Rev. Adm. (São Paulo) vol.51 número3

Revista

de

Administração

http://rausp.usp.br/ RevistadeAdministração51(2016)288–298

Public

management

Review

of

passive

transparency

in

Brazilian

city

councils

Balan¸co

da

transparência

passiva

em

câmaras

municipais

brasileiras

Evaluación

de

la

transparencia

pasiva

en

cámaras

municipales

en

Brasil

Fabiano

Maury

Raupp

,

José

Antonio

Gomes

de

Pinho

a_{UniversidadedoEstadodeSantaCatarina,Florianópolis,SC,Brazil} b_{UniversidadeFederaldaBahia,Salvador,BA,Brazil}

Received26March2015;accepted11February2016

Abstract

ThegoalofthisstudyistoinvestigatecompliancewiththerequirementsofpassivetransparencyincitycouncilsofBrazilianmunicipalitieswith populationsgreaterthan300,000inhabitants.Theresearchisdescriptive,operationalizedbyasurveywithpredominantlyqualitativeapproach. Thedatacollectedfrom79citycouncilswereanalyzedusingthedescriptiveanalysistechnique.Threegroupswereidentifiedinthecitycouncils analyzed:first,citycouncilstowhichitwasnotpossibletosubmittherequestforinformation;second,citycouncilstowhichtherequestfor informationwassubmitted,buttherewasnoreplyortheresponsewasinsufficient;andthird,citycouncilstowhichtherequestforinformation wassubmittedandtherewassatisfactoryresponse.Thescenarioshowslittlepassivetransparencybeforethetechnologicalapparatuswasavailable. Therearecitycouncilsthatviolateaseriesoflegalprovisionsregulatingthetransparencyofgovernmentactions.Thestudystandsoutfordiagnosing thecurrentsituationofpassivetransparencyinthecitycouncilsofthelargestBrazilianmunicipalities,revealinghowthelaw,ingeneral,canbe violated,andnottakenseriously.

©2016DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublishedbyElsevierEditoraLtda.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBYlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Keywords: Transparency;Passivetransparency;Citycouncils

Resumo

Oestudoteveporobjetivoinvestigaroatendimentoàsexigênciasdetransparênciapassivapelascâmarasdemunicípiosbrasileiroscompopulac¸ão superiora300.000habitantes.Apesquisaédescritiva,operacionalizadaporumestudodelevantamento,comabordagempredominantemente qualitativa.Osdadoscoletadoscom79câmarasmunicipaisforamanalisadospelatécnicadaanálisedescritiva.Identificaram-setrêsgruposnas câmarasanalisadas:oprimeiro refere-seàscâmarasem quenãofoipossívelencaminharorequerimento;osegundodiz respeitoàscâmaras cujorequerimentofoiencaminhado,masnãohouveretorno(resposta)ouoretornofoiinsuficiente;oterceiroconsideraàscâmarasemqueo requerimentofoiencaminhadoehouveretornosatisfatório.Éumcenárioquerevelapoucatransparênciapassivadiantedeumaparatotecnológico disponível.Hácâmarasquedescumpremumasucessãodetextoslegaisqueregulamentamatransparênciadosatosgovernamentais.Oestudose

∗_{Correspondingauthorat:UniversidadedoEstadodeSantaCatarina,AvenidaMadreBenvenuta,2037,88035-001,Florianópolis,SC,Brazil.} E-mail:fabianoraupp@hotmail.com(F.M.Raupp).

PeerReviewundertheresponsibilityofDepartamentodeAdministrac¸ão,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸ãoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeSãoPaulo –FEA/USP.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2016.02.001

destacapordiagnosticaraatualsituac¸ãodatransparênciapassivadecâmarasdosmaioresmunicípiosbrasileiroserevelacomoalei,emgeral, podeserdescumprida,nãolevadaàsério.

©2016DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Este ´eumartigoOpenAccesssobumalicenc¸aCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Palavras-chave:Transparência;Transparênciapassiva;Câmarasmunicipais

Resumen

Elobjetodelestudioesanalizarlaatenciónalasexigenciasdetransparenciapasivaporpartedelascámarasdelosmunicipiosbrasile˜noscon poblaciónsuperiora300.000habitantes.Sellevóacaboelestudiodescriptivopormediodeunanálisispredominantementecualitativo.Losdatos obtenidosenlas79cámarasmunicipalesfueronanalizadosporlatécnicadeanálisisdescriptivo.Seidentificarontresgruposenlascámaras estudiadas:elprimeroserefierealascámarasenlasquenofueposibletramitarlapetición;elsegundoserefierealascámarasenquesetramitó lapetición,peronohuborespuestaolamismafueinsuficiente,yelterceroconsideraalascámarasenlasquesetramitólapeticiónyhubouna respuestasatisfactoria.Esunescenarioqueindicapocatransparenciapasivadelantedelatecnologíadisponible.Existencámarasquenocumplen conunasucesióndetextoslegalesqueregulanlatransparenciadelosactosgubernamentales.Elestudiosedestacapordiagnosticarlasituación actualdelatransparenciapasivadelascámarasdelosmayoresmunicipiosbrasile˜nos,ymuestracomolaley,engeneral,puedeserincumpliday noserplenamenterespetada.

©2016DepartamentodeAdministrac¸˜ao,FaculdadedeEconomia,Administrac¸˜aoeContabilidadedaUniversidadedeS˜aoPaulo–FEA/USP. PublicadoporElsevierEditoraLtda.Esteesunart´ıculoOpenAccessbajolalicenciaCCBY(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Palabrasclave: Transparencia;Transparenciapasiva;Cámarasmunicipales

Introduction

Although the term transparency is recent andit has been highlightedinrecentyears,theconcernrelatedtothetermhas a long history. The formation of the liberal state and repre-sentativedemocraciesencouragedthefightagainsttheopacity thatprevailedinmonarchicalregimesandtheestablishmentof accountabilityoftheexecutivebythelegislature(Zuccolotto& Teixeira,2014).Fortheauthors,despitetheimportancegivento theissueinthepastdecade,itsmeaningremainsfluid, display-ingvariationsamongdifferentareasofknowledge.Inpart,this isduetothefactthatthisconceptisused indifferentaspects relatedtotheflowofinformation.

ZuccolottoandTeixeira(2014)alsohighlightthelowlevelof transparencyshownbysubnationalBrazilianstates,indicating asignificantdistance betweenthegovernment andcivil soci-ety, as little information is released by the states. Therefore, thereisagapbetweentherequirementsimposedongovernment entitiesregarding active transparency (providinginformation, regardlessofrequest)andtheeffectiveapplicationbythepublic managers.Withoutwantingtojustifynon-compliancewithlegal requirements,somequestionsareraised:Wouldpassive trans-parency(informationprovidedinreplytocitizens’requests)be onewaytomitigatethe failureof governmentsin relationto thetransparencyofactionstakeninpublicadministration?As ithappenstoactivetransparency,istherefailureinrelationto passivetransparencyaswell?

