased on in form ation availab le a p riori, b u t on ly d e-term in ed ‘h o rizo n ta lly’, i.e., a n a lyzin g th e gen otyp e of an oth er gen otyp ical twin .
If we n ow co n sid er th e a rgu m en t co n tra ry to clon in g, b ased on th e righ t to an u n m an ip u -la ted gen etic en d owm en t (i.e., n on -rep ro-gram m ed a priori), as a n ecessary con d ition for resp ect for in d ivid u al au ton om y, we n ote th at th e m o ra l co n troversy ca n o n ly p erta in to ‘clon es’ ob tain ed by SCNT, sin ce n ob od y wou ld rea so n a b ly th in k o f m o ra lly co n d em n in g th e situ ation of m on ozygotic twin s. In oth er word s, th e m oral con troversy in th is case can on ly p er-ta in to clo n ed in d ivid u a ls im p lyin g in d istin c-tion b etween clo n in g in d ivid u a ls a n d clo n ed in d ivid u als.
Identity and ipseity in cloning
Th e a b ove rem a rks lea d u s to lo gica lly d istin -gu ish b etween th e two sen ses of th e word iden -tity: 1) id en tity a s ‘id en tity’ (fro m th e La tin
id em, ‘sam e’, ‘id en tical’) or ‘sam en ess’, u n d er-stood as a p rop erty of on e b ein g b elon gin g to a sam e class of b ein gs p ossessin g th e sam e ch ar-acteristics (for exam p le, th e class of in d ivid u als fro m th e sp ecies Hom o sap ien s sap ien s); 2) id en tity as ‘ip seity’ (from th e Latin ip se, ‘self’) o r ‘selfh o o d ’, u n d ersto o d a s th e p ro p erty th a t o n ly o n e given b ein g p o ssesses in h is/ h er/ its u n icity (fo r exa m p le, ‘So -a n d -so’). In o th er word s, if we ap p ly th is logical d istin ction to h u -m an b ein gs, we can u se th e ter-m ‘sa-m en ess’ to in d ica te th e p o in t o f view th a t co n sid ers a n y h u m an b ein g as b elon gin g to th e sp ecies Hom o sap ien s sap ien sb eca u se h e/ sh e p o ssesses a ll th ose (an d on ly th ose) ch aracteristics th at d e-fin e th e class of b ein gs in qu estion . Mean wh ile, th e term ‘selfh o o d ’ refers to th e p o in t o f view co n sid erin g th e h u m a n in d ivid u a l n o t a s a m em b er of th e class of h u m an b ein gs, b u t as a p articu lar in d ivid u al (or, as it were, as a m em b er o f th e cla ss th a t o n ly co n ta in s th a t m em -b er) a n d wh o th u s p o ssesses reflexiven ess, in th e d o u b le sen se o f ‘kn owin g h ow to reflect’ a n d b ein g a b le ‘to refer to o n e’s self’. In o th er word s, in th e latter case we h ave a ‘u n iq u e’ b e-in g, th at is, a p erson , wh o is “a th in k in g an d in
-telligen t bein g, capable of reason in g an d reflect-in g, w h o can con sid er h im self th e sam e,(...)
w h o th in k s in differen t tim es an d places” (Leib -n iz, 1980:176), or “w h o is aw are of th e n u m eri-cal iden tity of h im self in differen t tim es” (Kan t, 1989:341), or still, “n ot im p lyin g an y assertion con cern in g a su p p osed n on -m u tan t n u cleu s
[a n d ]im p lyin g a form of p erm an en ce in tim e th at is n ot red u cible to th e d eterm in ation of a su bstrate” (Ricoeu r, 1991:13; 143). In sh ort, ip -seity refers to th e d istin ctive ch aracteristics of th e in d ivid u al as su ch , th e fact th at th e in d ivid -u al is h im / h erself, d istin ct from all oth ers (La-la n d e, 1972:257) a n d in th e ca se o f h u m a n s, awaren ess of th is ‘selfh ood’.
Th is logical d istin ction is in d isp en sab le for a p rop er m oral an alysis of h u m an clon in g. In -d ee-d , an in -d ivi-d u al clon e-d by SCNT in p rin cip le h a s th e sa m e gen o tycip e (i.e, th e sa m e n u -clea r DNA) a s th e clo n in g in d ivid u a l, a n d th e two can (p resu m ab ly) b e id en tical from th e b i-ological p oin t of view. However, th ey will n ever h a ve th e sa m e ip seity, given th a t th ey a re d is-tin ct in d ivid u a ls with d ifferen t exp erien ces; h en ce, even at b est, clon in g can on ly p rod u ce gen erically id en tical in d ivid u als, rep rod u cin g th eir b iological id en tity b u t n ever th eir p erson -al id en tity.
Bu t let u s su p p ose, n o m atter h ow ab su rd it sou n d s, th at it wou ld b e p ossib le to m ake b io-logical id en tity an d p erson al id en tity coin cid e. In th is ca se, we sh o u ld p o stu la te a h igh ly im -p rob ab le syn ergism of n u m erou s id en tical an d sh a red co n d itio n s, resu ltin g fro m th e sa m e typ e of exp erien ces, th e sam e typ e of en viron -m en t, an d th u s th e fact of sp atially an d te-m p o-ra lly co in cid in g with o n e’s o th er self. In th e ca se of rea l ob jects, th is coin cid en ce is p h ysi-cally an d logiysi-cally im p ossib le, sin ce “w e n ever fin d n or cou ld w e ever con ceive th at it w ou ld be p ossible for tw o th in gs of th e sam e k in d to exist at th e sam e tim e in th e sam e p lace” (Leib n iz, 1980:172). In oth er words, in order for two in dividu als to h ave th e sam e ip seity we sh ou ld con -ceive o f a p a ra d oxica l situ a tio n wh ich wo u ld m ake m yself coin cide with m y oth er self, wh ich is lo gica lly im p o ssib le a n d p ra ctica lly u n -ach ievab le, given th at th e clon e sh ou ld occu py th e sam e sp ace at th e sam e m om en t (wh ich is p h ysically im p ossible), wh ile its iden tity sh ou ld coin cide with its ip seity, con fu sin g itself with its oth er self, wh ich is con trary to th e p rem ise d is-tin gu ish in g b etween ‘id en tity’ an d ‘ip seity’.
each oth er by th e fact th at th ey d o n ot occu p y th e sam e sp ace/ tim e; th e fact th at th ey d o n ot h ave exactly th e sam e life exp erien ces an d can m a ke a d istin ctio n b etween o n e’s self a n d th e oth er. In oth er word s, if we con fu se b iological an d p erson al id en tity, we com m it b oth a ‘logical ab u se’ (con fu sion b etween id en tity an d ip -seity) an d a ‘b iological red u ction ism’. However, red u ctio n ism is n o t u n co m m o n , sin ce th ere are frequ en t affirm ation s relatin g to th e gen et-ic o rigin o f b o th o rga n et-ic ch a ra cteristet-ics a n d d ysfu n ctio n s a s well a s ch a ra cter tra its, a tti-tu d es, q u a lities, a n d p erso n a l p referen ces. In fa ct, th e clo n e o f a ‘scien tist fa th er’ ca n ver y well b e an ‘au tistic son’ (Dim en stein , 1997). In sh o rt, a n in d ivid u a l’s p erso n a l id en tity d e-p en d s on b iological ch aracteristics, im e-p ortan t for th e im age in d ivid u al h as of h im / h erself an d for oth ers; still, th e cu ltu ral an d social m ilieu , as well as exp erien ce, m ake th is in d ivid u al re-sh ap e th e b iological p attern s th at con trib u te to th e form ation of h is/ h er p erson ality.
Are there arguments in favor of human cloning?
To b egin , on e sh ou ld state th at “th e eth ical im -p lication s of clon in g balan ce on a fin e lin e” (Kitch er, 1997:58), given th at th e tech n ologies a re st ill fu ll o f u n ce rt a in t ie s re ga rd in g risks an d b en efits (as th e NBAC rep ort em p h asized n icely).