Intermsofacademicpapers,inasurveydoneinSPELLbase – ScientificElectronic Library Periodicals(www.spell.org.br) on February 6, 2015, using as a search parameter the term “transparency” inthedocument title,we identified 44papers specificallyontransparency,publishedinjournals,butnowork addressedpassivetransparency.Usingthesameparameters,on

thatsamedate,wemadeasurveyconcerningtheissuesofthe eventsorganizedbyANPAD–NationalAssociationof Gradu-ateStudiesandResearchinAdministration(www.anpad.org.br), andweidentified35studiesthatincludetheword“transparency” in their titles. However, we did not identify any study that addressed passive transparency.Such surveysreveal agapin thisareaofknowledge,contributingtojustifythisstudyfrom anacademicpointofview.Therefore,therelevanceand perti-nenceofthestudyliesinthreemainreasons:firstly,theresults maycontributetoasituationaldiagnosisofpassivetransparency regarding the suitability or not of this instrument to legisla-tion(Raupp,Andrade,&Pinho,2015);secondly,itissustained by thefact that activetransparency isnot yet arealityin the Brazilian context (Araujo & Grossi, 2013; Bairral, Silva, & Alvez,2015;Cruz,Ferreira,Silva,&Macedo,2012;Raupp& Pinho,2011; LeiteFilho, Colares, & Andrade,2015; Raupp, 2014a, 2014b; Souza, Costa Barros, Araujo, & Silva, 2013; Staroscky,Nunes,LeãoLyrio,&Lunkes,2014;Zuccolotto& Teixeira, 2014),ascenariothat encouragesresearchaimedto investigate whether passive transparency can be one way to mitigatethisproblem;thirdly,relatedtothe second reason,it concernsthegapcausedbythelackofstudiesonpassive trans-parency.

Thefollowingsectionspresenttheresearchfindingsandfinal considerations,respectively.

Theoreticalfoundation

The theoretical foundations cover discussions on trans-parency, active and passive transparency and the use of informationandcommunicationtechnologies–ICTtopromote transparency.Italsoreferstoformalismandpaternalismas pos-sibleexplanationsforthegapbetweentherequirementsimposed ongovernmententitiesregardingtransparencyandtheeffective implementationbytheleaders.

It isobserved that many changesconcerning transparency haveoccurredover thepast20years. Ononehand,ifit can-notyetbesaidthat theveilof Braziliangovernmenthasbeen removedcompletely,ontheother,itshouldberecognizedthat thecurrentscenarioiscompletelydifferentfrom20yearsago, aspointedoutbyCampos(1990),whichcancauseanincrease ofaccountabilityor,atleast,createconditionsforthattotake place(Pinho&Sacramento,2009).The relationshipbetween transparencyandthemeaningofaccountabilityisevidentinthe studyofPinhoandSacramento(2009),wholookedupthe mean-ingofthewordaccountabilityinseveraldictionariesinorderto try tograsp more precisely what the term means in English and how it has been translated into Portuguese. Due to the lackofawordinPortuguesethatexpresseswhataccountability

means,theauthorsinferthatthemeaningoftheconceptinvolves responsibility(objectiveandsubjective),control,transparency, obligationof accountability, justifications for the actions that havebeenorceasedtobeundertaken,awardsand/orpunishment (Pinho&Sacramento,2009).BeforemovingtotheBrazilian sit-uationinparticular,itisworthbringingthereflectionsofBehn (1998),whointroducedthediscussionofaccountabilitywithin theemerging paradigmof the newpublic managementinthe mid-1990sintheAmericancontext.Fortheauthor,the“problem ofcorruption”wouldbelessdisturbingthanthe“performance issue”(Behn, 1998,p.6). Thus,the “emphasis onproducing results”becomespredominant(Behn,1998,p.7)andthatcalls fora“democraticaccountability”.ItisworthstatingthatBehn (1998) pointsout many problemsanddifficulties inbuilding an effective accountability, which leadsto realizing that this conceptisdifficulttooperationalizeevenwithintheAmerican context,regardedasanadvanceddemocracy.Theauthorshows thedifficultiesof allocatingresponsibilitiestopublic officials involvedwithpublicpolicies,as wellas difficultiesrelatedto thecapacityofcivil societytomobilizeitselfconcerningthat issue.

The entitiesthat make up the Braziliangovernment struc-ture are required,by the Federal Constitution (Brasil, 1988), to provide accountability on the use of public funds and to respecttheprincipleofpublicity,amongotherprinciplesof pub-licadministration.Therefore,itisevidentthatthereisneedfor transparency intheaccountability of publicentities andtheir bodies in direct and indirect administration (Neto, da Cruz, Ensslin,& Ensslin,2007).The public sectoris compelled to servethecollectiveinterestand,therefore,itshouldincreasethe leveloftransparencysothatcitizenscanseetheaccountability

andcheckitsperformancemeetsthecollectiveinterest(Silva, Pereira,&Araújo,2014).

For Neto et al.(2007), there are three elements of trans-parency of public accounts: publicity, understandability and usefulness for decisions. By publicity, Neto et al. (2007) meanthewidedisseminationofinformationtothepopulation, providinglow-costaccesstomultiplemediainalanguage under-standableforusers.Theauthorspresupposetheopportunityof theinformationprovided,withtiming,andwithinfeasibletime to supportthe decisions. The comprehensibilitydimension is related,accordingtotheauthors,tovisualpresentation, includ-inginformationformat(statements,reports),andtheuseofan adequatelanguage.Simplicityandaccessiblelanguage,targeted totheprofileofusers,shouldbepursuedtoincrease understand-ingoftheinformation.Theusefulnessfordecisionsisbasedon the relevanceof theinformation. The relevance,inturn,may ormaynotcoincidewithusers’interests.Associatedwith rele-vance,thereisthereliabilityoftheinformationtowhichusers haveaccess,thatis,theaccuracyguaranteeofwhatisdisclosed. Comparabilityshouldbefosteredamongstperiodsandamongst entities(Netoetal.,2007).