Next, th e cu rren t d eb ate on th e m orality of clon in g (as well as oth er p rob lem s in b ioeth ics) sh ou ld b e seen as a d ifferen ce b etween p oin ts of view as to wh at is con sid ered good an d evil, th a t is, a s a “d ifferen ce betw een m oral p rin ci-p les” (Stich , 1989:229). Th u s, d ifferen t p rin ci-p les im ci-p ly d ifferen t m o ra l th eo ries ci-p rovid in g u s with d ifferen t p ertin en t a rgu m en ts fo r th e an alysis.
Th e argu m en ts for an d again st clon in g are gen erally of two typ es: d eon tological an d con -seq u en tialist, each with its own logic. Th e for-m er essen tially says th at sofor-m eth in g is good or b a d in itself(b eca u se it is m o ra lly rep u gn a n t, again st religiou s d ictates, etc.); th e latter con -ten d th at som eth in g is good or b ad d ep en d in g on its con sequ en ces. Th is p ap er d oes n ot focu s on d eon tologica l a rgu m en ts, ra th er on ly con -seq u en tia list o n es, sin ce we b elieve th a t in a secu larized world with a p lu rality of legitim ate m oral (an d often tim es in com m en su rab le) con -cep ts, o n ly co n seq u en tia list a rgu m en ts (if p rop erly argu ed ) can b e th e ob ject of a ration al con sen su s an d th u s of a con tract. Th is is valid
a fortioriwh en o n e a n a lyzes th e m o ra lity o f clon in g in ligh t of th e p oten tialities for th e field
of h ealth an d esp ecially for rep rod u ctive h ealth an d p rocreative au ton om y.
Am o n g t h e co n se q u e n t ia list a rgu m e n t s a ga in st clo n in g, a p rim e e xa m p le is th e ‘slip -p ery slo-p e argum en t’, accordin g to which som e-th in g sh ou ld n ot b e d on e b ecau se of its p ossi-b le aossi-b u ses. Bu t th is argu m en t is n ot p ertin en t, sin ce a b u se s a re a lwa ys p o ssib le, e ve n wit h n a t u ra l su b st a n ce s a n d p ro d u ct s a n d t e ch -n iq u es crea ted with th e b est o f i-n te-n tio -n s. I-n fact th e slip p ery slop e argu m en t d oes n ot h old wa t e r a n t h ro p o lo gica lly; we wo u ld n o t h a ve em erged from th e p re-h om in id stage, sin ce we wou ld h ave virtu ally n oth in g of wh at h as p ro-vid ed u s with a b etter qu ality of life.
Fin a lly, we n eed to kn ow n o t o n ly wh a t is m ean t by ‘h u m an clon in g’, b u t also wh at its ob -jectives are: (1) to clon e a gen etically com p ati-b le in d ivid u al in ord er to save an oth er? For ex-am p le, to clon e a b roth er to d on ate b on e m ar-row, a kid n ey, or a liver? (2) to clon e em b ryos to exp a n d a wo m a n’s p ro crea tive a u to n o m y, a l-lowin g h er to h a ve h ea lth y ch ild ren , with o u t d iseases of m itoch on d rial origin , for exam p le? (3) to clon e in d ivid u als with given ch aracteristics, like greater p h ysical fitn ess for sp orts con -tests, o r grea ter resista n ce to en viro n m en ta l ad versities an d d iseases? (4) to clon e in d ivid u -als in th e n am e of th e collective in terest or th e welfare of a com m u n ity or society?
Su ch exa m p les ra ise d ifferen t d egrees o f m o ra lity. Th e first (1 a n d 2) d o n o t a p p ea r to raise su bstan tive m oral objection s, at least from a u tilita ria n -co n seq u en tia list p o in t o f view; n u m b er (3) is co n troversia l, b u t p erh a p s ten -ab le in som e cases; an d (4) is clearly u n accep t-ab le in a lib eral d em ocracy, wh ere in p rin cip le th ere is resp ect for in d ivid u al righ ts.
clon e’s righ t to ch ose wh at h e/ sh e wan ts ou t of life wou ld n ot b e en su red . In th is case, th e ar-gu m en ts in fa vo r o f clo n in g will b rin g o th er fa cto rs in to p la y, like a ffectio n , a ltru ism , a n d o th er ‘virtu es’, wh ich m a y b e d esira b le b u t wh ich can n ever b e im p osed reason ab ly. How-ever, it is im p o rta n t to n o te th a t th is typ e o f sacrifice m ay soon b ecom e ob solete th an ks to th e su b seq u en t d evelop m en t of clon in g tech n ology itself, p rod u cin g organ s rath er th an in d ivid u a ls, wh ich will elim in a te th e m o ra l o b -jection .
Wh a t is a t sta ke in exa m p le (2) is th e en -h an cem en t of t-h e wom an’s rep rodu ctive -h ealt-h , an d m ore p recisely, h er p rocreative au ton om y, sin ce a wo m a n wh o wish es to h a ve a h ea lth y ch ild will b e ab le to ch oose th e m ost ad eq u ate p ro crea tive m eth o d fo r h er sp ecific situ a tio n . Morally, th is case d oes n ot ap p ear to b e d iffer-en t from assisted fertilization , a com m on p lace p ra ctice in m a n y co u n tries to d a y, given th a t th e righ t to o n e’s own h ea lth a n d th a t o f o n e’s ch ild ren is a righ t recogn ized by con tem p orary d em ocratic cu ltu re, in clu d in g th e WHO.
Exa m p le (3) seem s m o re co n troversia l. To u n d ersta n d th is co n troversia l sid e, let u s ta ke an exam p le. Su p p ose th at d u rin g th e evolu tion o f th e sp ecies Hom o sap ien s sap ien s, a n in d i-vid u al em erges with given gen etic ch aracteris-tics, p roven to b e resp on sib le for a red u ction in th e “probability of th reats” (Lu h m an n , 1996:73), i.e., a greater resistan ce (or lesser su scep tib ili-ty) to given d ysfu n ction s or d iseases, like m or-tal viru ses; or to ad verse en viron m en or-tal con d i-tio n s, like p o llu i-tio n , ra d io a ctivity, io n iza i-tio n , etc. In p art, th is alread y occu rs n atu rally in th e p ro cess o f n a tu ra l selectio n th a n ks to gen etic variab ility. Bu t in th is sp ecific case, on e cou ld reason ab ly ask if it wou ld n ot b e m orally licit to p reser ve th is ch a ra cteristic ra th er th a n let th in gs ru n th eir ‘n a tu ra l’ co u rse th ro u gh th e lottery of n a tu ra l selection , wh ich wou ld on ly fa vo r ca rriers o f th e p ro tective ch a ra cteristic. Th e p ertin en ce of th is q u estion em erges if we co n sid er th a t n a tu re itself d o es n o t a lwa ys d o wh a t is b est fo r m a n , i.e., th a t “before th e ap -p earan ce of m an , evolu tion (in clu d in g th e evo-lu tion of life) h ad been a h igh ly th reaten in g p rocess in itself” (Lu h m a n n , 1996:73), wh ich cou ld exp lain th e em ergen ce of tech n iq u e an d cu ltu re as in d isp en sab le factors for h u m an su r-vival. In th is sen se, th e resp ective ch aracteris-tic ca n b e co n sid ered (in p rin cip le) a good, b oth for th e carrier of th e resistan t trait an d for o th er in d ivid u a ls wh o m igh t co m e to b en efit fro m it. An d if it is a go o d , its p reser va tio n th ro u gh clo n in g ca n b e ju stified rea so n a b ly, th ereb y m a kin g th is go o d a va ila b le to o th ers
an d red u cin g illn ess an d in creasin g well-b ein g for m ore h u m an s.
Su p p o se fu rth er th a t th is a b ility to resist m orta l viru ses a n d oth er a d verse situ a tion s is n ot th e resu lt of n a tu re’s lottery or n a tu ra l selection th em selves, b u t th e resu lt of h u m an in -terferen ce, an d th at th is resistan ce cou ld liter-ally com e to b e ‘b u ilt’ on th e b asis of tran sgen ic m od ifica tion . Th is secon d ca se is n o d ifferen t (m u tatis m u tan d i) from th e first, an d th e typ e of m oral an alysis is p ractically th e sam e, sin ce b o th in vo lve kn owin g wh eth er o r n o t it is m o ra lly licit to in ter ven e in n o rm a l, n a tu ra l p ro cesses th a t a re ‘p red icted ’ o r wh ich ‘h a p -p en’ d u rin g evolu tion .