Within the legal perspective, laws concerning access to informationdetail howgovernmentbodiesshouldproactively provide information tothe public,andtheyalso specify how governmentsshoulddealwithrequestsforinformation,pointing outthestructuresforreceivingsuchrequests,theappealsystems andpunitivemeasuresforthosewhodonotcomply(Angélico &Teixeira,2012).Inrecentyears,ithasbeenpossibleto iden-tifyalargeincreaseofAccesstoInformationLawsaroundthe world,withmorethantwo-thirdsoftheapproximately100laws of thiskind being adopted only in the past decade. In Latin America, only Venezuela andCosta Rica havenot legislated onaccess toinformation. Brazilwasoneofthe lastcountries tojointhismovementfortransparency(Michener,Moncau,& Velasco,2014).TheBrazilianAccesstoInformationLaw, sanc-tioned onNovember18th,2011,wasthe89thnationallaw of that kind. The textestablished 180 days for the beginningof its validity;therefore,itwasindeedapplicableinBrazilas of May 16th,2012 (Angélico&Teixeira, 2012).Raupp (2014a) believesthatthepublicationoftheAccesstoInformationLaw– LAI(Brasil,2011)reinforcestheneedfortransparencyfor pub-lic officials,present inthe FiscalResponsibility Law (Brasil, 2000)andtheTransparencyLaw(Brasil,2009).TheLAI estab-lished the dutyof the Government to spontaneouslydisclose informationof public interest(activetransparency),andmeet the demands that are made by the population (passive trans-parency)(Silva,Hoch,&Santos,2013).TherulesofLAIapply toallpublicbodies,whicharepartofthedirectadministrationof theExecutive,LegislativeandJudicialPowersandAutonomous Bodiesaswellaspubliccompanies,joint-stockcompaniesand otherentitiesofindirectpublicadministration(Micheneretal., 2014).

withintheircompetencies,ofinformationofcollectiveor gen-eralinterestproducedbythemorundertheircustody”(Brasil, 2011).Incompliancewithart.8,governmentbodiesand enti-ties“shalluseallmeansandlegitimateinstrumentsavailableto them,beingitmandatorythedisclosureinofficialsites”(Brasil, 2011).Thedisclosureofinformationshallcontainatleast:

[...]II – records of any transfers or transfers of financial

resources;III–recordsofexpenses;IV–information con-cerningbiddingprocedures,includingtherespectivenotices and results, as well as all contracts; V – general data for monitoringprograms,actions,projectsandworksofbodies andentities;andVI–answerstosociety’sfrequentlyasked questions(Brasil,2011).

Passivetransparencyisoneinwhichtheinformationismade availableaccordingtothedemandsofsociety.Thearticle10of theLAImentionsthat“anyinterestedpartymaysubmitrequest foraccesstoinformationtobodiesandentitiesreferredtoinart. 1ofthisLaw,byanylegitimatemeans,andtheapplicationmust containtheidentificationoftheapplicantandthespecification ofthe requiredinformation.”Fortheapplication ofart.10of LAI,thegovernmentalentityshouldconsider:

§1stForaccesstoinformationofpublicinterest,the iden-tificationoftheapplicantmaynotcontainrequirementsthat hinder the request; §2nd The bodies and entities of pub-lic power must enable alternative waysto forward access requeststhroughtheirofficialwebsitesontheInternet;and§

3rdanyrequirementsfordeterminingreasonsfortherequest forinformationofpublicinterestareforbidden.

Thearticle11oftheLawstatesthat“thepublicbodyorentity mustauthorize or grantimmediate access toinformation”.If immediateaccessisnotpossible,§1 ofart.11advocatesthat thebodyorentityreceivingtherequestshall,withinaperiodnot exceedingtwenty(20)days:

I–communicatethedate,placeandwaytoperformthequery, performthereproductionorobtainthecertificate;II–statethe reasons,defactoordejure,fortherefusalofallorpartofthe intendedaccess;orIII–reportthatitdoesnothavethe infor-mation,indicate,ifpossible,thebodyorentitywhichholds suchinformation,orevenforwardtheapplicationtothatbody orentity,notifyingtheinterestedpartyofthesubmissionof his/herinformationrequest.

With the Information andCommunication Technologies – ICT,especiallythe Internet, the dutyof passive transparency oftheState,mechanismbywhichacitizenrequestsaccessto information,canbewidelyusedbypublicpower,ensuringmore rapidandlessbureaucratizedresponses(Silvaetal.,2013).The spreadofICTenables,therefore,theimplementationof instru-mentsinordertomakemoreefficientgovernmentmanagement. ItsspreadtomanysectorsoftheState,suchastheLegislative andExecutivePowers,aimsatthesamegoals:greaterefficiency andtransparency(Raupp&Pinho,2011).

The discussion on transparency of government actions is associated, therefore, to the rapid growth and technological developmentofcomputerandcommunicationdeviceindustries

(Akutsu&Pinho,2002).Fortheauthors,thecitizencanaccess thisinformationusingthe Internet,whichallowsaccess from anywhereintheworld,24haday,andwhichmightbeoneof the most effective tools to build a moreeffective democracy (Akutsu &Pinho, 2002).Most governmentbodies havenow homepages,providinginformationonpolicies,projectsand gov-ernmentactions,inadditiontoofferingservicestocitizens.This possibilityofinteractionandprovisionofgovernmentservices tothesociety,knownase-government,constitutesaninstrument toassistthegovernmenttoperformitsfunctionsinanintegrated, efficientandtransparentmanner,providingitamoredemocratic character,orientedtothecitizens.However,itisnoteworthythat ICTcanfacilitatetransparencyandparticipation,butitisunable to banthe existence of democratic deficit andaccountability itself(Cruzetal.,2012).

DespitethefactthatmodernICTmakesitpossible,building transparencytools(theso-calledelectronicgovernment, trans-parencywebsites,etc.)isapoliticalprocessthatiseffectivein thecontextofdemocratizationandtheneedforpolitical legit-imacy ofrulers.On theotherhand,the institutionalizationof governmenttransparencyalsorelatestothecountry’s integra-tionintotheglobaleconomyandtheconsequentrequirements forbalanceofpublicaccounts,necessaryforthesolvencyand credibility ofthe governmentforthefinancial market;which, inturn,triggersrestructuringandmodernizationactionsofthe stateapparatus(Loureiro,Teixeira,&Prado,2008).

Governments can use transparency websites to disclose a rangeof informationontheInternet,whichbecome available foraccesstosocietyasawhole.However,foramore transpar-entandefficientpublicadministration,itisnecessarytomove tolevelsbeyondthosesetbylegislation(Starosckyetal.,2014). Despitelegalobligations,transparencyiscloselyrelatedtothe “willingnesstoinform”orevenresponsibilitytobeaccountable as aresult of the responsibility for the management of pub-licresources.TransparencyplaystheroleofbringingtheState andsocietytogetherandexpandingthecitizen’slevelofaccess toinformationonpublicmanagement(Cruzetal.,2012).Itis seen as a necessary factor for accountabilityand, hence,for theconsolidationofdemocracy.Evenifitsimportanceisoften highlighted,itscausesarestillunknown,especiallywithinthe Braziliancontext(Zuccolotto&Teixeira,2014).