Th e issu e is o bvio u sly co n troversia l a n d co m p lex. First, b eca u se d u e to th e p ro b a b le evo lu tio n o f clo n in g tech n o lo gy itself, it will p rob ab ly n ot b e n ecessary to clon e in d ivid u als, b u t o n ly o rga n s a n d tissu es, wh ich ca n ver y well b e grown in lab oratories an d ad m in istered th rou gh equ itab le h ealth p olicies. On e will also b e a b le to u se gen etic th era p y, in ter ven in g in som atic cells (to cu re d am age) in an in d ivid u al, an d if th e ab sen ce of sign ifican t risks is p roven , a ctin g on germ cells (to p reven t d a m a ge) th a t will tra n sm it th e ‘resista n ce’ to fu tu re gen era -tion s. Regard in g th is p oin t, on e cou ld ask if th is typ e of in terven tion is n ot a form of eu gen ics, aim ed at im p rovin g th e ‘h u m an race’. It is, b u t so is a n y a ttem p t to im p rove th e h u m a n ‘sp ecies’(in fact, in d ivid u als), em p loyin g oth er m ean s, like ed u cation (in all its varian ts), eat-in g, life styles, etc., to wh ich n ob od y raises rea-so n a b le o b jectio n s, excep t fo r th e in d ivid u a l righ t to ch o o se o n e’s wa y o f life, wh ich a s we kn ow is con d ition ed in th ou san d s of ways. An -o th er a p p a ren tly releva n t a rgu m en t refers t-o th e risk th at clon in g m igh t d ecrease b iod iversi-ty an d th u s in crease vu ln erab iliiversi-ty, given th at it cou ld in p rin cip le m ake all h u m an in d ivid u als gen etica lly id en tica l a n d th u s th rea ten h u m an kin d with extin ction if a n ew organ ism ap -p ea rs a ga in st wh ich it is n o t -p ro tected . All th ese ob jection s are p ertin en t, sin ce th ey refer to p o ten tia l risks, b u t th ey a re b a sed o n th e p rem ise th a t clo n in g, ra th er th a n servin g a s a th era p eu tic o r p reven tive m ed iu m to b e u sed in ca ses o f a ctu a l n eed o r legitim a te wish es, will b ecom e a fad , or even worse, a m ean s to d o h arm , an d th at clon in g wou ld red u ce b iod iver-sity, wh ich rem a in s to b e d em o n stra ted a n d ab ou t wh ich th ere are seriou s d ou b ts.
grea t so cia l exp ecta tio n s su rro u n d in g th em , wh ich co u ld ver y well m ea n a restrictio n o f th eir freedom an d th u s con tradict th e very p u r-p o se o f grea ter in d ivid u a l a u to n o m y. Bu t th e cru cial p oin t in th is case is th e p rin cip le of re-sp on sibility exercised by in dividuals who should p ra ctice th eir ro les a s citizen s a n d stru ggle to red u ce th e p rob ab ility of ab u ses.
An o th er a rgu m en t a ga in st clo n in g co n d em n s th e m ere in stru m en ta liza tio n o f a h u -m a n in d ivid u a l (see th e GAEIB), in scrib ed in th e Ka n tia n im p era tive a cco rd in g to wh ich “m an , an d in gen eral all ration al bein gs, exist as an en d in th em selves, n ot as a m ean s for som e u se accord in g to th is or th at w ill;[a n d sh o u ld ]th erefore alw ays be con sid ered an en d at th e sam e tim e” (Ka n t, u n d a ted :78). Su ch wo u ld b e th e ca se o f h u m a n in d ivid u a ls p ro -d u ce-d to serve as m ere organ an -d tissu e b an ks, wh ich obviou sly is m ora lly u n a ccep ta b le, ju st as th e ab ove-m en tion ed exam p le (4) wou ld b e u n a ccep ta b le. Th a t is, in ca se h u m a n clo n es a ctu a lly existed , th ey wo u ld a lso b e p erso n s a n d co u ld th u s n o t b e u sed a s m ere m ea n s to ser ve th ird p a rties. However, we sh o u ld a lso p oin t ou t th at a certain d egree of in stru m en tal-ization ten d s to b e a p art of an y in terp erson al rela tio n sh ip, esp ecia lly b etween p a ren ts a n d ch ild ren , tea ch ers a n d p u p ils, a n d em p loyers an d em p loyees.