ornotofsuchinitiatives,itisworthsayingthattheresultsshowed that“[in]theunderdevelopednations,nothingseemedtowork as planned” (Santos et al., 2013).An important contribution totheunderstandingofthisissuehasbeenfoundinthe stud-iesbyFredRiggsaboutprismaticsocietiesontheideathatthe developmentresonatesdifferentlyinperipheralcountries.Thus, conventionaltheoreticalmodelsdevelopedtosocietiesbasedon “homogeneoussocialstructuresandprescribednorms”,when transferredtosocietiesbasedona“strongdegreeof heterogene-ity,formalism andoverlay,such modelswill beof little use” (Santosetal.,2013).NotaimingatexhaustingRiggs’s formu-lation,thistextwillfocusontheissueofformalism.According toRiggs (Ramos, 1983,p. 252), formalism isshown as “the dissociationbetweentheactualconductandtheprescribedrule whichissupposedtoregulateit.”AccordingtoRiggs, formal-ismisexpressedbythediscrepancybetweenwhatisprescribed andwhatisdescribed,betweenwhatispresentinthe constitu-tion,lawsandeveninthestatisticsandwhatactuallyhappens (Santos et al., 2013). It is as if there were a real world and aworldoflaws,of legalsystems.Failuretocomplywiththe rules,withintheformalistsystems,doesnotimplysanctionson violators.Thereisadiscrepancybetweenwhatthenorm pre-scribesandwhatactuallyoccursinsocialpracticesbyboththe governmentandsociety(Raupp&Pinho,2012).Theconceptof formalism,accordingtoRauppandPinho(2012),ishelpfulto graspthemeaningofhomepages,aninstrumentimportedfrom moredevelopedrealities,whicharebuilt,withintheBrazilian reality,muchmoreforthesakeofdisplayinganadjustmentto parametersofadvanceddemocracies,butwhich,inreality,are farfromeffectivelyfunctioning,sincetheydonotfindsupport insocialpracticeshistoricallyconstructedbysociety.

ForMachado-da-Silva (2003), insocieties such as Brazil, thereistheinfluenceofforeignmodels,whichareadoptedby decreeorbylawratherthanbasedonpredominantsocial behav-ior.Thechoiceof externalstandard, accordingtotheauthors, revealstheexpressionofformalism,whichbecomesan institu-tionalmechanismofregulationandlegalsanction.Formalism manifests itself when the rules cease to be observed, with-out mandatory sanctions. The case of websites, according to RauppandPinho(2012),manifestsanexpressionofformalism, sincethereistheimportationofacontrolmechanismofsociety over theexisting powers,whichisdistantfrom the realityof theBraziliansociety’sbehavior.Riggsviewedthreestagesof society’sevolution:traditional,transitionalandmodern(Santos et al., 2013). Brazil, even nowadays, not just at the time of Riggs’sformulation,isincluded inthetransitionalstage;it is notmodernyet,butitisstilltraditional,asseenbelow.

Itisbelievedthatthedistancebetweenthebehaviorof gov-ernment officials andlegal transparency requirements isalso basedonpatrimonialistelements,duetothereluctanceto dis-closeinformation.ForAkutsuandPinho(2002),thepotential of the Internet to enable the effective exerciseof citizenship shouldbeconsideredinthelightofstructuralfeaturesof soci-ety andofthe StateinBrazil, such aspatrimonialism. Based onWeber,patrimonialismmeanstheinabilityorreluctanceof the prince, to distinguish betweenthe public and the private spheres(BresserPereira,1997).Schwartzman(1988)hasargued

that Brazilcan bebetter explainedwithin aWeberian frame-work ratherthan aMarxist one, considering the existence of components based on traditional leaders, still powerful, who do not follow what is dictated by class structures and mod-ern societies.Forthe author,modernpatrimonialregimes are calledneo-patrimonialists,whichisnotsimplysurvivalof tra-ditionalstructures,butacurrentformofpoliticaldominationby asocialstratumwithnopropertyandthathasnosocialhonor basedonmerit.Theauthoralsoarguesthatitiswithina Webe-rian framework that onecan see that the BrazilianState has as itspredominanthistoricalcharacteristicitsneo-patrimonial dimension.

Theresistanceofpatrimonialismcanbeobserved,whichis able toabsorb modernizingchanges inBraziliansociety. The neo-patrimonialism is able not only to give life to patrimo-nialism,but also,soit seems,tostrengthen itself,evenwhen theeconomicsituationundergoesconsiderablechanges(Pinho, 1998).Thus,theproblemisnotoftechnology,butofpolitical culture,ofpoliticaldevelopment.Thereisalotoftechnology, eventhoughitcanandshouldbeexpanded,butlittle democ-racy,becausethetechnologythatcouldbeusedfordemocratic improvement isnotaimedatdoingso(Pinho,2008).Inother words, it isimplanted whatis most modernandadvancedin relationtothelaw,butmorestructuralcharacteristics of soci-etyandtheStateitselfconspireagainsttheeffectivenessofthe law.

Inrelationtothat,itseemsappropriatetoassertthat patrimo-nialisminstillsitselfinseveralaspectsoftheBrazilianpolitical life. Thus,inadditiontogenerating “a promiscuous relation-shipbetween(whatshouldbe)publicandprivatespace”,where publicspace,seenasthe“extensionofprivatespace”,becomes “noman’sland, assetstobe capturedor goodswhichcanbe dilapidated” (Sorj,2001,p.31).Suchpersistent phenomenon oftheBrazilianreality,giventhisconfiguration,alsoaffectsthe application ofthelaw.Thus,“thefeelingofimpunityandthe arroganceofthedominantgroupsconvergetoweakenthe for-mationofapublicspaceandstrengthenanattitudeofcontempt towardthelaw”(Sorj,2001,p.31).And,here,thereisan inver-sion. If,ingeneral, “customsbecome laws andlaws become costoms.InBrazil,thecustomisnottotakethelawsseriously” (Sorj,2001,p.31).Thatistosay,thelawexists,itisestablished, butittakesalongwayforthelawtobeactuallyapplied,tosee whetheritwillactually“catchon”,orwhetheritwillbetaken seriously.Thereseemstobetheawarenessofsomecomfortin notfollowingthelaw,ensuredbytheineffectivenessofthe appli-cationofthelaw,theso-calledenforcement,avitalcomponent foraccountability.

Methodologicalprocedures

resources)tobuildmoredevelopedwebsites,even contemplat-ingtheissueofaccountability.Asecond reasonrelatestothe factthatthecontactwithacitycouncilmemberinlargercities, whenthereisany,ismorevirtualthanlive,andwhatwouldbe presentedtocivilsocietyliveshallbedisclosedonthewebsites, andthedigitalmediaisresponsibleforwelcomingsuggestions andansweringcitizens’questions(Raupp&Pinho,2013a).The thirdreasonrelatestothefactthatthisgroupofmunicipalities includesmoststatecapitalsand,accordingtoRaupp(2014b), inthecapitals,thereistheexpectationthatthecomputer facil-ityprocesses inthe city councilsbe older andmore mature, providingcouncilorsadequateinfrastructure.Thenameofthe municipalities,populationsizeandelectronicaddressofthecity councilsareshowninTable1.

Considering the option to investigate municipalities with populations greater than 300,000, we ended up with 79 city councils,basedontheCensus(2010)oftheBrazilianInstitute of Geography andStatistics – IBGE.The addresses of elec-tronicwebsiteswereidentifiedonFebruary2nd,2015,basedon Google;however,theelectronicaddressofonecitycouncilwas notfound.

After identifying the municipalities and the electronic addressesoftheircitycouncils,thestageofdatacollectionwas started.Basedonthethemepassivetransparency,inwhichthe citizenmakesarequestforinformationtoagovernmentalentity, wedesignedasingleapplicationtobeforwardedtothecity coun-cils,withthefollowingcontent:“Consideringtheassumptions ofLaw No.12,527/2011,Irequestalistof allcontractswith awaiverofbiddingin2014,withdetailsofvalueandmodeof waiverofthebiddingprocess.”Thisisarelevantissue,which candirectthewaybywhichpartoftheexpensesisincurredby citycouncilsandwhichhasbeentheobjectofrecurring trans-gressionsoflaw,ingeneral,inallthespheresoftherespublica. TherequestwassenttothecitycouncilsonFebruary6thand 7th,2015.Itwaspossibletoforwardtherequestto68councils, usinganelectronicformfor38ofthemande-mail(obtainedin theelectronicwebsite)for30.For11citycouncils,itwasnot possibletoforwardtherequestduetoproblemswiththewebsite. The collected data were analyzed using the descriptive analysis technique, which, according to Contradiopoulos, Champagne,Potvin,Denis,andBoyle,1994,servestoexplain the behavior of avariable, inthiscase the (un)fulfillment of passivetransparency,inagivenpopulation:thecitycouncilsof municipalitieswithapopulationof300,000inhabitantsormore. Electronicspreadsheetswereusedtotabulatethedata.

Theconstructionoftheresearchentailssomelimitations.The first onereferstothe selected cases, conducting the research findingstotheempirical objectinvestigated, without general-izationstoothercitycouncilsorentitiesfromotherspheresin Brazil.The second limitationis relatedtothe lackof studies onthesubject,especiallyrelatedtopassivetransparency, mak-ingitdifficulttocompareresultstootherreferences.Thethird limitationisrelatedtothespeedchangesof ICTandthevery informationandservicesavailableinthewebsites,i.e.,thedata indicatetherealityofthecollectionperiod.Inaddition,thereis thefactthatfewstudiesaredevotedtotheworkofthemunicipal legislature,totherulesthatdeterminetheprocessofinteraction

betweenthe executiveandlegislativepowers,andtohow the actionsofthepoliticalactorsofthelocallegislatureareguided (Kerbauy,2005).

Results

Theresultsidentifiedthreegroupsintheanalyzedcity coun-cils:thefirstreferstothecitycouncilswhereitwasnotpossible tosubmittheapplication;thesecondconcernsthecitycouncils towhichtheapplicationwassubmitted,buttherewasnoreply ortheresponsewasinsufficient;thethirdoneencompassesthe citycouncilstowhichtheapplicationwassubmittedandthere wassatisfactoryresponse.Thenamesofthecitycouncilswere codedtopreserveanonymity.Aftertheindividualanalysis,an assessmentofthe(in)transparencyintheinvestigatedwebsites wascarriedout.

Theinfringementatthesource

TheLAI,initsart.10,§1,statesthat“thebodiesand enti-tiesofpublicpowershouldenableNAoptionforroutingaccess requeststhroughtheirofficialwebsitesontheInternet.”Outof the79investigatedcitycouncils,11didnotmeetthedetermined criteria:in3websites(T2,J3andV3),itwasnotpossibletofind anelectronicformand/orcontacte-mailtoforwardtherequest; thee-mailsenttotwocitycouncils(S1andG2)returnedtwice; in2websites(O1andF3),anelectronicformwasfound, how-ever,itwasnotpossibletosendit;intwootherwebsites (A3 andS3),wecouldnotaccessthepagecontent;1website(H2) wasbeingdeveloped;andthee-mailaddressofonecitycouncil wasnotfound(A4).Itissurprisingthatthisgroupincludesfive Brazilianstatecapitalsandothercitycouncilslocatedinlarge citiesinmoredevelopedregions.Inotherwords,itshouldnot beexpectedtofindproblemsoftechnologicalresource limita-tionsinthesecitycouncils.Consideringthe5BrazilianRegions, thereare2municipalitiesintheNorth,7intheNortheast,and 2 in the Southeast.In this group,there areno municipalities intheSouthandMidwest.Noteworthyistheconcentrationof municipalitiesintheNortheast(63.64%ofthegroup),although it should be highlighted that out of the totalset (79 munici-palities),thisregionhas17(21.52%)municipalities.The fact thattheNortheastRegiondoesnotdisplaythelargestnumber ofmunicipalitiesinthewholesetcouldleadtotheassumption thatitshouldnotpresentthelargestnumberofmunicipalities inthisgroup.Sincethisisagroupofmunicipalitiesthatdonot havechannelsforrequestinginformation,itisassumedthatthe technologicaldevelopmentisnotasintenseintheNortheastas comparedtotheotherregions.

Table1

Municipalities,populationsizeandelectronicaddressofthecitycouncils.

N. Municipality Populationa _{Electronicaddress}b

1 SãoPaulo–SP 11,253,503 <www.camara.sp.gov.br> 2 RiodeJaneiro–RJ 6,320,446 <www.camara.rj.gov.br> 3 Salvador–BA 2,675,656 <www.cms.ba.gov.br> 4 Brasília–DF 2,570,160 <www.cl.df.gov.br> 5 Fortaleza–CE 2,452,185 <www.cmfor.ce.gov.br> 6 BeloHorizonte–MG 2,375,151 <www.cmbh.mg.gov.br> 7 Manaus–AM 1,802,014 <www.cmm.am.gov.br> 8 Curitiba–PR 1,751,907 <www.cmc.pr.gov.br> 9 Recife–PE 1,537,704 <www.recife.pe.leg.br> 10 PortoAlegre–RS 1,409,351 <www.camarapoa.rs.gov.br> 11 Belém–PA 1,393,399 <www.cmb.pa.gov.br> 12 Goiânia–GO 1,302,001 <www.camara.go.gov.br> 13 Guarulhos–SP 1,221,979 <www.camaraguarulhos.sp.gov.br> 14 Campinas–SP 1,080,113 <www.campinas.sp.leg.br> 15 SãoLuís–MA 1,014,837 <www.saoluis.ma.leg.br>

16 SãoGonc¸alo–RJ 999,728 <www.camaradesaogoncalo.rj.gov.br> 17 Maceió–AL 932,748 <www.camarademaceio.al.gov.br> 18 DuquedeCaxias–RJ 855,048 <www.cmdc.rj.gov.br>