Th ere is also th e p ossib ility of in ten tion ally creatin g decerebrate h u m an clon es, wh o wou ld th u s n o t b e p ro p erly h u m a n a n d wo u ld n o t su ffer an y p ain . Bu t th is case is still in th e realm of scien ce fiction , an d alb eit in tu itively rep u g-n a g-n t, it wo u ld d ep eg-n d o g-n a d va g-n ces ig-n o u r kn owled ge an d tren d s in th e m orality of fu tu re gen eration s.
Su m m in g u p, th e risks are obviou sly m an y, an d we wou ld say p rop ortion al to th e b en efits, b u t th is d o es n o t p reven t o n e fro m b egin n in g to a sk if th ere m igh t n o t b e go o d rea so n s fo r th e clo n in g o f given h u m a n tra its, a s lo n g a s on e p roves th eir n eed for th e im p rovem en t of qu ality of life for h u m an in d ivid u als an d p op u -lation s, resp ectin g th e d ialectic of p rim a facie
p rin cip les of b en eficen ce an d n on -m aleficen ce (wh ich h a ve b een th e fo u n d a tio n o f ‘co rrect’ h ealth in terven tion sin ce Hip p ocrates), resp ect for au ton om y an d free, in form ed con sen t, ju s-tice, an d oth ers wh ich m ay com e to b e n eed ed in ord er to live well.
Conclusion
Th e clon in g of h u m an b ein gs, organ s, an d tis-su es req u ires m u ch resea rch a n d fo reca stin g on its p ossib le d evelop m en ts in h ealth an d h u -m an ter-m s. In th is sen se, in th e cu rren t stage of ou r kn owled ge, it is worth wh ile to recom m en d h ea lth y p ru d en ce, in clu d in g p reser va tio n o f th e existin g b iod iversity, resu ltin g from sexu al rep rod u ction . Bu t in sp ecific cases, on e cou ld well su p p ose th at scien tific an d cu ltu ral ‘d iver-sity’ itself (like th at resu ltin g from th e clon in g o f th e resista n t ch a ra cteristics q u o ted in o u r exa m p le) m igh t co m e to jo in , co m p lem en t, an d im p rove existin g b iod iversity.
Th e m oral an alysis of clon in g, in tu rn , rests on two q u estion s: 1) are th ere good reason s to ap p ly clon in g to h u m an b ein gs, su ch as h ealth rea so n s, rega rd less o f wh eth er o r n o t clo n in g ap p ears in tu itively rep u lsive? 2) wh at typ es of rea so n s m igh t th ese b e, a n d wh a t is th eir d e-gree of cogen cy?
In fa ct, th e p ars d estru en s o f a rgu m en ts a ga in st clo n in g is a n ea sier ta sk th a n th e p ars con stru en s (Ca lla h a n , 1997b ; Ha rris, 1997), sin ce we still h a ve n o clea r, ela b o ra te eth ica l p osition in favor of it, b u t m ere d econ stru ction of argu m en ts to th e con trary. However, in order to b egin to co n stru ct th is m issin g th eo ry, o n e should take due n otice of theright to procreative au ton om y, con sistin g of p eop le’s righ t “to con -trol th eir ow n role in procreation u n less th e state h as a com p ellin g reason for d en yin g th em th at con trol” (Dworkin , 1993 ap u d Harris, 1997:358), wh ich wo u ld ju stify rep ro d u ctio n b y clo n in g fo r th era p eu tic en d s, a n d th e m o ra l p rin cip le cited by Harris accordin g to wh ich “it is better to do som e good th an to do n o good”(Harris, 1997: 355).In sh ort,“In th e absen ce of com pellin g ar-gu m en ts again st h u m an clon in g, w e can bid Dolly a cau tiou s ‘h ello’”(Harris, 1997:359).
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