19 Teresina–PI 814,230 <www.teresina.pi.leg.br> 20 Natal–RN 803,739 <www.cmnat.rn.gov.br> 21 NovaIguac¸u–RJ 796,257 <www.cmni.rj.gov.br> 22 CampoGrande–MS 786,797 <www.camara.ms.gov.br> 23 SãoBernardodoCampo–SP 765,463 <www.camarasbc.sp.gov.br> 24 JoãoPessoa–PB 723,515 <www.cmjp.pb.gov.br> 25 SantoAndré–SP 676,407 <www.cmsandre.sp.gov.br> 26 Osasco–SP 666,740 <www.camaraosasco.sp.gov.br> 27 JaboatãodosGuararapes–PE 644,620 <www.camarajaboatao.pe.gov.br> 28 SãoJosédosCampos–SP 629,921 <www.camarasjc.sp.gov.br> 29 RibeirãoPreto–SP 604,682 <www.camararibeiraopreto.sp.gov.br> 30 Uberlândia–MG 604,013 <www.camarauberlandia.mg.gov.br> 31 Contagem–MG 603,442 <www.cmc.mg.gov.br>

32 Sorocaba–SP 586,625 <www.camarasorocaba.sp.gov.br> 33 Aracaju–SE 571,149 <www.cmaju.se.gov.br>

34 FeiradeSantana–BA 556,642 <www.camarafeiradesantana.ba.gov.br> 35 Cuiabá–MT 551,098 <www.camaracba.mt.gov.br>

36 JuizdeFora–MG 516,247 <www.camarajf.mg.gov.br> 37 Joinville–SC 515,288 <www.cvj.sc.gov.br> 38 Londrina–PR 506,701 <www.cml.pr.gov.br> 39 Niterói–RJ 487,562 <www.camaraniteroi.rj.gov.br> 40 Ananindeua–PA 471,980 <www.cma.pa.gov.br> 41 BelfordRoxo–RJ 469,332 <www.cmbr.rj.gov.br> 42 CamposdosGoytacazes–RJ 463,731 <www.camaracampos.rj.gov.br>

43 SãoJoãodeMeriti–RJ 458,673 <www.camaradesaojoaodemeriti.rj.gov.br> 44 AparecidadeGoiânia–GO 455,657 <www.camaradeaparecida.go.gov.br> 45 CaxiasdoSul–RS 435,564 <www.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br> 46 PortoVelho–RO 428,527 <www.portovelho.ro.leg.br> 47 Florianópolis–SC 421,240 <www.cmf.sc.gov.br>

48 Santos–SP 419,400 <www.camarasantos.sp.gov.br/publico> 49 Mauá–SP 417,064 <www.camaramaua.sp.gov.br> 50 VilaVelha–ES 414,586 <www.cmvv.es.gov.br>

51 Serra–ES 409,267 <www.camaraserra.web470.uni5.net/> 52 SãoJosédoRioPreto-SP 408,258 <www.riopreto.sp.leg.br>

53 Macapá–AP 398,204 <www.cmm.ap.gov.br> 54 MogidasCruzes–SP 387,779 <www.cmmc.sp.gov.br> 55 Diadema–SP 386,089 <www.cmdiadema.sp.gov.br> 56 CampinaGrande–PB 385,213 <www.camaracg.pb.gov.br> 57 Betim–MG 378,089 <www.camarabetim.mg.gov.br> 58 Olinda–PE 377,779 <www.camaraolinda.pe.gov.br> 59 Jundiaí–SP 370,126 <www.jundiai.sp.leg.br>

60 Carapicuíba–SP 369,584 <www.camaracarapicuiba.sp.gov.br> 61 Piracicaba–SP 364,571 <www.camarapiracicaba.sp.gov.br> 62 MontesClaros–MG 361,915 <www.cmmoc.mg.gov.br> 63 Maringá–PR 357,077 <www.cmm.pr.gov.br>

Table1(Continued)

N. Municipality Populationa Electronicaddressb

65 Bauru–SP 343,937 <www.camarabauru.sp.gov.br> 66 RioBranco–AC 336,038 <www.riobranco.ac.leg.br/cmrb2013> 67 Anápolis–GO 334,613 <www.camaraanapolis.go.gov.br> 68 SãoVicente–SP 332,445 <www.camarasaovicente.sp.gov.br> 69 Pelotas–RS 328,275 <www.camarapel.rs.gov.br> 70 Vitória–ES 327,801 <www.cmv.es.gov.br> 71 Caucaia–CE 325,441 <www.cmcaucaia.ce.gov.br> 72 Canoas–RS 323,827 <www.camaracanoas.rs.gov.br> 73 Itaquaquecetuba–SP 321,770 <www.camaraitaquaquecetuba.sp.gov.br> 74 Franca–SP 318,640 <www.camarafranca.sp.gov.br> 75 Caruaru–PE 314,912 <www.camaracaruaru.pe.gov.br/2013> 76 PontaGrossa–PR 311,611 <www.cmpg.pr.gov.br>

77 Blumenau–SC 309,011 <www.camarablu.sc.gov.br> 78 VitóriadaConquista–BA 306,866 <www.camaravc.com.br/site> 79 Paulista–PE 300,466 Notfound

Source:

a _{BasedondatafromIBGE(CensoDemográfico,2010).} b _{DatafromGoogle.}

weresent,butwerereturnedtosender.Citycouncilswithno websites,withwebsitesundermaintenance,or withno possi-bilityofaccessinfringeeventheactivetransparency,because, accordingtoart.8,governmentbodies“shouldusealllegitimate meansandinstrumentsavailabletothem,withmandatory dis-closureonofficialwebsites”.Thisalreadyshowsthestateofthe artoftheempiricalobjectinvestigatedhere.

Weobservedthatthesewebsitesdonothaveadequate tech-nological resources, since they do not display the necessary conditionstoallowforinformationrequest.Itispossibletosay thattechnologyisaprobleminthisgroup,sinceitisnota mech-anismbywhichthecitizenrequestsaccesstoinformation(Silva etal.,2013).ThissituationseemstocontradictPinho’s argu-ment(2008)that there isenough technology,but notenough democracy.However, itcanalso besuggested thehypothesis thattechnology,inthiscasethe lackofit,canbeanobstacle fordemocracy. Inotherwords,topreventthe achievementof democracy,technologicalconstraintsarecreated,beingiteasier togiveexplanationsontechnologicallimitationsratherthanon limitationsontheexerciseofdemocracy.Thereisnotany con-structionof passive transparencytools made possiblebyICT (Loureiro et al., 2008). Similarly, it is difficult to figure out progresstolevelsbeyondthosesetbythelawwhenthe govern-mententitydoesnotmeeteventheminimumcriterion:thelegal requirement(Starosckyetal.,2014.).Thewebsitesdoexist,but theirexistenceseemsonlytomeetarequirementofthe moder-nity,necessarytolegitimizethecitycouncilsinrelationtothe dominanttechnologicalstandard(Raupp&Pinho,2013b).

Theinfringementcontinues

Thesecondgroupofcitycouncilsincludesthosetowhichthe requestwassubmitted,buttherewasnoreplyoritwas insuffi-cient,consideringthetimeperiodestablishedbylaw.Sending therequestwassuccessfulto68citycouncils.Outofthese,56 failedtocomplywithlegalrequirementsanddemonstratedlack ofabilitytofacilitatepassivetransparency,since:

- 47citycouncilsdidnotreply,B1,E1,F1,I1,J1,K1,L1,M1, N1,P1,Q1,R1,T1,U1,V1,W1,X1,Y1,A2,B2,D2,F2,I2, J2,M2,N2,O2,P2,R2,S2,U2,Y2,Z2,B3,C3,D3,E3,K3, L3,N3O3P3,Q3,U3,W3,X3andZ3;

- 08citycouncilscontactedus,buttheydidnotrespondtothe request:A1,G1,Z1,C2,L2,Q2,V2,andR3;

- 01citycouncilrespondedunsatisfactorily:E2.

Regardingthe BrazilianRegions, therewere4 municipali-tiesintheNorth,9intheNortheast,7intheSouth,31inthe Southeast, and5 municipalitiesin theMidwest. Thisset vir-tuallyprovidesamosaicoftheentirecountry, obviouslywith moreemphasisandparticipationofmunicipalitiesinthe South-east,whereurbanizationoccursmoreintensely,butitdoesnot avoidtakingplaceinallregions.Evendisplayingchannelsfor informationrequest,thesemunicipalitiesdidnotrespondtothe requestmade,whichemphaticallydemonstratesthatitis use-lesstohavetechnologicalapparatus,incompliancewithdigital modernity, if itis notused for a higherpurpose, inthiscase contributingtodeveloptransparencychannels.

Evenhavingthenecessarytechnologyandthepossibilityto forwardtherequestforinformation,thenumberofcitycouncils thatdidnotreturnthesubmittedrequestissignificant.Asmaller setofcitycouncils(08)contactedusafterreceivingtherequest, sayingtheywouldprovidetheinformation;however,theydid notforwardthereplywithinthetimelimitsetbytheLAI.Itis noteworthythat,amongthecitycouncilsthatreplied,butsentno laterresponse,manydemandedidentificationwithpersonal doc-umentssothatinformationcouldbemadeavailable.Someeven requestedthattherequestbemadeinloco,atthecitycouncil’s headquarters.Thesearepossiblebarrierstoaccessinformation. Asfaras thecity councilwhoseresponsewasregardedas unsatisfactory,theysentthefollowingtext: “Theresponsewe havegottenfromtheProcurementDepartmentisthattheirduty istopublishintheDiárioOficial(...)intheLegislative

sec-tion.Therefore,ifyouhavesomuchinterest,please,consultthe

informationcouldbeaccessedintheDiárioOficial.However, consideringthepublicationofoneyear(2014),thereweretoo manypagesthatshouldbereadtofindtherequestedinformation. Wearguethatbeingtransparentalsomeansfacilitatingaccess toinformationandmakingitavailablesothatitiseasytolocate, asstatedbyNetoetal.(2007).

Inthissetofcitycouncils,websitestakeanelectronicwall profile,buttheyshouldbeaspacefortransparencyinstead.They respondtoarequest,aboostofmodernity,expressedbya dom-inanttechnologicaldemand,buttheydonotcontribute tothe developmentoftransparency (Raupp&Pinho,2013b).There isthe understandingthat the lawis recentandtheycanhave theexcuse thatthecity councilshavenothadenoughtimeto adjustthemselvesyet.However,thisisnotthefirstlegislation torequiretransparency,anditisnotatallanewissue.The Fis-calResponsibilityLawandtheTransparencyLaw,passedafew yearsago,alreadydisplaysomeofthedemandsestablishedby the Access toInformation Law (Raupp &Pinho,2014).The problemofunsuitabilityandinfringementoftheLawseemsto bebetter explainedbyhistoricalpoliticalcomponents andby politicalculturethanbytechnologicalreasons(Raupp&Pinho, 2013b).

Whofollowsit?

Amongthecitycouncilsthatrespondedsatisfactorily(12), 09providedtheinformationimmediately,asthefollowing:C1, H1,K2,W2,X2,G3,H3,I3andT3.AstheLAIdoesnotspecify adeadlinefor“immediateaccesstoinformation”,wetookinto accountthosewhorespondedwithinthefirst05days.Theother citycouncils(03)providedtheinformationsometimebetween thefirst 05days andthe legaldeadline,asthe following:D1, M3,andY3.

In the analysis byregion, thereis onemunicipalityinthe Northeast,4intheSouth,6intheSoutheastandoneinthe Mid-west.Inthisgroup,thereisnomunicipalityintheNorth.The SouthandSoutheastRegionstogetheraccountfor10 municipal-ities,representing83.33%ofthemunicipalitiesthatresponded satisfactorilytotheresearchers’request.Itisasmallgroupof city councilsthatmeet thedemandsfor passive transparency. Amongthese,somecasesdeservemention.TheC1citycouncil notonlyprovidedareportcontainingthelistofallcontractswith biddingwaiverin2014,withdetailsofvalueandbiddingprocess mode,buttheyalsohighlightedsituationsthatcommonlytrigger biddingwaiverinthecitycouncil.TheD1citycouncilalready preparesanannualreportcontainingthecontracts,detailingthe specificationsofeachone.TheI3citycounciloffersa“Citizen InformationService”,which,despiterequestingtheapplicant’s registration,providedtheinformationinaspecificarea.Sucha resultseemstoindicateasurrealsituationinwhichthereisan inversionbetweentheruleandtheexception.Thesmallestpart oftheinvestigatedobjectscomplieswiththelaw.Thus,doesthe ruleconfirmtheexception?Ontheotherhand,theresultmay alsoindicatethat,ifthesecitycouncilsrespondedtotherequest, thenitdoesnotseemimpossibletomeetthelaw,whichleads toquestionstronglythereasonsfortheothercitycouncilsnot tomeet, or partiallyor poorly meetthe law. Amongthe city

Table2

Synthesisofthepassive(in)transparencyincitycouncils.

Citycouncilgroups N. Percentage Nopossibilityofsendingtherequest 11 13.92% Noreplyorinsufficientresponsetotherequest 56 70.89% Satisfactoryresponsetotherequest 12 15.19%

Total 79 100.00%

Source:Researchdata(2015).

councilsthatcomplywiththelaw,threearelocatedin Brazil-iancapitals. Othercitycouncilsarelocatedinlargecitiesand inmoredevelopedregions.Asimilarsituationwasidentifiedin the groupwhoseinfringementoccurredatthesource,as seen earlier.

Synthesisofthepassive(in)transparencyincitycouncils

The empirical evidence presented in the three previous sections reveals an inventory, not exciting at all, of the pas-sive (in)transparencyincitycouncils,whichissummarizedin Table2.

AccordingtoTable2,68(84.81%)citycouncilsof munic-ipalities with a population over 300,000 inhabitants present passiveintransparency.Thesearedistributedasfollows:for11 (13.92%) city councils, it was not even possible tosend the requestsimplyforlackofaform;for56(70.89%)citycouncils, sendingtherequestwaspossible,however,therewasnoreply or theresponsewasinsufficient.Only12(15.19%)city coun-cilssatisfactorilyrespondedtotherequest.Thefindingsofthis researchdonotconfirmtheSilva,HochandSantos’s assump-tion (2013)that,withICT,especiallytheInternet,thedutyof passivetransparencyoftheState,mechanismbywhichcitizens requestaccesstoinformation,iswidelyexercisedbypublic pow-ers, guaranteeing morerapidandlessbureaucraticresponses. Thisleadstoconfirmingtheneedtoseparatetechnologyfrom the exerciseof political participation andtransparency. As it wasseen,insomecases,thenecessarytechnologyisnoteven present.Inothers,themajority,theresponsesarenotprovided or,whentheyare,theyareinsufficienttomeettherequestthat wasformulatedandforwardedtothecitycouncils.Thus,there seemstobeatechnologicalmind(whenthereis)andapolitical mind,theheadthatthinksofmeetingthedemandsofcivil soci-etytowardincreasingtransparency.Infewcases,asseen,these mindsarealigned,establishingadialogandproximity.

observedinthisempirical investigation,thelaw “strugglesto catchon”,itdoesnotseemtobetakenseriously,aspointedout bySorj(2001).Ononehand,thereisagroupwherenoteven minimaltechnologicalrequirementsareimplanted,anddespite beingasmall group,it isrelevant, consideringthesize ofthe municipalitiestowhichtheyrelate.Ontheotherhand,thereis alsoasmallgroupofcitycouncilswherethelawhaseffectively “caughton”.Inthemiddlebetweenthesetwoextremes,there isawidegrayareawith70.89%ofthecitycouncilswherethe lawseemstofail,occupyingaplacebetweenthesituation of “catchingon”andnotbeingtakenseriously.Thinkingaboutthe metaphoroftheignitionofacar,wecansaythatitmightstart ornot.So,complyingwiththe lawdependsonmanyfactors, suchas,amongothers,thedevelopmentofacivicculture,rising educationlevels,amoreactiveroleof civilsociety,increased enforcement(oneofthedimensionsofaccountability),andthe abilitytopunishthe infringers.Seeingallthat as anongoing process,muchisstillopeninBraziliansociety.

Conclusion

Thestudyaimedtoinvestigatecompliancewiththe require-mentsofpassivetransparencybycitycouncilsofmunicipalities witha populationof 300,000inhabitants or more. Most city councils(84.81%)infringethelegalrequirementsandare pas-sivelyintransparent.Fewcity councils(15.19%)satisfactorily responded the submitted request. Thus, the gap between the transparencyrequirementsimposedongovernmentbodiesand theeffectivecompliancebytheirleadersisnotaprerogativeof activetransparency,butitalsooccurswithpassivetransparency, asthisresearchhasshowed.And,asanattempttoanswerthe inquiriesmadeatthebeginningofthisarticle,it isnot possi-ble yet tosay that passive transparency is away tomitigate thefailureofgovernmentsinrelationtotransparencyofactions takeninpublicadministration.Moreover,itcanbestatedthat, as it happenswithactive transparency,there isalso infringe-mentinrelationtopassivetransparency.Thedataobtained in thisresearchseemtobeevenmoreworryingwhenone consid-ersthattheinvestigationinvolvedthecitycouncilsofthelargest municipalities,expectedtobethemostdevelopedoneswithin thenationalcontext.

Itis noteworthy that thelow level of compliancewiththe passive requirements can be explained by the characteristics offormalism andpatrimonialism,discussed inthetheoretical foundation. In addition to formalism and the persistent pat-rimonialism, it seems to be possible to make the following reflection:passivetransparencycanbeseenasonefoundina moredeveloped,moreparticipatorysociety,whichisnotthecase ofBraziliansociety.Ontheotherhand,byincorporatingBehn’s reflections,seenabove,showingthedifficultiesofbuildingand operatingaccountability,ofwhichtransparencyisacomponent, itcouldserveasa“consolation”,butitalsoservesasawarning havingaccountability(andmorespecificallytransparency) con-taminatedbypatrimonialismandformalism,i.e.,morestructural andresilientfeaturesoftheBraziliansocialconstruction.

Thus,thestateentitiesaresatisfiedtomeettherequirements of the law in general, as it is the case of the LAI. The law

weighs like Damocles’ sword and, for better or worse, there isanattempttocomplywithit.But,whatisnotestablishedby thelaw,whatderivesfromcivilsociety’sinitiative,canbeseen asextra,additionalwork,whichthesestateentitiestrytoavoid. Ontheotherhand,weidentifiedmeetingthedemandsofcivil society in15.19% of cases.Within apessimistic perspective, thesedatarevealascenariothat isnotencouragingfor trans-parencyconcerningthelawinBrazil.Ontheotherhand,within arealisticperspective,basedontheeffectiveknowledgeofhow thingsworkinBrazil,thesedatamayindicatetheexistenceof amovementtowardpassivetransparency.

Thus,thereislittlepassivetransparencyconsideringthe avail-able technology, showing, once again,that technology is not an obstacle to transparency. Even being demanded by legal requirements, local city councils infringe a series of regula-tions concerning the transparencyof government actions. On thatpath,thestudystandsoutfordiagnosingthecurrentsituation of passivetransparencyincity councilsof thelargest munici-palities,revealinghowthelaw,ingeneral,mightbeinfringed, nottakenseriously.Atthesametime,sharingamoreoptimistic thought,itshowsthataprocessofcompliancewiththelawand citizenshipthroughpassivetransparencymightbeinprogress, which shouldbe seen as abearer of goodnews inBrazilian historicaltrajectory.

Furtherresearch,withwiderrangeofmunicipalitiesandother pointsofview,forexample,inordertoidentifythefactorsthat explain the ability of the local administrations of the largest municipalitiestobuildpassivetransparency,arestrongly encour-aged. Thatwill allowfor abetter understandingof thisissue withinthisfieldofknowledge.Itishopedthatthefindingsof thisresearchcaninspirenewtheoreticalandempiricalefforts, sinceitis,asthetitleitselfclaims,afirstdiagnosis.

Conflictsofinterest

Theauthorsdeclarenoconflictsofinterest.

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